Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A man was charged with several sexual offenses after his former partner alleged that he had assaulted her on two occasions at her mother’s house. The complainant did not immediately seek medical attention or report the incident to law enforcement, waiting about 12 days before making a report. During the investigation, a sheriff’s deputy assisted in arranging a pretext video call between the complainant and the defendant, which was recorded. At trial, the state presented testimony from the complainant and a friend to whom the complainant had allegedly texted immediately after the incident. The state did not introduce any text messages or call the investigating deputy as a witness. The defense did not cross-examine the complainant’s friend or the complainant about the texts, and, although the deputy was subpoenaed, the defense did not call her to testify.After the jury found the defendant guilty on one count and acquitted him of the other charges, the defendant appealed to the Oregon Court of Appeals. He argued that the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument improperly shifted the burden of proof by suggesting to the jury that the defendant could have elicited additional evidence through cross-examination of the state’s witnesses. The Court of Appeals agreed, finding that such comments amounted to impermissible burden-shifting and were not harmless, and reversed the conviction.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court held that the prosecutor’s comments during rebuttal, which implied that the defendant had an obligation to cross-examine state witnesses to present additional evidence, were improper and inconsistent with the allocation of the burden of proof in criminal cases. The court concluded that these comments were prejudicial, as they undermined the defendant’s presumption of innocence, particularly in a case dependent on witness credibility. The circuit court’s judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Strain" on Justia Law

A man previously convicted of a felony sex crime in another state moved to Oregon and became subject to Oregon’s sex offender registration requirements. These requirements mandated that he report within ten days of any change in residence and annually within ten days of his birthday. In early 2019, the man was in the process of moving from Albany to Lebanon, Oregon. He attempted to report this change at the Lebanon Police Department before and after his birthday but was told to report in Albany. On February 15, he reported at the Albany police station, stating he was moving but had not yet completed his move. He signed an annual report listing his Albany address. Later, police stopped him in May and arrested him for failing to report his change of residence within ten days, after learning his registration still listed the Albany address though he was living in Lebanon.The Linn County Circuit Court denied his motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds and his motion for judgment of acquittal, after he argued that the state was pursuing a different factual theory than the evidence showed. The jury convicted him. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the state needed to prove he failed to report on the exact date in the indictment, but found sufficient evidence supporting the conviction based on the record.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon affirmed the decisions below, but for different reasons. It held that the state was bound by its choice at trial to proceed on the theory that the defendant changed residence after his February 15 annual report. The Court further held that while the passage of ten days after a change of residence is a material element of the crime, the state is not required to prove that the offense occurred on the exact date listed in the indictment. Because evidence showed the defendant changed residence after February 15 and failed to report within ten days, the conviction was upheld. View "State v. Ribas" on Justia Law

A worker was severely injured while operating a bulldozer during a nighttime firefighting operation on a fire line managed by the Oregon Department of Forestry. At the time, he was employed by a private company under contract with the state and received workers’ compensation benefits for his injuries. He also filed a lawsuit alleging that two state employees supervising the site had negligently directed operations, resulting in his injuries. The complaint sought damages from the employees and the State of Oregon, which was alleged to be vicariously liable.The Jackson County Circuit Court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against the individual state employees based on a provision of the Oregon Tort Claims Act, ORS 30.265(3), making the state the sole defendant. The court also dismissed the claims against the state under ORS 30.265(6)(a), which grants immunity to public bodies and their employees against tort claims when the injured party is covered by workers’ compensation. However, the court allowed the plaintiff’s wife’s loss of consortium claim to proceed. On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that the statutory immunity barred the plaintiff’s claims and did not violate the remedy clause of the Oregon Constitution.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case and reversed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the circuit court. The court held that the statutory immunity provision in ORS 30.265(6)(a), which entirely bars a common-law negligence action by a privately employed worker injured by a negligent state employee, exceeds the limits imposed by Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution. The court concluded that this statutory immunity unconstitutionally denies such injured persons a substantive right to a remedy by due course of law and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Crandall v. State of Oregon" on Justia Law

