Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioners sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 26 (2012), arguing that the ballot title did not satisfy the requirements of ORS 250.035(2). Initiative Petition 26 would amend a number of statutory provisions pertaining to the commercial harvest and sale of fish caught in Oregon waters. As the Supreme Court noted in reviewing the ballot title for a different initiative petition concerning commercial fishing, those statutes "exist[ed] as part of a complex web of laws," including an interstate compact between Oregon and Washington, statutes and regulations of both states, federal law, treaties with Native American tribes, and various court orders. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the initiative's caption overstated the effect of the proposed measure by asserting that it would eliminate "non-tribal commercial fishing." Petitioners argued, and the Attorney General did not appear to disagree, that some commercial fishing -- of some species, in some Oregon waters, using some gear -- has occurred or was then occurring and that it would not be prohibited by Initiative Petition 26. Accordingly, the reference in the caption to the "elimination" of non-tribal commercial fishing needed to be changed. The caption also referred to only the Columbia River, thus understating the scope of the proposed measure, which would ban non-tribal commercial gillnetting of all fish in all Oregon "inland waters." That description, too, needed to be changed. The Court did not address petitioners' other challenges to the caption, and remanded the matter back to the Attorney General for modification. View "Girod v. Kroger" on Justia Law

Petitioners, Northeast Coalition of Neighborhoods and Coalition for a Livable Future, sought direct review under Oregon Laws 1996, chapter 12, of a decision by the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA) that affirmed in relevant part a land use final order by Respondent METRO. The land use final order at issue concerned the Columbia River Crossing Project, which (among other things) would extend a light rail line from Oregon to Washington. Petitioners contended Metro either exceeded its statutory authority in adopting the order or that its decisions in the order were not supported by substantial evidence. Respondents Metro and Tri-County Metropolitan Transit District of Oregon (TriMet) opposed the petition. Finding that Petitioners failed to show that METRO either exceeded its statutory authority or made a decision about the highway improvements that was not supported by substantial evidence on the whole record, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Weber Coastal Bells v. METRO" on Justia Law

Petitioners Jann Carson, David Fidanque, Roey Thorpe and Cynthia Pappas sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot initiative petition 22 (2012), arguing that the title did not satisfy the requirements of state law. "Initiative Petition 22" would amend the Oregon Constitution to create a new provision to "recognize personal 'right to life' (undefined) that begins at fertilization [and] prohibits all abortions [and] certain contraceptives." Petitioners contended that the ballot title was deficient in a number of respects pertaining to the caption, the "yes" and "no" vote result statements and the summary. The Supreme Court found that reference to the "full legal rights of a person" in the "no" vote result statement was too vague to substantially comply with state law. Furthermore, "the use of the phrase in the summary pose[d] the same problems and for that reason, the summary must be referred to the Attorney General to more accurately describe the current state of the law." The Court found that there appeared to be no dispute that adoption of the measure would have the effect of prohibiting certain fertility treatments. The Court therefore referred the ballot measure back to the Attorney General for further modification. View "Carson v. Kroger" on Justia Law

In 2004, Defendant Nicholas Rainoldi was convicted of first degree forgery and identity theft, and was sentenced to 24 months' probation. On the judgment, the trial judge wrote "misd. treat. on completion of probation." Defendant completed probation in May 2006. Several months later, Defendant attempted to purchase a shotgun from a gun show. As part of that transaction, Defendant completed the background check form indicating he had never been convicted of a felony. Based on the background check, Defendant's application to purchase the gun was denied. Two police officers were at the gun show, and cited Defendant for attempted unlawful purchase of a firearm and attempted felon in possession of a firearm. The State then charged Defendant by information with those offenses, alleging Defendant "knowingly" attempted to purchase an "intentionally" attempted to own a firearm. The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was whether Oregon law requires proof that Defendant knew he had been convicted of a felony before he possessed or attempted to possess a firearm. The Court of Appeals held that Oregon law requires proof of such knowledge, and that the trial court erred in failing the deliver a jury instruction to that effect. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding the legislature clearly intended to dispense with the culpable mental state requirement as to the element that a defendant "has been convicted of a felony." Accordingly, the Court concluded that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's request for an instruction that it could not convict unless it found he knew he was a felon at the time he attempted to purchase the gun. View "Oregon v. Rainoldi" on Justia Law

This matter came to the Supreme Court on a "request" that it enforce, on its own motion, an alternative writ of mandamus that it previously issued in connection with Defendant Gary Haugen's death-warrant proceeding. After that writ issued, the Court determined that it had been complied with, and then sua sponte dismissed it. The request to enforce the dismissed writ was premised on an assertion that the trial court did not comply with the writ. The trial court held a hearing on whether to issue the death warrant. Defendant was represented by two lawyers, but before the hearing, Defendant made clear he wanted to represent himself and waive all future challenges to his conviction and sentence. Defense counsel objected, believing Defendant not competent to be executed. The trial court then asked Defendant a series of questions to evaluate his competency. Finding Defendant competent, his counsel was withdrawn but placed on "standby." After validly waiving his rights, the trial judge issued the death warrant and set a date for Defendant's execution. The Oregon Capital Resource Center (OCRC) attempted to participate by filing a writ of mandamus contending that the trial court discharged Defendant's counsel and issued a death warrant without a sufficient inquiry into Defendant's competence. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that OCRC had not made the necessary showing that it had any legal authority to bring the proceeding on Defendant's behalf. Furthermore, however, Defendant's former lawyers had authority to challenge Defendant's competency to discharge them. Finding no error in the trial judge's inquiry as to Defendant's competence to represent himself, the Court denied OCRC's request and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Oregon v. Haugen" on Justia Law

