Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

An informant told law enforcement that a person named “Tom Collins” was dealing heroin from a residence in Albany, Oregon. Detectives planned to utilize the informant in executing a controlled buy at the residence. However, rather than relying on the observations and results from that controlled buy to subsequently apply for a warrant, the detectives applied for, and obtained, a search warrant for the residence that anticipated that controlled buy. The State argued that the warrant at issue here was an “anticipatory warrant” of the type approved, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Grubbs, 547 US 90 (2006). Defendant disagreed, arguing that anticipatory warrants were incompatible with Article I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution. The Oregon Supreme Court did not reach the constitutionality of the issue presented. The Court determined that under ORS 133.555(2), a judge could issue a warrant only when “the basis of the record made before the judge” established that “there is probable cause to believe that the search will discover things specified in the application” and the warrant application satisfies the requirement in ORS 133.545(6) that it “particularly set[ ] forth the facts and circumstances tending to show that the objects of the search are in the places, or in the possession of the individuals, to be searched.” The affidavit in support of the warrant here failed to comply with the requirements of ORS 133.545(6). As a result, the warrant issued in defendant’s case did not comply with ORS 133.555(2), and the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress, pursuant to ORS 133.673(1). Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed. The judgment of the circuit court was reversed, and this case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Lee" on Justia Law

Defendant Ahmed Turay, Jr. was convicted of compelling prostitution, based in part on incriminating images and text messages that law enforcement found pursuant to a warrant to search his cell phone for nine categories of information (search categories). Defendant challenged the warrant, and his challenge presented an opportunity for the Oregon Supreme Court to consider the constitutional requirement that search warrants “particularly describe” the place to be searched or thing to be seized in the context of warrants that authorize law enforcement to search for digital data. It was undisputed the warrant in this case contained some search categories that failed to particularly describe the evidence sought; the Supreme Court also considered whether and to what extent those unlawful search categories require suppression of evidence obtained through the search of defendant’s phone. The Court concluded here that five of the nine search categories set out in the warrant to search defendant’s cell phone failed to satisfy the constitutional particularity requirement and, thus, those categories failed to authorize a lawful search. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the inclusion of those unlawful search categories in the warrant did not necessarily require suppression of all evidence found on defendant’s phone: (1) defendant has established a minimal factual nexus between a constitutional violation and the challenged evidence; and (2) that minimal factual nexus undermined the presumption of validity that ordinarily attends warrant-based searches and therefore required suppression unless the State could establish the challenged evidence was not tainted by the constitutional violation. The Court remanded the case for the trial court to develop a factual record and for the trial court to make the required factual findings under the correct legal standard. View "Oregon v. Turay" on Justia Law

Defendant John Haley was convicted under ORS 164.215 after he entered a university administrator’s office and stole a briefcase. The issue presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review in this case was whether a college administrator’s office within a university building was a “separate unit” in the building, thereby making the office a “separate building” for purposes of ORS 164.215. The Court of Appeals concluded that the office was not a “separate unit,” and thus not a “building” as defined in ORS 164.205(1), because the administrator shared the room’s “function and occupation” with the university. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court's interpretation and application of the statute: "Whether a space within a building is considered a 'separate unit' as defined in ORS 164.205(1) depends on the structure, occupancy, function, physical layout, and appearance of both the building as a whole and the space at issue." Here, the Court found sufficient evidence in the record for a factfinder to find, based on those factors, that the administrator’s office was a “separate unit.” The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on that charge. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Oregon v. Haley" on Justia Law

The issue defendant's appeal presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's consideration was the nature and scope of the Court of Appeals’ authority to deny an appellant’s motion to dismiss. After that court issued a decision resolving defendant’s criminal appeal, he filed an unopposed motion to dismiss, which the court denied. On review, both parties agreed the Court of Appeals erred in denying defendant’s motion, but they approached the analysis differently. The Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred in denying defendant’s motion in this case. Accordingly, the appellate court's order was reversed and defendant's appeal was dismissed. View "Oregon v. Mott" on Justia Law

While interrogating defendant George Craigen about the murder at the heart of this case (for which defendant had not yet been charged with), detectives asked defendant about firearms crimes, which defendant had already been charged with in other cases and on which he was represented by counsel. After the State brought this murder case against defendant, defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the interrogation, including, evidence obtained as a result of the questioning about the firearms cases. Defendant argued that that questioning violated his right to counsel under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution and that all evidence resulting from the violation had to be suppressed. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant appealed, renewing the argument that he had made in the trial court. The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant. The Oregon Supreme Court concurred with the Court of Appeals: because the detectives violated defendant’s right to counsel by questioning him about the Felon-In-Possession (FIP) charges on which he was represented, the State cannot use evidence obtained as a result of the violation of defendant's constitutional rights. View "Oregon v. Craigen" on Justia Law

