Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves the interpretation of Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) 166.255, which makes it unlawful for a person to possess a firearm or ammunition if they have been convicted of a "qualifying misdemeanor" involving the use or attempted use of physical force. The defendant, Richard Darrel Eggers, was convicted of harassment under ORS 166.065(1)(a)(A) for subjecting his brother to offensive physical contact. The key issue is whether this harassment conviction qualifies as a misdemeanor involving "physical force" under ORS 166.255.The Lane County Circuit Court concluded that harassment did involve physical force and imposed a firearms prohibition on Eggers. The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed this decision, ruling that "offensive physical contact" did not necessarily constitute "physical force" as required by ORS 166.255(3)(e). The state then sought review from the Oregon Supreme Court.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and focused on the statutory construction of ORS 166.255. The court examined the legislative intent behind the statute and noted that the Oregon legislature modeled ORS 166.255 after the federal firearms prohibition in the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). The United States Supreme Court had previously interpreted the term "physical force" in VAWA to include even the slightest offensive touching, akin to common-law battery.The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the legislature intended ORS 166.255 to mirror the federal law, including its interpretation of "physical force." Therefore, the court held that the "offensive physical contact" element of harassment does constitute "physical force" for the purposes of ORS 166.255(3)(e). Consequently, the court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, upholding the firearms prohibition against Eggers. View "State v. Eggers" on Justia Law

The case involves a plaintiff, representing the estate of a deceased individual, who sued the owners of a golf club. The plaintiff alleged that the deceased was served alcohol while visibly intoxicated, leading to a fall from a golf cart and serious injuries. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the claim was barred by ORS 471.565(1), which limits the liability of alcohol servers in certain circumstances.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon reviewed the case and certified a question to the Oregon Supreme Court, asking whether ORS 471.565(1) violates the remedy clause of Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution. The district court noted that the Oregon Court of Appeals had previously held that the statute violated the remedy clause, but the Oregon Supreme Court had affirmed that decision on different grounds, leaving the constitutional question unresolved.The Oregon Supreme Court examined the text and context of ORS 471.565(1), which bars claims by individuals who voluntarily consume alcohol, even if served while visibly intoxicated. The court also reviewed the legislative history, noting that the statute was enacted in response to the court's decision in Fulmer v. Timber Inn Restaurant and Lounge, Inc., which recognized a common-law negligence claim for individuals injured due to being served alcohol while visibly intoxicated.The court concluded that ORS 471.565(1) does not violate the remedy clause of the Oregon Constitution when applied to individuals who voluntarily consume alcohol. However, the court clarified that the statute does not bar claims by individuals who involuntarily consume alcohol, meaning after losing the sense of reason and volition. The court held that the statute is constitutional as long as it is interpreted to allow claims for involuntary consumption of alcohol.The Oregon Supreme Court answered the certified question, holding that ORS 471.565(1) does not violate the remedy clause of Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution, provided it is interpreted to allow claims for involuntary consumption of alcohol. View "Bonner v. American Golf Corp. of California" on Justia Law

The case involves the interpretation of Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) 166.255, which makes it unlawful for a person to possess a firearm or ammunition if they have been convicted of a "qualifying misdemeanor" involving the use or attempted use of physical force against a family or household member. The defendant, Richard Darrel Eggers, was convicted of harassment under ORS 166.065(1)(a)(A) for subjecting his brother to offensive physical contact during a domestic altercation.The Lane County Circuit Court concluded that the harassment conviction constituted a "qualifying misdemeanor" under ORS 166.255, thereby prohibiting Eggers from possessing firearms. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the "offensive physical contact" element of harassment did not meet the "physical force" requirement of ORS 166.255(3)(e).The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether the "offensive physical contact" element of harassment qualifies as "physical force" under ORS 166.255(3)(e). The court concluded that the Oregon legislature intended to align ORS 166.255 with the federal firearms prohibition under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which the U.S. Supreme Court had interpreted to include even minimal offensive touching as "physical force" in United States v. Castleman.The Oregon Supreme Court held that the "physical force" requirement in ORS 166.255(3)(e) includes the degree of force necessary to complete a common-law battery, which encompasses offensive physical contact. Therefore, harassment under ORS 166.065(1)(a)(A) is a "qualifying misdemeanor" for the purposes of ORS 166.255. The court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, upholding the firearms prohibition against Eggers. View "State v. Eggers" on Justia Law

