Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case, the plaintiffs, Weston and Carrie Twigg, hired Rainier Pacific Development LLC to build a home. After taking possession, they discovered various construction defects, including issues with the garage floor. Rainier Pacific agreed to make repairs, but failed to meet deadlines, leading to arbitration. The parties settled through a "Repair Agreement," but Rainier Pacific's subsequent repairs were also defective, prompting the Twiggs to reinitiate arbitration. The arbitrator found Rainier Pacific's work defective and awarded the Twiggs $150,000 for the garage floor repairs.The Multnomah County Circuit Court granted summary judgment to Admiral Insurance Company, Rainier Pacific's insurer, concluding that the damages did not arise from an "accident" as required by the commercial general liability (CGL) policy. The court relied on the precedent set by Oak Crest Construction Co. v. Austin Mutual Insurance Co., which held that damages solely from a breach of contract do not qualify as an "accident."The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that the damages arose solely from a breach of contract and not from an "accident" as defined by the CGL policy. The court emphasized that the Twiggs had not contended that Rainier Pacific's liability arose from a separate duty of care, i.e., a tort.The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and the trial court's decisions. The Supreme Court held that whether an insurance claim seeks recovery for an "accident" does not depend on the plaintiff's pleading decisions but on whether there is a factual basis for imposing tort liability. The court found that there were material factual disputes regarding whether Rainier Pacific's defective work constituted an "accident" under the CGL policy. Therefore, the case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Twigg v. Admiral Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The case involves a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by the Oregon State Building and Construction Trades Council (OBTC) against a preliminary injunction issued by the Marion County Circuit Court. The injunction was part of a public contracting dispute between the Oregon-Columbia Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America (AGC) and the Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT). AGC challenged the process used by ODOT to set the terms of "community benefit contracts" for certain highway improvement projects under ORS 279C.308.The Marion County Circuit Court issued a preliminary injunction preventing ODOT from using the terms of a Community Workforce Agreement (CWA) in any projects while AGC's challenge to the validity of the CWA under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) was pending before the Oregon Court of Appeals. AGC had filed three cases: one in the circuit court and two petitions for judicial review in the Court of Appeals. The circuit court case sought declaratory relief and an injunction against ODOT's use of the CWA. The Court of Appeals certified the case challenging the CWA's validity to the Oregon Supreme Court, which accepted the certification.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and decided the challenge to the validity of the CWA in a related case, Oregon-Columbia Chapter of AGC v. ODOT. As a result, the preliminary injunction issued by the circuit court expired, rendering OBTC's request for mandamus relief moot. Consequently, the Oregon Supreme Court dismissed the petition for a writ of mandamus. View "Oregon-Columbia Chapter Associated General Contractors of America v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

In Friends of Columbia Gorge v. Energy Fac. Siting Coun., 365 Or 371, 446 P3d 53 (2019), the Oregon Supreme Court held that the Energy Facility Siting Council had failed to substantially comply with a procedural requirement when it amended rules governing how it processes requests for amendment (RFAs) to site certificates that the council issued. The Court therefore held that the rules were invalid. In response to that decision, the council adopted temporary rules governing the RFA process. Petitioners contended that those temporary rules were also invalid. According to petitioners, the rules were invalid because the council failed to prepare a statement of its findings justifying the use of temporary rules. Petitioners also maintained that the council’s rules exceed the 180-day limit on temporary rules or otherwise improperly operated retroactively. After review, the Supreme Court disagreed with petitioners’ arguments and concluded the temporary rules were valid. View "Friends of Columbia Gorge v. Energy Fac. Siting Coun." on Justia Law

