Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
State v. Lee
An informant informed law enforcement that a person named "Tom Collins" was dealing heroin from a residence in Albany, Oregon. Detectives planned to use the informant in a controlled buy at the residence. Instead of waiting for the results of the controlled buy to apply for a warrant, the detectives applied for and obtained a search warrant that anticipated the controlled buy. The state argued that the warrant was an "anticipatory warrant" as approved by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Grubbs. The defendant argued that such warrants are incompatible with Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.The Linn County Circuit Court denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search, ruling that anticipatory warrants were valid under both the Oregon and U.S. Constitutions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that anticipatory warrants were permissible under Article I, section 9, and that the affidavit established probable cause.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and declined to address the constitutional question. Instead, the court focused on Oregon's statutory warrant requirements, specifically ORS 133.555(2) and ORS 133.545(6). The court concluded that the affidavit in support of the warrant failed to comply with ORS 133.545(6), which requires that the facts and circumstances show that the objects of the search are in the places to be searched at the time of the warrant's issuance. As a result, the warrant did not comply with ORS 133.555(2), and the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress.The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court, remanding the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "State v. Lee" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
State v. Akins
The case involves allegations of child sexual abuse against the defendant, who was accused by his daughter, M, of sexually abusing her when she was between 5 and 10 years old. M disclosed the abuse to her mother when she was 15, leading to an investigation and charges against the defendant. The defendant sought to exclude expert testimony on delayed reporting of abuse and out-of-court statements made by M when she was a child.The Clackamas County Circuit Court denied the defendant's pretrial motions to exclude the expert testimony and the out-of-court statements. The jury convicted the defendant on all charges. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, relying on its own precedents regarding the admissibility of such evidence.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that expert testimony on delayed reporting of abuse is admissible to help the jury assess the victim's credibility, even if the defendant does not argue that the delay undermines the victim's credibility. The court also held that out-of-court statements made by a child victim of sexual abuse are admissible under OEC 803(18a)(b) if the victim testifies at trial, regardless of the victim's age at the time of trial. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in admitting the expert testimony and the out-of-court statements. View "State v. Akins" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law, Personal Injury
Twigg v. Admiral Ins. Co.
In this case, the plaintiffs, Weston and Carrie Twigg, hired Rainier Pacific Development LLC to build a home. After taking possession, they discovered various construction defects, including issues with the garage floor. Rainier Pacific agreed to make repairs, but failed to meet deadlines, leading to arbitration. The parties settled through a "Repair Agreement," but Rainier Pacific's subsequent repairs were also defective, prompting the Twiggs to reinitiate arbitration. The arbitrator found Rainier Pacific's work defective and awarded the Twiggs $150,000 for the garage floor repairs.The Multnomah County Circuit Court granted summary judgment to Admiral Insurance Company, Rainier Pacific's insurer, concluding that the damages did not arise from an "accident" as required by the commercial general liability (CGL) policy. The court relied on the precedent set by Oak Crest Construction Co. v. Austin Mutual Insurance Co., which held that damages solely from a breach of contract do not qualify as an "accident."The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that the damages arose solely from a breach of contract and not from an "accident" as defined by the CGL policy. The court emphasized that the Twiggs had not contended that Rainier Pacific's liability arose from a separate duty of care, i.e., a tort.The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and the trial court's decisions. The Supreme Court held that whether an insurance claim seeks recovery for an "accident" does not depend on the plaintiff's pleading decisions but on whether there is a factual basis for imposing tort liability. The court found that there were material factual disputes regarding whether Rainier Pacific's defective work constituted an "accident" under the CGL policy. Therefore, the case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Twigg v. Admiral Ins. Co." on Justia Law
Oregon-Columbia Chapter Associated General Contractors of America v. Department of Transportation
The case involves a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by the Oregon State Building and Construction Trades Council (OBTC) against a preliminary injunction issued by the Marion County Circuit Court. The injunction was part of a public contracting dispute between the Oregon-Columbia Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America (AGC) and the Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT). AGC challenged the process used by ODOT to set the terms of "community benefit contracts" for certain highway improvement projects under ORS 279C.308.The Marion County Circuit Court issued a preliminary injunction preventing ODOT from using the terms of a Community Workforce Agreement (CWA) in any projects while AGC's challenge to the validity of the CWA under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) was pending before the Oregon Court of Appeals. AGC had filed three cases: one in the circuit court and two petitions for judicial review in the Court of Appeals. The circuit court case sought declaratory relief and an injunction against ODOT's use of the CWA. The Court of Appeals certified the case challenging the CWA's validity to the Oregon Supreme Court, which accepted the certification.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and decided the challenge to the validity of the CWA in a related case, Oregon-Columbia Chapter of AGC v. ODOT. As a result, the preliminary injunction issued by the circuit court expired, rendering OBTC's request for mandamus relief moot. Consequently, the Oregon Supreme Court dismissed the petition for a writ of mandamus. View "Oregon-Columbia Chapter Associated General Contractors of America v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law
