Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case concerns an individual who, in June 2025, was sentenced to two consecutive 30-month terms of incarceration, with the judgment stating he would receive credit for time served under Oregon law. Following the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in State ex rel Torres-Lopez v. Fahrion, the Oregon Department of Corrections (DOC) recalculated his sentence and determined his release date had already passed, resulting in his release in August 2025. Subsequently, the Jackson County District Attorney sought to amend the judgment, aiming to alter the language regarding sentence credits. DOC then revised its interpretation of the law, concluded the individual still had time to serve, and issued an order for his re-arrest under ORS 144.350, which led to his return to custody in November 2025. The District Attorney then withdrew the motion to correct the judgment, and the trial court granted that withdrawal. After the Oregon Supreme Court decided Arellano-Sanchez v. Thrasher and related cases, which held that DOC lacked authority under ORS 144.350 to re-arrest similarly situated individuals, the District Attorney again moved to amend the judgment to remove the credit language, but the trial court denied the motion. The plaintiff then petitioned the Oregon Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting his circumstances were indistinguishable from those in recent Supreme Court decisions granting relief. The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon held that, as in Arellano-Sanchez and several companion cases, DOC did not have authority under ORS 144.350 or any other source to order the plaintiff’s arrest and continued imprisonment. The court ordered the plaintiff’s immediate release, waived procedural rules regarding reconsideration and judgment issuance, and clarified that circuit courts are equipped to handle future similar habeas petitions. View "Robinson v. Hendricks" on Justia Law

An individual was indicted in Oregon for unauthorized use and possession of a stolen vehicle, alleged to have occurred in August 2021. After the charges were initially dismissed without prejudice in October 2022 due to the state's inability to appoint counsel, the same charges were refiled in April 2024. Upon arraignment, the defendant requested appointed counsel and was found eligible, but no attorney was available. Despite multiple hearings over several months to appoint counsel, the defendant remained unrepresented and subject to pretrial release conditions, including mandatory court appearances and restrictions on travel.In December 2024, a volunteer attorney entered a limited appearance to file a motion to dismiss based on the lack of counsel, arguing violations of Oregon's constitutional right to counsel. The Multnomah County Circuit Court denied the motion, noting the case was in "suspended animation" due to the absence of counsel. The defendant then petitioned the Supreme Court of Oregon for mandamus relief. While briefing was ongoing, the trial court ultimately dismissed the criminal case without prejudice in April 2025, citing lack of available attorneys.The Supreme Court of Oregon reviewed the mandamus petition and found the case was moot since the underlying criminal charges had already been dismissed. However, the court exercised its discretion under ORS 14.175 to address the recurring legal issue. On the merits, the court held that the state violated the defendant's right to counsel under Article I, section 11 of the Oregon Constitution by failing to appoint counsel post-arraignment for an extended period. The court determined that dismissal without prejudice is an appropriate remedy for such violations and established a general rule: if an eligible defendant is unrepresented for more than 60 consecutive days in a misdemeanor case or 90 consecutive days in a felony case post-arraignment, dismissal without prejudice is required. The alternative writ of mandamus was dismissed as moot. View "State v. Roberts" on Justia Law

A man was charged with several sexual offenses after his former partner alleged that he had assaulted her on two occasions at her mother’s house. The complainant did not immediately seek medical attention or report the incident to law enforcement, waiting about 12 days before making a report. During the investigation, a sheriff’s deputy assisted in arranging a pretext video call between the complainant and the defendant, which was recorded. At trial, the state presented testimony from the complainant and a friend to whom the complainant had allegedly texted immediately after the incident. The state did not introduce any text messages or call the investigating deputy as a witness. The defense did not cross-examine the complainant’s friend or the complainant about the texts, and, although the deputy was subpoenaed, the defense did not call her to testify.After the jury found the defendant guilty on one count and acquitted him of the other charges, the defendant appealed to the Oregon Court of Appeals. He argued that the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument improperly shifted the burden of proof by suggesting to the jury that the defendant could have elicited additional evidence through cross-examination of the state’s witnesses. The Court of Appeals agreed, finding that such comments amounted to impermissible burden-shifting and were not harmless, and reversed the conviction.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court held that the prosecutor’s comments during rebuttal, which implied that the defendant had an obligation to cross-examine state witnesses to present additional evidence, were improper and inconsistent with the allocation of the burden of proof in criminal cases. The court concluded that these comments were prejudicial, as they undermined the defendant’s presumption of innocence, particularly in a case dependent on witness credibility. The circuit court’s judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Strain" on Justia Law

