Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue presented to the Supreme Court in this case was the appeal of a final order of the Energy Facility Siting Council that approved an amended site certificate for construction of a wind energy facility. Specifically, the issue was whether, in approving the amended site certificate, the council correctly declined to require compliance with a recently adopted county ordinance requiring a two-mile setback between wind turbines and rural residences pursuant to ORS 469.401(2). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the council did not err in not requiring compliance with the ordinance. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the council did not err in denying petitioners' requests for a contested case proceeding. Therefore the council's final order approving the amended site certificate was affirmed. View "Blue Mountain Alliance v. Energy Facility Siting" on Justia Law

In February 2005, the parties stipulated to a judgment dissolving their marriage. At that time, the parties had been married for seven years and had two minor children, then ages four and six. The judgment provided that the parties would have joint legal custody of their children, with mother having primary physical custody and father having reasonable parenting time. It also required that father pay child support of $1,750 per month, which exceeded by $8 the presumptively correct amount indicated by application of the Oregon Child Support Guidelines Formula (Child Support Formula). The judgment provided that neither party would seek modification of that support obligation. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether that stipulation could be enforced. And after review, the Court concluded that the trial court did not err in enforcing the parties' nonmodification agreement in accordance with Oregon law. View "Matar v. Harake" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certified two questions of Oregon law to the Oregon Supreme Court. They arose from an action for personal injury brought in federal district court against defendant Christopher Boyle and his employer, the City of Beaverton, for injuries that plaintiff Jean Howell suffered in an automobile collision with a police car that defendant Boyle drove. A jury found that plaintiff and Boyle were equally at fault and that plaintiff's damages totaled approximately $1 million. The trial court reduced the award by half, in accordance with the jury's findings of comparative fault. Defendants then moved to reduce the award further, to the $200,000 limit of the then-current Oregon Tort Claims Act. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the application of the statutory limitation would have violated the remedy clause of Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution. Defendants appealed, and the Ninth Circuit certified the following questions: (1) is plaintiff's negligence action constitutionally protected under the Oregon Constitution's remedy clause irrespective of the jury's finding of comparative negligence?; and (2) if plaintiff's action is protected, is $200,000 an unconstitutional emasculated remedy despite the jury's finding of comparative negligence? The Oregon Supreme Court addressed the second question only, because its answer was dispositive: "[e]ven assuming for the sake of argument that, under the circumstances of this case, plaintiff's negligence action is constitutionally protected by Article I, section 10, the $200,000 limitation on her recovery is constitutionally permissible. Under this court's case law, the constitution requires that any remedy that remains after the imposition of a modern limitation on it be 'substantial.' In this case, the $200,000 judgment that plaintiff received satisfies that constitutional requirement." View "Howell v. Boyle" on Justia Law

In this personal injury action, defendant Alex Kalugin moved for a defense medical examination pursuant to ORCP 44 A. Plaintiff Paul Lindell, Jr. objected on the ground that he would not submit to such an examination without being allowed to bring a friend, family member, or counsel with him. The trial court declined to impose the discovery condition that Lindell requested. Lindell then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to permit the examination only on condition that he be allowed to bring with him a friend, family member, or counsel. The Court issued an alternative writ directing the trial court to permit Lindell to have legal counsel present as an observer at the examination or, in the alternative, to show cause for not doing so. In a letter opinion, the trial court respectfully informed the Supreme Court that it would not modify its order and explained its reasoning for that conclusion. In response, Lindell requested that the Supreme Court enter a peremptory writ of mandamus requiring the trial court to allow a third-party observer. For the reasons that follow, the Supreme Court declined Lindell's request for a peremptory writ and dismiss the alternative writ of mandamus: "we cannot say that the court failed to exercise its discretion or that it exercised its discretion in a manner that was outside the range of choices that the law permits." View "Lindell v. Kalugin" on Justia Law