Oregon-Columbia Chapter Associated General Contractors of America v. Department of Transportation
The Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT) established terms for "community benefit contracts" for certain highway improvement projects, which included provisions for contractor training, use of apprentices, and employer-paid family health insurance. ODOT negotiated and signed a "Community Workforce Agreement" (CWA) with various trades councils and labor unions to include these terms in its contracts.The Oregon-Columbia Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America (AGC) challenged the validity of the CWA in the Court of Appeals, arguing that it constituted a "rule" under Oregon's Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and that ODOT was required to follow the APA's notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures before adopting it. ODOT acknowledged it did not follow these procedures but contended that the CWA was not a "rule." The Court of Appeals certified the case to the Oregon Supreme Court.The Oregon Supreme Court held that the CWA is a "rule" under the APA because it is a statement of general applicability that prescribes ODOT's policies for its community benefit program. The court noted that the CWA applies to all current and future ODOT community benefit projects, making it generally applicable. The court concluded that ODOT was required to follow the APA's notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures before adopting the CWA. As ODOT did not comply with these procedures, the court declared the CWA invalid as an invalidly promulgated rule. View "Oregon-Columbia Chapter Associated General Contractors of America v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Government & Administrative Law
Continental Casualty Co. v. Argonaut Insurance Co.
The case involves an insurance contribution action under the Oregon Environmental Cleanup Assistance Act (OECAA). The parties are insurers who issued comprehensive general liability (CGL) insurance policies to Schnitzer Steel Industries, Inc., and Schnitzer Investment Corporation. Schnitzer was named by the federal government as potentially responsible for contamination at the Portland Harbor Superfund Site. Continental Casualty Company and Transportation Insurance Company (together, Continental) paid defense costs on behalf of Schnitzer and sought contribution from Schnitzer’s other insurers, including Employers Insurance Company of Wausau (Wausau) and Century Indemnity Company (Century).The Multnomah County Circuit Court ruled that Wausau was still liable for contribution despite a settlement agreement with Schnitzer. The court found that Schnitzer had already obtained a federal judgment against Continental for all unpaid defense costs, and thus Schnitzer no longer had a claim for those costs against Wausau. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Wausau’s settlement with Schnitzer was a settlement of the environmental claim, which barred Continental’s contribution claim.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the term "the environmental claim" in ORS 465.480(4)(a) refers to the specific environmental claim that has been paid by the targeted insurer. Since Schnitzer had already recovered the defense costs from Continental, Schnitzer had no remaining claim for those costs against Wausau that it could settle. Therefore, Wausau’s settlement did not extinguish Continental’s right to seek contribution for the defense costs it had paid. The judgment of the circuit court was affirmed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Continental Casualty Co. v. Argonaut Insurance Co." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Environmental Law, Insurance Law
State v. Cotter
The defendant was charged with reckless driving and recklessly endangering another person. Unable to secure counsel, the defendant represented himself at trial, where his arguments were not responsive to the charges, leading to his conviction by a jury. On appeal, the defendant continued to represent himself, filing a pro se brief with arguments similar to those made at trial. The state interpreted the brief as challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions in a nonprecedential opinion.After the defendant was appointed appellate counsel in a separate case, the Court of Appeals also appointed counsel for this case. However, the case had already been submitted for decision. The appellate counsel filed an emergency motion to withdraw the case from submission to file a brief, arguing that the defendant had not validly waived his right to counsel and that the trial court erred in not ordering a competency evaluation. The Court of Appeals denied the motion but invited a petition for reconsideration, which was also denied.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and allowed the petition for review. The court granted the joint motion for remand, vacating the Court of Appeals' decision and the circuit court’s judgment of conviction. The Supreme Court agreed with the parties that the record did not show the defendant had validly waived his right to counsel, as there was no colloquy or indication of a knowing and intelligent waiver. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings, ensuring the defendant's right to a new trial with proper legal representation. View "State v. Cotter" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Bohr v. Tillamook County Creamery Assn.
