Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this criminal case, the victim filed an interlocutory appeal challenging several orders of the trial court that she contended violated her right to "refuse an interview, deposition or other discovery request by the criminal defendant," under Article I, section 42(1)(c), of the Oregon Constitution. Defendant attempted to obtain from Google, Inc., by subpoena duces tecum "all internet activity and searches conducted by [the victim], email [of the victim] . . . including IP addresses, web searches requested, results, and sites viewed" as well as "[a]ny and all of [the victim's] email . . . to or from anyone concerning [defendant]." Google denied defendant's request, asserting that, under the federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 USC 2702(a) (2006), the company was prohibited from disclosing the information without the victim's consent or a court order. The prosecuting attorney requested the victim's consent, but she refused. Defendant then renewed his motion to compel. The prosecuting attorney opposed defendant's motion, arguing that requiring the discovery of the requested information following the victim's refusal to provide it would violate her right to refuse a discovery request under the Oregon Constitution. In December 2011, the trial court held a hearing on the prosecuting attorney's objections. Ultimately, the trial court overruled those objections and ordered the prosecuting attorney to obtain the Google information on defendant's behalf. Following arguments on the matter, the trial court denied the relief requested by the victim. The trial court explained that "the Court has never ordered the victim to produce anything and so there is nothing that the Court has ordered that is inconsistent with . . . her protections under . . . the Oregon [C]onstitution[.]" Upon review, the Supreme Court dismissed the interlocutory appeal: "[t]he victim had seven days from the trial court's issuance of its order denying her requested relief. . . . The victim did not file her notice of interlocutory appeal until April 27, 2012. The appeal was untimely. The timely filing of the notice of interlocutory appeal is 'jurisdictional and may not be waived.'" Accordingly, the Court dismissed the victim's appeal. View "Oregon v. Bray" on Justia Law

Defendant Jesse Moss filed a notice of appeal and then absconded. The state moved to dismiss his appeal pursuant to the state's fugitive dismissal rule (ORAP 8.05(3)). In the meantime, Defendant was arrested and returned to custody. On the basis of his return to custody, Defendant opposed the motion to dismiss, arguing that he had "surrendered" within the meaning of the statute. The State responded that the mere fact that an absconding defendant has been apprehended by police is not sufficient to establish that he has "surrendered" within the meaning of the rule. The Court of Appeals agreed with the State and dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court allowed Defendant's petition for review and affirmed the order of dismissal. View "Oregon v. Moss" on Justia Law

Realtor-Defendant Dylan McDowell petitioned for a peremptory or alternative writ of mandamus to compel his release pending trial. He contended that he was entitled to release under ORS 136.290, which provides, in part, that a criminal defendant "shall not remain in custody pending commencement of the trial of the defendant more than 60 days after the time of arrest." According to Defendant, he was indicted, arrested, and then held more than 60 days, when the state dismissed the charges and released him. Several days later, however, the state reindicted him on the same charges and arrested him again. He contended that the 60-day statutory deadline ran and that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to be released under ORS 136.290. The state argued that the court did not err in denying relator's motion, because the statutory 60-day deadline recommenced upon his rearrest. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with Defendant and issued a peremptory writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to release Defendant immediately. View "Oregon v. McDowell" on Justia Law

This case arose out of Defendant Javier Eumana-Moranchel's motion in limine to exclude the testimony of the State's expert witness in his prosecution for driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII). The issue presented was whether the state could introduce an expert's testimony to prove that defendant's blood alcohol content (BAC) was over the legal limit of .08 percent when a police officer stopped him for driving erratically, even though Defendant's BAC was under the legal limit at the time of his breath test, approximately an hour and a half later. At the pretrial hearing on Defendant's motion, the trial court excluded the expert's testimony interpreting defendant's breath test results to the extent that that testimony would explain that Defendant's BAC was over .08 percent at the time he was driving. The State filed an interlocutory appeal of that ruling and the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the expert's testimony was derived from a chemical analysis of defendant's breath and was therefore admissible. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the State should have been permitted to offer the expert's testimony explaining retrograde extrapolation to establish that Defendant's BAC was over .08 percent at the time he was driving. The Court affirmed the appellate court, reversed the circuit court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Eumana-Moranchel" on Justia Law

Defendants Michael Miskell and Anthony Sinibaldi sought review of a Court of Appeals decision affirming their convictions for aggravated first-degree theft and second-degree burglary. The Supreme Court allowed their petition for review to consider one of the issues defendants raised in their consolidated appeal: whether the trial court erred in denying their motion to suppress an audio recording of a conversation between defendants and a police informant, which the police made without first obtaining a court order. Upon review, the Court concluded that the police acted unlawfully in failing to seek a court order under ORS 9 133.726 before intercepting and recording the conversation, and that the recording should have been suppressed. The Court further concluded that the error was prejudicial. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Miskell/Sinibaldi" on Justia Law

