Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A police officer stopped a vehicle driven by the defendant after learning that the vehicle’s registered owner had a suspended license, but before identifying the driver. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence from the stop, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion because the driver was not identified before the stop. The trial court denied the motion, concluding it was reasonable for the officer to infer that the registered owner was driving. The defendant was convicted of driving with a suspended license.On appeal, the defendant acknowledged that the stop would be lawful under the Court of Appeals case law, State v. Panko, but argued that Panko was wrongly decided and should be overruled. The Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding that Panko was not "plainly wrong" and was binding. The defendant then sought review from the Oregon Supreme Court.The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court held that an officer has reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop when the officer believes, based on specific articulable facts, that the person stopped has committed or is about to commit a specific crime, and that belief is objectively reasonable under the circumstances. The court concluded that the officer’s suspicion that the defendant was driving with a suspended license was objectively reasonable because the officer saw a vehicle matching the description and license plate of the defendant’s vehicle, knew the defendant’s license was suspended, and confirmed the defendant was the sole registered owner. The court held that these facts made the officer’s inference objectively reasonable, and the possibility that someone else was driving did not undercut this reasonableness. The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court were affirmed. View "State v. Betancourt" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Peter Lowes and Amy Thompson, formerly Amy Lowes, regarding a nondisparagement clause in their stipulated divorce judgment. Lowes alleged that Thompson breached this clause by describing him as her "abuser" during a political campaign interview. Thompson filed a special motion to strike the breach of contract claim under Oregon’s anti-SLAPP statute, which aims to quickly dismiss nonmeritorious claims arising from protected speech. The trial court granted Thompson’s motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the nondisparagement clause waived Thompson’s right to the anti-SLAPP statute’s protections.The Deschutes County Circuit Court initially granted Thompson’s special motion to strike, finding that her statements were protected under the anti-SLAPP statute and that Lowes failed to show a probability of prevailing on his claim. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the nondisparagement clause constituted a waiver of Thompson’s anti-SLAPP protections, thus making it unnecessary to evaluate whether Lowes could prevail on his claim.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and disagreed with the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the nondisparagement clause did not clearly indicate an intention to waive the procedural protections of the anti-SLAPP statute. Therefore, the clause alone could not defeat Thompson’s special motion to strike. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision in part and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals to determine whether Lowes met his burden of establishing a probability of prevailing on his breach of contract claim. View "Lowes v. Thompson" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a tenant, brought a personal injury action against the defendants, his landlords, under the Oregon Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (ORLTA). The plaintiff sought damages for injuries sustained when a plastic cover of a light fixture fell from the ceiling of a shared, exterior hallway outside his apartment and struck him on the head. The plaintiff argued that the landlords were liable for his injuries due to their failure to maintain the premises in a habitable condition as required by ORS 90.320(1).The landlords moved for summary judgment, arguing that their habitability obligations under ORS 90.320(1) applied only to the interior of the tenant’s dwelling unit and not to common areas like the hallway. The trial court granted the landlords' motion for summary judgment, agreeing with their interpretation of the statute. The plaintiff appealed, and the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the landlords' habitability obligations did not extend to areas outside the tenant’s dwelling unit.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that a landlord’s habitability obligations under ORS 90.320(1) do extend to common areas of an apartment building that are adjacent to a tenant’s apartment and used by the tenant to access the apartment. The court concluded that conditions in these common areas can render a dwelling unit unhabitable. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. View "Jackson v. KA-3 Associates, LLC" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Abraham Torres-Lopez, sought to compel the Oregon Department of Corrections (DOC) to grant him credit towards his Marion County prison sentence for the 125 days he spent in Clackamas and Marion County jails before being sent to prison. The circuit court granted the relief, but the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the circuit court had misinterpreted ORS 137.370(4).The circuit court had granted Torres-Lopez credit for the time served in jail before his probation was revoked and he was sentenced to prison. The Court of Appeals, however, found that the circuit court had erred in its interpretation of the statute, leading to the current appeal.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case to resolve two statutory interpretation questions regarding ORS 137.370(4). The first question was whether a trial court may grant presentence incarceration credit for time served for unrelated conduct, even when the person has not yet been convicted or sentenced for that conduct. The second question was whether a person held in custody in a local jail awaiting resolution of a pending probation violation matter while serving an unrelated prison sentence is in "jail" presentencing for purposes of ORS 137.370(4).The Oregon Supreme Court held that a trial court may grant presentence incarceration credit in both circumstances. The court concluded that confinement for certain conduct, even in the absence of a sentence, is covered by ORS 137.370(4). Additionally, the legislature expressly authorized trial courts to order presentence credit for time spent in jail awaiting resolution of a probation violation matter, even if the person was also serving a prison sentence for an unrelated crime. Consequently, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. View "State ex rel Torres-Lopez v. Fahrion" on Justia Law