Plaintiffs in this case are four Oregon residents who filed a putative class action against Tillamook County Creamery Association (Tillamook) under Oregon’s Unlawful Trade Practices Act (UTPA). They allege that Tillamook falsely represented the nature and origin of its dairy products, claiming they were sourced from small, family-owned farms in Tillamook County, while most of the milk actually came from a large factory farm in eastern Oregon. Plaintiffs argue that these misrepresentations led consumers to suffer economic harm by purchasing products they otherwise would not have bought or by paying inflated prices.The Multnomah County Circuit Court partially granted Tillamook’s motion to dismiss, ruling that plaintiffs must plead that Tillamook’s false representations were observed and relied upon by anyone seeking recovery. The court dismissed the claims based on a price-inflation theory and a prohibited-transaction theory, reasoning that the class must be limited to consumers who purchased Tillamook products in reliance on the marketing representations.The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, concluding that plaintiffs’ UTPA claim required them to plead reliance on Tillamook’s representations. The court rejected the price-inflation theory, likening it to the fraud-on-the-market theory used in securities fraud cases, and found it inapplicable to consumer goods. The court also determined that the prohibited-transaction theory required proof of reliance, as the claimed loss was the purchase price resulting from misrepresentations.The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision, holding that plaintiffs’ premium-price theory and prohibited-transaction theory do not require pleading reliance. The court explained that the premium-price theory alleges that Tillamook’s deceptive marketing inflated the market value of its products, causing all purchasers to pay higher prices, regardless of individual reliance. Similarly, the prohibited-transaction theory claims that plaintiffs suffered loss by purchasing misbranded or falsely advertised products, which does not depend on consumers’ awareness of the misrepresentations. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "Bohr v. Tillamook County Creamery Assn." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Class Action, Consumer Law
Bellshaw v. Farmers Ins. Co.
The case involves a dispute between an individual plaintiff and Farmers Insurance Company of Oregon regarding the adequacy of a notice provided by the insurer. The plaintiff alleged that the notice issued by Farmers did not include all the required information as mandated by Oregon law, specifically ORS 746.290(2), which requires motor vehicle insurers to provide a notice with certain information in clear and conspicuous language approved by the director of the Department of Consumer and Business Services (DCBS).The Multnomah County Circuit Court agreed with the plaintiff's interpretation of the statute, granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and denying Farmers' motion. The court held that Farmers had violated ORS 746.290(2) because the notice omitted required information, despite being approved by the director. The Court of Appeals upheld this ruling, reasoning that the statute did not delegate authority to the director to determine what is necessary to comply with the statute.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court. The Supreme Court held that the legislature intended for insurers to be able to rely on the director's approval to ensure compliance with the statute. Therefore, an insurer satisfies its obligation under ORS 746.290(2) if it uses language approved by the director, regardless of whether the approved language includes all the information described in the statute. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. View "Bellshaw v. Farmers Ins. Co." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Insurance Law
Gilbert v. Dept. of Energy
Petitioners challenged an amendment to the energy facility site certificate for constructing a high-voltage electrical transmission line from Boardman, Oregon, to Hemingway, Idaho. The Energy Facility Siting Council (EFSC) had previously approved the original site certificate, which was affirmed by the court in Stop B2H Coalition v. Dept. of Energy. EFSC later approved Idaho Power’s request to amend the site certificate, expanding the site boundary and making other changes. Petitioners contested the process EFSC followed and the substance of the amendment, arguing they were entitled to a contested case proceeding and that the amendment did not comply with legal protections for watersheds and wildlife habitats.The lower court, EFSC, denied petitioners’ requests for contested case proceedings and approved the amendment. Petitioners then sought judicial review, contending that the circuit court had jurisdiction over their process challenge and that EFSC’s decisions were substantively flawed.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case and held that it had jurisdiction to address the process challenge. The court found that EFSC did not err in denying the contested case proceedings, as the issues raised by petitioners were either untimely or did not present significant issues of fact or law. The court also rejected the substantive challenges, concluding that the bond requirements were adequately addressed in the original site certificate and that the expanded site boundary did not permit construction outside the micrositing corridors without further review.The Supreme Court affirmed EFSC’s final order approving the amended site certificate, holding that EFSC’s decisions were legally sound and supported by substantial evidence. View "Gilbert v. Dept. of Energy" on Justia Law