Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a criminal defendant who was initially charged with second-degree murder by information and who, through counsel, invoked his statutory right to testify before the grand jury under ORS 132.320(12)(a). The defendant requested to appear in person before the grand jury, but the prosecutor stated that only remote testimony would be permitted. The defendant then moved the Douglas County Circuit Court for an order requiring his in-person appearance before the grand jury, arguing that he had an absolute statutory and constitutional right to do so.The Douglas County Circuit Court denied the defendant’s motion, reasoning that it lacked authority to dictate the manner in which the grand jury received testimony, other than ensuring the defendant’s rights were upheld. The court stayed the trial court proceedings pending appellate review but expressed uncertainty about its authority to stay the grand jury proceedings themselves. After the grand jury returned an indictment while the stay was in place, the defendant filed additional motions, including to dismiss the indictment, but the trial court declined to lift the stay to consider those motions.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the matter on a petition for a writ of mandamus. The court held that neither the prosecutor nor the defendant has unilateral authority to determine whether a defendant’s grand jury testimony must be in person or remote. Instead, the decision regarding the manner of witness testimony before the grand jury is, at least initially, for the grand jury itself to make, as provided by statute. The court concluded that the trial court did not have a nondiscretionary duty to order the defendant’s in-person appearance and therefore mandamus relief was not appropriate. The Supreme Court of Oregon dismissed the alternative writ of mandamus. View "State v. Wall" on Justia Law

A tenant rented a space on a landlord’s farm to park and live in her recreational vehicle (RV). The site lacked a sewage disposal system, and the tenant connected her RV’s wastewater port to a pipe that discharged raw sewage onto the ground. After the county health department cited the landlord for this violation, the landlord notified the tenant of lease termination for cause and initiated a forcible entry and detainer (FED) action to evict her. The tenant argued that her obligation to keep the premises clean and sanitary depended on the landlord’s duty to provide a sewage system. She also counterclaimed for damages, alleging the landlord failed to provide both a sewage system and safe drinking water.The Umatilla County Circuit Court ruled in favor of the landlord on both the eviction and the tenant’s counterclaims, awarding possession to the landlord. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the landlord’s failure to provide a sewage system did not excuse the tenant’s duty to keep the premises sanitary, and that the tenant failed to prove her counterclaims, particularly because she did not notify the landlord of the problems.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case. It held that the landlord’s failure to provide a sewage disposal system violated his statutory obligation to maintain the premises in a habitable condition. However, this did not excuse the tenant from her independent obligation to refrain from dumping sewage onto the ground. The tenant’s continued discharge of sewage constituted a violation that justified termination of the tenancy and eviction. Regarding the counterclaims, the court found the tenant could recover damages for the lack of a sewage system because the landlord already knew of the deficiency, but not for unsafe drinking water, as there was no evidence the landlord knew or should have known of that issue. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings. View "Jared v. Harmon" on Justia Law

The defendant and his then-wife, J, lived in Deschutes County, Oregon, and their marriage ended in divorce proceedings after J obtained a restraining order against the defendant. The criminal charges arose from two separate incidents: one in December 2016, when the defendant dragged J from their bedroom to the yard in freezing weather, and another in July 2017, when the defendant damaged J’s car with a power drill and made threatening statements. The December incident led to a second-degree kidnapping charge, while the July incident resulted in a menacing charge. The state also filed a motion in limine to limit certain evidence related to the divorce proceedings.The Deschutes County Circuit Court denied the defendant’s motions for judgment of acquittal on both charges and granted the state’s motion in limine in part, restricting argument about whether J gained a tactical advantage in the divorce from her allegations. The jury convicted the defendant of both kidnapping and menacing. On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed both convictions, though several judges dissented on aspects of the kidnapping and menacing rulings and the scope of the motion in limine.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case. It held that the evidence was insufficient to support the kidnapping conviction because the movement of J did not constitute taking her “from one place to another” as required by ORS 163.225(1)(a); specifically, the movement did not increase her isolation or restrict her freedom of movement in the manner contemplated by the statute. The court reversed the kidnapping conviction. However, the court affirmed the menacing conviction, finding that the defendant’s words and conduct were sufficient for a rational factfinder to conclude he intended to place J in fear of imminent serious physical injury. The court also affirmed the trial court’s ruling on the motion in limine. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "State v. Anderson" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged in a single indictment with multiple counts of sexual abuse involving two minor victims, A and M, who are cousins. The alleged conduct toward A spanned four years and involved repeated touching, while the conduct toward M consisted of two isolated incidents. The defendant moved to sever the charges relating to each victim, arguing that joinder would cause substantial prejudice, particularly because the evidence against M was weaker and the jury might improperly use the stronger evidence regarding A to convict on the charges involving M. The trial court denied the motion to sever, and the case proceeded to trial. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts involving A and one count involving M.On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to sever, finding that the defendant had not shown substantial prejudice beyond that inherent in joinder. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the mandatory 75-month Measure 11 sentence imposed for the conviction involving M, holding that it was unconstitutionally disproportionate under the Oregon Constitution.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed both issues. It held that the trial court erred in denying the motion to sever because the defendant had articulated a case-specific theory of substantial prejudice, supported by the record, as required by State v. Delaney. The Supreme Court clarified that when such a showing is made, the trial court must provide some remedy to address the prejudice. However, the error was deemed harmless as to the counts involving A, so those convictions were affirmed. The conviction involving M was reversed and remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court did not reach the sentencing issue in light of this disposition. The Court of Appeals’ decision was affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "State v. Hernandez-Esteban" on Justia Law

