Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The petitioner was arrested on December 21, 2019, on warrants issued by both Marion County and Clackamas County. The Marion County warrants were for alleged probation violations, while the Clackamas County warrant was based on new criminal charges. After pleading guilty in Clackamas County and being sentenced on March 11, 2020, the petitioner was transported to Department of Corrections (DOC) custody rather than to Marion County Jail, despite a court order for transport to Marion County to resolve the probation matters. During the subsequent 43-day period, the petitioner remained in DOC physical custody but was under the legal custody of Marion County Jail due to the unresolved probation violation warrants. On April 24, 2020, the Marion County Circuit Court revoked the petitioner’s probations and imposed a 60-month prison sentence, ordering credit for time served since December 21, 2019, including the period credited to the Clackamas County case.The Oregon Court of Appeals previously reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s decision, finding that the Marion County Circuit Court had authority under ORS 137.370(4) to grant presentence incarceration credit for the time the petitioner was held in custody, even though the time overlapped with the sentence imposed in Clackamas County. The appellate court agreed that the trial court had expressly ordered credit for the relevant period.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon, upon reconsideration, corrected a factual error regarding the petitioner’s physical location during the 43-day period but held that the petitioner’s legal custody by Marion County Jail was sufficient to constitute “time served in jail” under ORS 137.370(4). The court concluded that physical custody in a jail is not required for presentence incarceration credit if the sentencing court expressly orders such credit. The court adhered to its prior opinion as modified, allowing the credit as ordered. View "State ex rel Torres-Lopez v. Fahrion" on Justia Law

The case concerns a criminal defendant who was initially charged with second-degree murder by information and who, through counsel, invoked his statutory right to testify before the grand jury under ORS 132.320(12)(a). The defendant requested to appear in person before the grand jury, but the prosecutor stated that only remote testimony would be permitted. The defendant then moved the Douglas County Circuit Court for an order requiring his in-person appearance before the grand jury, arguing that he had an absolute statutory and constitutional right to do so.The Douglas County Circuit Court denied the defendant’s motion, reasoning that it lacked authority to dictate the manner in which the grand jury received testimony, other than ensuring the defendant’s rights were upheld. The court stayed the trial court proceedings pending appellate review but expressed uncertainty about its authority to stay the grand jury proceedings themselves. After the grand jury returned an indictment while the stay was in place, the defendant filed additional motions, including to dismiss the indictment, but the trial court declined to lift the stay to consider those motions.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the matter on a petition for a writ of mandamus. The court held that neither the prosecutor nor the defendant has unilateral authority to determine whether a defendant’s grand jury testimony must be in person or remote. Instead, the decision regarding the manner of witness testimony before the grand jury is, at least initially, for the grand jury itself to make, as provided by statute. The court concluded that the trial court did not have a nondiscretionary duty to order the defendant’s in-person appearance and therefore mandamus relief was not appropriate. The Supreme Court of Oregon dismissed the alternative writ of mandamus. View "State v. Wall" on Justia Law

