Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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The case involves a defendant charged with multiple first-degree sexual offenses against a victim, J, who has an intellectual disability. The defendant did not dispute J's disability but argued that she was capable of consenting to the sexual acts. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal, and a jury convicted him of various charges. The defendant appealed, arguing that the state failed to prove that J's disability rendered her incapable of appraising the nature of her conduct.The Oregon Court of Appeals, in a divided decision, reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to show that J was incapable of understanding the sexual nature of the conduct or exercising judgment to consent to it. The state petitioned for review, challenging the Court of Appeals' interpretation and application of the relevant statutes.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on the interpretation of ORS 163.305(3) and ORS 163.315(1)(b), which define when a person is incapable of consenting to a sexual act due to a mental defect. The court clarified that to be capable of consent, a person must be able to appraise the nature of their conduct, which involves exercising judgment and making choices based on an understanding of the conduct's significance. The court emphasized that the state must prove that the person's intellectual disability prevented them from appraising the nature of the conduct at the time of the alleged offense.The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to allow a rational jury to find that J's intellectual disability rendered her incapable of appraising the nature of her conduct. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. The court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's judgment in part, but reversed the conviction on Count 5 due to a nonunanimous jury verdict, remanding for further proceedings. View "State v. Wallace" on Justia Law

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Yamhill County filed an in rem civil forfeiture action against a property in Yamhill, Oregon, alleging it was used to facilitate prohibited conduct. Sheryl Lynn Sublet, who claimed an interest in the property, opposed the forfeiture, arguing it violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because she had already been prosecuted for the same conduct. The trial court rejected her argument, and a jury found in favor of the county, leading to a judgment forfeiting the property.The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, agreeing with Sublet that the forfeiture was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court held that civil forfeiture in Oregon is effectively a criminal penalty, thus implicating double jeopardy protections.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether civil forfeiture under Oregon law constitutes criminal punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court concluded that the civil forfeiture scheme under ORS chapter 131A is intended to be remedial and not punitive. The court emphasized that the forfeiture proceeds through an in rem action, targeting the property itself rather than the owner, and incorporates distinctly civil procedures. The court found no clear proof that the forfeiture's purpose and effect are punitive, thus it does not trigger double jeopardy protections.The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that civil forfeiture under current Oregon law does not constitute criminal punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. View "Yamhill County v. Real Property" on Justia Law

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The case involves a criminal defendant charged with domestic violence offenses who served a pretrial subpoena on Clackamas Women’s Services (CWS) to obtain records related to services provided to the alleged victim (AV). CWS moved to quash the subpoena, arguing that the records were protected under Oregon Evidence Code (OEC) 507-1 and ORS 147.600, which protect confidential communications and records created or maintained in the course of providing services to victims of domestic violence. The defendant sought the records to challenge AV’s credibility, claiming she fabricated her claims to obtain financial assistance.The Clackamas County Circuit Court quashed the subpoena in part but ordered CWS to produce records disclosing the cell phone information and financial assistance provided to AV. CWS sought mandamus relief from the Oregon Supreme Court, arguing that the records were protected under the statute and rule, and disclosure without AV’s consent was prohibited.The Oregon Supreme Court agreed with CWS, holding that the records ordered for production by the trial court were protected under OEC 507-1 and ORS 147.600. The court concluded that the statute and rule broadly protect all records created or maintained by CWS in the course of providing services to victims of domestic violence, including those that do not contain confidential communications. The court also determined that the trial court had no authority to require CWS to create a new document disclosing the information contained in the protected records. Consequently, the court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its orders. View "State v. Sacco" on Justia Law

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The case involves the Department of Human Services (DHS) assuming dependency jurisdiction over a child, A, born prematurely with special medical needs. Both parents have cognitive disabilities, and due to concerns about their ability to care for A, she was placed in substitute care. DHS provided services to the parents for approximately two years before requesting a change in the permanency plan from reunification to adoption, which the juvenile court approved in August 2022.The juvenile court found that DHS made reasonable efforts to reunify the family, but the parents did not make sufficient progress to safely care for A. The court noted that the parents' most significant barrier was their lack of follow-through and unwillingness to attend services. The court also determined that there was no compelling reason why adoption would not be in A's best interest.The parents appealed, arguing that DHS failed to make reasonable efforts tailored to their cognitive disabilities and that the agency displayed cultural and racial insensitivity. The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court's judgment, acknowledging DHS's shortcomings but concluding that the totality of DHS's efforts was reasonable.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and upheld the lower courts' decisions. The court concluded that DHS's efforts, including multiple referrals to services tailored to the parents' needs, were reasonable. The court also found that the parents' failure to engage in services was a significant barrier to reunification. Additionally, the court determined that there was no compelling reason to conclude that adoption would not be in A's best interest, given the lack of an alternative permanent plan and the child's need for stability. View "Dept. of Human Services v. C. H." on Justia Law

