Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Arnold Nix was found guilty of 20 counts of second-degree misdemeanor animal neglect. The state asked the trial court to impose sentence on 20 separate convictions. Defendant objected, arguing that the violations “merged” into a single conviction under Oregon’s anti-merger statute, ORS 161.067, when there were multiple violations of a single statute and only one victim. In this case, defendant argued animals were not “victims” within the meaning of that statute, so the trial court should have imposed a sentence on a single, merged, conviction. The trial court agreed and did just that. The state appealed, challenging the lawfulness of the sentence. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for resentencing. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. Shortly after the Supreme Court's opinion was published, however, the state filed a motion to stay the issuance of the appellate judgment and a motion to determine jurisdiction; the state noted that, although it had prevailed on its appeal, it perhaps had lacked authority to file an appeal in the first place, because no statute authorized it to appeal a judgment of conviction for a misdemeanor. Defendant responded by moving to vacate both opinions and dismiss the appeal. The Supreme Court, after review of the state's motion and defendant's response thereto, concluded that the State lacked authority to appeal the judgment of conviction in this misdemeanor case. Both the Court of Appeals and Supreme Courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. As a result, the Court vacated both opinions and dismissed the appeal. View "Oregon v. Nix" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of the Attorney General’s certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 8 (2016), arguing that the ballot title did not satisfy the requirements of ORS 250.035(2). IP 8 would alter the authority of metropolitan service districts in Oregon by eliminating the authority of a metropolitan service district to engage in various planning functions related to land use, urban growth, air and water quality, and transportation. The Attorney General did not dispute that the reference in the results statements to a “regional plan for managing urban growth” was too broad to apprise potential petition signers and voters of the effect of the elimination of districts' authority to engage in those planning functions; it necessitated assuming that they would readily understand all that was entailed in a regional plan under current state law. Moreover, it failed to cover the role of a metropolitan service district as the federally mandated metropolitan planning organization charged with carrying out federal air and water quality planning responsibilities. The Supreme Court therefore referred the ballot title back to the Attorney General for modification. View "Schoenheit v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of first-degree robbery. After pursuing a direct appeal, he filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Among other things, petitioner argued that his trial counsel either did not decide or reasonably could not have decided to forego giving the jury the option of convicting him of the lesser-included offense of third-degree robbery. The post-conviction court ruled that no reasonable counsel would have failed to ask for an instruction on that lesser-included offense and entered judgment in petitioner’s favor. The Court of Appeals affirmed the post-conviction court’s judgment but on a different ground, concluding that the failure to make a conscious decision regarding that issue was sufficient, without more, to establish constitutionally inadequate assistance. The State appealed. After its review, the Supreme Court reversed both the appellate and postconviction courts: "Although the post-conviction court did not say so expressly, its conclusion may well reflect the view that, given the particular facts in this case, the risk that an 'all or nothing' strategy posed was so high (seven and a half years of certain confinement on conviction), and the cost of seeking a lesser-included offense instruction was so low (adding a possibility of short-term imprisonment without relinquishing an argument for acquittal), that it is more probable than not that petitioner’s trial counsel did not engage in the necessary decision-making." This case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Pereida-Alba v. Coursey" on Justia Law

Defendant was found in what appeared to be an unconscious state, sitting in his stopped car with the engine running in the left turn lane of a public road. When police arrived, they conducted field sobriety tests, which defendant failed. The police then arrested defendant. At the police station, defendant agreed to take an Intoxylizer alcohol breath test and was found to have a blood alcohol level of 0.30. At his trial for reckless driving under ORS 811.140, defendant requested "a minimum of a ten-person jury, under Article 1, section 11 of the Oregon Constitution[.]" The trial court refused, instead empanelling a six-person jury that unanimously found defendant guilty. Defendant renewed his objection to the jury size before and after the verdict, as well as at sentencing. After its review, the Court of Appeals concluded that the intended effect of Article I, section 11, was to permit nonunanimous jury verdicts in felony cases in circuit court, but not to create a right to a jury of a particular size. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision to empanel a six-person jury. The Supreme Court affirmed (but using slightly different reasoning). View "Oregon v. Sagdal" on Justia Law

This case presented the question of what standard applied to determine whether an unequivocal invocation of the right against self-incrimination was made and the particular question of whether, in the context in which they were communicated, defendant's words, "I won't answer any questions," constituted an unequivocal invocation of that right. The trial court found, in light of contextual indicia on which it relied, that defendant's words did not amount to an unequivocal invocation and denied his motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals reversed that ruling and remanded to the trial court. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court, reversed, and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Avila-Nava" on Justia Law