In two criminal cases consolidated for purposes of opinion, each defendant attempted to waive his constitutional right to a jury trial as guaranteed by Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution. In both cases, the trial court refused to consent to the waiver, and juries subsequently convicted each defendant of the charges against him. In "Oregon v. Harrell," (250 P3d 1 (2011)), the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in refusing defendant Harrell's requested jury waiver and affirmed the convictions. On review in Harrell, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to reconsider defendant's jury waiver. In "Oregon v. Wilson," (247 P3d 1262 (2011)), the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court's refusal to consent to defendant's requested jury waiver had been within the trial court's discretion and affirmed defendant's convictions. On review in Wilson, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court to reconsider defendant's jury waiver. View "Oregon v. Harrell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Mark Strawn, the plaintiff in a class action case, petitioned for an award of attorney fees and costs incurred for the appellate work done on review before the Supreme Court in the underlying matter. In addition, Strawn sought two supplemental fee awards: one for the cost of litigating the fee petition, and the other for the cost of defending against a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court after the Oregon court issued its decision. Further, Strawn sought a $5,000 incentive fee for his service on review as class representative. The issues raised by this appeal included: (1) the appropriate method for determining the amount of a reasonable fee award in a case that involved both a statutory fee-shifting award and a common-fund award; (2) the propriety of applying a multiplier to the awards; (3) how fees should be apportioned between the fee-shifting and the common-fund awards; (4) whether this court has authority to award attorney fees for work done in opposing a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court; (5) whether a court has authority to award post-opinion, prejudgment interest on court-awarded attorney fees; and (6) whether an appellate court may award a class representative a class incentive fee on appeal and review. Strawn filed a class action against Farmers raising two contractual claims (breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith) and one common law claim (fraud) in connection with auto insurance policies written by Farmers. The jury found for the class on the contractual claims and the fraud claim, and it made a single award of compensatory damages on those claims. In addition, and for the fraud claim only, the jury awarded punitive damages. The Supreme Court took the opportunity of this case to discuss the methodology appropriate to award fees based on the issues raised in the appeal, and made adjustments as deemed necessary in compliance with the limits of Oregon law. View "Strawn v. Farmers Ins. Co.  " on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether plaintiff had standing under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, ORS 28.020, to seek a declaration that defendant Sisters School District #6 and its Board of Directors lacked authority to enter into a particular form of financing arrangement without a vote of the people. Plaintiff alleged that he had standing because his "status as a taxpayer and voter within the district will or may be adversely affected[.]" More specifically, plaintiff alleged that entering into the challenged form of financing arrangement might, in some unspecified way, "jeopardize the district[']s ability to provide for the daily operation of the district" and, if that should come to pass, increase the likelihood that the district will have to seek additional financing to cover its obligations. The trial court concluded that those allegations were insufficient to satisfy the requirement of ORS 28.020 that only persons "whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected" by the challenged ordinance have standing. The Court of Appeals concluded that the harm that plaintiff alleges is too attenuated and speculative to satisfy the standing requirement of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the appellate and trial courts. View "Morgan v. Sisters School District #6" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant Leland Hemenway with possession of methamphetamine. Before trial, he filed a motion to suppress evidence seized by police, arguing that his consent to search was the product of an illegal seizure, and therefore was inadmissible under the Oregon Constitution. The trial court denied the motion, and Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, finding that the stop was unlawful and the evidence from the search was presumptively obtained through exploitation of the earlier unlawful conduct. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, using the opportunity of this opinion to modify the exploitation analysis announced in the case-law authority the Court of Appeals relied on in its reversal (Oregon v. Hall, 115 P3d 908 (2005)). View "Oregon v. Hemenway" on Justia Law

The Board of Licensed Professional Counselors and Therapists (board) issued a final order suspending petitioner Rachel Weldon's license for two years and assessed costs against her. Petitioner asked the board to stay enforcement of that order pending judicial review. A few months later, the board issued an amended final order of suspension. Concluding that petitioner had not demonstrated irreparable harm and had failed to show a colorable claim of error, and that substantial public harm would result if it entered a stay, the board also entered a final order denying petitioner's request for a stay. Petitioner appealed the board's order assessing the fine and denying the stay. Petitioner also asked the Court of Appeals to enter an emergency stay to permit her to continue to practice until appellate court proceedings were complete. The Appellate Commissioner granted petitioner a temporary stay pending the board's response to petitioner's motion. In its response, the board asserted that ORS 676.210 precluded the Court of Appeals from entering a stay. The commissioner accepted the board's understanding of ORS 676.210 but, sua sponte, decided that, by precluding the exercise of the court's inherent authority to grant a stay, the statute violated the separation of powers provision of Article III, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution. The board appealed the part of the commissioner's order that declared ORS 676.210 unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals ultimately granted review of the matter and determined that petitioner demonstrated a colorable claim of error. It denied petitioner's motion for a stay and vacated that part of the appellate commissioner's order that permitted petitioner to file a supersedeas matter to stay the board's fine. Upon review of the appeals, the Supreme Court concluded that the board erred when it argued, and the Court of Appeals erred when it decided, that the Court of Appeals had no authority to issue a stay pending its decision on the merits of petitioner's appeal. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court stayed the board's order suspending petitioner's license until the Court of Appeals issued its decision on petitioner's request. View "Weldon v. Bd. of Lic. Pro. Counselors and Therapists" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Synectic Ventures I, LLC, Synectic Ventures II, LLC, and Synectic Ventures III, LLC, entered into a loan agreement regarding money that they had loaned to defendant EVI Corporation. The loan agreement provided that the loan, secured by a security interest in essentially all of defendant's property, would be converted to equity ownership in defendant, if defendant obtained additional financing by a certain date. Shortly before that deadline, the managing member of plaintiffs (who was also chairman of the board and treasurer of defendant and financially interested in defendant) entered into an agreement purporting to extend the loan period by an additional year. During the extension period, defendant obtained the additional financing and converted the debt to equity. Plaintiffs filed an action against defendant, asserting that they were not bound by the extension because the managing member had had a conflict of interest and defendant knew of the conflict. The trial court rejected that argument and granted summary judgment for defendant. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in granting defendant summary judgment, and reversed the court's judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Synectic Ventures I, LLC v. EVI Corp." on Justia Law