Grange Hill LLC sought approval from Yamhill County to operate a nine-guestroom bed and breakfast on its vineyard property, which is zoned for Exclusive Farm Use (EFU). The county approved the application, determining that the proposed bed and breakfast would operate as a "home occupation" within a "dwelling" that Grange Hill had yet to build. Friends of Yamhill County challenged this approval, arguing that the proposed structure did not meet the statutory requirements for a home occupation on EFU land, specifically that it must operate within a "dwelling" as defined by ORS 215.448(1).The Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA) affirmed the county's decision, reasoning that the proposed structure qualified as a "dwelling" because it met the design standards for a single-family residence and would be used as a residence for the innkeeper. LUBA dismissed Friends' argument that the structure needed to satisfy all requirements for a "primary dwelling in conjunction with farm use," including being the home of a farm operator.The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed LUBA's decision, concluding that the proposed structure was not a "dwelling" as a matter of law because it resembled a motel more than a home. The court emphasized that the entire structure must be a farm dwelling occupied by a group of people sharing a household on a long-term basis.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed in part and reversed in part the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the "dwelling" requirement in ORS 215.448 means a structure that satisfies the requirements for a category of dwelling allowed in the zone, specifically a "primary dwelling" on EFU land, which must be the home of a farm operator. The court concluded that LUBA erred in affirming the county's approval without ensuring the proposed structure met this requirement. The case was remanded to LUBA for further consideration. View "Friends of Yamhill v. Yamhill County" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between a nurse, the plaintiff, and her former employer, the defendant hospital. The plaintiff alleged that her termination was in retaliation for her complaints about safety issues. She brought five claims for relief, but only three statutory claims went to the jury: whistle-blower retaliation, unlawful retaliation, and unlawful employment practice. The jury found in favor of the defendant on the first two claims and in favor of the plaintiff on the third claim. The trial court entered a general judgment reflecting these verdicts.The defendant appealed the general judgment, arguing that the trial court erred in giving a "cat's paw" jury instruction, which allowed the jury to impute the bias of the plaintiff's coworkers to the defendant. The Court of Appeals agreed that the instruction was improper and reversed and remanded for a new trial. The trial court then vacated the general judgment and ordered a retrial of all three claims, including those on which the defendant had prevailed. The defendant appealed this order, but the Appellate Commissioner dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and the Court of Appeals denied reconsideration.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case to determine whether the trial court's order was appealable under ORS 19.205(3). The court concluded that, after the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the general judgment, there was no longer a general judgment in place. Therefore, the trial court's order determining the scope of the retrial was not an order made "after a general judgment" and was not immediately appealable under ORS 19.205(3). The orders of the Court of Appeals were affirmed. View "Crosbie v. Asante" on Justia Law

The case involves a criminal trial where the defendant was charged with second-degree sexual abuse and third-degree rape. Before his arrest, law enforcement conducted a phone interview with the defendant, during which he made no admissions. The state did not present evidence of this phone call during its case-in-chief, and the prosecutor assumed that this precluded defense counsel from mentioning the call during cross-examination. During closing arguments, defense counsel referred to the lack of evidence about any interview or admissions by the defendant, leading to multiple objections from the state, which the trial court sustained.The trial court allowed defense counsel to argue that there was no evidence of admissions by the defendant but prohibited statements suggesting that no interview had occurred. The jury found the defendant guilty on both charges. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in sustaining the state's objections and that the court's sua sponte instruction to the jury not to speculate about whether an interview had occurred was improper.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in sustaining the objections and that the defendant had not preserved his argument regarding the jury instruction. The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court did not err in sustaining the state's objection to the first statement by defense counsel but did err in sustaining the objection to the fourth statement. However, the court found that the error was harmless. The court also agreed that the defendant had not preserved his argument regarding the jury instruction and declined to reach the merits of that issue. The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court were affirmed. View "State v. Burton" on Justia Law