A man previously convicted of a felony sex crime in another state moved to Oregon and became subject to Oregon’s sex offender registration requirements. These requirements mandated that he report within ten days of any change in residence and annually within ten days of his birthday. In early 2019, the man was in the process of moving from Albany to Lebanon, Oregon. He attempted to report this change at the Lebanon Police Department before and after his birthday but was told to report in Albany. On February 15, he reported at the Albany police station, stating he was moving but had not yet completed his move. He signed an annual report listing his Albany address. Later, police stopped him in May and arrested him for failing to report his change of residence within ten days, after learning his registration still listed the Albany address though he was living in Lebanon.The Linn County Circuit Court denied his motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds and his motion for judgment of acquittal, after he argued that the state was pursuing a different factual theory than the evidence showed. The jury convicted him. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the state needed to prove he failed to report on the exact date in the indictment, but found sufficient evidence supporting the conviction based on the record.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon affirmed the decisions below, but for different reasons. It held that the state was bound by its choice at trial to proceed on the theory that the defendant changed residence after his February 15 annual report. The Court further held that while the passage of ten days after a change of residence is a material element of the crime, the state is not required to prove that the offense occurred on the exact date listed in the indictment. Because evidence showed the defendant changed residence after February 15 and failed to report within ten days, the conviction was upheld. View "State v. Ribas" on Justia Law

A motel guest noticed a person he did not know walking alongside him as he retrieved an item from his car. When the guest returned to the motel entrance, he used his keycard to unlock the door. At that moment, the other individual quickly grabbed the keycard from the guest’s hand and ran into the motel. The guest followed, asking the individual to go to the front desk to resolve the situation. The individual instead threw the keycard, ran out, and was later found exiting a motel room that was not his. After a short chase, the guest and a motel manager detained him until the police arrived. Throughout the encounter, there were no threats or other contact beyond the grabbing of the keycard.The case was tried in the Baker County Circuit Court, where the defendant was charged with third-degree robbery under Oregon law, which requires the use or threatened use of physical force upon another person during a theft. The defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the evidence did not show he used or threatened “physical force.” The trial court denied this motion, relying on prior Oregon Court of Appeals precedent interpreting “physical force” broadly. The defendant was convicted. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding its own precedent controlled.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case. The court held that the legislature intended “physical force upon another person” in the robbery statute to mean contact that either causes bodily harm or is reasonably capable of creating a sense of fear or danger that such harm will occur. The court found that the defendant’s actions—quickly grabbing the keycard without other contact or threat—did not meet that standard. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the lower courts and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

A man was convicted in 2014 of multiple sex crimes, including rape and sodomy, against a single victim. The prosecution’s case at trial relied on the victim’s testimony, testimony from eyewitnesses who interacted with the victim immediately after the incident, medical and forensic evidence, and a codefendant’s statements. The defendant testified, asserting that the sexual activity was consensual but admitting to having lied to police. The jury found him guilty of several charges, and he was sentenced to 575 months in prison. The Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions, and the Oregon Supreme Court declined review.Subsequently, the defendant pursued post-conviction relief in Marion County Circuit Court, first on various grounds (without asserting actual innocence), and later, in a second petition, on the basis of newly discovered evidence—a sworn recantation by the victim stating that the sexual acts had been consensual and her prior testimony was false. The state moved to dismiss this second petition, arguing that Oregon’s Post-Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA) does not recognize “actual innocence” as a standalone ground for relief. The post-conviction court agreed and dismissed the petition with prejudice, finding no authority for a freestanding innocence claim.The petitioner then sought mandamus relief from the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon, asking it to direct the lower court to vacate its dismissal. The Oregon Supreme Court held that the PCHA does not provide a remedy for claims based solely on newly discovered evidence, such as a recantation, unless there is an allegation that the prosecution knowingly presented or failed to correct false testimony. Because the petitioner did not allege prosecutorial misconduct, the court concluded the post-conviction court was not required by law to deny the state’s motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Oregon dismissed the alternative writ of mandamus. View "Perkins v. Fhuere" on Justia Law

An individual went to a police station to report being assaulted, and officers responded to take his statement. While at the hospital, where the individual had been transported, officers observed that he was intoxicated and later placed him in custody for transport to a detoxification facility under Oregon’s civil detox statutes. The individual had a backpack with him. During an inventory of his property, an officer opened the closed, opaque backpack and discovered a butterfly knife, which led to a criminal history check and a subsequent arrest for possession of a restricted weapon.Initially, the Washington County Circuit Court denied a motion to suppress evidence from the backpack. On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals upheld both the seizure and the inventory search of the backpack, reasoning that, under established case law, police could open closed, opaque containers likely to contain valuables if done pursuant to a lawful inventory policy. The Court of Appeals relied heavily on its prior decisions, concluding the inventory search was permissible under the relevant county ordinance and inventory policy.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case. It held that, under Article I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution, inventory searches of closed, opaque containers that do not announce their contents are not permitted when a person is taken into custody on a civil detox hold, even if executed under a valid, non-discretionary inventory policy. The court emphasized that in the civil detox context, compliance with an inventory policy does not alone render such a search reasonable; privacy interests and the non-criminal nature of the detention require a higher level of protection. The Supreme Court of Oregon reversed the decisions of the lower courts and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Wilcox" on Justia Law