A motel guest noticed a person he did not know walking alongside him as he retrieved an item from his car. When the guest returned to the motel entrance, he used his keycard to unlock the door. At that moment, the other individual quickly grabbed the keycard from the guest’s hand and ran into the motel. The guest followed, asking the individual to go to the front desk to resolve the situation. The individual instead threw the keycard, ran out, and was later found exiting a motel room that was not his. After a short chase, the guest and a motel manager detained him until the police arrived. Throughout the encounter, there were no threats or other contact beyond the grabbing of the keycard.The case was tried in the Baker County Circuit Court, where the defendant was charged with third-degree robbery under Oregon law, which requires the use or threatened use of physical force upon another person during a theft. The defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the evidence did not show he used or threatened “physical force.” The trial court denied this motion, relying on prior Oregon Court of Appeals precedent interpreting “physical force” broadly. The defendant was convicted. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding its own precedent controlled.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case. The court held that the legislature intended “physical force upon another person” in the robbery statute to mean contact that either causes bodily harm or is reasonably capable of creating a sense of fear or danger that such harm will occur. The court found that the defendant’s actions—quickly grabbing the keycard without other contact or threat—did not meet that standard. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the lower courts and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

The plaintiff shot and killed her uncle outside her grandmother’s house, claiming ongoing abuse and financial exploitation. She recorded the incident on her cellphone, which was seized and later returned by police, who did not review the video. After being charged with manslaughter and released on bail, the trial court appointed the defendant as her new criminal defense attorney. The plaintiff informed the defendant about the video and gave him her cellphone. Without her consent, the defendant sent the video to the district attorney, who then presented it to a grand jury, resulting in an amended indictment for murder. Her bail was revoked due to the murder charge, leading to 20 months of pretrial incarceration. The defendant subsequently withdrew from the case; the murder charge was later dismissed, and the plaintiff pleaded guilty to second-degree manslaughter.In Jackson County Circuit Court, the defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing under Stevens v. Bispham, 316 Or 221 (1993), that the plaintiff had not suffered “legally cognizable harm” because she had not been exonerated of her crime. The circuit court granted the motion, and the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that exoneration was a necessary element for a legal malpractice claim following a criminal conviction.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case and reversed both lower courts. It held that Stevens applies only when the alleged harm is the conviction itself or flows from the conviction. Here, the plaintiff alleged harms unrelated to her conviction, such as reputational damage, emotional distress, and economic losses from being charged with murder and pretrial incarceration. The court concluded that a legal malpractice plaintiff need not always allege exoneration to state a claim when the alleged attorney negligence caused harm independent of the conviction. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Moore-Reed v. Griffin" on Justia Law

A man was convicted in 2014 of multiple sex crimes, including rape and sodomy, against a single victim. The prosecution’s case at trial relied on the victim’s testimony, testimony from eyewitnesses who interacted with the victim immediately after the incident, medical and forensic evidence, and a codefendant’s statements. The defendant testified, asserting that the sexual activity was consensual but admitting to having lied to police. The jury found him guilty of several charges, and he was sentenced to 575 months in prison. The Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions, and the Oregon Supreme Court declined review.Subsequently, the defendant pursued post-conviction relief in Marion County Circuit Court, first on various grounds (without asserting actual innocence), and later, in a second petition, on the basis of newly discovered evidence—a sworn recantation by the victim stating that the sexual acts had been consensual and her prior testimony was false. The state moved to dismiss this second petition, arguing that Oregon’s Post-Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA) does not recognize “actual innocence” as a standalone ground for relief. The post-conviction court agreed and dismissed the petition with prejudice, finding no authority for a freestanding innocence claim.The petitioner then sought mandamus relief from the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon, asking it to direct the lower court to vacate its dismissal. The Oregon Supreme Court held that the PCHA does not provide a remedy for claims based solely on newly discovered evidence, such as a recantation, unless there is an allegation that the prosecution knowingly presented or failed to correct false testimony. Because the petitioner did not allege prosecutorial misconduct, the court concluded the post-conviction court was not required by law to deny the state’s motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Oregon dismissed the alternative writ of mandamus. View "Perkins v. Fhuere" on Justia Law

A group of medical professionals and a pharmacy were alleged to have negligently prescribed and dispensed controlled substances to a patient with a history of substance abuse. The patient, while impaired by these drugs, drove her vehicle, crossed the center line, and fatally struck a cyclist. The personal representative of the cyclist’s estate brought wrongful death claims against the patient and the medical providers, asserting that the providers’ negligence foreseeably led to the fatal collision.In the Deschutes County Circuit Court, the medical providers and pharmacy moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that, under Oregon law, medical professionals can only be liable in negligence to their own patients or those with whom they have a special relationship, not to third parties like the deceased cyclist. The trial court agreed, relying in part on prior Supreme Court precedent, and dismissed the claims against these defendants. The plaintiff appealed, and the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the complaint stated a claim for relief under ordinary negligence principles, finding that prior case law did not bar such claims.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Supreme Court held that, under Oregon’s common-law negligence principles, a plaintiff can state a claim against medical professionals for physical harm to nonpatients if the professionals’ conduct unreasonably created a foreseeable risk of the kind of harm that occurred. The Court rejected the argument that liability should be limited only to patients or those with a special relationship, declining to create an exception for medical professionals. The Court reversed the circuit court’s limited judgments and remanded for further proceedings, clarifying that ordinary negligence liability extends to foreseeable physical harm to nonpatients caused by medical professionals’ unreasonable conduct. View "Stone v. Witt" on Justia Law

