Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of aggravated murder. He petitioned the Supreme Court for reconsideration of its prior decision in his case, arguing that the Supreme court erred in affirming the conviction, arguing: (1) the trial court did not err in allowing the prosecutor's extensive cross-examination of a defense witness at a pretrial hearing until after defendant interposed a second objection to that cross-examination; and (2) any trial court error allowing the extensive cross-examination was harmless. Upon reconsideration, the Supreme Court agreed that it was unclear in the opinion why it marked the error at the trial court’s overruling of the second and third objections, and allowed reconsideration to clarify the its reasoning in that regard. However, the Court found defendant's arguments as to "harmless error" to be unpersuasive, and denied reconsideration as to that issue. The petition for reconsideration was allowed, and the former opinion was modified and adhered to as modified. View "Oregon v. Agee" on Justia Law

While defendant Anthony Lazarides' criminal appeal was pending before the Court of Appeals, he absconded from post-prison supervision, prompting the state to move for dismissal of his appeal. After defendant had been arrested and returned to supervision, the Court of Appeals granted the state’s motion to dismiss. Later, the Court of Appeals denied defendant’s motion for reconsideration and declined to reinstate his appeal after the state supplied additional information concerning defendant’s behavior. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on when a court determines a defendant’s status. The Supreme Court concluded that “the motion” referenced in ORAP 8.05(3) was the motion to dismiss, and agreed with the parties that the state failed to meet its burden to prove that defendant was on “abscond status” at the time that the Court of Appeals decided that motion. Thus, the court erred in dismissing defendant’s appeal. View "Oregon v. Lazarides" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review centered on whether a defamatory statement made in an online business review was entitled to First Amendment protection. Plaintiff Carol Neumann owned plaintiff Dancing Deer Mountain, LLC, a business that arranged and performed wedding events at a property owned by Neumann. Defendant Christopher Liles was a wedding guest who attended a wedding and reception held on Neumann’s property in June 2010. Two days after those events, Liles posted a negative review about Neumann and her business on Google Reviews, a publicly accessible website where individuals may post comments about services or products they have received. In response to Neumann and Dancing Deer Mountain's defamation claim, Liles filed a special motion to strike under Oregon’s Anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (Anti-SLAPP) statute. After a hearing, the trial court allowed Liles’s motion to strike and entered a judgment of dismissal of Neumann’s defamation claim without prejudice. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, reasoning that “the evidence submitted by plaintiffs, if credited, would permit a reasonable factfinder to rule in Neumann’s favor on the defamation claim, and the evidence submitted by [Liles] does not defeat Neumann’s claim as a matter of law.” After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the online review at issue in this case was entitled to First Amendment protection. The Court therefore reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals to the contrary and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to resolve a disputed attorney fee issue. View "Neumann v. Liles" on Justia Law

Defendant Kade William Kirschner and his co-defendant broke into the victim’s home and, after the victim confronted them, fled. Defendant was apprehended shortly thereafter, and the police found defendant in possession of drugs and a concealed weapon. Defendant was charged with various crimes, including burglary, trespass, criminal mischief and carrying a concealed weapon, as well as several drug offenses. The victim was subpoenaed for trial, but, shortly before the trial was scheduled to occur, defendant entered into a plea agreement under which he pleaded guilty to two drug possession charges and the charge of carrying a concealed weapon; the state dismissed the other charges. Defendant also agreed to pay the victim restitution in an amount to be determined by the court. Defendant challenged the imposition of restitution for wages that the victim lost when the victim was subpoenaed to testify at defendant’s criminal trial and restitution hearing. In a per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the restitution award. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Oregon v. Kirschner" on Justia Law

After defendant Ema Ramos set fire to her restaurant and filed a fraudulent claim with her insurance company for damage to restaurant equipment, she was convicted of second-degree arson and attempted first-degree aggravated theft. The trial court ordered defendant to pay restitution and included in its restitution award to one of the victims, defendant’s insurer, fees that the victim had paid to attorneys and investigators for their time spent in investigating defendant’s claim for benefits and in providing grand jury and trial testimony. Defendant challenged that award on appeal, claiming that it was improper to include those investigation and witness fees in the award. The Court of Appeals affirmed the restitution award, and finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed too. View "Oregon v. Ramos" on Justia Law

In July 2010, defendant Roman Suppah was driving his girlfriend’s car. Deputy Sheriff Hulke stopped defendant for a traffic violation. After being stopped, defendant “told [the deputy that] his name was Harold Pennington, born in 7/21/64.” Defendant said that he lived in Warm Springs but that he did not “have a physical address or a mailing address.” The deputy contacted the dispatcher to check the name and date of birth that defendant had given him. The dispatcher told him that “Pennington was driving while suspended,” and defendant did not offer any proof of insurance. The deputy cited defendant (as Pennington) for driving while suspended and driving without insurance. The deputy did not cite defendant for the traffic violation that had led him to stop defendant in the first place, nor did he make a written record of the reason why he had stopped defendant. As the deputy later explained, the traffic violation that had led him to stop defendant was one for which he normally gives drivers a warning but no citation. The state charged defendant with giving false information to a deputy sheriff. Later, at a hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress, the deputy could not remember the specific traffic violation that had led him to stop defendant. The trial court found that the state’s inability to establish the reason for the stop rendered it unlawful, but it denied defendant’s motion to suppress the statements that defendant had made following the stop. Focusing on defendant’s reasons for giving the deputy false information, the trial court found that defendant’s decision to do so was independent of the illegality. The en banc Court of Appeals reversed. The Oregon Supreme Court allowed the state’s petition for review and reversed the Court of Appeals decision. "[F]rom a temporal perspective, the illegality did not become apparent until months later at the suppression hearing when the officer could not remember which traffic violation had led him to stop defendant. The trial court correctly concluded that the stop had no appreciable effect on defendant’s decision to give the deputy a false name and date of birth. Because that decision attenuated the taint of the unlawful stop, the trial court correctly denied defendant’s motion to suppress his statements." View "Oregon v. Suppah" on Justia Law