Out-of-state architects engaged in the illegal practice of architecture by holding themselves out as being licensed in Oregon. The Oregon Board of Architect Examiners (board) petitioned for certiorari review of the Court of Appeals decision to reverse in part the board’s determination that respondents (the Washington firm Twist Architecture & Design, Inc., and its principals, Callison and Hansen), engaged in the unlawful practice of architecture and unlawfully represented themselves as architects. The board argued respondents, who were not licensed to practice architecture in Oregon, engaged in the “practice of architecture” when they prepared master plans depicting the size, shape, and placement of buildings on specific properties in conformance with applicable laws and regulations for a client that was contemplating the construction of commercial projects. The board further argued that respondents’ use of the term “architecture” in the logo on those master plans and the phrase “Licensed in the State of Oregon (pending)” on their website violated the law prohibiting unlicensed individuals from representing themselves as architects or indicating that they were practicing architecture. The Oregon Supreme Court agreed with the board, reversed the Court of Appeals, and affirmed the board's order. View "Twist Architecture v. Board of Architect Examiners" on Justia Law

This case required the Oregon Supreme Court's interpretation of ORS 12.135(1)(a). ORS 12.135(1)(a) provided that an action arising from the “construction, alteration or repair of any improvement to real property” must be commenced within “[t]he applicable period of limitation otherwise established by law.” The question in this construction defect case was precisely what is the period of limitation “otherwise established by law.” Plaintiffs argued their action was subject to a six-year statute of limitations set out in ORS 12.080(3). Defendant argued that the action was not for injury to an “interest” in real property, but for damage to the property itself, which is governed by a shorter, two-year statute of limitations described in ORS 12.110(1) that applied to tort actions generally. The trial court agreed with plaintiffs that the six year-limitation period applied, but granted summary judgment for defendant on the ground that plaintiffs brought their action more than six years after the construction was completed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that, although the six-year statute applied, a “discovery rule” applied, there remained an issue of fact as to whether plaintiffs initiated their action within six years from the time that they knew or should have known of the injury that formed the basis for their claim. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that plaintiffs’ action was subject to the six-year statute: that statute applied to actions for interference with or injury to an “interest” in real property, such as trespass or waste, not to actions for damage to property itself, which are subject to the two-year statute of limitations. There remained, however, a question of fact as to when plaintiffs discovered the damage to their property, which would have triggered the two-year statute of limitations. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the Court of Appeals with regard to summary judgment, and remanded for for further proceedings. View "Goodwin v. Kingsmen Plastering, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was a general contractor that builds “spec” houses (houses built without pre-existing construction contracts in anticipation of eventual sale to the public). On May 30, 2000, defendant and plaintiff entered into a purchase and sale agreement for a house. Although most of the construction had been completed, the agreement specified that defendant would make changes to the interior of the house. Specifically, defendant agreed to upgrade some of the flooring, install an air conditioning unit, and install a gas dryer in the laundry room. After defendant made those changes and the parties conducted a walk-through inspection, the sale closed on July 12, 2000. The primary question in this construction defect case was which of two statutes of repose applied when a buyer enters into a purchase and sale agreement to buy an existing home. Although each statute provided for a 10-year period of repose, the two periods of repose ran from different dates. One runs from “the date of the act or omission complained of;” the other ran from the date that construction is “substantial[ly] complet[e].” In this case, the trial court found that plaintiff filed her action more than 10 years after “the date of the act or omission complained of” but less than 10 years after the construction was “substantial[ly] complet[e].” The trial court ruled that the first statute, ORS 12.115(1), applied and accordingly entered judgment in defendant’s favor. The Court of Appeals affirmed. After review of the parties' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court found no reversible error in the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed. View "Shell v. Schollander Companies, Inc." on Justia Law