The defendant faced serious felony charges and underwent two trials, both ending in mistrials. The second mistrial occurred because a courtroom clerk mistakenly gave the jury an exhibit revealing the defendant's prior felony conviction, which had been excluded from the jury's consideration. The defendant moved to dismiss the charges with prejudice, arguing that a retrial was barred by the former jeopardy provision in the Oregon Constitution, as interpreted in State v. Kennedy. The trial court denied the motion, concluding it could not find "indifference" under the Kennedy test.The Multnomah County Circuit Court initially declared a mistrial due to a deadlocked jury. Months later, a juror contacted the defendant's counsel, revealing that the jury had seen an exhibit disclosing the defendant's prior conviction. The trial court then changed the basis for the mistrial to include the erroneous submission of the exhibit. After further hearings and testimony from jurors and the clerk's supervisor, the trial court found that the clerk had made an error but did not intentionally give the jury the exhibit knowing it disclosed the prior conviction. The court could not determine whether the clerk was indifferent or simply lacked the capacity to do her job.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and denied the petition for a writ of mandamus. The court held that the record did not compel findings that the clerk knowingly engaged in improper and prejudicial conduct or acted with indifference to the consequences. The court emphasized that the Kennedy test requires a conscious choice of prejudicial action, which was not evident in this case. Therefore, the trial court was not compelled to dismiss the charges with prejudice, and a retrial was not barred under the Oregon Constitution. View "State v. Blackmon" on Justia Law

The case involves the State of Oregon and Stephen Andrew Aranda. Aranda was charged with first-degree rape and chose to testify in his own defense. The state sought to impeach his testimony with evidence of his prior felony convictions, including two counts of first-degree sexual abuse and one count of second-degree assault. Aranda argued that the court should weigh the probative value of his conviction history against its potential for unfair prejudice before admitting it as evidence. The trial court denied his motion, and Aranda was subsequently convicted.On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with Aranda's argument and reversed his conviction, holding that due process required the trial court to conduct a balancing test before admitting his prior convictions as impeachment evidence. The state appealed to the Supreme Court of Oregon.The Supreme Court of Oregon reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. The court held that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that due process required a balancing test before admitting a defendant's prior convictions as impeachment evidence. The court found that neither historical practice nor principles of fundamental fairness required such a balancing test. The court noted that while the admission of prior convictions could be prejudicial, it was also highly relevant to a defendant's credibility as a witness. The court concluded that due process did not require a balancing test under Oregon Evidence Code 403 before admitting a defendant's prior convictions as impeachment evidence under Oregon Evidence Code 609. View "State v. Aranda" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the Walton family and the Neskowin Regional Sanitary Authority over the installation of sewer lines on the Walton's property. The Waltons claimed that the installation constituted a "taking" under the Oregon Constitution and the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, for which they were entitled to "just compensation". The Sanitary Authority argued that the claim was time-barred under Oregon law, as it was not brought within the six-year limitations period.The trial court granted the Sanitary Authority's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the claim was indeed time-barred. The Waltons appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. The Waltons then petitioned for review by the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. The court held that the Waltons' claim was subject to the six-year limitations period established by Oregon law. The court further held that the claim accrued when the sewer lines were installed, which was no later than 1995, and therefore, the six-year limitations period expired in 2001, sixteen years before the Waltons filed their complaint. Consequently, the court concluded that the Waltons' claim was time-barred. View "Walton v. Neskowin Regional Sanitary Authority" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Terri Lee Brown, was incarcerated due to an order from Governor Tina Kotek that revoked a previous conditional commutation of one of Brown's sentences. Brown had received the commutation in December 2020 from then-Governor Kate Brown and completed all her sentences by February 2023. Governor Kotek's revocation order was issued in December 2023. Brown petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the Governor lacked authority to revoke the commutation after she had finished serving all her sentences.In the lower courts, the state argued that the Governor had the authority to revoke Brown's commutation after her sentence had expired. The state also contended that Brown, in accepting the previous Governor's conditional commutation, had waived her right to seek habeas relief or otherwise challenge the revocation. Brown countered that the purported waiver in the acceptance agreement she signed was invalid or unenforceable.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon concluded that when the Governor revoked Brown's conditional commutation, she lacked the authority to do so under the terms of the commutation. The court also rejected the state's argument that Brown waived her right to challenge her present imprisonment. The court found that Brown's imprisonment was unlawful and ordered her immediate release from custody. The court further waived otherwise applicable appellate rules relating to reconsideration and the issuance of the appellate judgment, directing the State Court Administrator to issue the appellate judgment immediately. View "Brown v. Kotek" on Justia Law

