Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Police officers entered a residence without a warrant and opened a wooden box that they found in a bedroom, believing that they had lawful consent to take each of those actions. Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance based on evidence found in the box, and moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that the persons who had given consent to the home entry and the search of the box were not authorized to give consent. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant appealed her conviction, arguing that there was no evidence that she had consented to the home entry or the search of the box. The state replied that, for purposes of Article I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution, the persons who gave consent to the entry and search had actual authority to do so. The Court of Appeals reversed. Focusing specifically on the search of the box, that court rejected the state’s argument that the person who had consented to the search had actual authority to give consent, based on her shared possession and control of the room in which the box was located. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the warrantless search of the wooden box in this case was not authorized under the consent exception to the warrant requirement. Furthermore, the Court concluded the state’s alternative argument (that the search was lawful because it was reasonable) was essentially a request to overturn the Court's longstanding construction of Article I, section 9. The Court declined the state's argument, affirmed the Court of Appeals, reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Bonilla" on Justia Law

Defendant and her five-year-old daughter were passengers in a borrowed car driven by defendant’s 17-year-old daughter. A police officer stopped the car for a traffic violation and, during the stop, noticed objects in defendant’s open purse that appeared to be drugs. The officer asked for consent to search the car, which defendant gave. As a result of the consent search, the officer confirmed that defendant’s purse contained drugs. Based on those facts, defendant was charged with unlawful possession of heroin (ORS 475.854), unlawful possession of methamphetamine (ORS 475.894), unlawful possession of a controlled substance (ORS 475.752(3)(b)), and two counts of child endangerment (ORS 163.575). The issue in this case was whether ORS 163.575 was violated when a person knowingly possesses drugs in a container (here, a purse) while in a car with two children. The Supreme Court concluded that a person in that circumstance can be found to have engaged in unlawful “activity” involving controlled substances. The Court agreed with defendant, however, that when, as here, the possession of the drugs in the car is a brief isolated incident of illegal drug activity, the car is not, within the meaning of the statute, “a place” where unlawful activity involving controlled substances “is maintained or conducted.” The Court therefore concluded that defendant was entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the charges of child endangerment, and reversed the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals which held to the contrary. View "Oregon v. Gonzalez-Valenzuela" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with the aggravated murder of a prison inmate while he himself was an inmate. Defendant's case came before the Oregon Supreme Court on automatic review because defendant was sentenced to death. Defendant raised 29 assignments of error relating to his conviction and sentence. After careful consideration of each, the Supreme Court concluded that "many of them are not well taken" and did "not merit further discussion." View "Oregon v. Agee" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated murder in 1988. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed those convictions in 1990, but vacated defendant’s death sentence three times and remanded each time for new penalty-phase trials. This case was an automatic and direct review of defendant’s fourth death sentence. Defendant raised 87 assignments of error. The Supreme Court found that only 13 merited discussion, and even then, found no error in the trial court’s handling of his case. Accordingly, the Court affirmed defendant’s death sentences. View "Oregon v. Guzek" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant of 10 counts of rape, sodomy, and sexual abuse. When a jury finds a defendant guilty of multiple offenses, a trial court must make two related but separate sentencing decisions. One decision involves the length of the sentence for each conviction. The other involves whether the convictions should run concurrently or consecutively. On appeal in this case, the Court of Appeals concluded that both rules increased defendant’s sentence based on facts that, under “Apprendi v. New Jersey,” (530 US 466 (2000)), a jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt. Although the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court should have submitted those facts to the jury, it held that the failure to do so was harmless error. On review, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the two sentencing guidelines rules do not implicate Apprendi and affirmed the Court of Appeals decision on that ground. View "Oregon v. Cuevas" on Justia Law

