Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Taxpayer Leslie Scott appealed a tax court judgment that dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In 2012, the Department of Revenue issued notices of deficiency assessments against taxpayer relating to his personal income taxes for the tax years 2007 and 2008. Taxpayer appealed, and the Magistrate Division of the Tax Court determined that taxpayer had substantiated some claimed deductions that the department had disputed, but also that he had additional unreported income. Following the proceedings in the Magistrate Division, the department assessed additional income taxes for 2007 and 2008, and issued notices of liability balances to that effect. Taxpayer appealed to the Regular Division. The Tax Court received taxpayer’s complaint, a declaration of mailing, a motion for a stay of the requirement to pay the taxes owed, and the filing fee for the complaint. The Tax Court did not, however, receive an affidavit, with the complaint, alleging that payment of the disputed amounts pending appeal would cause him undue hardship. The department moved to dismiss taxpayer’s complaint on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter because taxpayer had not complied with the requirements of ORS 305.419 and TCR 18 C. Taxpayer opposed the department’s motion and submitted a declaration by his counsel that, according to counsel’s recollection, he had printed and assembled a packet for mailing to the Tax Court that included a complaint, a declaration of mailing, a motion for a stay, a hardship declaration, and a filing fee. Ultimately, the Tax Court granted the department’s motion. The Supreme Court reversed. "We hesitate to deem as jurisdictional a statutory requirement that is designed to allow someone without funds access to the courts to pursue their statutory appeal rights. […] what makes the taxpayer’s complaint subject to dismissal is the failure to establish undue hardship, not the failure to file an affidavit with the complaint." The Supreme Court concluded the Tax Court erred in dismissing taxpayer’s appeal on that ground. View "Scott v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

At issue before the Oregon Supreme Court in this matter was ORS 471.565(2), which provided an independent statutory right of action against a social host who served alcohol to a visibly intoxicated guest, who in turn caused injuries to a third party. Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sued the driver of the other vehicle, Defendant Diana Bunch, and the social host who served that driver, defendant Jeffrey King. Plaintiff asserted two claims against the social host: (1) for common-law negligence; and (2,at issue in this appeal) statutory liability. In the common-law negligence claim, plaintiff alleged that King was negligent in serving alcohol to his visibly intoxicated guest at his home when it was reasonably foreseeable that she would drive her vehicle and cause injury to persons on the roadway. In his statutory liability claim, plaintiff alleged that defendant was statutorily liable for serving alcohol to the guest in violation of ORS 471.565(2) Defendant filed a pretrial motion to dismiss plaintiff’s statutory liability claim for failure to allege ultimate facts sufficient to state a claim for relief. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and the case was tried solely on the common-law negligence claim, resulting in a jury verdict for defendant. Plaintiff appealed, arguing it was error to dismiss the statutory liability claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that in enacting ORS 471.565(2), the legislature intended to impose statutory liability on social hosts for serving visibly intoxicated guests. The appellate court also rejected defendant’s argument that any error in dismissing the statutory liability claim was rendered harmless by the jury instructions that the trial court gave. The Supreme Court concluded that ORS 471.565(2) does not provide a statutory liability claim against alcohol providers that exists independently from a claim for common-law negligence. Therefore, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the circuit court. View "Deckard v. Bunch" on Justia Law

TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., and its directors were defendants in two consolidated shareholder derivative suits filed in Washington State. TriQuint moved to dismiss those suits on the ground that its corporate bylaws establish Delaware as the exclusive forum for shareholder derivative suits. The trial court denied TriQuint’s motion to dismiss, and the Supreme Court allowed TriQuint’s petition for an alternative writ of mandamus. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that, as a matter of Delaware law, TriQuint’s bylaw was a valid forum-selection clause and bound its shareholders. The Court also concluded that, as a matter of Oregon law, the bylaw was enforceable. The Court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus directing the trial court to grant TriQuint’s motion to dismiss. View "Roberts v. TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue presented in this case was one of first impression: to what extent do the confidentiality provisions of Oregon’s mediation statutes (ORS 36.100 to 36.238) prevent a client from offering evidence of communications made by his attorney and others in a subsequent malpractice action against that attorney? Plaintiff retained defendant, an attorney specializing in employment law, to pursue discrimination and retaliation claims against plaintiff’s former employer. In the course of that representation, defendant filed administrative complaints with the Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries and thereafter a civil action against the former employer for damages on plaintiff’s behalf. After limited discovery, plaintiff, represented by defendant, and plaintiff’s former employer entered into mediation under the terms and conditions set forth in the mediation statutes. Before meeting with the mediator and plaintiff’s former employer, defendant advised plaintiff about the potential value of his claims and the amount for which he might settle the lawsuit. Plaintiff and his former employer, along with their respective lawyers and the mediator, attended a joint mediation session and attempted to resolve the dispute. However, no resolution was reached. After the session ended, the mediator proposed a settlement package to the parties. In the weeks that followed, defendant provided advice to plaintiff about the proposed settlement. At defendant’s urging, plaintiff accepted the proposed terms and signed a settlement agreement with his former employer. One of the terms to which plaintiff agreed was that the settlement agreement would be confidential. After the parties signed the agreement, defendant continued to counsel plaintiff and provide legal advice regarding the settlement. Some months after the mediation ended, plaintiff concluded that defendant’s legal representation had been deficient and negatively affected the outcome of his case. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to strike certain allegations in plaintiff’s complaint and then dismissed the complaint with prejudice under ORCP 21 A(8) for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that ORS 36.220 and 36.222 barred some, but not all, of plaintiff’s allegations, and that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice before a responsive pleading had been filed. The Supreme Court agreed that ORS 36.220 and 36.222 limited the subsequent disclosure of mediation settlement terms and certain communications that occur in the course of or in connection with mediation. The Court disagreed, however, as to the scope of communications that are confidential under those statutes. Furthermore, the Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals as to whether the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice because no responsive pleading had been filed. The Court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "Alfieri v. Solomon" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that, after being served alcohol at defendant’s bar when he was visibly intoxicated, a patron, Mayfield, walked down the street to another business location and, without intending to do so, fired a gun through the doorway, causing injuries to plaintiffs. The trial court granted defendant’s summary judgment motion, concluding that plaintiffs had presented insufficient evidence to permit an inference that the type of harm that plaintiffs suffered was reasonably foreseeable to defendant when it served alcohol to Mayfield while he was visibly intoxicated. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the ensuing judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ claim against defendant. On review, the Supreme Court concluded plaintiffs’ evidence was not sufficient to permit a trier of fact to find that the harm that plaintiffs suffered was a reasonably foreseeable risk of defendant’s conduct. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court and the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Chapman v. Mayfield" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were two individuals who purchased Marlboro Light cigarettes in Oregon. Defendant Philip Morris was the company that manufactured, marketed, and sold Marlboro Lights. Plaintiffs brought this action under Oregon’s Unlawful Trade Practices Act (UTPA), alleging that defendant misrepresented that Marlboro Lights would deliver less tar and nicotine than regular Marlboros and that, as a result of that misrepresentation, plaintiffs suffered economic losses. Plaintiffs moved to certify a class consisting of approximately 100,000 individuals who had purchased at least one pack of Marlboro Lights in Oregon over a 30-year period (from 1971 to 2001). The trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion after concluding that individual inquiries so predominated over common ones that a class action was not a superior means to adjudicate the putative class’s UTPA claim. On appeal, a majority of the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court’s predominance assessment, concluding that the essential elements of the UTPA claim could be proved through evidence common to the class. The majority remanded to the trial court to reconsider whether, without the trial court’s predominance assessment, a class action was a superior means of litigating the class claims. In granting defendant’s petition for review, the Supreme Court considered whether common issues predominated for purposes of the class action certification decision, and what a private plaintiff in a UTPA case of this nature had to prove. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court properly denied class certification, and accordingly, it reversed the contrary decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on the individual plaintiffs’ claims. View "Pearson v. Philip Morris, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants were in the business of processing and selling industrial wood products and maintained a large inventory at numerous distribution centers throughout the United States. In 2002, defendants and plaintiffs entered into an asset purchase agreement (PA), which provided for the merger of the two companies, changes in personnel, and until plaintiffs' purchase of an inventory unit, plaintiffs, for a fee, would provide defendants with "all management and administrative services associated with purchasing, processing, and maintaining [defendants'] inventory." In 2003, plaintiffs' books were audited by a certified public accountant, Schmidt. Schmidt found unusual entries in the books and many entries that did not appear to be related to normal inventory activity. After Schmidt completed his work on defendants' books, the bookkeeper who was employed by plaintiffs but was providing inventory-related services to defendants, was discovered to have embezzled at least $360,000 from defendants' accounts. Three legal actions (including this case) ensued. The issue on review in this case was whether the trial court erred in denying defendants' motion for a new trial under ORCP 64 (B)(4),2 based on the asserted ground of newly discovered evidence. The trial court determined that defendants' proffered evidence did not satisfy the legal standard for granting a new trial under that rule. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that defendants' post-trial proffer qualified as newly discovered evidence, that the evidence was material for defendants, and that defendants exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to produce the evidence at trial. Because the Supreme Court concluded that, irrespective of whether the proffered evidence was newly discovered and material for defendants, defendants failed to exercise reasonable diligence to produce the evidence at trial. Ultimately, the Court concluded the trial court did not err in denying defendants' motion for a new trial. View "Greenwood Products v. Greenwood Forest Products" on Justia Law

