Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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The case involves the interpretation of Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) 166.255, which makes it unlawful for a person to possess a firearm or ammunition if they have been convicted of a "qualifying misdemeanor" involving the use or attempted use of physical force. The defendant, Richard Darrel Eggers, was convicted of harassment under ORS 166.065(1)(a)(A) for subjecting his brother to offensive physical contact. The key issue is whether this harassment conviction qualifies as a misdemeanor involving "physical force" under ORS 166.255.The Lane County Circuit Court concluded that harassment did involve physical force and imposed a firearms prohibition on Eggers. The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed this decision, ruling that "offensive physical contact" did not necessarily constitute "physical force" as required by ORS 166.255(3)(e). The state then sought review from the Oregon Supreme Court.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and focused on the statutory construction of ORS 166.255. The court examined the legislative intent behind the statute and noted that the Oregon legislature modeled ORS 166.255 after the federal firearms prohibition in the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). The United States Supreme Court had previously interpreted the term "physical force" in VAWA to include even the slightest offensive touching, akin to common-law battery.The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the legislature intended ORS 166.255 to mirror the federal law, including its interpretation of "physical force." Therefore, the court held that the "offensive physical contact" element of harassment does constitute "physical force" for the purposes of ORS 166.255(3)(e). Consequently, the court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, upholding the firearms prohibition against Eggers. View "State v. Eggers" on Justia Law

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The case involves a plaintiff, representing the estate of a deceased individual, who sued the owners of a golf club. The plaintiff alleged that the deceased was served alcohol while visibly intoxicated, leading to a fall from a golf cart and serious injuries. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the claim was barred by ORS 471.565(1), which limits the liability of alcohol servers in certain circumstances.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon reviewed the case and certified a question to the Oregon Supreme Court, asking whether ORS 471.565(1) violates the remedy clause of Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution. The district court noted that the Oregon Court of Appeals had previously held that the statute violated the remedy clause, but the Oregon Supreme Court had affirmed that decision on different grounds, leaving the constitutional question unresolved.The Oregon Supreme Court examined the text and context of ORS 471.565(1), which bars claims by individuals who voluntarily consume alcohol, even if served while visibly intoxicated. The court also reviewed the legislative history, noting that the statute was enacted in response to the court's decision in Fulmer v. Timber Inn Restaurant and Lounge, Inc., which recognized a common-law negligence claim for individuals injured due to being served alcohol while visibly intoxicated.The court concluded that ORS 471.565(1) does not violate the remedy clause of the Oregon Constitution when applied to individuals who voluntarily consume alcohol. However, the court clarified that the statute does not bar claims by individuals who involuntarily consume alcohol, meaning after losing the sense of reason and volition. The court held that the statute is constitutional as long as it is interpreted to allow claims for involuntary consumption of alcohol.The Oregon Supreme Court answered the certified question, holding that ORS 471.565(1) does not violate the remedy clause of Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution, provided it is interpreted to allow claims for involuntary consumption of alcohol. View "Bonner v. American Golf Corp. of California" on Justia Law

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The case involves the interpretation of Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) 166.255, which makes it unlawful for a person to possess a firearm or ammunition if they have been convicted of a "qualifying misdemeanor" involving the use or attempted use of physical force against a family or household member. The defendant, Richard Darrel Eggers, was convicted of harassment under ORS 166.065(1)(a)(A) for subjecting his brother to offensive physical contact during a domestic altercation.The Lane County Circuit Court concluded that the harassment conviction constituted a "qualifying misdemeanor" under ORS 166.255, thereby prohibiting Eggers from possessing firearms. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the "offensive physical contact" element of harassment did not meet the "physical force" requirement of ORS 166.255(3)(e).The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether the "offensive physical contact" element of harassment qualifies as "physical force" under ORS 166.255(3)(e). The court concluded that the Oregon legislature intended to align ORS 166.255 with the federal firearms prohibition under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which the U.S. Supreme Court had interpreted to include even minimal offensive touching as "physical force" in United States v. Castleman.The Oregon Supreme Court held that the "physical force" requirement in ORS 166.255(3)(e) includes the degree of force necessary to complete a common-law battery, which encompasses offensive physical contact. Therefore, harassment under ORS 166.065(1)(a)(A) is a "qualifying misdemeanor" for the purposes of ORS 166.255. The court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, upholding the firearms prohibition against Eggers. View "State v. Eggers" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff was charged with second-degree murder and held in jail pending trial. A jury acquitted him of the murder charge but convicted him of first-degree manslaughter, resulting in a 200-month prison sentence. The plaintiff later sought habeas corpus relief in federal court, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. The federal court agreed, terminating the state's authority to hold him for the manslaughter conviction. The state chose to retry him, and he was transferred to the custody of the Multnomah County Sheriff.In the Multnomah County Circuit Court, the plaintiff filed two motions for release under ORS 136.290, which limits pretrial custody to 60 days. Both motions were denied by different judges, who ruled that the 60-day limit does not apply to retrials. The plaintiff then petitioned the Oregon Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he should be released based on the 60-day limit. The court ordered the sheriff to show cause but did not order the plaintiff's release. Subsequently, the plaintiff pleaded no-contest to the manslaughter charge and was sentenced to 120 months, less time than he had already served, leading to his release.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether ORS 136.290 applies to retrials. The court concluded that the 60-day limit on pretrial custody does apply to retrials. The court reasoned that the statute's text, context, and legislative history indicate that it aims to limit the time a defendant can be held in custody pending trial, regardless of whether it is the first or a subsequent trial. The court denied the plaintiff's petition for habeas corpus because he was no longer in custody. View "Benjamin v. O'Donnell" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The case involves a defendant who brought a loaded handgun to a crowded bar, displayed it in the palm of his hand without touching the trigger, and accidentally discharged it while putting it back in his waistband. The bullet hit his leg and ricocheted into his cousin's foot, causing injury. The defendant was charged with third-degree assault, felon in possession of a firearm, and multiple counts of reckless endangerment.The Marion County Circuit Court, after a bench trial, found the defendant guilty of third-degree assault, felon in possession of a firearm, and eight counts of reckless endangerment. The court concluded that the defendant acted recklessly with "extreme indifference to the value of human life." The defendant appealed, arguing that his conduct did not meet the legal standard for "extreme indifference." The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and focused on the meaning of "extreme indifference" in the context of third-degree assault under ORS 163.165(1)(c). The court concluded that the legislature did not intend for all reckless use of a deadly weapon to constitute "extreme indifference." Instead, it associated "extreme indifference" with conduct presenting a greater risk to human life than ordinary recklessness, such as shooting a firearm in the direction and range of others or materially increasing the risk of accidental discharge.The court found that the defendant's conduct did not meet this standard. The defendant's actions, while reckless, did not materially increase the risk of accidental discharge beyond the inherent risk of handling a loaded gun in public. Consequently, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of conviction for third-degree assault. The case was remanded to the circuit court for entry of conviction for the lesser-included offense of fourth-degree assault and for resentencing. View "State v. Giron-Cortez" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The defendant faced serious felony charges and underwent two trials, both ending in mistrials. The second mistrial occurred because a courtroom clerk mistakenly gave the jury an exhibit revealing the defendant's prior felony conviction, which had been excluded from the jury's consideration. The defendant moved to dismiss the charges with prejudice, arguing that a retrial was barred by the former jeopardy provision in the Oregon Constitution, as interpreted in State v. Kennedy. The trial court denied the motion, concluding it could not find "indifference" under the Kennedy test.The Multnomah County Circuit Court initially declared a mistrial due to a deadlocked jury. Months later, a juror contacted the defendant's counsel, revealing that the jury had seen an exhibit disclosing the defendant's prior conviction. The trial court then changed the basis for the mistrial to include the erroneous submission of the exhibit. After further hearings and testimony from jurors and the clerk's supervisor, the trial court found that the clerk had made an error but did not intentionally give the jury the exhibit knowing it disclosed the prior conviction. The court could not determine whether the clerk was indifferent or simply lacked the capacity to do her job.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and denied the petition for a writ of mandamus. The court held that the record did not compel findings that the clerk knowingly engaged in improper and prejudicial conduct or acted with indifference to the consequences. The court emphasized that the Kennedy test requires a conscious choice of prejudicial action, which was not evident in this case. Therefore, the trial court was not compelled to dismiss the charges with prejudice, and a retrial was not barred under the Oregon Constitution. View "State v. Blackmon" on Justia Law

