Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, an adult in custody at an Oregon correctional institution, sued the Oregon Department of Corrections and others for breach of contract and civil rights violations. He sought economic damages based on lost future wages and employment opportunities, alleging that the department had breached an oral promise of nonretaliation by using negative video footage of him in training videos, which led to his loss of job assignments and income-generating opportunities. The plaintiff claimed $11,640 in economic damages due to this negative portrayal.The Marion County Circuit Court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, agreeing with the department's argument that Article I, section 41(3) of the Oregon Constitution, which states that inmates have no legally enforceable right to a job or compensation for work performed while incarcerated, rendered the plaintiff unable to plead economic damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, reasoning that the constitution precluded the plaintiff from establishing economic damages in the form of lost income.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case and held that the trial court erred in granting the department's motion to dismiss. The court concluded that the lack of a right to employment does not establish, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff cannot prove economic damages in the form of future lost wages. The court emphasized that challenges to the sufficiency of proof are properly suited to a motion for summary judgment or trial, not a motion to dismiss. The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the judgment of the circuit court was also affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Huskey v. Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who intentionally set a fire in her apartment building, resulting in property damage and serious injuries to another resident. The defendant was convicted of first-degree arson after the trial court found that she had intentionally caused the fire and recklessly placed others in danger of physical injury. During sentencing, the trial court considered various mitigating circumstances related to the defendant's mental health and personal history and concluded that the mandatory 90-month prison sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate. Instead, the court imposed a 60-month term of probation.The state appealed the trial court's decision, and the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court had erred in relying on the defendant's personal characteristics and circumstances in its proportionality analysis. The appellate court concluded that the 90-month mandatory minimum sentence required by ORS 137.700(2)(b)(A) was not constitutionally disproportionate as applied to the defendant.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether the mandatory minimum sentence violated the proportionality clause of Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that the 90-month mandatory minimum sentence for first-degree arson was not unconstitutionally disproportionate. The court reasoned that the defendant's conduct was egregious and caused significant harm, and that there was no societal consensus or objective evidence indicating that individuals with mental health issues similar to the defendant's are less morally culpable for their crimes. Therefore, the mandatory minimum sentence did not shock the moral sense of reasonable people. View "State v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

A law enforcement officer, qualified as an expert in evaluating impaired driving, testified in a criminal case that babies have limited peripheral vision and that a person impaired by alcohol could be said to be seeing just like a baby. The defendant objected to this testimony as hearsay, but the trial court overruled the objection, reasoning that the officer was explaining the basis for his opinion. The defendant was subsequently convicted of DUII, reckless driving, and reckless endangerment.The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the officer's testimony about baby vision as it was hearsay and beyond the officer's expertise. The Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding that the testimony was not hearsay because it did not recount a particular statement made by the ophthalmologist and was offered to explain the officer's expert opinion.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the trial court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that the officer's testimony about baby vision was inadmissible hearsay because it was offered for the truth of the matter asserted and merely repeated information beyond the officer's personal or specialized knowledge. The court also concluded that the error was not harmless, as the testimony was central to the state's theory of impairment and was qualitatively different from other evidence presented. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "State v. Bowman" on Justia Law

The petitioner pleaded guilty to three counts of first-degree sodomy and was sentenced to 60 months in prison for Count 1, 100 months for Count 3, and 100 months for Count 5, with the sentences for Counts 3 and 5 to be served consecutively. The trial court also imposed terms of post-prison supervision (PPS) for each count, calculated as 240 months minus the term of imprisonment served for each count. The petitioner completed his prison terms and was released in April 2016.The Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision calculated the PPS terms by subtracting the time served for each count from the 240-month maximum, resulting in 180 months for Count 1 and 140 months for Counts 3 and 5. The petitioner argued that the "term of imprisonment served" should be the total time served for all counts, which would result in a shorter PPS term. The board rejected this argument, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the board's decision.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the "term of imprisonment served" in ORS 144.103 refers to the time spent in prison for the specific count of conviction, not the total time served for all counts. The court also concluded that the PPS term begins when the offender is released into the community, not while still incarcerated on other counts. Therefore, the court affirmed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision. View "Kragt v. Board of Parole" on Justia Law

The case involves the defendant, who was charged with 46 sex crimes against the same person over an eight-year period. The counts in the indictment were identical and did not specify the incidents they were based on. During the first trial, the state did not link any specific incidents to the counts, and the jury found the defendant not guilty of 40 counts and guilty of six. The defendant appealed, arguing an evidentiary error, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case.On remand, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, claiming that retrying him on the six counts of conviction would violate his constitutional rights against double jeopardy. The trial court denied the motion, and the case proceeded to a second jury trial, where the defendant was again convicted of the six counts. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the Court of Appeals had erred in resolving the case on preservation grounds. The Supreme Court concluded that the defendant had consistently raised the same double jeopardy argument throughout the case: that due to the lack of specificity in the indictment and the first trial, it was impossible to determine the factual basis for any count, and there was a risk that he would be convicted based on incidents of which he had already been acquitted. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings to address the merits of the double jeopardy issue. View "State v. Dodge" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant charged with multiple first-degree sexual offenses against a victim, J, who has an intellectual disability. The defendant did not dispute J's disability but argued that she was capable of consenting to the sexual acts. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal, and a jury convicted him of various charges. The defendant appealed, arguing that the state failed to prove that J's disability rendered her incapable of appraising the nature of her conduct.The Oregon Court of Appeals, in a divided decision, reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to show that J was incapable of understanding the sexual nature of the conduct or exercising judgment to consent to it. The state petitioned for review, challenging the Court of Appeals' interpretation and application of the relevant statutes.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on the interpretation of ORS 163.305(3) and ORS 163.315(1)(b), which define when a person is incapable of consenting to a sexual act due to a mental defect. The court clarified that to be capable of consent, a person must be able to appraise the nature of their conduct, which involves exercising judgment and making choices based on an understanding of the conduct's significance. The court emphasized that the state must prove that the person's intellectual disability prevented them from appraising the nature of the conduct at the time of the alleged offense.The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to allow a rational jury to find that J's intellectual disability rendered her incapable of appraising the nature of her conduct. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. The court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's judgment in part, but reversed the conviction on Count 5 due to a nonunanimous jury verdict, remanding for further proceedings. View "State v. Wallace" on Justia Law