In this Oregon Supreme Court case, the appellant Matthew Dwight Thompson challenged his death sentence, arguing that it was unconstitutional due to changes in the law under Senate Bill (SB) 1013. Thompson also argued that two of the penalty-phase questions presented to the jury at his sentencing were unconstitutional. The post-conviction court vacated Thompson's death sentence and modified it to life without the possibility of parole. It also ruled that Thompson's claims concerning the penalty-phase questions were procedurally barred.While Thompson's appeal was pending, Oregon Governor Kate Brown commuted his death sentence to life without the possibility of parole. After this action, the Supreme Court concluded that Thompson was not entitled to a resentencing, despite any earlier error by the post-conviction court. The commutation had the legal effect of treating the sentence of life without parole as if it had been originally imposed. As a result, Thompson's challenge to his death sentence was rendered moot.Furthermore, Thompson's claims concerning the penalty-phase questions were not preserved for appeal. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the post-conviction court. View "Thompson v. Fhuere" on Justia Law

In 2022, Oregon voters approved Ballot Measure 113, amending the state constitution to disqualify any state legislator who accumulates 10 or more unexcused absences during a legislative session from holding office "for the term following the election after the member’s current term is completed." The Secretary of State interpreted this to mean that the disqualification applies to a legislator’s immediate next term. However, a group of legislators challenged this interpretation, arguing that the disqualification should apply one term later.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon held that the measure's disqualification applies to the legislator’s immediate next term of office. The Court found that the text of the amendment was capable of supporting the Secretary's interpretation. This interpretation was also supported by the ballot title and the voters’ pamphlet, which repeatedly described the disqualification as occurring immediately following the legislator’s current term. The Court concluded that voters would have understood the amendment in light of these materials. Therefore, the Court upheld the Secretary's rules implementing the amendment. View "Knopp v. Griffin-Valade" on Justia Law

The case involves the defendant, Jason Thomas Wilcox, who was taken into police custody for public intoxication under ORS 430.399, a noncriminal statute. During this process, the police seized and inventoried his backpack, discovering a butterfly knife. As Wilcox had a prior felony conviction, he was charged and convicted for being a felon in possession of a restricted weapon under ORS 166.270(2). Wilcox appealed, arguing that the seizure of his backpack was unlawful under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. The Court of Appeals agreed, finding that the seizure was unlawful, and based its decision on a previous case, State v. Edwards.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals had erred in its analysis because it treated the seizure as a criminal one rather than an administrative one. The Court pointed out that when a person or their property is seized under ORS 430.399, the seizure is administrative, not criminal, and such seizures must comply with a different set of constitutional standards. The Court also clarified that the state’s interference with a person’s possessory or ownership interests constitutes a seizure, regardless of whether the person objects to the interference.The Supreme Court held that the seizure of the backpack was indeed a seizure. However, it did not decide whether the seizure was lawful, instead remanding the case to the Court of Appeals to determine whether ORS 430.399, or some other source of authority, authorized the seizure of defendant’s backpack and if so, whether that seizure was effectuated in accordance with the requirements of State v. Atkinson, which set the framework for assessing the constitutionality of an administrative search or seizure. View "State v. Wilcox" on Justia Law