Defendant Alen Simonov and his brother, Vadim, talked to their neighbor about purchasing a 1983 Datsun pickup truck. The neighbor testified that she agreed to allow the brothers to take the truck to a car wash to check for an oil leak. The neighbor watched the brothers drive away. Because the brothers failed to return the truck when she expected them to, the neighbor reported the truck stolen. Defendant later left a voicemail message stating, “I’m in Portland. We’re bringing the truck back.” The neighbor saw Vadim pull the truck into her driveway several hours later, with defendant in the passenger seat. Defendant appealed his conviction for unauthorized use of a vehicle (UUV), a felony offense committed when a person “takes, operates, exercises control over, rides in or otherwise uses another’s vehicle * * * without consent of the owner.” At trial, defendant requested an instruction that, to reach a guilty verdict, the jury must find that he knew that the use of the vehicle was without the owner’s consent; instead, the trial court instructed the jury that it could convict defendant if it found that he was criminally negligent with regard to whether the owner had consented. The Court of Appeals reversed defendant’s conviction on the ground that the charged offense required that the person riding in the vehicle knew that the vehicle was being used without the owner’s consent, the trial court therefore improperly instructed the jury, and the error was reversible. After review of this case, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, reversed the judgment convicting defendant, and remanded the case back to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Simonov" on Justia Law

As part of a highway improvement project, plaintiff Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT or the state), brought a condemnation action against defendant Alderwoods (Oregon), Inc., seeking to acquire "[a]ll abutter’s rights of access, if any," between defendant’s property and Highway 99W. The improvement project involved rebuilding the sidewalk along Highway 99W and eliminating two driveways that previously had allowed direct vehicular access from defendant’s property to the highway. Defendant’s property retained access to the highway, however, by means of two driveways onto a city street that ran perpendicular to and intersected the highway. Before trial, the state moved in limine to exclude as irrelevant evidence of any diminution in value of defendant’s property as a result of the loss of the two driveways. The trial court concluded that the elimination of those driveways had not effected a taking of defendant’s right of access to the highway and granted the state’s motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court that there was no taking in this case, and affirmed. View "ODOT v. Alderwoods" on Justia Law

Police officers entered a residence without a warrant and opened a wooden box that they found in a bedroom, believing that they had lawful consent to take each of those actions. Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance based on evidence found in the box, and moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that the persons who had given consent to the home entry and the search of the box were not authorized to give consent. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant appealed her conviction, arguing that there was no evidence that she had consented to the home entry or the search of the box. The state replied that, for purposes of Article I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution, the persons who gave consent to the entry and search had actual authority to do so. The Court of Appeals reversed. Focusing specifically on the search of the box, that court rejected the state’s argument that the person who had consented to the search had actual authority to give consent, based on her shared possession and control of the room in which the box was located. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the warrantless search of the wooden box in this case was not authorized under the consent exception to the warrant requirement. Furthermore, the Court concluded the state’s alternative argument (that the search was lawful because it was reasonable) was essentially a request to overturn the Court's longstanding construction of Article I, section 9. The Court declined the state's argument, affirmed the Court of Appeals, reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Bonilla" on Justia Law

Defendant and her five-year-old daughter were passengers in a borrowed car driven by defendant’s 17-year-old daughter. A police officer stopped the car for a traffic violation and, during the stop, noticed objects in defendant’s open purse that appeared to be drugs. The officer asked for consent to search the car, which defendant gave. As a result of the consent search, the officer confirmed that defendant’s purse contained drugs. Based on those facts, defendant was charged with unlawful possession of heroin (ORS 475.854), unlawful possession of methamphetamine (ORS 475.894), unlawful possession of a controlled substance (ORS 475.752(3)(b)), and two counts of child endangerment (ORS 163.575). The issue in this case was whether ORS 163.575 was violated when a person knowingly possesses drugs in a container (here, a purse) while in a car with two children. The Supreme Court concluded that a person in that circumstance can be found to have engaged in unlawful “activity” involving controlled substances. The Court agreed with defendant, however, that when, as here, the possession of the drugs in the car is a brief isolated incident of illegal drug activity, the car is not, within the meaning of the statute, “a place” where unlawful activity involving controlled substances “is maintained or conducted.” The Court therefore concluded that defendant was entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the charges of child endangerment, and reversed the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals which held to the contrary. View "Oregon v. Gonzalez-Valenzuela" on Justia Law