Petitioner Marco Montez sought review of an appellate court decision that denied him post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court had rejected Petitioner's claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase retrial proceeding that resulted in him receiving the death penalty. In his petition for reconsideration, Petitioner contended that one of the Justices on the Supreme Court should not have participated in the decision to deny review of the appellate court's decision. Petitioner pointed out that the Justice in question served on the Court of Appeals at the time of his appeal, and that the then-judge recused himself from considering Petitioner's appeal. Though the record in this case provided no explanation for the judge's decision to recuse himself from considering Petitioner's post-conviction appeal at the Court of Appeals, the Judge/Justice recused himself from the Supreme Court's review of Petitioner's appeal. As such, the Court concluded that Petitioner's arguments about the Justice's previous participation in the Court's decision to deny review was made moot. The Court subsequently allowed Petitioner's petition for reconsideration. View "Montez v. Czerniak" on Justia Law

Petitioners Gail Rasmussen and Bethanne Darby sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 18 (2012). If approved by the voters, Initiative Petition 18 would enact a prohibition on the imposition of any state or local estate tax, inheritance tax, tax on property transferred in connection with a person's death, or tax on the transfer of property between family members. The proposed measure would supersede current statutes that imposed those taxes, and it would exclude from its prohibition certain statutes that imposed fees relating to attendant transactions following a person's death. Petitioners argued that the certified "yes" and "no" vote result statements did not comply with the applicable statutory standards. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that indeed the certified statements were inaccurate, and the Court "invited" the Attorney General to address and correct the problems with the narrative. View "Rasmussen v. Kroger" on Justia Law

Two cases involving ORS 135.747 were consolidated in this opinion. In the first case, the State charged Defendant Vladmir Glushko with one count of attempt to elude, one count of reckless driving and one count of driving under the influence (DUI). Defendant pled not guilty, but entered a diversion agreement as to the DUI charge. The court received notice that Defendant failed to attend a "victim impact panel" as a part of his diversion program. Subsequently, Defendant was ordered to court to "show cause" as to why his diversion should not be revoked. Defendant failed to appear at the show cause hearing, and accordingly, the court revoked the diversion and issued a warrant for Defendant's arrest. In the second case, Defendant Harold Little was cited for DUI and ordered to appear for arraignment. Defendant appeared, and at that time, the court entered a release order which required Defendant to appear one week later. Defendant failed to appear and the court issued a warrant for his arrest. Both Defendants appealed, arguing that the trial courts erred in denying their respective motions to dismiss. Both argued that under ORS 135.747 whether or not they were deprived of their statutory right to a speedy trial "hinged" on the delay between the dates the courts issued arrest warrants and the dates the warrants were executed. This delay would be grounds for dismissal of the charges against them. The appellate court affirmed both cases without opinion. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Defendants' failures to appear at scheduled hearings was "consent" to delay as used in the statute, and if not, whether the delay was reasonable nonetheless. Upon review, the Court concluded that although Defendants did not consent to the delays that occurred in their cases as a result of their failures to appeal, the delays were reasonable. The trial courts therefore did not err in denying Defendants' motions to dismiss on statutory speedy trial grounds. View "Oregon v. Glushko" on Justia Law

Defendant David Swanson was charged with misdemeanor reckless driving. At trial, Defendant asked the trial court to instruct the jury on the elements of "careless" driving (a traffic violation), arguing that it is a lesser-included offense of reckless driving. The trial court declined to give such an instruction, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that "reckless driving" did not extend to the lesser-included violation, and was instead limited to lesser-included criminal offenses: "violations and crimes are distinctive categories of offenses and... juries are authorized to consider only lesser-included crimes, not lesser-included violations of a charged crime." View "Oregon v. Swanson" on Justia Law

Petitioners Gail Rasmussen and Bethanne Darby sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 15 (2012). If enacted, Initiative Petition 15 would add a provision to the Oregon Revised Statutes that would phase out all estate and inheritance taxes, and related taxes on intra-family property transfers that the state currently has statutory authority to collect. The proposed measure would supersede any Oregon law that purports to impose such a tax. Petitioners were electors who timely submitted written comments to the Secretary of State concerning the content of the Attorney General's draft ballot title and who therefore were entitled to seek review of the resulting certified ballot title to the Supreme Court. Petitioners challenged the caption and "yes" and "no" vote result statements. The Supreme Court reviewed the certified ballot title to determine whether it substantially complied with ORS 250.035(2) (stating requirements for ballot titles). The Court determined that the initiative warranted revision by the Attorney General, and referred the ballot back for modification. View "Rasmussen v. Kroger" on Justia Law