Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The trial court found defendant Robert Makin guilty of first-degree child neglect, as well as other offenses. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s first-degree child neglect convictions without discussion. The question in this case was whether a reasonable trier of fact could find defendant guilty of first-degree child neglect for knowingly allowing his children to stay “[i]n a vehicle where controlled substances are being criminally delivered * * *.” Defendant's three children were in his car when a police officer stopped him for a traffic violation. Also in the car were methamphetamine and implements for selling it. There was no evidence, however, that defendant had sold or was delivering methamphetamine to an identified buyer while his children were with him in the car. Rather, all that the evidence showed was that, while his children were in the car, defendant possessed methamphetamine with the intent to sell in the future. After review, the Supreme Court held that first-degree child neglect, as defined in ORS 163.547, did not include knowingly leaving or allowing a child under 16 years of age to stay in a vehicle where controlled substances are possessed with an intent to deliver. Because the state did not argue that the evidence in this case gave rise to any inference other than possession with intent to deliver, the Court of Appeals' decision to the extent it upheld defendant’s convictions for first-degree child neglect was reversed. On review, defendant did not challenge his convictions for delivery and possession, and the state did not challenge the Court of Appeals decision reversing defendant’s conviction for manufacturing and remanding that charge for further proceedings. Those parts of the Court of Appeals decision were affirmed. View "Oregon v. Makin" on Justia Law

In 2009, plaintiff American Civil Liberties Union of Oregon, Inc. (ACLU), made a request under the Oregon Public Records law to inspect and copy certain documents of the Civilian Review Board of the City of Eugene pertaining to city police officers' use of a Taser against "Mr." Van Ornum. The request was ultimately denied, and the ACLU sued for release of the documents under ORS 192.420 (1). The City of Eugene cited, as grounds for its denial the records request, a conditional exemption in the statute. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the exemption did not apply when “the public interest requires disclosure of the information. . . .[W]hen that exemption applies, a trial court must determine, as a matter of both law and fact, the nature and significance of two competing interests - the public’s interest in disclosure and the public body’s interest in confidentiality. Then, the court must balance those competing interests and determine, as a matter of law, which interest predominates." In this case, after considering the nature and significance of the competing interests, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the public interest in disclosure of the requested records predominates, and the trial court erred in declining to order their disclosure. View "American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Eugene" on Justia Law

Defendant Robert Davis threatened and assaulted two people outside of a store, and two uniformed officers were dispatched to the area. When the officers arrived, one of them saw defendant walking away from a group of people. Believing that defendant was the perpetrator, the officer got out of his patrol car and identified himself as a police officer. Defendant ran away. The officer chased him and repeatedly yelled “Stop, police!” The other officer pursued defendant in his patrol car, activating its overhead emergency lights and siren. Defendant kept running and continued to run from the officers until they apprehended him. The state ultimately charged defendant with third-degree escape for fleeing from police after the officer commanded him to stop. The issue in this case was whether, in running from the police, defendant committed the criminal offense of third-degree escape. The statute that defined the offense requires proof that the defendant was in custody at the time of the escape. The trial court concluded that the police, in shouting for defendant to stop, had effectively placed him in “constructive custody.” The Court of Appeals agreed, affirming without a written opinion. After review, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that police merely shouting for another person to stop does not place that person in custody for the purposes of establishing third-degree escape. View "Oregon v. Davis" on Justia Law

Defendant Caryn Nascimento was convicted of theft and computer crime for using a computer terminal at work, which was linked to the Oregon State Lottery, to print and steal lottery tickets. She appealed the conviction for computer crime, arguing that the trial court erred in denying her motion for judgment of acquittal on that count because, she argued, she was “authorized” to use the computer terminal and therefore had not violated ORS 164.377(4). The narrow "but potentially far-reaching issue" in this case was the scope of ORS 164.377(4), and the term “without authorization.” The State argued that, although defendant’s employer authorized her to use the computer terminal at issue here, defendant did so for a purpose not permitted by her employer and thus was guilty of computer crime. Defendant conceded that her use may have violated her employer’s policies or other provisions of ORS 164.377, but she was still authorized to use it. After review, the Supreme Court agreed that defendant’s conduct did not violate subsection (4) of the statute, and, accordingly, that the trial court erred in denying her motion for judgment of acquittal. Defendant’s computer crime conviction was therefore reversed. View "Washington v. Nascimento" on Justia Law