Yamhill County filed an in rem civil forfeiture action against a property in Yamhill, Oregon, alleging it was used to facilitate prohibited conduct. Sheryl Lynn Sublet, who claimed an interest in the property, opposed the forfeiture, arguing it violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because she had already been prosecuted for the same conduct. The trial court rejected her argument, and a jury found in favor of the county, leading to a judgment forfeiting the property.The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, agreeing with Sublet that the forfeiture was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court held that civil forfeiture in Oregon is effectively a criminal penalty, thus implicating double jeopardy protections.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether civil forfeiture under Oregon law constitutes criminal punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court concluded that the civil forfeiture scheme under ORS chapter 131A is intended to be remedial and not punitive. The court emphasized that the forfeiture proceeds through an in rem action, targeting the property itself rather than the owner, and incorporates distinctly civil procedures. The court found no clear proof that the forfeiture's purpose and effect are punitive, thus it does not trigger double jeopardy protections.The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that civil forfeiture under current Oregon law does not constitute criminal punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. View "Yamhill County v. Real Property" on Justia Law

The case involves a criminal defendant charged with domestic violence offenses who served a pretrial subpoena on Clackamas Women’s Services (CWS) to obtain records related to services provided to the alleged victim (AV). CWS moved to quash the subpoena, arguing that the records were protected under Oregon Evidence Code (OEC) 507-1 and ORS 147.600, which protect confidential communications and records created or maintained in the course of providing services to victims of domestic violence. The defendant sought the records to challenge AV’s credibility, claiming she fabricated her claims to obtain financial assistance.The Clackamas County Circuit Court quashed the subpoena in part but ordered CWS to produce records disclosing the cell phone information and financial assistance provided to AV. CWS sought mandamus relief from the Oregon Supreme Court, arguing that the records were protected under the statute and rule, and disclosure without AV’s consent was prohibited.The Oregon Supreme Court agreed with CWS, holding that the records ordered for production by the trial court were protected under OEC 507-1 and ORS 147.600. The court concluded that the statute and rule broadly protect all records created or maintained by CWS in the course of providing services to victims of domestic violence, including those that do not contain confidential communications. The court also determined that the trial court had no authority to require CWS to create a new document disclosing the information contained in the protected records. Consequently, the court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its orders. View "State v. Sacco" on Justia Law

The case involves the Department of Human Services (DHS) assuming dependency jurisdiction over a child, A, born prematurely with special medical needs. Both parents have cognitive disabilities, and due to concerns about their ability to care for A, she was placed in substitute care. DHS provided services to the parents for approximately two years before requesting a change in the permanency plan from reunification to adoption, which the juvenile court approved in August 2022.The juvenile court found that DHS made reasonable efforts to reunify the family, but the parents did not make sufficient progress to safely care for A. The court noted that the parents' most significant barrier was their lack of follow-through and unwillingness to attend services. The court also determined that there was no compelling reason why adoption would not be in A's best interest.The parents appealed, arguing that DHS failed to make reasonable efforts tailored to their cognitive disabilities and that the agency displayed cultural and racial insensitivity. The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court's judgment, acknowledging DHS's shortcomings but concluding that the totality of DHS's efforts was reasonable.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and upheld the lower courts' decisions. The court concluded that DHS's efforts, including multiple referrals to services tailored to the parents' needs, were reasonable. The court also found that the parents' failure to engage in services was a significant barrier to reunification. Additionally, the court determined that there was no compelling reason to conclude that adoption would not be in A's best interest, given the lack of an alternative permanent plan and the child's need for stability. View "Dept. of Human Services v. C. H." on Justia Law

In this criminal case, the defendant was convicted of third-degree assault under Oregon law. The incident involved the defendant injuring the victim, RR, during a confrontation where RR approached the defendant with a metal pole. The defendant claimed self-defense, stating that he inadvertently injured RR while disarming her. The injury resulted in multiple fractures to RR’s eye socket and a laceration near her left eye.The Curry County Circuit Court convicted the defendant, and he appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by giving a special jury instruction requested by the state. This instruction defined “serious physical injury” to include “protracted disfigurement” and specified that a scar visible five months after the injury qualifies as such. The defendant did not object to this instruction during the trial but contended on appeal that it constituted a “plain error” under Oregon appellate rules.The Oregon Court of Appeals agreed that the instruction was an impermissible comment on the evidence, violating ORCP 59 E, which prohibits trial courts from instructing juries on matters of fact. However, the court held that the error did not qualify as a plain error because it was possible that the defendant had agreed to the instruction or made a strategic choice not to object, meaning the error did not appear on the record.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the Court of Appeals erred in its plain-error analysis. The Supreme Court determined that whether a jury instruction violates the rules governing jury instructions can be assessed based on the instruction itself. The court concluded that the trial court’s instruction was a plain error because it was an error of law, obvious, and apparent on the record. However, the Supreme Court declined to exercise its discretion to reverse the conviction, considering factors such as the gravity of the error, the parties’ interests, and the purposes of the preservation requirement. The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court were affirmed. View "State v. Wiltse" on Justia Law