Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

An individual went to a police station to report being assaulted, and officers responded to take his statement. While at the hospital, where the individual had been transported, officers observed that he was intoxicated and later placed him in custody for transport to a detoxification facility under Oregon’s civil detox statutes. The individual had a backpack with him. During an inventory of his property, an officer opened the closed, opaque backpack and discovered a butterfly knife, which led to a criminal history check and a subsequent arrest for possession of a restricted weapon.Initially, the Washington County Circuit Court denied a motion to suppress evidence from the backpack. On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals upheld both the seizure and the inventory search of the backpack, reasoning that, under established case law, police could open closed, opaque containers likely to contain valuables if done pursuant to a lawful inventory policy. The Court of Appeals relied heavily on its prior decisions, concluding the inventory search was permissible under the relevant county ordinance and inventory policy.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case. It held that, under Article I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution, inventory searches of closed, opaque containers that do not announce their contents are not permitted when a person is taken into custody on a civil detox hold, even if executed under a valid, non-discretionary inventory policy. The court emphasized that in the civil detox context, compliance with an inventory policy does not alone render such a search reasonable; privacy interests and the non-criminal nature of the detention require a higher level of protection. The Supreme Court of Oregon reversed the decisions of the lower courts and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Wilcox" on Justia Law

The petitioner was serving two probation terms following no contest pleas to computer crime, burglary, and criminal mischief. As a condition of probation, he was prohibited from possessing “weapons, firearms or dangerous animals.” During a scheduled probation meeting, his officer noticed a knife handle protruding from his backpack. The knife was described as a nine-inch steak knife with a rounded tip. The officer arrested the petitioner and reported a probation violation, alleging that possession of the knife breached the weapons condition. The petitioner argued that the knife was an essential eating tool, not a weapon, given his unhoused status.At the Washington County Circuit Court probation violation hearing, the probation officer testified that “anything that can cause harm” was considered a weapon and that the office’s notice defined “all knives” as weapons. The petitioner argued that the statutory condition did not cover utility knives like steak knives. The trial court found a violation, concluding that the knife was clearly a weapon under the probation provision, and imposed a 30-day jail sentence without revoking probation. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment without opinion.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed whether possession of a steak knife constituted a violation of the probation weapons condition under ORS 137.540(1)(j). The court held that “weapons,” as used in the statute, refers only to instruments designed primarily for offensive or defensive combat or those reasonably recognized as having substantially the same character—not to tools designed primarily for utility, even if such tools could be used as weapons. The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the circuit court, remanding the case for further factual inquiry consistent with this interpretation. View "State v. Cortes" on Justia Law

The defendant was accused of unauthorized use of a U-Haul truck. She had rented the truck in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and drove it to Oregon, where she lived in it for several weeks. The truck was later reported stolen and found with the defendant inside. The prosecution's case relied on a photograph of a rental agreement that purportedly bore the defendant’s signature, indicating a one-day rental. The defendant, however, denied signing the contract, claimed she was not shown the contract, and asserted that the signature was not hers. She also testified that she had rented the truck for 30 days and provided evidence that the U-Haul database only contained an unsigned version of the contract.After a first trial ended in a hung jury, the case was retried in Curry County Circuit Court. Before the retrial, the state sought to admit the photograph of the signed agreement, rather than the original document. The defendant objected, citing the best evidence rule under OEC 1002 and arguing that, under OEC 1003(1), a duplicate is inadmissible when a genuine question is raised about the authenticity of the original. The trial court ruled that the duplicate was admissible and allowed the photograph. The jury convicted the defendant. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the defendant’s denial of signing was insufficient to raise a “genuine question” as to authenticity.Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon held that a genuine question under OEC 1003(1) is raised when there is evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that the original is not authentic. The court found the defendant’s testimony and supporting evidence sufficient to raise such a question, making the admission of the photograph in error. The court further held the error was not harmless, as the photograph was central to the state’s case. The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the circuit court, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Blue" on Justia Law

The petitioner was arrested on December 21, 2019, on warrants issued by both Marion County and Clackamas County. The Marion County warrants were for alleged probation violations, while the Clackamas County warrant was based on new criminal charges. After pleading guilty in Clackamas County and being sentenced on March 11, 2020, the petitioner was transported to Department of Corrections (DOC) custody rather than to Marion County Jail, despite a court order for transport to Marion County to resolve the probation matters. During the subsequent 43-day period, the petitioner remained in DOC physical custody but was under the legal custody of Marion County Jail due to the unresolved probation violation warrants. On April 24, 2020, the Marion County Circuit Court revoked the petitioner’s probations and imposed a 60-month prison sentence, ordering credit for time served since December 21, 2019, including the period credited to the Clackamas County case.The Oregon Court of Appeals previously reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s decision, finding that the Marion County Circuit Court had authority under ORS 137.370(4) to grant presentence incarceration credit for the time the petitioner was held in custody, even though the time overlapped with the sentence imposed in Clackamas County. The appellate court agreed that the trial court had expressly ordered credit for the relevant period.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon, upon reconsideration, corrected a factual error regarding the petitioner’s physical location during the 43-day period but held that the petitioner’s legal custody by Marion County Jail was sufficient to constitute “time served in jail” under ORS 137.370(4). The court concluded that physical custody in a jail is not required for presentence incarceration credit if the sentencing court expressly orders such credit. The court adhered to its prior opinion as modified, allowing the credit as ordered. View "State ex rel Torres-Lopez v. Fahrion" on Justia Law