The case involves a criminal matter where the defendant was charged with first-degree assault and unlawful use of a weapon following a stabbing incident. The central issue at trial was whether the defendant acted in self-defense. The prosecution argued that the defendant was the initial aggressor, which would negate the self-defense claim. The trial court instructed the jury using Uniform Criminal Jury Instruction (UCrJI) 1110, which did not define the term "initial aggressor." During closing arguments, the prosecutor incorrectly suggested that being an initial aggressor could be determined by words alone, not just physical actions. The defendant did not object to the prosecutor's statements or request a supplemental instruction to define "initial aggressor."The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not defining "initial aggressor" for the jury. The Oregon Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the trial court's failure to provide a definition amounted to plain error under the first prong of the Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc. decision. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the trial court should have sua sponte provided a definition for "initial aggressor."The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not commit plain error by failing to give an unrequested custom supplemental instruction. The court explained that UCrJI 1110 was a correct statement of the law and that the trial court's duty to instruct the jury does not extend to providing definitions for terms unless the given instruction is legally incorrect. The Supreme Court emphasized that plain error review requires the error to be apparent on the record, and without a requested supplemental instruction, it is impossible to determine if the trial court's failure to provide one was legally incorrect. Therefore, the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed. View "State v. Worsham" on Justia Law

The case involves a criminal matter where the defendant was charged with four Measure 11 offenses, including first-degree unlawful sexual penetration and three counts of first-degree sexual abuse against a child under twelve. The parties reached a plea agreement where the defendant pleaded guilty to a lesser-included offense of attempted first-degree unlawful sexual penetration and one count of first-degree sexual abuse, with the remaining charges to be dismissed. The plea agreement included a stipulation that the court "may impose" consecutive sentences on the two charges.At sentencing, the defendant argued that Oregon law required the trial court to make specific findings under ORS 137.123(5) before imposing consecutive sentences, as the offenses arose from a continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct. The state contended that the stipulation in the plea agreement allowed the court to impose consecutive sentences without making those findings. After a discussion, the defendant withdrew his legal argument and affirmed that the court could impose consecutive sentences without the statutory findings. The trial court then imposed consecutive sentences totaling 180 months.The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the plea agreement did not prevent the defendant from arguing that consecutive sentences were legally impermissible without the required findings, and that the trial court erred in concluding that there was no plea agreement. The state petitioned for review.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the plea agreement's stipulation that the court "may impose" consecutive sentences was ambiguous. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in addressing the ambiguity by seeking clarification and proceeding to sentence the defendant after he withdrew his legal argument. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the trial court acted appropriately under the circumstances. View "State v. Walsh" on Justia Law

A landlord sought to terminate a rental agreement with a tenant due to extensive property damage caused by the tenant's guinea pigs. The landlord issued a 30-day termination notice stating that no cure opportunity was available because the damage was too extensive to repair while the tenant remained on the premises. The tenant did not vacate, leading the landlord to initiate an eviction action.The trial court ruled in favor of the landlord, finding that the termination notice complied with ORS 90.392(3)(c) because the repairs were too costly and extensive for the tenant to complete within the minimum 14-day cure period. The tenant appealed, arguing that the notice was invalid because it did not inform him of his right to cure the violation.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that a landlord's termination notice need not state that a violation can be cured if the landlord determines that it is unreasonable to believe that any tenant could cure the violation within the prescribed time period.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that a termination notice under ORS 90.392 must state that a violation can be cured when, as a matter of law, the tenant has a right to cure the violation. The court concluded that a tenant has a right to cure all violations that can be the basis for termination under ORS 90.392, except for certain repeat violations described in ORS 90.392(5). Because the violation in this case was one that the tenant had a right to cure, the landlord's notice was invalid for failing to state that the violation could be cured. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "KKMH Properties, LLC v. Shire" on Justia Law