An individual went to a police station to report being assaulted, and officers responded to take his statement. While at the hospital, where the individual had been transported, officers observed that he was intoxicated and later placed him in custody for transport to a detoxification facility under Oregon’s civil detox statutes. The individual had a backpack with him. During an inventory of his property, an officer opened the closed, opaque backpack and discovered a butterfly knife, which led to a criminal history check and a subsequent arrest for possession of a restricted weapon.Initially, the Washington County Circuit Court denied a motion to suppress evidence from the backpack. On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals upheld both the seizure and the inventory search of the backpack, reasoning that, under established case law, police could open closed, opaque containers likely to contain valuables if done pursuant to a lawful inventory policy. The Court of Appeals relied heavily on its prior decisions, concluding the inventory search was permissible under the relevant county ordinance and inventory policy.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case. It held that, under Article I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution, inventory searches of closed, opaque containers that do not announce their contents are not permitted when a person is taken into custody on a civil detox hold, even if executed under a valid, non-discretionary inventory policy. The court emphasized that in the civil detox context, compliance with an inventory policy does not alone render such a search reasonable; privacy interests and the non-criminal nature of the detention require a higher level of protection. The Supreme Court of Oregon reversed the decisions of the lower courts and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Wilcox" on Justia Law

The petitioner was serving two probation terms following no contest pleas to computer crime, burglary, and criminal mischief. As a condition of probation, he was prohibited from possessing “weapons, firearms or dangerous animals.” During a scheduled probation meeting, his officer noticed a knife handle protruding from his backpack. The knife was described as a nine-inch steak knife with a rounded tip. The officer arrested the petitioner and reported a probation violation, alleging that possession of the knife breached the weapons condition. The petitioner argued that the knife was an essential eating tool, not a weapon, given his unhoused status.At the Washington County Circuit Court probation violation hearing, the probation officer testified that “anything that can cause harm” was considered a weapon and that the office’s notice defined “all knives” as weapons. The petitioner argued that the statutory condition did not cover utility knives like steak knives. The trial court found a violation, concluding that the knife was clearly a weapon under the probation provision, and imposed a 30-day jail sentence without revoking probation. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment without opinion.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed whether possession of a steak knife constituted a violation of the probation weapons condition under ORS 137.540(1)(j). The court held that “weapons,” as used in the statute, refers only to instruments designed primarily for offensive or defensive combat or those reasonably recognized as having substantially the same character—not to tools designed primarily for utility, even if such tools could be used as weapons. The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the circuit court, remanding the case for further factual inquiry consistent with this interpretation. View "State v. Cortes" on Justia Law

The defendant was accused of unauthorized use of a U-Haul truck. She had rented the truck in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and drove it to Oregon, where she lived in it for several weeks. The truck was later reported stolen and found with the defendant inside. The prosecution's case relied on a photograph of a rental agreement that purportedly bore the defendant’s signature, indicating a one-day rental. The defendant, however, denied signing the contract, claimed she was not shown the contract, and asserted that the signature was not hers. She also testified that she had rented the truck for 30 days and provided evidence that the U-Haul database only contained an unsigned version of the contract.After a first trial ended in a hung jury, the case was retried in Curry County Circuit Court. Before the retrial, the state sought to admit the photograph of the signed agreement, rather than the original document. The defendant objected, citing the best evidence rule under OEC 1002 and arguing that, under OEC 1003(1), a duplicate is inadmissible when a genuine question is raised about the authenticity of the original. The trial court ruled that the duplicate was admissible and allowed the photograph. The jury convicted the defendant. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the defendant’s denial of signing was insufficient to raise a “genuine question” as to authenticity.Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon held that a genuine question under OEC 1003(1) is raised when there is evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that the original is not authentic. The court found the defendant’s testimony and supporting evidence sufficient to raise such a question, making the admission of the photograph in error. The court further held the error was not harmless, as the photograph was central to the state’s case. The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the circuit court, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Blue" on Justia Law