The case concerns a criminal defendant who was initially charged with second-degree murder by information and who, through counsel, invoked his statutory right to testify before the grand jury under ORS 132.320(12)(a). The defendant requested to appear in person before the grand jury, but the prosecutor stated that only remote testimony would be permitted. The defendant then moved the Douglas County Circuit Court for an order requiring his in-person appearance before the grand jury, arguing that he had an absolute statutory and constitutional right to do so.The Douglas County Circuit Court denied the defendant’s motion, reasoning that it lacked authority to dictate the manner in which the grand jury received testimony, other than ensuring the defendant’s rights were upheld. The court stayed the trial court proceedings pending appellate review but expressed uncertainty about its authority to stay the grand jury proceedings themselves. After the grand jury returned an indictment while the stay was in place, the defendant filed additional motions, including to dismiss the indictment, but the trial court declined to lift the stay to consider those motions.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the matter on a petition for a writ of mandamus. The court held that neither the prosecutor nor the defendant has unilateral authority to determine whether a defendant’s grand jury testimony must be in person or remote. Instead, the decision regarding the manner of witness testimony before the grand jury is, at least initially, for the grand jury itself to make, as provided by statute. The court concluded that the trial court did not have a nondiscretionary duty to order the defendant’s in-person appearance and therefore mandamus relief was not appropriate. The Supreme Court of Oregon dismissed the alternative writ of mandamus. View "State v. Wall" on Justia Law

A tenant rented a space on a landlord’s farm to park and live in her recreational vehicle (RV). The site lacked a sewage disposal system, and the tenant connected her RV’s wastewater port to a pipe that discharged raw sewage onto the ground. After the county health department cited the landlord for this violation, the landlord notified the tenant of lease termination for cause and initiated a forcible entry and detainer (FED) action to evict her. The tenant argued that her obligation to keep the premises clean and sanitary depended on the landlord’s duty to provide a sewage system. She also counterclaimed for damages, alleging the landlord failed to provide both a sewage system and safe drinking water.The Umatilla County Circuit Court ruled in favor of the landlord on both the eviction and the tenant’s counterclaims, awarding possession to the landlord. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the landlord’s failure to provide a sewage system did not excuse the tenant’s duty to keep the premises sanitary, and that the tenant failed to prove her counterclaims, particularly because she did not notify the landlord of the problems.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case. It held that the landlord’s failure to provide a sewage disposal system violated his statutory obligation to maintain the premises in a habitable condition. However, this did not excuse the tenant from her independent obligation to refrain from dumping sewage onto the ground. The tenant’s continued discharge of sewage constituted a violation that justified termination of the tenancy and eviction. Regarding the counterclaims, the court found the tenant could recover damages for the lack of a sewage system because the landlord already knew of the deficiency, but not for unsafe drinking water, as there was no evidence the landlord knew or should have known of that issue. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings. View "Jared v. Harmon" on Justia Law