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The case involves a defendant charged with driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII). At trial, the arresting officer testified about administering two field sobriety tests (FSTs) to the defendant: the walk-and-turn test and the one-leg-stand test. The officer described these tests as "standardized" and "designed to determine impairment," supported by studies proving their validity. The defendant did not object to this testimony, and the jury found her guilty of DUII.The defendant appealed to the Oregon Court of Appeals, arguing that the officer's testimony constituted scientific evidence that was admitted without an adequate foundation, constituting plain error. The Court of Appeals agreed, concluding that the testimony was scientific evidence requiring a foundation under the standards set in State v. Brown and State v. O’Key. The court exercised its discretion to reverse the conviction, determining that the error was not harmless due to the persuasive effect of scientific evidence.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case to address the application of plain-error review. The court assumed, without deciding, that the admission of the officer's testimony was plain error. However, it concluded that the Court of Appeals abused its discretion by reversing the conviction based solely on the determination that the error was not harmless. The Supreme Court emphasized that reversing based on plain error requires considering multiple factors, including the gravity of the error and the ends of justice, rather than solely whether the error was harmless.The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals was instructed to consider the appropriate factors in exercising its discretion and, if necessary, address the defendant's remaining assignment of error. View "State v. Ortiz" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The defendant was prosecuted for attacking a woman who was jogging on a sidewalk. He tackled her from behind, knocked her out, and dragged her into a ditch. The victim fought back, and the defendant fled. He was charged with attempted first-degree sexual abuse, among other crimes. The state lacked direct evidence of his intent to sexually assault the victim, so it introduced evidence of sexually explicit notes the defendant had previously written to two other women, expressing a desire to forcibly sexually assault them. The trial court admitted these notes under OEC 404(3) to prove intent, and the defendant was convicted on all charges.The Court of Appeals initially held that the notes were inadmissible under OEC 404(3) because their relevance depended on a character-based propensity inference. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine if the notes were admissible under OEC 404(4), which allows for the admission of other acts evidence if relevant, subject to OEC 403 balancing. On remand, the trial court admitted the notes under OEC 404(4) and found that their probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion, later ruled that the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting the notes under OEC 403.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court's decision to admit the notes under OEC 403 was within the permissible range of discretion. The court found that the notes were highly probative of the defendant's intent and that the trial court had taken steps to mitigate any unfair prejudice. The court declined to address the defendant's due process argument because it was not preserved at the trial court level. The decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The defendant was convicted of multiple crimes after forcibly entering the victim’s apartment at night, moving her from the entryway to a bedroom and then to a bathroom, where he strangled, sodomized, and assaulted her. The defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove the "asportation" element of first-degree kidnapping, which requires moving the victim "from one place to another." He also contended that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences for the kidnapping and sodomy convictions.The Marion County Circuit Court denied the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the kidnapping charge, finding that the movement within the apartment was not incidental to the other crimes. The court found the defendant guilty of all charges and imposed consecutive sentences for the kidnapping and sodomy convictions. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the movement increased the victim’s isolation and was not merely incidental to the other crimes.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant moved the victim to a qualitatively different place within the apartment, increasing her isolation and limiting her freedom of movement. The court also held that the movement was not incidental to the other crimes, as it was a distinct step in a series of events. Regarding the consecutive sentences, the court found that the sodomy was not merely incidental to the kidnapping but indicated the defendant’s willingness to commit more than one offense, as the crimes were distinct in nature, conduct, and timing. View "State v. Soto" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The case involves a defendant who was charged with third-degree sexual abuse for making sexual contact with a woman studying alone at a community college library. The state presented "other acts" evidence, which included security video footage showing the defendant engaging in a similar course of conduct with another woman in the library just before the incident with the victim. The defendant argued that this evidence was inadmissible as it relied on character-based reasoning. However, the trial court admitted the evidence, and the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon, arguing that the video footage was character evidence and thus inadmissible under the Oregon Evidence Code (OEC) 404(3). The state countered that the footage was relevant to show the defendant's state of mind and course of conduct at the time of the incident, and did not rely on impermissible character reasoning.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. The court concluded that the video footage, when considered with the victim's testimony, was admissible to establish that the defendant had engaged in an unusual pattern of behavior consistent with a person seeking an opportunity to make sexual contact with a woman studying alone in the library. This fact was relevant to inferring that the defendant committed the charged act and did so intentionally. The court held that this inference did not depend on impermissible character reasoning. View "State v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law