Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In previous proceedings before the Oregon Supreme Court, the Court agreed with defendant Santiago Vallin that the trial court had erred in imposing a sentence under ORS 137.717(1)(b) (2015). The Court concluded the 2017 version of that statute, Or Laws 2017, ch 673, section 5, governed defendant’s sentence. Accordingly, the dispositional “tag line” of the opinion remanded the case for resentencing. Although he prevailed on the merits, defendant petitioned for reconsideration of the Supreme Court's opinion, specifically seeking modification of the tag line in light of his conditional plea, which he was permitted to withdraw on remand. The state did not file a response in opposition to defendant’s petition. The Supreme Court allowed defendant’s petition for reconsideration and modified its earlier tag line, to remand the case for further proceedings as: “The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.” View "Oregon v. Vallin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case were Clackamas County District Attorney John Foote and two individuals, Mary Elledge and Deborah Mapes-Stice, who identified themselves as both crime victims and voters. Together, plaintiffs brought an action against Oregon, seeking a declaration that HB 3078 (2017), which amended ORS 137.717 (2015) to reduce the presumptive sentences provided therein for certain property crimes, was enacted in violation of Article IV, section 33, of the Oregon Constitution, and therefore was invalid. Article IV, section 33, was adopted by the voters in 1996 as Ballot Measure 10, and provided a two-thirds majority in both houses of the legislature was necessary “to pass a bill that reduces a criminal sentence approved by the people under [Article IV, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution].” Plaintiffs argued the longer presumptive prison sentences set out in ORS 137.717 (2015) had been “approved by the people” in 2008, when Ballot Measure 57 was adopted, and could not lawfully be reduced by the simple majorities that HB 3078 had garnered to amend the statute. The State appealed the trial court's order invalidating HB 3078 as unconstitutional. Among other things, the state contended plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the underlying declaratory judgment action. The Oregon Supreme Court agreed plaintiffs lacked standing, and vacated the declaratory judgment. The matter was remanded with instructions to dismiss the action. View "Foote v. Oregon" on Justia Law

The Oregon Supreme Court allowed review of two cases this case, and Gutale v. Oregon, 395 P3d 942 (2017), requiring it to interpret the meaning and scope of the "escape clause" found in ORS 138.510(3). In both cases, petitioners alleged that their trial counsels were constitutionally ineffective and inadequate under the state and federal constitutions, based on the failure of those attorneys to provide petitioners with information regarding the immigration consequences of their guilty pleas. And petitioners in both cases alleged that their claims fell within the escape clause because they learned of their counsel’s inadequacy only when they were put in deportation proceedings after the statute of limitations had run. Both petitioners argued that they should not have been presumed to know the law any sooner than that. In this case (but not in Gutale), petitioner Ricardo Perez-Rodriquez was told at the time of his plea that there might be immigration consequences to his conviction, even though he was not told that there certainly would be immigration consequences. Furthermore, in this case (but not in Gutale), petitioner alleged that his mental illness and intellectual disability prevented him from knowing that he had a claim for post-conviction relief within the two-year limitations period. The state moved to dismiss, arguing that the laws underlying petitioner’s claim were reasonably available to him. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as time-barred under ORS 138.510(3). The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. Finding no error in this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and the post-conviction court. View "Perez-Rodriguez v. Oregon" on Justia Law

Defendant Dawn McColly failed to appear for a scheduled trial call, but, before that date, she had not been released following arrest, detention, or confinement. Instead, as part of a voluntary arraignment appearance, the trial court had ordered that she be conditionally released and also officially fingerprinted and photographed pursuant to a “book-and-release” process; defendant also had signed a release agreement stating that she had “been released” and agreed to personally appear at future court appearances. In response to a motion for judgment of acquittal at defendant’s trial on the failure-to-appear charge, the court concluded that the previously ordered book-and-release process satisfied the statutory “custody” requirement. A jury convicted defendant, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded the statutes required the state to prove that, prior to defendant’s failure to appear: (1) a peace officer had imposed actual or constructive restraint, pursuant to an arrest or court order, amounting to “custody”; and, then, (2) the trial court had released her from that custody, under a release agreement and upon an appearance condition. The state’s evidence did not satisfy those requirements, and the Court therefore reversed defendant’s judgment of conviction. View "Oregon v. McColly" on Justia Law

In 2015, defendant Kelly Edmonds was charged with having raped a five-year-old girl in 1994 or 1995. At the time that the crime occurred, defendant’s wife operated a daycare service out of her and defendant’s home. The victim was regularly left at that day-care. At defendant’s trial, the victim, then twenty-five, testified that, on one occasion, while she was at the daycare, defendant had taken her into another room and raped her. The victim testified that she had reported the rape to her mother on the day that it had happened and to her father, grandmother, therapist, and school counselor in 2002. Defendant’s theory of the case was that the victim had formed a false memory of the rape. In support of that theory, defendant offered testimony from an expert witness that memories can become distorted over time and that false memories are possible. Defendant also presented testimony from the victim’s mother and grandmother that they had only learned of the rape in the past year and had not previously been told about it by the victim. Defendant also called the therapist and the counselor as witnesses, each testifying they had no recollection of the victim telling them about being raped by defendant and that, as mandatory reporters of child abuse, they would have made a report to the Department of Human Services if they had been told. From that evidence, defendant attempted to make the case that the victim’s memories of the rape had formed only recently and were therefore false. The question that this case presented for review was whether a transcript of a police interview, which was unquestionably hearsay evidence, could be introduced under the business records exception, OEC 803(6). That question was complicated by the existence of the official records exception, OEC 803(8)(b), an overlapping hearsay exception that specifically excludes from its scope “matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel” in criminal cases. The Oregon Supreme Court held that the limitations that the legislature placed on the use of law enforcement records in OEC 803(8)(b) could not be avoided by introducing those records under the business records exception. The Court therefore held that the trial court’s decision to admit part of the transcript into evidence was error, and accordingly, reversed defendant’s conviction. View "Oregon v. Edmonds" on Justia Law

