Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, mostly elderly individuals, purchased lifetime membership contracts for an RV resort in Oregon. The resort was sold to the defendant, who refused to honor these contracts despite knowing that some plaintiffs relied on them for housing. Plaintiffs sued for breach of contract and elder abuse.The Coos County Circuit Court held a four-day jury trial, resulting in a verdict for the plaintiffs on both claims. The jury awarded $500,000 for breach of contract and $900,000 for elder abuse. The trial court entered a judgment reflecting these awards, including treble damages for the elder abuse claim.The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying its motions for a directed verdict on both claims. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the breach of contract ruling but reversed the elder abuse claim, remanding it for dismissal. Both parties sought further review.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case. It upheld the trial court's denial of the directed verdict on the breach of contract claim, noting that the pleadings were amended to conform to the evidence, allowing the contracts to be binding as servitudes. The court found that the defendant's arguments about statutory preemption and lack of privity were not preserved for appeal.Regarding the elder abuse claim, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals, finding sufficient evidence that the defendant wrongfully took or appropriated the plaintiffs' property. The court concluded that the defendant's conduct, including purchasing the property at a reduced price with knowledge of the contracts and then refusing to honor them, could be seen as wrongful under ORS 124.110(1)(a).The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the Court of Appeals, and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. View "Adelsperger v. Elkside Development LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, an adult in custody at an Oregon correctional institution, sued the Oregon Department of Corrections and others for breach of contract and civil rights violations. He sought economic damages based on lost future wages and employment opportunities, alleging that the department had breached an oral promise of nonretaliation by using negative video footage of him in training videos, which led to his loss of job assignments and income-generating opportunities. The plaintiff claimed $11,640 in economic damages due to this negative portrayal.The Marion County Circuit Court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, agreeing with the department's argument that Article I, section 41(3) of the Oregon Constitution, which states that inmates have no legally enforceable right to a job or compensation for work performed while incarcerated, rendered the plaintiff unable to plead economic damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, reasoning that the constitution precluded the plaintiff from establishing economic damages in the form of lost income.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case and held that the trial court erred in granting the department's motion to dismiss. The court concluded that the lack of a right to employment does not establish, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff cannot prove economic damages in the form of future lost wages. The court emphasized that challenges to the sufficiency of proof are properly suited to a motion for summary judgment or trial, not a motion to dismiss. The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the judgment of the circuit court was also affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Huskey v. Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

HotChalk, LLC filed a lawsuit against the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod and 22 other defendants, alleging breach of contract and fraud in relation to the closure of Concordia University - Portland. HotChalk claimed that the Synod orchestrated the university’s closure to financially benefit itself and its affiliates while leaving the university’s creditors out in the cold. During discovery, the Synod sought a protective order to prevent the disclosure of certain documents related to internal religious matters. The trial court granted the protective order, effectively denying a motion to compel discovery of those documents. HotChalk then filed a petition for mandamus.The trial court's decision to grant the protective order was based on an in-camera review of the documents in question. The court equated the Synod's motion to a motion to restrict discovery to protect a party from embarrassment. After completing its final in-camera review, the trial court granted the Synod's motion for a protective order. HotChalk then filed a timely petition for mandamus in the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon issued an alternative writ of mandamus, directing the trial court to either vacate its order or show cause why it should not do so. The trial court declined to vacate its order, leading to arguments in the Supreme Court. The Synod argued that the writ should be dismissed because HotChalk has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. The Supreme Court agreed with the Synod, stating that HotChalk had not established that the normal appellate process would not constitute a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in this case. Therefore, the Supreme Court dismissed the alternative writ as improvidently allowed. View "Hotchalk, Inc. v. Lutheran Church--Missouri Synod" on Justia Law

In a case before the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon, the plaintiffs, Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, sued TNA NA Manufacturing, Inc. and Food Design, Inc., claiming negligence and product liability for a listeria outbreak that resulted from using the defendants' food processing equipment. The outbreak cost the plaintiffs around $20 million. The trial court and Court of Appeals upheld that the plaintiffs had waived any action in tort through their purchase contract with the defendants, as the contract contained a waiver of tort liability. The Supreme Court of Oregon, however, disagreed.The court ruled that, under Oregon law, a contract will not be construed to provide immunity from consequences of a party’s own negligence unless that intention is clearly and unequivocally expressed. The court found that the language in the contract between the plaintiffs and defendants did not meet this standard. The court held that to waive tort liability, contract language must be clear and explicit, stating that the waiver will not be deduced from inference or implication. The text of the contract must unambiguously show that the parties intended to disclaim actions outside of contract, i.e., actions in tort.Consequently, the court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the case back to the circuit court for further proceedings. The court confirmed that, while no magic words are required for a waiver of tort liability to be effective, the use of terms such as "negligence" or "tort" may be helpful in demonstrating an explicit intent to waive such liability. View "Certain Underwriters v. TNA NA Manufacturing" on Justia Law