A worker alleged that he suffered a back injury while employed at a meat processing company. The employer’s workers’ compensation insurer investigated the claim and issued a written denial, stating that the injury was not work-related. The worker requested a hearing to challenge the denial. After this request, the insurer required the worker to undergo an independent medical examination (IME) by a physician of its choosing. The IME report supported the insurer’s denial, concluding that the worker’s preexisting condition, not a work injury, was the major cause of his disability. The worker’s own physician disagreed with the IME’s findings. The worker then requested authorization for a worker requested medical examination (WRME), citing the conflict between the IME and his physician’s opinion.The Workers’ Compensation Division’s Medical Resolution Team denied the WRME request, reasoning that the IME had been conducted after the insurer’s initial written denial. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) upheld both the denial of compensability and the denial of the WRME request, relying on the IME report as persuasive evidence. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed the ALJ’s decisions. The worker’s estate, after his death, pursued judicial review in the Oregon Court of Appeals, which reversed the Board’s denial of the WRME request and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the insurer’s denial was “based on” the IME report.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the statutory interpretation of ORS 656.325(1)(e). The court held that whether a denial of compensability “is based on” an IME report should be determined at the time the WRME request is decided, not at the time of the initial hearing request. Because the insurer relied on the IME report to defend its ongoing denial, the worker was entitled to a WRME. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, reversed the Workers’ Compensation Board, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Teitelman v. SAIF" on Justia Law

Two children, S and P, who are members of the Pit River Tribe, were the subject of juvenile dependency proceedings in Oregon. The Department of Human Services (DHS) initially pursued reunification with their mother as the permanency plan. However, after DHS determined that reunification was no longer safe or feasible, it petitioned to change the plan to tribal customary adoption (TCA), a process recognized under the Oregon Indian Child Welfare Act (ORICWA) that allows for adoption through tribal custom without terminating parental rights. The juvenile court held a contested permanency hearing, received evidence from DHS, the tribe, and a qualified tribal expert, and ultimately found by clear and convincing evidence that TCA was an appropriate permanent placement and in the children’s best interests. The court then requested the tribe to submit a formal order or judgment evidencing completion of the TCA.After the tribe submitted its TCA resolution, the juvenile court scheduled a hearing to consider whether to accept the tribe’s documentation. At this hearing, the mother objected, arguing that she was entitled to a contested evidentiary hearing to challenge the TCA and that the court was required to make an independent best-interests determination. The juvenile court accepted the tribe’s resolution, entered judgment for TCA, and terminated its jurisdiction over the children. The mother appealed, raising procedural and substantive challenges to the process.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed whether the juvenile court was required to hold a contested evidentiary hearing before accepting the tribe’s TCA order or judgment. The court held that neither ORICWA nor the TCA statute requires a juvenile court to conduct a contested evidentiary hearing after a tribe submits its completed TCA documentation. The court found that the required determinations—including whether TCA is an appropriate permanent placement and is in the child’s best interests—are made at the permanency hearing, and the TCA hearing is not intended to relitigate those issues. The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the circuit court. View "Dept. of Human Services v. M. G. J." on Justia Law

