Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In prior cases, the Oregon Supreme Court has held that officers who had lawfully seized individuals for purposes of investigation also could, consistently with the Oregon Constitution, request and verify the individuals' identifications. This case presented another variation on the issues pertaining to asking for identification: whether an officer's request for and verification of a person's identification, in and of itself, convert an encounter that is not a seizure for constitutional purposes into one that is. The Supreme Court responded with a "no." Consequently, in this case, whereby Defendant challenged the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence following an officer's request for his identification, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the trial court's denial of that motion to suppress. View "Oregon v. Backstrand" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the legal standard for what constitutes a seizure under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. Defendant challenged the denial of his motion to suppress evidence officers obtained following a search. At the outset of the contact, the officers asked for identification. The officers did not seize defendant and his companion by asking them for identification. The Supreme Court found that the actions that the officers took after asking for that identification did result in seizing defendant and his companion. Defendant did not dispute, that by then the officers had reasonable suspicion for his seizure. The trial court concluded that the initial contact was "not a stop." The trial court further concluded that, once defendant gave the officers a false name, the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant, "given the circumstances which took the officers to the location[.]" Based on those findings and conclusions, the court denied the motion. The case went to trial, and a jury found defendant guilty as charged. The Court of Appeals reversed, but the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Oregon v. Anderson" on Justia Law

In 2007, a Portland police officer investigated a dispute between defendant and his girlfriend. During that investigation, the officer learned that defendant was 21 years old and that his girlfriend (victim) was 16. Defendant admitted to the officer that he had had sexual intercourse with the victim on several occasions during the previous year. Given that information, a grand jury indicted defendant for four counts of second-degree sexual abuse. Specifically, on four occasions "on or between December 11, 2006 to December 24, 1 2007," defendant "unlawfully and knowingly subject[ed the victim] to sexual intercourse, [the victim] not consenting thereto by reason of being under 18 years of age." Defendant waived his right to a jury trial, and the parties tried the charges to the court. The issue in before the Supreme Court in this case was what the phrase "does not consent" meant: defendant argued that it referred only to those instances in which the victim does not actually consent; the state responded that it also includes instances in which the victim lacks the capacity to consent. The trial court agreed with the state and convicted defendant of second-degree sexual abuse. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court's decision and affirmed. View "Oregon v. Ofodrinwa" on Justia Law

At issue in this case is whether Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution implicitly requires the state to treat the location where the offense was committed as a material allegation, which it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. The state contended that nothing in the wording of Article I, section 11, required such proof. In the state's view, the constitution merely granted a defendant a right to object (or waive objection to) improper venue, and in this case defendant waived that right by failing to assert it before trial. Defendant argued that, although the state was correct that Article I, section 11, itself did not say anything about requiring proof of venue as a part of the state's case, Supreme Court precedent nevertheless read the section to impose that requirement, and, here, the state failed to satisfy it. The Court of Appeals concluded that the state was required to establish venue beyond a reasonable doubt and that, in this case, the state failed to meet its burden. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that its earlier cases were mistaken in reading Article I, section 11: "The venue guarantee of that constitutional provision recognizes a right to a trial in a particular place, which right must be asserted before trial." Furthermore, the Court concluded it would be unfair to hold that the defendant in this case forfeited that right, given that, under the law at the time of trial, he was permitted to raise the issue during trial. Therefore, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals, reversed the circuit court, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Mills" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of the ballot title for Initiative Petition 12 (2014). Because the Supreme Court concluded that the ballot title did not 4 substantially comply with ORS 250.035(2), it referred it to the Attorney General for modification. View "Rasmussen v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

Two petitioners sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 11 (2014). Among them, petitioners advanced a host of arguments asserting various inadequacies of the ballot title. After careful review, the Supreme Court found the ballot title did not substantially comply with ORS 250.035(2). Therefore, the Court referred the ballot title to the Attorney General for modification. View "Buehler v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

Petitioner and her friend were crossing a street late at night when defendant, who had been drinking, hit them with his car and seriously injured them. Defendant pled guilty to one count of driving under the influence of intoxicants and two counts of assault in the fourth degree for "intentionally, knowingly or recklessly caus[ing] physical injury." The trial court sentenced defendant to a combination of supervised probation, jail time, fines, and suspension of his driver's license. The trial court judgment also granted the state 90 days to submit a "reasonable final restitution amount." The state timely submitted a proposed supplemental judgment requesting that defendant be ordered to pay restitution in an amount that defendant stipulated represented the full amount of petitioner's economic damages. Petitioner filed suit, alleging that the trial court had violated her right to "receive prompt restitution" under Article I, section 42(1)(d) of the Oregon Constitution. The trial court denied petitioner's claim, and, pursuant to ORS 147.539, petitioner sought direct review of that order with the Supreme Court. Finding no constitutional violation, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Oregon v. Algeo" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested, handcuffed, booked, and lodged in jail along with other 49 other "Occupy Portland" protesters. She was then charged with second-degree criminal trespass. The issue in this mandamus proceeding was whether the state's election under ORS 161.566(1) to "treat" the misdemeanor offense of criminal trespass as a violation effectively decriminalized that offense and thereby deprived defendant of the jury trial right afforded her under Article I, section 11. The Supreme Court concluded defendant was entitled to a jury trial on the violation charge, and accordingly dismissed the state's petition. View "Oregon v. Benoit" on Justia Law

Defendant was accused of shoplifting, was arrested and briefly incarcerated. She was charged with third-degree theft and attempted first-degree theft. At defendant's arraignment, the state elected under ORS 161.566(1) to prosecute the charges as violations rather than misdemeanors. Defendant filed a motion to have the charges tried to a jury and to be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, contending that she was entitled to those protections even though the state was prosecuting the charges as violations. The trial court denied the motion and found defendant guilty on both charges by a preponderance of the evidence. Defendant was fined $300 on each conviction. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the prosecutor's election to treat the offenses as violations precluded defendant from asserting her right to a jury trial. Consistently with its decision in "Benoit," the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court erred in rejecting defendant's demand for those protections and that the Court of Appeals correctly reversed defendant's convictions after a trial to the court. View "Oregon v. Fuller" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court in this case was whether Article I, section 17, of the Oregon Constitution applied to a restitution determination in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. The youth-defendant in this case argued that he was entitled to a jury trial because recent constitutional and statutory amendments transformed the juvenile restitution statute, ORS 419C.450, into a civil device through which victims of crime could recover monetary damages for their injuries. The Supreme Court held that a restitution determination pursuant to ORS 419C.450 was not civil in nature and that Article I, section 17, therefore did not require a jury trial in the defendant's case. View "Oregon v. N. R. L." on Justia Law