Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant drove through a stop sign and collided with a car in which plaintiff was a passenger. Plaintiff filed a negligence action, which was tried to a jury of twelve. The trial court instructed the jury that defendant had “admitted liability so that the only issue to be decided by you [. . .] is the amount of the damages to be awarded to the plaintiff.” The court defined both economic and noneconomic damages for the jury. The court told the jury that it should answer the questions on the verdict form “according to the directions on the form and all the instructions of the court.” The court then explained that “[a]t least the same nine jurors must agree on each answer unless the verdict form instructs you otherwise as to a particular question.” After deliberations, the jury returned its verdict. The trial court read the verdict form to the parties and asked the presiding juror whether at least nine jurors had answered Question 2; she answered, “yes, sir.” Defendant asked that the jury be polled. When the court asked each juror whether the vote of $65,386 in economic damages was “your vote,” ten jurors said “yes.” Jurors one and three said “no.” When the court asked whether the vote of $300,000 was “your vote,” nine jurors said “yes”; jurors two, three, and twelve said “no.” The court indicated that it would accept the verdict and thanked the jurors for their service. Defendant then asked the court to wait, stating, “I don’t think there’s nine agreeing, if I counted right.” The court stated that it counted ten jurors agreeing on economic damages and nine agreeing on noneconomic damages. After the jury was discharged, defendant took exception for the record: looking for nine common people on economic and noneconomic, I add that up as only being eight people who agree." The trial judge replied: I agree with you that there were only eight that answered yes to the same—for the economic and noneconomic damages that answered the same way, and if your theory is that the same nine had to vote on both, then that will have to go up for the appeal…" Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the jury's verdict met the requirements of Oregon law. The Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the trial court. View "Kennedy v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

In this case, the trial court granted wife’s petition for a restraining order against husband and entered that order in the trial court register on May 9, 2013. On June 10 2013, husband’s attorney filed a notice of appeal and served a copy of that notice by mailing it to wife. Husband’s attorney did not serve a copy of the notice on wife’s attorney, even though ORCP 9 B required him to do so. Eight days later, the Court of Appeals sent a "deficiency notice" to husband stating that the case caption in the notice of appeal was incorrect. The Court of Appeals sent a copy of the deficiency notice to wife, who emailed a picture of it to her attorney. Shortly after wife’s attorney learned that husband had filed a notice of appeal, wife moved to dismiss husband’s appeal because the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction. The Appellate Commissioner agreed and dismissed husband’s appeal. The Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals denied husband’s motion for reconsideration, and the Supreme Court allowed husband’s petition for review to consider whether his failure to comply with ORCP 9 B was a jurisdictional defect. On review, husband noted that the plain text of the jurisdictional statutes required that an appellant serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the other "parties" to the case. In husband’s view, those statutes define what a party must do to confer jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals, and he complied with them. He timely served the only other "party" to the action (his wife) with a copy of the notice of appeal. In its analysis of the controlling case law pertinent to this case, the Supreme Court ultimately agreed with the Court of Appeals and affirmed its dismissal of husband's appeal. View "J. A. H. v. Heikkila" on Justia Law

Davis Wright Tremaine LLP ("DWT") challenged a trial court order compelling production of certain materials that, in DWT’s view, were protected under the attorney-client privilege. The trial court issued the order in the context of a legal malpractice action against DWT by a former client. The materials that are the subject of the order are communications between DWT’s designated in-house counsel and the lawyers in the firm who had represented the former client, and concern how actual and potential conflicts between the lawyers and the former client should have been handled. The trial court concluded that all but three of the communications with the firm’s in-house counsel ordinarily would have been covered by the attorney-client privilege, but the court recognized a “fiduciary exception” to the attorney-client privilege, which arose out of the fact that the firm was attempting to shield its internal communications from a former client. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court correctly determined that the attorney-client privilege as defined in OEC 503 applied to communications between lawyers in a firm and in-house counsel. However, the trial court erred in recognizing an exception to OEC 503 that the legislature did not adopt in the terms of that rule. Accordingly, the Supreme Court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to vacate its order compelling production of materials related to those communications that it determined were otherwise subject to the attorney-client privilege. View "Crimson Trace Corp. v. Davis Wright Tremaine LLP" on Justia Law

The issue in this mandamus proceeding was whether the trial court correctly denied defendants' motion to change venue. Plaintiffs, a husband and wife, initiated a medical malpractice action against defendants in Multnomah County. Defendants argued that venue was in Clackamas County, because that was where the clinic was located, where the doctor who provided the husband's medical services resided, and where the husband received treatment. Plaintiffs argued that venue is proper in Multnomah County, because defendants solicited patients who lived in that county, referred patients to imaging facilities in that county, used medical education programs in that county, and "identified" the clinic's location in its website as the "Portland area." The trial court denied defendants' motion, explaining that defendants, by soliciting patients in Multnomah County, "purposely availed themselves of the court's jurisdiction" in that county. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court mistakenly conflated personal jurisdiction considerations with the statutory requirements for venue and erred in denying defendants' motion. The Court therefore granted defendants relief and granted the writ. View "Kohring v. Ballard" on Justia Law

In this product liability action, plaintiff appealed a judgment for defendants after a jury trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed without considering the merits of nine of plaintiff's ten assignments of instructional and evidentiary error. Plaintiff contended on appeal that, in so holding, the Court of Appeals misconstrued the standard for reversal in ORS 19.415(2) as it applied to claims of instructional and evidentiary error like those that the court declined to consider. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the appellate court erred in its reasoning for not considering all of plaintiff's arguments. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded this case to the Court of Appeals to address plaintiff's assignments of error. View "Purdy v. Deere & Company" on Justia Law