A certified question of Oregon law was certified to the Oregon Supreme Court from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The question arose out of a construction contract dispute in which a homeowner's association sued a builder in state court for construction defects. The homeowner's association and the builder settled, and the settlement included an unconditional release and covenant not to execute against the builder. When the homeowner's association attempted to garnish the builder's liability insurance policy, however, the insurer claimed that it had no liability because the settlement unconditionally released its insured from any liability. The state trial court agreed, and the builder appealed. Meanwhile, in response to the state trial court's conclusion that the settlement agreement eliminated the insurer's liability, the homeowner's association and the builder amended their settlement agreement to eliminate the unconditional release and covenant not to execute. Pursuant to the new agreement, the builder initiated this action in federal court against its insurer. In the federal court action, the insurer argued that the state court already had determined that, given the terms of the original settlement, the builder could not recover under its insurance policy and that the parties lacked authority to create any new insurance coverage obligation by amending their settlement agreement. The federal district court agreed. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit certified a question on whether the homeowner's association and the builder could amend their settlement agreement in such a way as to revive the liability of the builder's insurer. After review, the Oregon Court concluded that, although the parties possessed authority to amend the terms of their settlement agreement, they could not do so in a way that retroactively revived the liability that was eliminated in their original agreement (at least not on the basis of the legal theories that they proposed). View "A&T Siding, Inc. v. Capitol Specialty Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant Capitol Specialty Insurance Co. moved to dismiss this appeal on mootness grounds. According to Capitol, the issues to be decided in the appeal pertained to the terms of an agreement settling an underlying construction defect case, but those terms were superseded by amendments to the agreement adopted during the pendency of the appeal. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that, because the amendments to the settlement agreement did not have the effect of superseding the terms of the original agreement, a judicial decision about that original agreement will have a practical effect on the rights of the parties. Consequently, the appeal was not moot, and the motion to dismiss was denied. View "Brownstone Homes Condo. Assn. v. Brownstone Forest Hts." on Justia Law

The Montara Owners Association (homeowners) sued developer and general contractor, La Noue Development, LLC for damages caused by design and construction defects in the building of the Montara townhomes. The defects included problems with the framing, siding, decking, and windows, resulting in water intrusion and water damage. La Noue, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against multiple subcontractors, including Vasily Sharabarin, dba Advanced Construction (Sharabarin), who provided siding work on four buildings. Before trial, La Noue settled with the homeowners for $5 million (eliminating the first-party litigation from the case) and also reached settlements with most of the third-party subcontractors. La Noue did not settle with Sharabarin. Because of various pretrial rulings, the only claims submitted to the jury were La Noue’s breach of contract claims against Sharabarin and two other subcontractors. Before trial, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Sharabarin on La Noue’s claim for contractual indemnity, on the ground that the indemnification provision on which La Noue had relied was void under ORS 30.140. The trial court also held that the court would decide whether La Noue could recover the attorney fees that it had incurred in defending against the homeowners’ claims as consequential damages for Sharabarin’s breach of contract and that the court would resolve that issue after trial. In its post-trial ruling on the attorney fee issue, the court ultimately held that La Noue could not recover attorney fees as consequential damages in the case, even after trial, and denied La Noue’s claim for those attorney fees. The issues this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on: the proper application of ORS 30.140; whether it was error for the trial court to give an instruction on the economic waste doctrine in the absence of any evidence on the alternative measure of damages, diminution in value; and whether a third-party plaintiff can recover attorney fees as consequential damages for a third-party defendant’s breach of contract when the attorney fees were incurred in the first-party litigation in the same action. The Supreme Court concluded that it was error to have given the economic waste instruction. The Court affirmed on the Court of Appeals' decisions as to the other issues presented, and remanded for the trial court to consider the general contractor’s substantive right to attorney fees. View "Montara Owners Assn. v. La Noue Development, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant general contractor Super One, Inc., and various subcontractors, including defendant subcontractor T. T. & L. Sheet Metal, Inc., contracted with VIP's Industries, Inc. and VIP's Motor Inns, Inc. (VIP's) to build a hotel. Defendants began work in 1996. In early 1997, VIP's posted a "completion notice" pursuant to ORS 87.045. On or about that same date, VIP's also obtained a certificate for temporary occupancy and began accepting paying guests. However, a Certificate of Substantial Completion was not issued by the architect or accepted by VIP's as had been contemplated by the contract between the parties. After the date on which VIP's posted the completion notice, defendants continued to perform construction work. The county issued a certificate of final occupancy later that year. In 2006, plaintiff purchased the hotel and soon thereafter allegedly discovered damage. Plaintiff filed an action against defendants for negligence, nuisance, and trespass in 2007, a date more than 10 years after the posting of the completion notice but less than 10 years after the issuance of the certificate of final occupancy. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff's claims were barred by ORS 12.135. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was the meaning of the term "substantial completion" as used in ORS 12.135. The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "PIH Beaverton, LLC v. Super One, Inc." on Justia Law