Defendant drove through a stop sign and collided with a car in which plaintiff was a passenger. Plaintiff filed a negligence action, which was tried to a jury of twelve. The trial court instructed the jury that defendant had “admitted liability so that the only issue to be decided by you [. . .] is the amount of the damages to be awarded to the plaintiff.” The court defined both economic and noneconomic damages for the jury. The court told the jury that it should answer the questions on the verdict form “according to the directions on the form and all the instructions of the court.” The court then explained that “[a]t least the same nine jurors must agree on each answer unless the verdict form instructs you otherwise as to a particular question.” After deliberations, the jury returned its verdict. The trial court read the verdict form to the parties and asked the presiding juror whether at least nine jurors had answered Question 2; she answered, “yes, sir.” Defendant asked that the jury be polled. When the court asked each juror whether the vote of $65,386 in economic damages was “your vote,” ten jurors said “yes.” Jurors one and three said “no.” When the court asked whether the vote of $300,000 was “your vote,” nine jurors said “yes”; jurors two, three, and twelve said “no.” The court indicated that it would accept the verdict and thanked the jurors for their service. Defendant then asked the court to wait, stating, “I don’t think there’s nine agreeing, if I counted right.” The court stated that it counted ten jurors agreeing on economic damages and nine agreeing on noneconomic damages. After the jury was discharged, defendant took exception for the record: looking for nine common people on economic and noneconomic, I add that up as only being eight people who agree." The trial judge replied: I agree with you that there were only eight that answered yes to the same—for the economic and noneconomic damages that answered the same way, and if your theory is that the same nine had to vote on both, then that will have to go up for the appeal…" Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the jury's verdict met the requirements of Oregon law. The Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the trial court. View "Kennedy v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

In this case, the trial court granted wife’s petition for a restraining order against husband and entered that order in the trial court register on May 9, 2013. On June 10 2013, husband’s attorney filed a notice of appeal and served a copy of that notice by mailing it to wife. Husband’s attorney did not serve a copy of the notice on wife’s attorney, even though ORCP 9 B required him to do so. Eight days later, the Court of Appeals sent a "deficiency notice" to husband stating that the case caption in the notice of appeal was incorrect. The Court of Appeals sent a copy of the deficiency notice to wife, who emailed a picture of it to her attorney. Shortly after wife’s attorney learned that husband had filed a notice of appeal, wife moved to dismiss husband’s appeal because the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction. The Appellate Commissioner agreed and dismissed husband’s appeal. The Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals denied husband’s motion for reconsideration, and the Supreme Court allowed husband’s petition for review to consider whether his failure to comply with ORCP 9 B was a jurisdictional defect. On review, husband noted that the plain text of the jurisdictional statutes required that an appellant serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the other "parties" to the case. In husband’s view, those statutes define what a party must do to confer jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals, and he complied with them. He timely served the only other "party" to the action (his wife) with a copy of the notice of appeal. In its analysis of the controlling case law pertinent to this case, the Supreme Court ultimately agreed with the Court of Appeals and affirmed its dismissal of husband's appeal. View "J. A. H. v. Heikkila" on Justia Law

Davis Wright Tremaine LLP ("DWT") challenged a trial court order compelling production of certain materials that, in DWT’s view, were protected under the attorney-client privilege. The trial court issued the order in the context of a legal malpractice action against DWT by a former client. The materials that are the subject of the order are communications between DWT’s designated in-house counsel and the lawyers in the firm who had represented the former client, and concern how actual and potential conflicts between the lawyers and the former client should have been handled. The trial court concluded that all but three of the communications with the firm’s in-house counsel ordinarily would have been covered by the attorney-client privilege, but the court recognized a “fiduciary exception” to the attorney-client privilege, which arose out of the fact that the firm was attempting to shield its internal communications from a former client. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court correctly determined that the attorney-client privilege as defined in OEC 503 applied to communications between lawyers in a firm and in-house counsel. However, the trial court erred in recognizing an exception to OEC 503 that the legislature did not adopt in the terms of that rule. Accordingly, the Supreme Court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to vacate its order compelling production of materials related to those communications that it determined were otherwise subject to the attorney-client privilege. View "Crimson Trace Corp. v. Davis Wright Tremaine LLP" on Justia Law