Relator was 14 years old when he committed murder in 1998. Relator was waived into adult court and convicted of aggravated murder. The court sentenced relator to life imprisonment with a 30-year mandatory minimum period of incarceration. After relator had served roughly half of that period, he obtained a “second look” hearing under ORS 420A.203. The trial court entered a preliminary order of conditional release, but the state appealed that order to the Court of Appeals. At issue in this mandamus proceeding was the trial court’s related “direction” to the Department of Corrections, pursuant to ORS 420A.206(1)(a), requiring it to prepare a proposed release plan. Relator sought, and the Supreme Court issued, an alternative writ of mandamus ordering the department to comply with the trial court’s direction or to show cause for not doing so. The department, however, contended that its obligation to comply was automatically stayed under ORS 138.160. The Supreme Court disagreed and ordered the department to comply with the trial court’s direction to prepare and submit a proposed plan of release. View "Oregon ex rel Walraven v. Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

In January 2011, defendant was indicted on 21 felony counts, including nine counts of aggravated murder, for allegedly causing the death of Rainier Police Chief Ralph Painter. Shortly after defendant was indicted, his attorneys became concerned about his ability to aid and assist in his defense. The defense hired a psychiatrist (Dr. Larsen) to evaluate defendant. Larsen concluded that defendant suffered from psychosis and possibly schizophrenia, and recommended that defendant be treated with antipsychotic medication. In this mandamus proceeding, the issue presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review centered on the trial court's order directing relator, Oregon State Hospital (OSH), to administer involuntary medication to defendant for the purpose of restoring defendant's capacity to stand trial on felony charges. Upon review, the Court concluded that ORS 161.370(1) granted the trial court implied authority to issue the order (which was based on the trial court's assessment of all the medical evidence) even though OSH did not agree that administering the medication was medically necessary. View "Oregon State Hospital v. Butts" on Justia Law

Defendants Dale and Shannon Hickman were convicted of second-degree manslaughter after they declined to seek medical treatment for their son David, who died about nine hours after he was born prematurely. Defendants are members of the Followers of Christ Church, which encourages its members to rely on God to heal sickness and injury, and considers resorting to conventional medicine as a failure in faith. At trial, defendants argued that, because they withheld medical treatment from David based on their religious beliefs, the Oregon Constitution required the state to prove that they "knew" David would die if they relied on prayer alone and, despite that knowledge, failed to seek medical treatment for him. The trial court disagreed and allowed the state to proceed on a theory of "criminal negligence," consistently with the statute defining second-degree manslaughter by neglect or maltreatment. The Court of Appeals summarily affirmed. The Supreme Court granted review to consider whether the state must prove that a criminal defendant acted with "knowledge" that an unlawful result would follow when that defendant's conduct was motivated by a sincerely held religious belief. The Court concluded that it does not. View "Oregon v. Hickman" on Justia Law

Defendant Fernando Clemente-Perez was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm. At the close of the state’s case, defendant moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the state had not presented sufficient evidence that he had “[p]ossesse[d] a handgun that is concealed and readily accessible to the person within any vehicle,” within the meaning of ORS 166.250(1)(b). Alternatively, defendant argued that he qualified for an exception under ORS 166.250(2)(b), which provided a person may possess a handgun at the person’s “place of residence.” The trial court rejected those arguments, and a jury found defendant guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that defendant failed to preserve his argument that he had not been “within any vehicle” at the time that he possessed a handgun, and that he did not meet the “place of residence” exception. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Oregon v. Clemente-Perez" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by jury on one count of sodomy, one count of rape, and one count of unlawful sexual penetration. On appeal of that conviction, he argued that the trial court erred in failing to give his requested jury instruction that ten jurors had to agree on what factual occurrence constituted each of the offenses. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court correctly declined to give the requested instruction. On review, defendant argued that the circumstances of this case fell within the rule providing that, when a single crime has been charged but the evidence is sufficient for the jury to find that there were multiple, separate occurrences of the charged crime involving the same victim and the same perpetrator during the period of time alleged in the indictment, the state either must elect which occurrence constituted the charged crime or, alternatively, the defendant is entitled to an instruction that ten or more jurors must concur on which occurrence constituted that crime. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in failing to give defendant's proposed concurrence instruction. However, the Court concluded that the error was harmless, and therefore affirmed defendant's convictions. View "Oregon v. Ashkins" on Justia Law