The defendant and his then-wife, J, lived in Deschutes County, Oregon, and their marriage ended in divorce proceedings after J obtained a restraining order against the defendant. The criminal charges arose from two separate incidents: one in December 2016, when the defendant dragged J from their bedroom to the yard in freezing weather, and another in July 2017, when the defendant damaged J’s car with a power drill and made threatening statements. The December incident led to a second-degree kidnapping charge, while the July incident resulted in a menacing charge. The state also filed a motion in limine to limit certain evidence related to the divorce proceedings.The Deschutes County Circuit Court denied the defendant’s motions for judgment of acquittal on both charges and granted the state’s motion in limine in part, restricting argument about whether J gained a tactical advantage in the divorce from her allegations. The jury convicted the defendant of both kidnapping and menacing. On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed both convictions, though several judges dissented on aspects of the kidnapping and menacing rulings and the scope of the motion in limine.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case. It held that the evidence was insufficient to support the kidnapping conviction because the movement of J did not constitute taking her “from one place to another” as required by ORS 163.225(1)(a); specifically, the movement did not increase her isolation or restrict her freedom of movement in the manner contemplated by the statute. The court reversed the kidnapping conviction. However, the court affirmed the menacing conviction, finding that the defendant’s words and conduct were sufficient for a rational factfinder to conclude he intended to place J in fear of imminent serious physical injury. The court also affirmed the trial court’s ruling on the motion in limine. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "State v. Anderson" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged in a single indictment with multiple counts of sexual abuse involving two minor victims, A and M, who are cousins. The alleged conduct toward A spanned four years and involved repeated touching, while the conduct toward M consisted of two isolated incidents. The defendant moved to sever the charges relating to each victim, arguing that joinder would cause substantial prejudice, particularly because the evidence against M was weaker and the jury might improperly use the stronger evidence regarding A to convict on the charges involving M. The trial court denied the motion to sever, and the case proceeded to trial. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts involving A and one count involving M.On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to sever, finding that the defendant had not shown substantial prejudice beyond that inherent in joinder. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the mandatory 75-month Measure 11 sentence imposed for the conviction involving M, holding that it was unconstitutionally disproportionate under the Oregon Constitution.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed both issues. It held that the trial court erred in denying the motion to sever because the defendant had articulated a case-specific theory of substantial prejudice, supported by the record, as required by State v. Delaney. The Supreme Court clarified that when such a showing is made, the trial court must provide some remedy to address the prejudice. However, the error was deemed harmless as to the counts involving A, so those convictions were affirmed. The conviction involving M was reversed and remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court did not reach the sentencing issue in light of this disposition. The Court of Appeals’ decision was affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "State v. Hernandez-Esteban" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who pleaded guilty to charges of attempted possession of heroin and unlawful use of a vehicle (UUV) in Lake County Circuit Court. The court imposed a departure sentence of 24 months' supervised probation for the UUV offense. While on probation, the defendant was involved in a serious automobile accident in Jefferson County, leading to multiple charges. The defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of failure to perform the duties of a driver (FPDD) and was sentenced to 75 months in prison.The Lake County court then revoked the defendant's probation for the UUV offense and imposed an 18-month prison term, to be served consecutively to the Jefferson County sentences. The defendant objected, arguing that the sentencing guidelines did not authorize consecutive sentences in this context. The trial court disagreed and imposed the consecutive sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision in a nonprecedential opinion.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether the trial court had the authority to impose a consecutive sentence after revoking the defendant's probation. The court held that Article I, section 44(1)(b) of the Oregon Constitution, which states that no law shall limit a court's authority to sentence a criminal defendant consecutively for crimes against different victims, supersedes any sentencing guidelines that would prevent such a consecutive sentence. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in imposing the consecutive sentence and affirmed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the circuit court. View "State v. Logston" on Justia Law

A police officer stopped a vehicle driven by the defendant after learning that the vehicle’s registered owner had a suspended license, but before identifying the driver. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence from the stop, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion because the driver was not identified before the stop. The trial court denied the motion, concluding it was reasonable for the officer to infer that the registered owner was driving. The defendant was convicted of driving with a suspended license.On appeal, the defendant acknowledged that the stop would be lawful under the Court of Appeals case law, State v. Panko, but argued that Panko was wrongly decided and should be overruled. The Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding that Panko was not "plainly wrong" and was binding. The defendant then sought review from the Oregon Supreme Court.The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court held that an officer has reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop when the officer believes, based on specific articulable facts, that the person stopped has committed or is about to commit a specific crime, and that belief is objectively reasonable under the circumstances. The court concluded that the officer’s suspicion that the defendant was driving with a suspended license was objectively reasonable because the officer saw a vehicle matching the description and license plate of the defendant’s vehicle, knew the defendant’s license was suspended, and confirmed the defendant was the sole registered owner. The court held that these facts made the officer’s inference objectively reasonable, and the possibility that someone else was driving did not undercut this reasonableness. The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court were affirmed. View "State v. Betancourt" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Abraham Torres-Lopez, sought to compel the Oregon Department of Corrections (DOC) to grant him credit towards his Marion County prison sentence for the 125 days he spent in Clackamas and Marion County jails before being sent to prison. The circuit court granted the relief, but the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the circuit court had misinterpreted ORS 137.370(4).The circuit court had granted Torres-Lopez credit for the time served in jail before his probation was revoked and he was sentenced to prison. The Court of Appeals, however, found that the circuit court had erred in its interpretation of the statute, leading to the current appeal.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case to resolve two statutory interpretation questions regarding ORS 137.370(4). The first question was whether a trial court may grant presentence incarceration credit for time served for unrelated conduct, even when the person has not yet been convicted or sentenced for that conduct. The second question was whether a person held in custody in a local jail awaiting resolution of a pending probation violation matter while serving an unrelated prison sentence is in "jail" presentencing for purposes of ORS 137.370(4).The Oregon Supreme Court held that a trial court may grant presentence incarceration credit in both circumstances. The court concluded that confinement for certain conduct, even in the absence of a sentence, is covered by ORS 137.370(4). Additionally, the legislature expressly authorized trial courts to order presentence credit for time spent in jail awaiting resolution of a probation violation matter, even if the person was also serving a prison sentence for an unrelated crime. Consequently, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. View "State ex rel Torres-Lopez v. Fahrion" on Justia Law