Elkside Development, LLC (Elkside) owned and operated the Osprey Point RV Resort in Lakeside, Oregon. Part of Elkside’s business model involved selling membership contracts that conferred free use of the campground, among other benefits. In April 2017, Barnett Resorts LLC, an Oregon limited liability company operated by member-managers Stefani and Chris Barnett, purchased Elkside. Shortly after the purchase, the Barnetts sent a letter to all campground members, identifying them as “owners” of the resort, and indicating that they would not honor Elkside’s membership contracts. Plaintiffs, a group of 71 people who, collectively, were party to 39 membership contracts with Elkside, brought suit alleging a variety of claims against Stefani and Chris Barnett individually, and against the company, Barnett Resorts LLC. On appeal, this case raised three issues relating to: (1) a breach of contract claim; (2) an intentional interference with contract claim; and (3) a statutory claim of elder abuse, based on the fact that the majority of the membership contracts had been held by plaintiffs over the age of 65. As to the claims against the Barnetts individually, the trial court granted summary judgment for defendants, relying on ORS 63.165 and Cortez v. Nacco Materials Handling Group, 337 P3d 111 (2014). Plaintiffs argued, in part, that whether ORS 63.165 shielded the Barnetts from liability required considering whether their actions were entirely in support of the LLC, or whether they were, instead, in furtherance of a non-LLC individual motive. The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. The Oregon Supreme Court allowed review and reversed in part the Court of Appeals and the trial court. Specifically, the Supreme Court reversed as to the elder abuse claim, affirmed as to the breach of contract claim, and affirmed the intentional interference claim by an equally divided court. View "Adelsperger v. Elkside Development LLC" on Justia Law

In 2014, plaintiffs Roberta and Kevin Haas' stopped car was struck by a car driven by defendant Mark Carter. Plaintiffs brought this negligence action against defendants, Carter's estate and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, seeking to recover economic and noneconomic damages. Carter died after plaintiffs filed suit. State Farm was Roberta Haas' insurer, whom she sued for breach of contract, alleging it failed to pay all the personal injury protection benefits that were due. At trial, one of the primary issues was whether Carter’s driving was a cause-in-fact of the injuries that plaintiffs alleged, and the issue on appeal became whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on causation. The jury returned a verdict for defendants. After review, the Oregon Supreme Court determined the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on causation, and affirmed the circuit court's judgment. View "Haas v. Estate of Mark Steven Carter" on Justia Law

After plaintiff filed this class-action complaint against defendants, defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration. The trial court granted the motion. Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Oregon Supreme Court granted review of the matter, finding that plaintiff and defendants executed a contract—the “Driver Services Agreement” (DSA)—for plaintiff to provide delivery services for defendants. The DSA stated that drivers are independent contractors. The DSA includes a section on dispute resolution. That section provides that any party “may propose mediation as appropriate” as a means for resolving a dispute arising out of or relating to the DSA. It then provided that, if the parties did not pursue mediation or mediation failed, “any dispute, claim or controversy” arising out of or relating to the DSA—including disputes about “the existence, scope, or validity” of the DSA itself—would be resolved through binding arbitration conducted by a panel of three arbitrators. The DSA also included a savings clause, which allowed for the severance of any invalid or unenforceable term or provision of the DSA. On review, plaintiff argued, inter alia, that the arbitration agreement within the DSA was unconscionable because it required him to arbitrate his wage and hour claims but prohibited the arbitrators from granting him relief on those claims. Plaintiff based his argument on a provision of the arbitration agreement that stated that the arbitrators could not “alter, amend or modify” the terms and conditions of the DSA. The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant’s reading of the DSA, as did the Supreme Court: read in the context of the DSA as a whole, the provision that the arbitrators may not “alter, amend or modify” the terms and conditions of the DSA “is not plausibly read as a restriction on their authority to determine what terms are enforceable or what law is controlling.” View "Gist v. Zoan Management, Inc." on Justia Law

