Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was what constituted a "proof of loss" in a claim for UIM benefits and what sufficed to trigger the safe harbor provision. The insured provided notice of an injury automobile accident to her insurer, but did not submit a UIM benefits claim at that time. Nearly two years later, the insurer learned of the possible UIM claim. The insurer agreed in writing that it accepted coverage, that the only remaining issues were liability and damages, and that it was willing to submit to binding arbitration. After recovering on her UIM claim, the insured asked for attorney fees. The insurer claimed the benefit of the safe harbor provision of ORS 19 742.061(3). The Court of Appeals concluded that the insurer did not send its safe harbor letter within six months of the insured's "proof of loss." According to the Court of Appeals, the "proof of loss" was the initial report of injury two years earlier. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the initial report of injury did not provide sufficient information to constitute a proof of loss for a UIM claim and that the insurer's safe harbor letter was sufficient to trigger the statutory exception to an attorney fee award. View "Zimmerman v. Allstate Property and Casualty Ins." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action to recover for injuries that their son sustained during delivery. The issues before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether ORCP 59 H limits an appellate court's ability to review objections to a trial court's instructional rulings and whether a statutory cap on noneconomic damages constitutionally can be applied to actions brought by children injured during birth. The Court of Appeals held that, because defendant had not excepted to the trial court's rulings as ORCP 59 H requires, it could not seek appellate review of those rulings. On appeal and again on review, the parties debated whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury and whether applying a statutory cap to the jury's damages award would violate the Oregon Constitution. The jury returned a general verdict finding that defendant was "negligent in one or more ways alleged by plaintiffs" and, awarded plaintiffs economic damages and noneconomic damages. On appeal, defendant argued that both rulings were incorrect because the informed consent statute had no application to a vaginal delivery. The Supreme Court concluded that because an action for medical malpractice was one for which "the right to jury trial was customary in 1857," Article I, section 17, prohibited the legislature from limiting the jury's determination of noneconomic damages. Having reached that conclusion, the Court did not address plaintiffs' other arguments on constitutional grounds. View "Klutschkowski v. PeaceHealth" on Justia Law

The petitioners in this case sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 9 (2014). They argued the ballot title did not satisfy the requirements of ORS 250.035(2). Initiative Petition 9, if adopted by the voters, would amend provisions of the Oregon Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act. Upon review of the ballot title, the Supreme Court concluded that the proposed ballot title did not contain a concise and impartial summary of not more than 125 words that summarized the proposed measure and its effects. Furthermore, the Court found that the proposed summary of the initiative did not disclose that employees who were not members of the union but who were members of the bargaining unit would receive representation without cost. Accordingly the title was referred back to the Attorney General's office for modification. View "Towers v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

Defendant was accused of embezzling money from her employer in multiple transactions over a period of sixteen months. The prosecutor aggregated those transactions to indict defendant on sixteen counts of theft, one count for each month. The prosecutor's office did not have a "policy" for aggregating theft transactions, but did so to create "a clear organizational outline for the jury." Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that it violated the Supreme Court's mandate in "Oregon v. Freeland," (667 P2dd 509 (1983)). The trial court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the privileges and immunities provision of the state constitution, and whether it applied to prosecutors' charging decisions. If so, then the question remaining in this case was whether the prosecutor must consistently adhere to a coherent, systematic policy in making charging decisions. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed defendant's conviction. By this decision, the Supreme Court overruled "Freeman" and reaffirmed its decision in "Washington v. Clark," (630 P2d 810 (1981)). View "Oregon v. Savastano" on Justia Law

Defendant kidnapped his victim as part of an effort to persuade her not to testify against one of his friends. The friend had terrorized, raped, and sodomized the victim, and the victim feared that the defendant would use a gun to harm her. As a result, a grand jury indicted defendant for, among other things, second-degree kidnapping. He waived his right to a jury, and the trial court convicted him of that crime in addition to several others. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on whether the state constitution required that the facts necessary to impose a dangerous offender sentence be found by the grand jury and pleaded in the indictment. The trial court held that it did not, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court agreed, and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. View "Oregon v. Reinke" on Justia Law

Defendant challenged his conviction for the crime of felon in possession of a firearm, arguing that when he possessed the firearm in question, he was not a "person who has been convicted of a felony" within the meaning of the felon-in-possession statute. In this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had not declared defendant's conviction to be a misdemeanor in the original or a subsequent judgment of conviction by the time that defendant possessed the firearm in question. Accordingly, the Court rejected defendant's claim of error and affirm his conviction on the felon-in-possession charge. View "Oregon v. Stark" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of several weapons-related charges based on his possession of loaded semiautomatic handguns and a knife in a public place within the city of Portland. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Defendant petitioned the Supreme Court to review his convictions. The Court concluded that the ordinance enacted by the City of Portland was constitutional, and therefore affirmed. View "Oregon v. Christian" on Justia Law

Defendant Dean MacBale petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to order the trial court in his case to hold a public hearing to determine the admissibility of a rape victim's past sexual conduct, notwithstanding the state Rape Shield law. Defendant claimed that the victim made false allegations against him so that she could later bring a civil action against him for money damages. Defendant wanted to present evidence that the victim had a habit of falsely accusing men for later financial gain. Before his criminal trial, Defendant filed a motion under the Rape Shield law to determine the admissibility of the victim's conduct. The court granted the motion for a hearing, but denied making the hearing public in accordance with the Rape Shield Law. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that a hearing to determine admissibility of evidence under the Rape Shield Law does not constitute an "administration of justice" for the purposes of Article I, Section 10 of the Oregon Constitution, and therefore, such hearing could be closed to the public. View "Oregon v. MacBale" on Justia Law

Defendant challenged the admission of certain evidence following being held in contempt for violating a Family Abuse Prevention Act restraining order. On appeal, defendant argued that the admission of a certificate of service at trial violated his right to confrontation under the state Constitution because the State did not establish the declarant was unable to testify. The trial court concluded the certificate was admissible; the appellate court affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the out-of-court declaration made by the deputy sheriff who issued the certificate was not "witness" evidence that triggered defendant's constitutional rights; the certificate was an official record that the deputy was duty-bound to report, and it did not include investigative or gratuitous facts or opinions. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial and appellate courts. View "Oregon v. Copeland" on Justia Law

The Oregon Supreme Court issued its decision in this case in January, 2013; that decision reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed defendant's judgment of conviction for possession of methamphetamine. A few weeks later, defense counsel filed a petition for reconsideration, asking the court to reconsider and modify or reverse its decision or, at a minimum, to remand the case to the trial court for additional proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. In February 2013, defense counsel filed a notice pursuant to ORAP 8.45 informing the court that defendant had died more than a year before (on January 27, 2012), and contended therefore that the case was moot. Defense counsel also moved to vacate the Supreme Courts opinion and the judgment of conviction. Defense counsel argued that, because defendant's death rendered the case moot as of January 2012, the case necessarily was moot at the time this court issued its decision, and the appropriate disposition was to vacate that decision. Defense counsel further asserted that because: (1) the proper disposition of the case was to remand the case back to trial court for further proceedings; and (2) defendant's death meant that he could not take steps in the trial court to undo his conviction, the Supreme Court also should have vacated the judgment of conviction. The state opposed the motion to vacate, arguing that "the public interest in leaving the court's decision undisturbed far outweighs any equitable interests supporting vacatur." Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated its decision and the decision of the Court of Appeals and vacated defendant's judgment of conviction. View "Oregon v. Hemenway" on Justia Law