Police officers unlawfully detained defendant when he was a passenger in a car. During that detention, the officers ascertained defendant’s identity, ran a warrant check, and discovered defendant was the subject of an outstanding arrest warrant. The officers arrested defendant and, during a search incident to arrest, discovered that he was in possession of illegal drugs. Based on that evidence, the state prosecuted defendant for various drug offenses. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence under the state and federal exclusionary rules, which, subject to certain exceptions (including the attenuation exception) prohibit the state from using at trial evidence that was obtained as a result of an unreasonable search or seizure. The circuit court and the Court of Appeals rejected defendant’s arguments and applied a per se rule to the attenuation analysis: The discovery and execution of a valid arrest warrant necessarily break the connection between preceding unlawful police conduct and a search incident to the arrest. The Court of Appeals drew that rule from this court’s decision in "Oregon v. Dempster," (434 P2d 746 (1967)). Upon review of the matter, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that Dempster’s per se rule was inconsistent with the subsequent development of the Fourth Amendment attenuation exception set out in "Brown v. Illinois," (422 US 590 (1975)), where the United States Supreme Court rejected such an approach. Applying those factors in this case, the Oregon Court concluded that the circuit court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress. View "Oregon v. Bailey" on Justia Law

The State charged defendant with one count of aggravated murder for the starvation, neglect and abuse of her daughter, "Jeanette," and one count of tampering with physical evidence. She moved to suppress statements she made to detectives who responded to a 911 call when the girl fell asleep on the floor and was thereafter unresponsive. The jury unanimously returned a guilty verdict to each charge, and the trial court sentenced defendant to death. On automatic review, defendant raised eighteen alleged errors in connection with her conviction, trial and sentence. Reviewing each, but finding no reversible error, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. View "Oregon v. McAnulty" on Justia Law

This case centered on the interpretation and application of two statutes, ORS 144.335(3) and ORS 144.135, to a final order of the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision that postponed petitioner’s release date from prison. The threshold question presented to the Oregon Supreme Court was whether, by amending ORS 144.335(3) in 1999, the legislature intended to exempt the board from the substantial reason standard that this court had identified and applied in "Martin v. Board of Parole," (957 P2d 1210 (1998)). If the legislature did not intend to exempt the board from the substantial reason standard, the second question was whether the board’s order in this case satisfied the substantial reason standard. The third question is whether the board’s order complied with ORS 144.135. The Court concluded that ORS 144.335(3) (1999) did not eliminate the substantial reason requirement that inheres in the substantial evidence standard of review to which the board’s orders are subject. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the board’s final order in this case satisfied that requirement and satisfied ORS 144.135. The Court affirmed the board’s final order postponing petitioner’s release date. View "Jenkins v. Board of Parole" on Justia Law

The state charged defendant with manufacture of cocaine and endangering the welfare of a minor, among other things. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress physical evidence and statements obtained by detectives after they knocked on the back door of defendant’s house and obtained defendant’s consent to enter and then to search the house. Defendant argued both that his consent had not been voluntary and that the detectives had exploited their unlawful conduct to obtain his consent in violation of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. The trial court denied the motion, and a jury convicted defendant as charged. The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that, under the "Oregon v. Hall" exploitation analysis, the detectives’ unlawful entry into defendant’s backyard to reach his back door had “tainted [defendant’s] subsequent consent.” Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, modifying in part, the exploitation analysis announced in Hall. Specifically, the Court "disavowed" the minimal factual nexus test described in Hall. Hall considered only the temporal proximity between the unlawful police conduct and the consent and mitigating or intervening circumstances. "Rather, courts must consider the totality of the circumstances, [. . .] including the nature of the illegal conduct and its purpose and flagrancy, without unduly emphasizing any single consideration." View "Oregon v. Unger" on Justia Law

In this case, a police officer on patrol encountered defendant at 10:00 p.m. in an area behind a shopping center where criminal activity frequently occurred. The officer stopped defendant and obtained her consent to search pouches that he saw inside her purse, as well as the remainder of her purse. During those searches, the officer found drugs and drug paraphernalia. Defendant sought to suppress that evidence at trial, arguing, among other things, that the stop had been unlawful and that defendant’s consent had been derived from the unlawful stop in violation of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. The trial court denied that motion, and defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of methamphetamine at a stipulated facts trial. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the officer had stopped defendant unlawfully and that the incriminating evidence had derived from that stop. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision: based on the facts of this case, the police improperly exploited their unlawful stop of defendant to obtain her consent to the search. View "Oregon v. Musser" on Justia Law