The State appealed, and Defendant Kevin Jarnagin cross-appealed a pretrial order in a murder case suppressing evidence. Neither party challenged the trial court's ruling that the officers violated Defendant's rights under the state constitution when they questioned him at the police station and later at a hospital without advising him of his Miranda rights. The parties focused instead on whether statements that defendant made the next day at his home and before and after a polygraph examination should be suppressed on the ground that those statements were a product of the Miranda violations the day before. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the statements Defendant made at his home were a product of the Miranda violations the day before but that the statements he made before and after the polygraph examination were not. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's order in part and reverse it in part. View "Oregon v. Jarnagin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court previously affirmed Defendant Robert Langley, Jr.'s aggravated murder convictions, but twice vacated his death sentences and remanded the case for further penalty-phase proceedings. On this third review, Defendant raised 27 assignments of error related to the third and most recent penalty-phase proceeding. As his second assignment of error, Defendant contended the trial court erred by requiring him to proceed pro se without first securing valid waiver of his right to counsel. Because the Supreme Court determined that that assignment was well-taken, the Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for further penalty-phase proceedings. View "Oregon v. Langley" on Justia Law

Two petitioners sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition (IP) 28 (2012). Before 2009, Oregon imposed a 6.6 percent tax rate on a corporation's "taxable income." In 2009, the voters approved Ballot Measure 67, which modified the marginal tax rate that corporations pay on their taxable income. Petitioner Patrick Green raised a single challenge to the caption, the "yes" vote result statement, the "no" vote result statement, and the summary. He contended that each part of the ballot title was defective because it referred to a tax on "corporate income" rather than a tax on corporate "profits" or "taxable income." He reasoned that the use of the phrase "corporate income" was misleading because it failed to communicate that the tax would fall only on corporate profits. Petitioner Dan Harmon raised a similar challenge, noting that what the IP would have modified was a corporate excise tax and that the ballot title should have either referred to an excise tax or used the phrase "taxable income." In his view, either phrase would have been more accurate and less misleading than the use of the unmodified term "income." In each instance, the certified ballot title used the term "income," even though that term can refer to more than one type of income and even though those differing types of income may have significantly different tax consequences. The Supreme Court concluded the Attorney General advanced no legitimate reason for not using a more accurate term, which would reduce the potential for misleading the voters that the certified ballot title currently presents. The Court agreed with Petitioners that referring to a tax on corporate "income" was, without more, misleading. Accordingly, the Court referred the caption, the "yes" result statement, the "no" result statement, and the summary to the Attorney General for modification. View "Green/Harmon v. Kroger" on Justia Law

Defendant Jose Cabanilla is a native Spanish speaker whose command of English was described as "weak." A witness saw Defendant's vehicle leave the road at a high rate of speed, roll over and come to rest in a nearby field. The responding officer arrested Defendant for driving under the influence of intoxicants. The matter before the Supreme Court concerned whether for purposes of implied consent, the officer "informed" Defendant of the consequences of refusing to take a breath test when those consequences were explained in English. The trial court concluded that Defendant had been adequately informed and declined to suppress evidence of Defendant's refusal to take the test. A jury convicted Defendant of driving while under the influence (DUII), and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that evidence of a DUII defendant's refusal to take a breath test is admissible against that defendant even if the state does not establish that the defendant understood the information given about his rights and the consequences of refusing the breath test. View "Oregon v. Cabanilla" on Justia Law

At issue in this dependency case was the lawfulness of a juvenile court order that required a father not to interfere with the ability of a child who is a ward of the court to visit other children who live with the father but are not wards of the court. The Court of Appeals concluded that the juvenile court possessed the authority to enter the order under ORS 419B.337(3). "J.R.F," the Father in this case, contended that the Court of Appeals erred in its holding, because the order at issue did not involve visitation "by the parents or the siblings." The Department of Human Services (DHS) contended that the Court of Appeals was correct, because, although ORS 419B.337(3) did not explicitly authorize the order at issue, the dependency statutes, taken as a whole, authorized the court to "make any order designed to further the best interest of a ward and advance the reunification of the family." Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that even if the state was correct about the scope of the authority that the statutes conferred on the juvenile court, the record in this case was inadequate to support the order at issue. The Court therefore reversed the opinion of the Court of Appeals and vacated the order of the juvenile court. View "Dept. of Human Services v. J. R. F." on Justia Law