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In this criminal case, the defendant was convicted of third-degree assault under Oregon law. The incident involved the defendant injuring the victim, RR, during a confrontation where RR approached the defendant with a metal pole. The defendant claimed self-defense, stating that he inadvertently injured RR while disarming her. The injury resulted in multiple fractures to RR’s eye socket and a laceration near her left eye.The Curry County Circuit Court convicted the defendant, and he appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by giving a special jury instruction requested by the state. This instruction defined “serious physical injury” to include “protracted disfigurement” and specified that a scar visible five months after the injury qualifies as such. The defendant did not object to this instruction during the trial but contended on appeal that it constituted a “plain error” under Oregon appellate rules.The Oregon Court of Appeals agreed that the instruction was an impermissible comment on the evidence, violating ORCP 59 E, which prohibits trial courts from instructing juries on matters of fact. However, the court held that the error did not qualify as a plain error because it was possible that the defendant had agreed to the instruction or made a strategic choice not to object, meaning the error did not appear on the record.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the Court of Appeals erred in its plain-error analysis. The Supreme Court determined that whether a jury instruction violates the rules governing jury instructions can be assessed based on the instruction itself. The court concluded that the trial court’s instruction was a plain error because it was an error of law, obvious, and apparent on the record. However, the Supreme Court declined to exercise its discretion to reverse the conviction, considering factors such as the gravity of the error, the parties’ interests, and the purposes of the preservation requirement. The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court were affirmed. View "State v. Wiltse" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The case involves the interpretation of Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) 166.255, which makes it unlawful for a person to possess a firearm or ammunition if they have been convicted of a "qualifying misdemeanor" involving the use or attempted use of physical force. The defendant, Richard Darrel Eggers, was convicted of harassment under ORS 166.065(1)(a)(A) for subjecting his brother to offensive physical contact. The key issue is whether this harassment conviction qualifies as a misdemeanor involving "physical force" under ORS 166.255.The Lane County Circuit Court concluded that harassment did involve physical force and imposed a firearms prohibition on Eggers. The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed this decision, ruling that "offensive physical contact" did not necessarily constitute "physical force" as required by ORS 166.255(3)(e). The state then sought review from the Oregon Supreme Court.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and focused on the statutory construction of ORS 166.255. The court examined the legislative intent behind the statute and noted that the Oregon legislature modeled ORS 166.255 after the federal firearms prohibition in the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). The United States Supreme Court had previously interpreted the term "physical force" in VAWA to include even the slightest offensive touching, akin to common-law battery.The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the legislature intended ORS 166.255 to mirror the federal law, including its interpretation of "physical force." Therefore, the court held that the "offensive physical contact" element of harassment does constitute "physical force" for the purposes of ORS 166.255(3)(e). Consequently, the court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, upholding the firearms prohibition against Eggers. View "State v. Eggers" on Justia Law

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The case involves a plaintiff, representing the estate of a deceased individual, who sued the owners of a golf club. The plaintiff alleged that the deceased was served alcohol while visibly intoxicated, leading to a fall from a golf cart and serious injuries. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the claim was barred by ORS 471.565(1), which limits the liability of alcohol servers in certain circumstances.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon reviewed the case and certified a question to the Oregon Supreme Court, asking whether ORS 471.565(1) violates the remedy clause of Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution. The district court noted that the Oregon Court of Appeals had previously held that the statute violated the remedy clause, but the Oregon Supreme Court had affirmed that decision on different grounds, leaving the constitutional question unresolved.The Oregon Supreme Court examined the text and context of ORS 471.565(1), which bars claims by individuals who voluntarily consume alcohol, even if served while visibly intoxicated. The court also reviewed the legislative history, noting that the statute was enacted in response to the court's decision in Fulmer v. Timber Inn Restaurant and Lounge, Inc., which recognized a common-law negligence claim for individuals injured due to being served alcohol while visibly intoxicated.The court concluded that ORS 471.565(1) does not violate the remedy clause of the Oregon Constitution when applied to individuals who voluntarily consume alcohol. However, the court clarified that the statute does not bar claims by individuals who involuntarily consume alcohol, meaning after losing the sense of reason and volition. The court held that the statute is constitutional as long as it is interpreted to allow claims for involuntary consumption of alcohol.The Oregon Supreme Court answered the certified question, holding that ORS 471.565(1) does not violate the remedy clause of Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution, provided it is interpreted to allow claims for involuntary consumption of alcohol. View "Bonner v. American Golf Corp. of California" on Justia Law