The petitioner was serving two probation terms following no contest pleas to computer crime, burglary, and criminal mischief. As a condition of probation, he was prohibited from possessing “weapons, firearms or dangerous animals.” During a scheduled probation meeting, his officer noticed a knife handle protruding from his backpack. The knife was described as a nine-inch steak knife with a rounded tip. The officer arrested the petitioner and reported a probation violation, alleging that possession of the knife breached the weapons condition. The petitioner argued that the knife was an essential eating tool, not a weapon, given his unhoused status.At the Washington County Circuit Court probation violation hearing, the probation officer testified that “anything that can cause harm” was considered a weapon and that the office’s notice defined “all knives” as weapons. The petitioner argued that the statutory condition did not cover utility knives like steak knives. The trial court found a violation, concluding that the knife was clearly a weapon under the probation provision, and imposed a 30-day jail sentence without revoking probation. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment without opinion.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed whether possession of a steak knife constituted a violation of the probation weapons condition under ORS 137.540(1)(j). The court held that “weapons,” as used in the statute, refers only to instruments designed primarily for offensive or defensive combat or those reasonably recognized as having substantially the same character—not to tools designed primarily for utility, even if such tools could be used as weapons. The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the circuit court, remanding the case for further factual inquiry consistent with this interpretation. View "State v. Cortes" on Justia Law

The defendant was accused of unauthorized use of a U-Haul truck. She had rented the truck in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and drove it to Oregon, where she lived in it for several weeks. The truck was later reported stolen and found with the defendant inside. The prosecution's case relied on a photograph of a rental agreement that purportedly bore the defendant’s signature, indicating a one-day rental. The defendant, however, denied signing the contract, claimed she was not shown the contract, and asserted that the signature was not hers. She also testified that she had rented the truck for 30 days and provided evidence that the U-Haul database only contained an unsigned version of the contract.After a first trial ended in a hung jury, the case was retried in Curry County Circuit Court. Before the retrial, the state sought to admit the photograph of the signed agreement, rather than the original document. The defendant objected, citing the best evidence rule under OEC 1002 and arguing that, under OEC 1003(1), a duplicate is inadmissible when a genuine question is raised about the authenticity of the original. The trial court ruled that the duplicate was admissible and allowed the photograph. The jury convicted the defendant. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the defendant’s denial of signing was insufficient to raise a “genuine question” as to authenticity.Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon held that a genuine question under OEC 1003(1) is raised when there is evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that the original is not authentic. The court found the defendant’s testimony and supporting evidence sufficient to raise such a question, making the admission of the photograph in error. The court further held the error was not harmless, as the photograph was central to the state’s case. The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the circuit court, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Blue" on Justia Law

The petitioner was arrested on December 21, 2019, on warrants issued by both Marion County and Clackamas County. The Marion County warrants were for alleged probation violations, while the Clackamas County warrant was based on new criminal charges. After pleading guilty in Clackamas County and being sentenced on March 11, 2020, the petitioner was transported to Department of Corrections (DOC) custody rather than to Marion County Jail, despite a court order for transport to Marion County to resolve the probation matters. During the subsequent 43-day period, the petitioner remained in DOC physical custody but was under the legal custody of Marion County Jail due to the unresolved probation violation warrants. On April 24, 2020, the Marion County Circuit Court revoked the petitioner’s probations and imposed a 60-month prison sentence, ordering credit for time served since December 21, 2019, including the period credited to the Clackamas County case.The Oregon Court of Appeals previously reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s decision, finding that the Marion County Circuit Court had authority under ORS 137.370(4) to grant presentence incarceration credit for the time the petitioner was held in custody, even though the time overlapped with the sentence imposed in Clackamas County. The appellate court agreed that the trial court had expressly ordered credit for the relevant period.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon, upon reconsideration, corrected a factual error regarding the petitioner’s physical location during the 43-day period but held that the petitioner’s legal custody by Marion County Jail was sufficient to constitute “time served in jail” under ORS 137.370(4). The court concluded that physical custody in a jail is not required for presentence incarceration credit if the sentencing court expressly orders such credit. The court adhered to its prior opinion as modified, allowing the credit as ordered. View "State ex rel Torres-Lopez v. Fahrion" on Justia Law