Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, an Oregon resident, sustained injuries in a motorcycle accident that occurred in Wyoming. She filed an action in Oregon seeking damages for her injuries, naming as a defendant Grand Teton Cycles, LLC, a Harley-Davidson franchisee with a physical presence in Idaho and Wyoming. The trial court determined that it lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant and granted defendant's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court allowed plaintiff's petition for review to determine whether defendant had sufficient contacts with Oregon for a court in this state to exercise specific jurisdiction over it. The Supreme Court concluded that this litigation did not arise out of or relate to defendant's activities in Oregon. However, the Court affirmed for different reasons than the Court of Appeals, and disavowed the substantive relevance test to the extent that it was advanced in "State ex rel Michelin v. Wells," (657 P2d 207 (1982)). View "Robinson v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co." on Justia Law

Four certified questions of law from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon went before the Oregon Supreme Court. All centered on the mortgage finance industry's practice of naming the Mortgage Electronic Recording System, Inc. (MERS) rather than the lender, as a security instrument's mortgagee or beneficiary and the Oregon Trust Deed Act (OTDA). The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that under Oregon Law, an entity like MERS cannot be a trust deed's beneficiary; ORS 86.735(1) does not require recordation of "assignments" of a trust deed by operation of law that results from the transfer of the secured property; MERS cannot hold or transfer legal title to the trust deed; and MERS' authority to foreclose must derive from the original beneficiary and successors in interest.View "Brandrup v. ReconTrust Co." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on nonjudicial foreclosure of trust deeds under the Oregon Trust Deed Act (OTDA) and the mortgage finance industry's practice of naming the Mortgage Electronic Recording System, Inc., (MERS), rather than the lender, as a trust deed's "beneficiary." Plaintiff argued that, although the trust deed identified MERS as the beneficiary of the trust deed, neither MERS nor any of the other entities involved in the foreclosure had any legal or beneficial interest in the trust deed that would allow them to foreclose. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendants, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether all of the requirements for nonjudicial foreclosure set out in the OTDA had been satisfied. The Supreme Court, after its review, also concluded that a genuine issue of material fact existed, but for a different reason than the one the Court of Appeals identified.View "Niday v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC" on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, plaintiff sought immediate release from prison. In his case against the superintendent of the institution in which he was incarcerated, plaintiff sought habeas corpus relief on the ground that the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision set a release date for him in 2018, but, when his earned sentence reduction credits were taken into account, his release date has passed; therefore, his continued incarceration was unlawful. In his administrative rule challenge, plaintiff argued that, to the extent that certain Department of Corrections (DOC) rules pertaining to the granting of earned-time sentence reductions are construed to exclude him from eligibility for such reductions, they are invalid. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that plaintiff was entitled to have his term of incarceration reduced by earned-time credits, but he was not entitled to habeas corpus relief, because the board had not yet performed its prerelease functions under ORS 144.125. The Court found it unnecessary to address plaintiff's rule challenge. Accordingly, the Court dismissed plaintiff's petitions in both cases. View "Engweiler v. Persson" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with criminally negligent homicide after he allegedly drove while under the influence of intoxicants and struck another vehicle, killing one of its occupants. During the investigation of the crime, a police officer read defendant the statutory implied consent warnings and defendant agreed to provide blood and urine samples. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the test results from those samples, arguing that his consent was involuntary because it was obtained after he had been warned of the legal consequences he would suffer if he refused consent. The trial court, following "Oregon v. Machuca," concluded that defendant's consent was involuntary. Accordingly, the trial court suppressed the blood and urine evidence because it was obtained in violation of defendant's constitutional rights. The state filed an interlocutory appeal of that pretrial order, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant's consent was voluntary; the police officer did not unconstitutionally coerce defendant's consent to the test of his blood and urine by reading him the statutory implied consent warnings. Therefore the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and the ruling of the trial court. View "Oregon v. Moore" on Justia Law