Several residents of a recreational vehicle park in Oregon brought a class action lawsuit against the park’s owners and managers, alleging that the park’s utility billing practices violated the Oregon Residential Landlord Tenant Act (ORLTA). Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that they were charged for electricity at rates higher than the actual cost and were improperly assessed meter reading fees. The plaintiffs sought to certify a class covering a ten-year period prior to the filing of the complaint, arguing that the statute of limitations should be tolled until tenants discovered or reasonably should have discovered the alleged violations.The Marion County Circuit Court agreed with the plaintiffs, holding that the one-year statute of limitations in ORS 12.125 incorporated a discovery rule. The court certified a class including tenants who paid the disputed charges during the ten years before the complaint was filed, provided they did not or should not have discovered the facts giving rise to their claims more than one year before filing. The court later granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs, found the defendants liable, and awarded substantial damages and attorney fees.On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s class certification and related rulings, holding that ORS 12.125 does not include a discovery rule and that the one-year limitations period is not tolled by a plaintiff’s lack of knowledge of the claim. The plaintiffs sought review of this issue.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The court held that ORS 12.125 does not incorporate a discovery rule; the one-year statute of limitations begins to run when the alleged violation or breach occurs, not when the plaintiff discovers it. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hathaway v. B & J Property Investments, Inc." on Justia Law

An electric utility company operating both within and outside Oregon was subject to central assessment for property tax purposes. For the 2020-21 tax year, the company and the Oregon Department of Revenue disagreed on the company’s overall value and the portion attributable to Oregon. The dispute centered on the methods used to determine real market value, specifically whether certain deductions and valuation models used by the company’s appraiser were consistent with the Department’s adopted standards. The Department relied on an administrative rule that incorporated the Western States Association of Tax Administrators (WSATA) Handbook, which prescribes valuation methods for centrally assessed properties.The Oregon Tax Court heard the case and considered expert testimony from both parties. The Department argued that the WSATA Handbook, as adopted by administrative rule, was binding and should control the valuation methods used. The company contended that the Tax Court, conducting a de novo review, was not bound by the Handbook. The Tax Court agreed with the company, holding that it was not required to defer to the Department’s rule and could determine real market value using other methods if it found them more accurate. The court ultimately adopted some of the company’s valuation approaches and set a value lower than the Department’s assessment.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case on appeal. It held that, absent a finding that the Department’s rule is invalid on its face or as applied, the rule has the force of law and must be given legal effect by the Tax Court. The Supreme Court found that the Tax Court erred by not treating the Department’s rule as binding unless its application would conflict with constitutional or statutory definitions of real market value. The Supreme Court reversed the Tax Court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings under the correct legal standard. View "PacifiCorp v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

A group of farmers in Marion County, Oregon, formed an irrigation district to secure water for agricultural use by constructing a reservoir on Drift Creek. In 2013, the district applied to the Oregon Water Resources Department for a permit to store water by building a dam, which would inundate land owned by local farmers and impact an existing in-stream water right held in trust for fish habitat. The proposed project faced opposition from affected landowners and an environmental organization, who argued that the reservoir would harm both their property and the ecological purpose of the in-stream water right.The Oregon Water Resources Department initially recommended approval of the application, finding that the project would not injure existing water rights, as the prior appropriation system would ensure senior rights were satisfied first. After a contested case hearing, an administrative law judge also recommended approval. However, the Oregon Water Resources Commission, upon review of exceptions filed by the protestants, reversed the Department’s decision and denied the application. The Commission concluded that the proposed reservoir would frustrate the beneficial purpose of the in-stream water right—namely, supporting fish habitat—even if the required water quantity was maintained at the measurement point. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission’s order.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case. It held that the public interest protected by Oregon water law includes not only the quantity of water guaranteed to a senior right holder but also the beneficial use for which the right was granted. The Commission was correct to consider whether the proposed use would frustrate the beneficial purpose of the in-stream right. However, the Court further held that, after finding the presumption of public interest was overcome, the Commission was required to consider all statutory public interest factors before making its final determination. Because the Commission failed to do so, the Supreme Court reversed its order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "East Valley Water v. Water Resources Commission" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who pleaded guilty to charges of attempted possession of heroin and unlawful use of a vehicle (UUV) in Lake County Circuit Court. The court imposed a departure sentence of 24 months' supervised probation for the UUV offense. While on probation, the defendant was involved in a serious automobile accident in Jefferson County, leading to multiple charges. The defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of failure to perform the duties of a driver (FPDD) and was sentenced to 75 months in prison.The Lake County court then revoked the defendant's probation for the UUV offense and imposed an 18-month prison term, to be served consecutively to the Jefferson County sentences. The defendant objected, arguing that the sentencing guidelines did not authorize consecutive sentences in this context. The trial court disagreed and imposed the consecutive sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision in a nonprecedential opinion.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether the trial court had the authority to impose a consecutive sentence after revoking the defendant's probation. The court held that Article I, section 44(1)(b) of the Oregon Constitution, which states that no law shall limit a court's authority to sentence a criminal defendant consecutively for crimes against different victims, supersedes any sentencing guidelines that would prevent such a consecutive sentence. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in imposing the consecutive sentence and affirmed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the circuit court. View "State v. Logston" on Justia Law