The case involves a criminal trial where the defendant was charged with second-degree sexual abuse and third-degree rape. Before his arrest, law enforcement conducted a phone interview with the defendant, during which he made no admissions. The state did not present evidence of this phone call during its case-in-chief, and the prosecutor assumed that this precluded defense counsel from mentioning the call during cross-examination. During closing arguments, defense counsel referred to the lack of evidence about any interview or admissions by the defendant, leading to multiple objections from the state, which the trial court sustained.The trial court allowed defense counsel to argue that there was no evidence of admissions by the defendant but prohibited statements suggesting that no interview had occurred. The jury found the defendant guilty on both charges. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in sustaining the state's objections and that the court's sua sponte instruction to the jury not to speculate about whether an interview had occurred was improper.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in sustaining the objections and that the defendant had not preserved his argument regarding the jury instruction. The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court did not err in sustaining the state's objection to the first statement by defense counsel but did err in sustaining the objection to the fourth statement. However, the court found that the error was harmless. The court also agreed that the defendant had not preserved his argument regarding the jury instruction and declined to reach the merits of that issue. The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court were affirmed. View "State v. Burton" on Justia Law

The case involves a criminal matter where the defendant was charged with first-degree assault and unlawful use of a weapon following a stabbing incident. The central issue at trial was whether the defendant acted in self-defense. The prosecution argued that the defendant was the initial aggressor, which would negate the self-defense claim. The trial court instructed the jury using Uniform Criminal Jury Instruction (UCrJI) 1110, which did not define the term "initial aggressor." During closing arguments, the prosecutor incorrectly suggested that being an initial aggressor could be determined by words alone, not just physical actions. The defendant did not object to the prosecutor's statements or request a supplemental instruction to define "initial aggressor."The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not defining "initial aggressor" for the jury. The Oregon Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the trial court's failure to provide a definition amounted to plain error under the first prong of the Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc. decision. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the trial court should have sua sponte provided a definition for "initial aggressor."The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not commit plain error by failing to give an unrequested custom supplemental instruction. The court explained that UCrJI 1110 was a correct statement of the law and that the trial court's duty to instruct the jury does not extend to providing definitions for terms unless the given instruction is legally incorrect. The Supreme Court emphasized that plain error review requires the error to be apparent on the record, and without a requested supplemental instruction, it is impossible to determine if the trial court's failure to provide one was legally incorrect. Therefore, the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed. View "State v. Worsham" on Justia Law

The case involves a criminal matter where the defendant was charged with four Measure 11 offenses, including first-degree unlawful sexual penetration and three counts of first-degree sexual abuse against a child under twelve. The parties reached a plea agreement where the defendant pleaded guilty to a lesser-included offense of attempted first-degree unlawful sexual penetration and one count of first-degree sexual abuse, with the remaining charges to be dismissed. The plea agreement included a stipulation that the court "may impose" consecutive sentences on the two charges.At sentencing, the defendant argued that Oregon law required the trial court to make specific findings under ORS 137.123(5) before imposing consecutive sentences, as the offenses arose from a continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct. The state contended that the stipulation in the plea agreement allowed the court to impose consecutive sentences without making those findings. After a discussion, the defendant withdrew his legal argument and affirmed that the court could impose consecutive sentences without the statutory findings. The trial court then imposed consecutive sentences totaling 180 months.The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the plea agreement did not prevent the defendant from arguing that consecutive sentences were legally impermissible without the required findings, and that the trial court erred in concluding that there was no plea agreement. The state petitioned for review.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the plea agreement's stipulation that the court "may impose" consecutive sentences was ambiguous. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in addressing the ambiguity by seeking clarification and proceeding to sentence the defendant after he withdrew his legal argument. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the trial court acted appropriately under the circumstances. View "State v. Walsh" on Justia Law