Defendant Bruce Pipkin was charged with first-degree burglary. At trial, defendant argued that the state should have been required to elect whether it intended to proceed on the theory that he entered the victim's home unlawfully or on the theory that he remained in her home unlawfully. Alternatively, relying on "Oregon v. Boots," (780 P2d 725 (1989), cert den, 510 8 US 1013 (1993)), defendant requested an instruction that at least 10 jurors had to agree on one (or both) of those theories. The trial court denied both requests, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court allowed defendant's petition for review and affirmed the Court of Appeals decision and the trial court's judgment. View "Oregon v. Pipkin" on Justia Law

Two law enforcement officers, believing that defendant was being assaulted, responded to an incomplete 9-1-1 call that had been traced to defendant's home. One officer took defendant's husband into custody, while the other officer proceeded to interview defendant on the porch of her home. While interviewing defendant, the officer made an observation that caused him to reasonably believe defendant might be in possession of drugs. The officer asked defendant if he could search her, and she agreed. During the search, the officer discovered a glass pipe with drug residue on it. Defendant was subsequently charged with possession of a controlled substance. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court in this case was whether the officers' actions, commands, and inquiries in investigating the possible domestic assault resulted in a seizure of defendant within the meaning of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution and, if so, whether that seizure was constitutionally permissible. The Court concluded that defendant was seized for constitutional purposes, but the Court further concluded that the seizure was lawful. The Court accordingly reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's judgment.View "Oregon v. Fair" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal was whether a taxpayer could satisfy its obligation to "pay annually to the state" the $75,000 corporate minimum tax under ORS 3 317.090(2), by claiming on its corporate excise tax return a $75,000 "Business Energy Tax Credit" (BETC) under ORS 315.354. The Tax Court concluded that the taxpayer, Con-Way, could satisfy its tax liability under ORS 317.090(2) by claiming a BETC on its return. The Department of Revenue (department) appealed, arguing that the Tax Court's conclusion was inconsistent with ORS 317.090(2), on the ground that a tax credit cannot be used to pay or otherwise satisfy the minimum tax imposed under ORS 2 317.090(2). Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Con-Way Inc. & Affiliates v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of felony driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII). At trial, defendant sought to introduce evidence that he suffered from a sleepwalking disorder and was "sleep driving" at the time he was stopped in his vehicle. Defendant argued he did not voluntarily drive his vehicle, an element of proof necessary to establish criminal liability for DUII. The trial court excluded defendant's proffered evidence, concluding it was not relevant because DUII is a strict-liability offense. On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed that DUII is a strict-liability offense and affirmed. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant's proffered evidence was indeed relevant to the driving element of the DUII charge, and accordingly reversed.View "Oregon v. Newman" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the legal standard for what constitutes a seizure under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. Police witnessed defendant and a companion "milling around" his car one evening in an area known for drug activity. The officer spoke briefly with defendant and asked him if he was "still on probation." Defendant told the officer he was not; the officer then asked both defendant and a companion whether they had their identification on them and whether the officer could look at that identification. Both defendant and the companion handed the officer their licenses. The officer estimated that he had the licenses for "at the most" between 30 seconds and a minute before returning them back. Defense counsel did not dispute that defendant's consent to search was voluntary or that the officers acquired sufficient cause to seize defendant when a plastic baggie concealed in defendant's hand was uncovered. Defendant argued only that before defendant gave his consent to search, the officer had unlawfully detained him by asking him for his identification and taking possession of that license, however briefly, and by asking for consent to search. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that the seizure was supported by a reasonable suspicion, and that the seizure ended when the officer handed back the licenses. The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant, but the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court: "Defendant's claim that [the officer] exploited an illegal stop of defendant to obtain his voluntary and otherwise valid consent falls with our conclusion that [the officer] did not seize defendant at any point before defendant gave his consent to search." View "Oregon v. Highley" on Justia Law