Petitioner Reed Scott-Schwalbach sought review of the Oregon Attorney General’s certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 5 (2024) (IP 5), contending that various aspects did not comply with the requirements for ballot titles set out in ORS 250.035(2). The proposal would create a constitutional right for parents to select any kindergarten-through-twelfth-grade (“K-12”) Oregon public school statewide, including any public charter school, for their children to attend throughout each school year, defined in the measure as a parent’s “chosen school.” Unless an exception set out in the measure applies, the chosen school district would be required to admit the child for enrollment in the chosen school. The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the certified ballot title to determine whether it substantially complied with those requirements. The Court concluded that the caption, the “yes” result statement, and the summary had to be modified. View "Scott-Schwalbach v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

Defendant Deangelo Martin argued his due process rights were violated when the trial court ruled that hearsay evidence—a recording of the victim’s phone call to 9-1-1—was admissible to demonstrate that defendant had contacted the victim in violation of the terms of his probation. Defendant argued that the state did not show good cause for failing to produce the victim at the hearing, and that his confrontation right was thus violated. The trial court revoked probation, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Defendant argued on appeal to the Oregon Supreme Court that the Court of Appeals erred in adopting a categorical rule that, in a probation revocation hearing, the admission of evidence covered by a “firmly rooted” exception to the hearsay rule always comports with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendant contended the ordinary balancing test under Oregon v. Johnson (190 P3d 455, rev den, 345 Or 418 (2008)) should have applied, and that, under that test, his confrontation rights were violated. The Oregon Supreme Court concurred with the appellate court's result, but on different reasoning: the state made a strong showing of good cause under the third and fourth Johnson factors that outweighed defendant’s modest interest in confrontation as reflected by the first and second factors. Thus, the admission of the 9-1-1 recording at defendant’s probation revocation hearing did not violate his Fourteenth Amendment confrontation rights. View "Oregon v. Martin" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review centered on the effect of Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S Ct 1390 (2020) in an appeal of a trial court’s rejection of a post-conviction petitioner’s challenge to convictions that were obtained through nonunanimous verdicts. Petitioner raised the issue as soon as Ramos was decided—but years after the challenged convictions had become final. The issue on appeal thus concerned the “retroactivity” of the constitutional rule announced in Ramos in a post-conviction proceeding under ORS 138.510 to 138.680. The Oregon Court held that when a petitioner seeks post-conviction relief on Sixth Amendment grounds, from a judgment of conviction which was based on a nonunanimous verdict and which became final before the Supreme Court’s Ramos decision issued, the petitioner was entitled to relief— assuming that none of the procedural defenses in the Post-Conviction Hearings Act were raised and sustained. "That is so because convicting a defendant on a nonunanimous jury verdict amounts to a 'substantial denial in the proceedings resulting in petitioner’s conviction *** of petiioner’s rights under the Constitution of the United States *** which denial rendered the conviction void,' for which post-conviction relief 'shall be granted.'” View "Watkins v. Ackley" on Justia Law

The trial court convicted defendant Heather Evans of initiating a false report based on evidence that she had triggered a police investigation by making a call and subsequent statements to the police that included both true and false allegations against another person. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court should have granted her motion for judgment of acquittal because much of what she had reported to the police had been true and there was no evidence that her false statements had resulted in any greater expenditure of police resources than would have resulted had she not made them. The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant and reversed the judgment of conviction. The Oregon Supreme Court held the trial court properly denied the motion for judgment of acquittal and that the Court of Appeals therefore erred in reversing on that ground. View "Oregon v. Evans" on Justia Law

Defendant Anthony Delaney appealed his convictions on multiple sex offenses arising from two separate incidents, each involving a different victim. He challenged the trial court’s refusal to sever the counts involving the first incident from the counts involving the second incident. At issue was the proper application of ORS 132.560(3), which described actions that a trial court “may order” when “it appears, upon motion, that the state or defendant was substantially prejudiced by a joinder of offenses” that otherwise satisfy the requirements for joining multiple offenses. Defendant contended the State’s pretrial description of the evidence that it expected to offer demonstrated that defendant would be substantially prejudiced by a joint trial, and he contended that the prejudice that he identified required the court to sever the counts. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. The Oregon Supreme Court held that a defendant seeking severance under ORS 132.560(3) must identify a case-specific theory of substantial prejudice that was more than the prejudice that was inherent whenever joined charges allow the jury to hear that the defendant may have committed other bad acts. And whether a defendant has identified a case-specific theory that meets the “substantially prejudiced” standard was a question of law that the appellate court reviews without deference to the trial court. Applying those standards, the Supreme Court concluded defendant failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to sever. View "Oregon v. Delaney" on Justia Law