Defendant Rasool Islam Islam shoplifted 15 pairs of jeans from a Macy’s retail department store and was convicted of one count of theft in the second degree. The prosecutor sought restitution for Macy’s economic damages based on the retail price of the jeans at the time and place of the theft. Defendant argued that restitution instead should have been based on the value of the jeans on the wholesale market, and any lost profits that Macy’s could prove resulted from the theft. The trial court granted restitution based on the retail value of the jeans, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that a retail seller of goods that have been stolen may recover, as restitution, the reasonable value of those goods on the market to which the seller would resort to replace those goods at the time and place of conversion, together with any additional losses that the state proves the victim sustained. In this case, because the state did not prove any such additional losses, the victim was limited to restitution in the amount of the reasonable wholesale value of the jeans. The Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Islam" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first-degree rape of the victim, a friend who had spent the night on defendant’s couch after an evening of drinking. The victim contacted the police following the incident, and Detective Myers asked the victim if she would send defendant text messages to “try to get [defendant] to make a comment about what had happened between the two of them.” The victim agreed, and Myers instructed her on the content of the messages. The victim sent defendant two text messages. Defendant did not respond to either message. At trial, defendant challenged the admissibility of the text messages and his nonresponse on both constitutional and evidentiary grounds. The trial court concluded that neither objection was well taken, and the jury found defendant guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the text messages and defendant’s nonresponse constituted inadmissible hearsay, and that the trial court erred in admitting them. The Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Schiller-Munneman" on Justia Law

Defendant Amanda Newcomb was convicted of second-degree animal neglect after she failed to adequately feed her dog, Juno, resulting in his malnourishment. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress blood test results showing that Juno had no medical condition that would have caused him to be malnourished, which in turn indicated that Juno was malnourished because he was starving. Defendant argued that the state had violated both Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, and the Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution by failing to obtain a warrant before testing the dog’s blood. The trial court denied the motion and allowed the state to introduce the test results during trial. Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which agreed with defendant that she had a protected privacy interest in her dog’s blood that required the state to obtain a search warrant, unless the circumstances fit within an exception to the warrant requirement, and reversed. The Supreme Court concluded defendant had no privacy interest in the dog's blood under the State or federal constitutions, and reversed. View "Oregon v. Newcomb" on Justia Law

Defendant William Althouse was convicted in 2011 of felony public indecency after previously having been convicted of three other felony sex crimes. Pursuant to ORS 137.719(1), the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Throughout this litigation, defendant argued that, as applied to him, a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole violated Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution and the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment without opinion. The Supreme Court allowed defendant’s petition for review to consider two issues: (1) whether ORS 138.222(2)(a) barred direct appellate review of a presumptive sentence imposed pursuant to ORS 137.719(1); and, (2) if not, whether defendant’s sentence was unconstitutional as applied. The Court held that defendant’s sentence was both reviewable and constitutional. The Court therefore affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Oregon v. Althouse" on Justia Law

This case involved a challenge to a juvenile court’s decision to waive its jurisdiction over a 13-year-old boy who was alleged to have committed aggravated murder. Under the relevant statutes, ORS 419C.352 and ORS 419C.349, a youth under age of 15 who is alleged to have committed murder may be waived into adult court only if, at the time of the conduct, he or she “was of sufficient sophistication and maturity to appreciate the nature and quality of the conduct involved.” In this case, the evidence suggested that youth was of “average” sophistication and maturity for his age and was “just as effective” as peers of his age in understanding that his conduct was wrong. The juvenile court found that the statutory “sophistication and maturity” requirement had been satisfied. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the “sophistication and maturity” provision required only an awareness of the physical nature and criminality of the conduct at issue. The Oregon Supreme Court agreed with the youth that the “sophistication and maturity” requirement was more demanding, and reversed both the appellate and juvenile courts. The case was remanded to the juvenile court for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. J. C. N.-V." on Justia Law

The Attorney General prepared and filed a modified ballot title following remand from the Supreme Court. In its second trip to the Oregon Supreme Court, two petitioners challenged the modified title. IP 62 applies to public employees (employees) and public employee labor organizations (unions). If adopted by the voters, IP 62 would have amended several provisions of the Oregon Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act. Petitioners Neel and Forest set out two main objections to the modified caption: (1) they claimed that the phrase “limits public employee union members’ obligations” was vague and overbroad and was likely to mislead and confuse voters; (2) the phrase “employees might benefit without sharing bargaining costs" petitioners contended that, as used to describe IP 62, that phrase was “underinclusive, inaccurate, misleading, politically loaded,” and failed to reasonably identify the actual major effect of the proposed initiative measure. The Supreme Court found certain of the objections to be well taken, and referred the modified ballot title to the Attorney General for additional modification. View "Conroy v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law