Consolidated cases presented a certified question from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. The Oregon Supreme Court was asked to determine whether Oregon law precluded an insurer from limiting its liability for uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) benefits on the basis that another policy also covered the insured’s losses. Each plaintiff suffered injuries caused by an uninsured or underinsured motorist, and each plaintiff incurred resulting damages that qualify as covered losses under multiple motor vehicle insurance policies issued by defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm). Each plaintiff alleged a loss that exceeded the declared liability limits of any single applicable policy and sought to recover the excess under additional applicable policies, up to the combined total of the limits of liability. In each case, however, State Farm refused to cover the excess loss, citing a term in the policies that allowed State Farm to limit its liability to the amount that it agreed to pay under the single policy with the highest applicable limit of liability. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that that term made State Farm’s uninsured motorist coverage less favorable to its insureds than the model coverage that the legislature has required and, thus, was unenforceable. View "Batten v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Daimler-Benz AG acquired Freightliner Corporation (Freightliner) from Consolidated Freightways (now Con-Way) in 1981. As part of the transaction, it liquidated Freightliner’s assets and liabilities into a subsidiary, Daimler Trucks North America LLC (Daimler). Between 1952 and 1982, Freightliner and then Daimler had engaged in business activities, primarily the manufacture of trucks, that subsequently led to several environmental remediation proceedings, including claims related to the Portland Harbor Superfund cleanup, and to some 1,500 asbestos personal injury claims. Plaintiffs Allianz Global Risk US Insurance and Allianz Underwriters Insurance Company (Allianz) insured Freightliner in 1981 and Daimler from 1981 to 1986 through a general commercial liability insurance policy. Daimler also purchased from Allianz another policy to provide coverage for future claims that might be made against Freightliner based on its past operations that were “incurred but not yet reported.” By the time it filed the operative complaint in this action in 2014, Allianz had spent more than $24 million defending and paying environmental and asbestos claims against Daimler and the now-dissolved Freightliner arising from Freightliner’s business operations between 1952 and 1982. In this litigation, Allianz sought contribution for the payments it has made and will make in the future based on those environmental and asbestos claims from insurance companies that insured Freightliner -- either directly or through its parent, Con-Way -- from 1976 to 1982. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' holding that Daimler did not assume the contingent liabilities of Freightliner (including the liabilities at issue here) and affirmed the jury verdict on that issue. On Allianz's appeal, the Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred in submitting to the jury the question of whether, because of side agreements between Con-Way/Freightliner and the insurers, those insurers had a "duty to defend or indemnify Freightliner" -- that question was to be decided by the trial court as a matter of law based on the relevant policies. As to the "London pollution exclusion", the Supreme Court agreed with Allianz that it was error for the trial court not to provide a legal interpretation of a key provision in the policy as part of the jury instructions. The Court also concluded that the jury instructions regarding the London pollution exclusion should be similar to those regarding the Domestic exclusion. The decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed. The limited judgments of the trial court were affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Allianz Global Risks v. ACE Property & Casualty Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from plaintiff Rich Jones’ civil action to recover unpaid wages that defendant Four Corners Rod & Gun Club unlawfully withheld after the parties agreed to trade a lodging benefit for labor. Although Oregon’s wage laws authorized employers to deduct from an employee’s wages “the fair market value of lodging, meals or other facilities or services furnished by the employer for the private benefit of the employee,” those laws also prohibited employers from taking any deduction from wages unless the employer obtains the employee’s advance written authorization and keeps a record of the deductions. Defendant admittedly failed to comply with the requirements for deducting the lodging benefit from plaintiff’s wages. The issue this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court’s review was whether defendant’s violation of ORS 652.610(3) prevented defendant from asserting an equitable claim for the value of the lodging benefit, either as an affirmative defense to plaintiff’s wage claim or as a lawful counterclaim. The Supreme Court concluded that defendant’s unlawful withholding of wages prevented it from asserting the value of the lodging benefit as an affirmative defense to defeat plaintiff’s wage claim, but did not prevent defendant from asserting an equitable counterclaim for the value of the lodging benefit. View "Jones v. Four Corners Rod & Gun Club" on Justia Law