The defendant and his then-wife, J, lived in Deschutes County, Oregon, and their marriage ended in divorce proceedings after J obtained a restraining order against the defendant. The criminal charges arose from two separate incidents: one in December 2016, when the defendant dragged J from their bedroom to the yard in freezing weather, and another in July 2017, when the defendant damaged J’s car with a power drill and made threatening statements. The December incident led to a second-degree kidnapping charge, while the July incident resulted in a menacing charge. The state also filed a motion in limine to limit certain evidence related to the divorce proceedings.The Deschutes County Circuit Court denied the defendant’s motions for judgment of acquittal on both charges and granted the state’s motion in limine in part, restricting argument about whether J gained a tactical advantage in the divorce from her allegations. The jury convicted the defendant of both kidnapping and menacing. On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed both convictions, though several judges dissented on aspects of the kidnapping and menacing rulings and the scope of the motion in limine.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case. It held that the evidence was insufficient to support the kidnapping conviction because the movement of J did not constitute taking her “from one place to another” as required by ORS 163.225(1)(a); specifically, the movement did not increase her isolation or restrict her freedom of movement in the manner contemplated by the statute. The court reversed the kidnapping conviction. However, the court affirmed the menacing conviction, finding that the defendant’s words and conduct were sufficient for a rational factfinder to conclude he intended to place J in fear of imminent serious physical injury. The court also affirmed the trial court’s ruling on the motion in limine. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "State v. Anderson" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged in a single indictment with multiple counts of sexual abuse involving two minor victims, A and M, who are cousins. The alleged conduct toward A spanned four years and involved repeated touching, while the conduct toward M consisted of two isolated incidents. The defendant moved to sever the charges relating to each victim, arguing that joinder would cause substantial prejudice, particularly because the evidence against M was weaker and the jury might improperly use the stronger evidence regarding A to convict on the charges involving M. The trial court denied the motion to sever, and the case proceeded to trial. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts involving A and one count involving M.On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to sever, finding that the defendant had not shown substantial prejudice beyond that inherent in joinder. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the mandatory 75-month Measure 11 sentence imposed for the conviction involving M, holding that it was unconstitutionally disproportionate under the Oregon Constitution.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed both issues. It held that the trial court erred in denying the motion to sever because the defendant had articulated a case-specific theory of substantial prejudice, supported by the record, as required by State v. Delaney. The Supreme Court clarified that when such a showing is made, the trial court must provide some remedy to address the prejudice. However, the error was deemed harmless as to the counts involving A, so those convictions were affirmed. The conviction involving M was reversed and remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court did not reach the sentencing issue in light of this disposition. The Court of Appeals’ decision was affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "State v. Hernandez-Esteban" on Justia Law

A worker alleged that he suffered a back injury while employed at a meat processing company. The employer’s workers’ compensation insurer investigated the claim and issued a written denial, stating that the injury was not work-related. The worker requested a hearing to challenge the denial. After this request, the insurer required the worker to undergo an independent medical examination (IME) by a physician of its choosing. The IME report supported the insurer’s denial, concluding that the worker’s preexisting condition, not a work injury, was the major cause of his disability. The worker’s own physician disagreed with the IME’s findings. The worker then requested authorization for a worker requested medical examination (WRME), citing the conflict between the IME and his physician’s opinion.The Workers’ Compensation Division’s Medical Resolution Team denied the WRME request, reasoning that the IME had been conducted after the insurer’s initial written denial. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) upheld both the denial of compensability and the denial of the WRME request, relying on the IME report as persuasive evidence. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed the ALJ’s decisions. The worker’s estate, after his death, pursued judicial review in the Oregon Court of Appeals, which reversed the Board’s denial of the WRME request and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the insurer’s denial was “based on” the IME report.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the statutory interpretation of ORS 656.325(1)(e). The court held that whether a denial of compensability “is based on” an IME report should be determined at the time the WRME request is decided, not at the time of the initial hearing request. Because the insurer relied on the IME report to defend its ongoing denial, the worker was entitled to a WRME. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, reversed the Workers’ Compensation Board, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Teitelman v. SAIF" on Justia Law

Two children, S and P, who are members of the Pit River Tribe, were the subject of juvenile dependency proceedings in Oregon. The Department of Human Services (DHS) initially pursued reunification with their mother as the permanency plan. However, after DHS determined that reunification was no longer safe or feasible, it petitioned to change the plan to tribal customary adoption (TCA), a process recognized under the Oregon Indian Child Welfare Act (ORICWA) that allows for adoption through tribal custom without terminating parental rights. The juvenile court held a contested permanency hearing, received evidence from DHS, the tribe, and a qualified tribal expert, and ultimately found by clear and convincing evidence that TCA was an appropriate permanent placement and in the children’s best interests. The court then requested the tribe to submit a formal order or judgment evidencing completion of the TCA.After the tribe submitted its TCA resolution, the juvenile court scheduled a hearing to consider whether to accept the tribe’s documentation. At this hearing, the mother objected, arguing that she was entitled to a contested evidentiary hearing to challenge the TCA and that the court was required to make an independent best-interests determination. The juvenile court accepted the tribe’s resolution, entered judgment for TCA, and terminated its jurisdiction over the children. The mother appealed, raising procedural and substantive challenges to the process.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed whether the juvenile court was required to hold a contested evidentiary hearing before accepting the tribe’s TCA order or judgment. The court held that neither ORICWA nor the TCA statute requires a juvenile court to conduct a contested evidentiary hearing after a tribe submits its completed TCA documentation. The court found that the required determinations—including whether TCA is an appropriate permanent placement and is in the child’s best interests—are made at the permanency hearing, and the TCA hearing is not intended to relitigate those issues. The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the circuit court. View "Dept. of Human Services v. M. G. J." on Justia Law