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The case involves the interpretation of Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) 166.255, which makes it unlawful for a person to possess a firearm or ammunition if they have been convicted of a "qualifying misdemeanor" involving the use or attempted use of physical force against a family or household member. The defendant, Richard Darrel Eggers, was convicted of harassment under ORS 166.065(1)(a)(A) for subjecting his brother to offensive physical contact during a domestic altercation.The Lane County Circuit Court concluded that the harassment conviction constituted a "qualifying misdemeanor" under ORS 166.255, thereby prohibiting Eggers from possessing firearms. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the "offensive physical contact" element of harassment did not meet the "physical force" requirement of ORS 166.255(3)(e).The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether the "offensive physical contact" element of harassment qualifies as "physical force" under ORS 166.255(3)(e). The court concluded that the Oregon legislature intended to align ORS 166.255 with the federal firearms prohibition under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which the U.S. Supreme Court had interpreted to include even minimal offensive touching as "physical force" in United States v. Castleman.The Oregon Supreme Court held that the "physical force" requirement in ORS 166.255(3)(e) includes the degree of force necessary to complete a common-law battery, which encompasses offensive physical contact. Therefore, harassment under ORS 166.065(1)(a)(A) is a "qualifying misdemeanor" for the purposes of ORS 166.255. The court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, upholding the firearms prohibition against Eggers. View "State v. Eggers" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff was charged with second-degree murder and held in jail pending trial. A jury acquitted him of the murder charge but convicted him of first-degree manslaughter, resulting in a 200-month prison sentence. The plaintiff later sought habeas corpus relief in federal court, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. The federal court agreed, terminating the state's authority to hold him for the manslaughter conviction. The state chose to retry him, and he was transferred to the custody of the Multnomah County Sheriff.In the Multnomah County Circuit Court, the plaintiff filed two motions for release under ORS 136.290, which limits pretrial custody to 60 days. Both motions were denied by different judges, who ruled that the 60-day limit does not apply to retrials. The plaintiff then petitioned the Oregon Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he should be released based on the 60-day limit. The court ordered the sheriff to show cause but did not order the plaintiff's release. Subsequently, the plaintiff pleaded no-contest to the manslaughter charge and was sentenced to 120 months, less time than he had already served, leading to his release.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether ORS 136.290 applies to retrials. The court concluded that the 60-day limit on pretrial custody does apply to retrials. The court reasoned that the statute's text, context, and legislative history indicate that it aims to limit the time a defendant can be held in custody pending trial, regardless of whether it is the first or a subsequent trial. The court denied the plaintiff's petition for habeas corpus because he was no longer in custody. View "Benjamin v. O'Donnell" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The case involves a defendant who brought a loaded handgun to a crowded bar, displayed it in the palm of his hand without touching the trigger, and accidentally discharged it while putting it back in his waistband. The bullet hit his leg and ricocheted into his cousin's foot, causing injury. The defendant was charged with third-degree assault, felon in possession of a firearm, and multiple counts of reckless endangerment.The Marion County Circuit Court, after a bench trial, found the defendant guilty of third-degree assault, felon in possession of a firearm, and eight counts of reckless endangerment. The court concluded that the defendant acted recklessly with "extreme indifference to the value of human life." The defendant appealed, arguing that his conduct did not meet the legal standard for "extreme indifference." The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and focused on the meaning of "extreme indifference" in the context of third-degree assault under ORS 163.165(1)(c). The court concluded that the legislature did not intend for all reckless use of a deadly weapon to constitute "extreme indifference." Instead, it associated "extreme indifference" with conduct presenting a greater risk to human life than ordinary recklessness, such as shooting a firearm in the direction and range of others or materially increasing the risk of accidental discharge.The court found that the defendant's conduct did not meet this standard. The defendant's actions, while reckless, did not materially increase the risk of accidental discharge beyond the inherent risk of handling a loaded gun in public. Consequently, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of conviction for third-degree assault. The case was remanded to the circuit court for entry of conviction for the lesser-included offense of fourth-degree assault and for resentencing. View "State v. Giron-Cortez" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law