A jury sentenced defendant David Taylor to death after he was convicted of aggravated murder, kidnapping, and other crimes against Celestino Gutierrez, as well as multiple offenses arising out of two bank robberies. In this automatic and direct review of his convictions and sentence, defendant primarily made two arguments contrary to controlling precedent without offering persuasive reasons to depart from that precedent, or arguments that otherwise lack merit. However, some of defendant’s assignments of error raised significant issues that the Oregon Supreme Court had yet to expressly address, including: whether the state must expressly allege its theory for joining multiple offenses, whether the governor’s moratorium on imposing the death penalty affects the jury’s ability to constitutionally consider that punishment, and whether the Supreme Court should presume that the undisclosed bias of an alternate juror impaired defendant’s constitutional right to trial by an impartial jury. Ultimately, the Court concluded none of defendant’s assignments of error identifies a basis for reversing the judgment, and affirmed. View "Oregon v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Defendant Rodney Banks was arrested for driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII) and, when asked, refused to take a breath test, which would have revealed the percentage of alcohol in his blood. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution prohibited the state from using defendant’s refusal as evidence when it prosecuted him for that crime. Therefore, the Court reversed the contrary decision of the Court of Appeals, and that of the circuit court. View "Oregon v. Banks" on Justia Law

Petitioner Melton Jackson, Jr. was tried on charges of first-degree sexual abuse and first-degree sodomy in 2001. At trial, petitioner’s counsel did not object to certain testimony, and controlling case law at that time from the Court of Appeals held that such testimony was admissible. In 2009, however, the Supreme Court held that that testimony was not admissible. In his post-conviction complaint, petitioner alleged that his trial counsel had failed to provide constitutionally adequate assistance and that he had been prejudiced as a result. The Court of Appeals affirmed the post-conviction court’s grant of partial summary judgment against petitioner, assuming that counsel exercising reasonable professional skill and judgment would have objected to the testimony so as to preserve the right to seek Supreme Court review of then-existing Court of Appeals case law. Thus the Court of Appeals concluded that as a factual matter, the chance that the Supreme Court would have allowed review in petitioner’s case and ruled in his favor was too small for him to demonstrate prejudice. The Oregon Supreme Court addressed only the prejudice aspect of petitioner's claim, and disagreed with the appellate court's application of the case law controlling here. "In our view, it is not appropriate, or workable as a matter of judicial decision-making, to speculate as to how individual members of the Supreme Court would have viewed a petition for review in petitioner’s case, as the post-conviction court suggested. Nor is it correct to conclude [. . .] that because of this court’s 'complete discretion' regarding whether or not to allow petitions for review, any assessment of the likelihood that such a petition by petitioner would have been allowed would be 'nothing but speculation.'" The Oregon Supreme Court concluded a petitioner had to show his lawyer’s deficiency had “a tendency to affect the result of the prosecution.” Given that conclusion, the alleged constitutional inadequacy of his trial counsel, which blocked his appellate counsel from the opportunity to raise the issue on appeal and subsequently in a petition for review, was prejudicial. View "Jackson v. Franke" on Justia Law

Defendant Santiago Vallin was charged with first-degree theft in June 2017. At that time, ORS 137.717 provided a presumptive sentence of 18 months imprisonment for first-degree theft for defendants having two prior convictions for certain specified crimes, to be increased by two months from that baseline for every additional prior conviction of those specified crimes. While defendant’s case was pending, HB 3078 (2017), had been enacted by the legislature by a simple majority, became effective, and as pertinent here, amended ORS 137.717 (2015) to provide a presumptive sentence of 13 months imprisonment for a first-degree theft conviction of a person in defendant’s circumstances. In the plea negotiations in defendant’s case, an issue arose as to which version of ORS 137.717 would apply if defendant were to plead guilty to first degree theft. The state insisted the trial court would be required to sentence defendant in accordance with the 2015 version of the statute because HB 3071 was unconstitutional. In his sentencing memorandum, defendant argued that HB 3078 (2017) had reduced a presumptive sentence that had been adopted by the legislature, not one that had been “approved by the people.” Defendant acknowledged that “the people” had approved an 18-month presumptive sentence when they enacted Measure 57 in 2008, but he argued that the legislature had lawfully reduced and replaced that sentence when, in 2009, it enacted HB 3508 and amended ORS 137.717 by a two-thirds majority in both houses. The trial court rejected defendant’s argument and agreed with the state that HB 3078 (2017) had been enacted in violation of Article IV, section 33. The trial court concluded the sentences that were in place when HB 3078 came before the legislature in 2017 were the original sentences that the voters had approved as Measure 57, and, under Article IV, section 33, they could not be reduced by the simple majority vote that HB 3078 (2017) garnered. Defendant thereafter conditionally entered a guilty plea, and the trial court imposed a stipulated downward departure sentence of 24 months of probation. The Oregon Supreme Court found that under Article IV, section 33, of the Oregon Constitution, the legislature may not reduce a criminal sentence that was “approved by the people” through the initiative or referendum process by a simple majority vote, but must garner a two-thirds majority in both houses. The Court concluded HB 3078 (2017) did not “reduce a criminal sentence approved by the people” within the meaning of Article IV, section 33, and that it could be, and was, validly enacted by a simple majority of the legislature. The Court therefore reversed and remanded defendant's sentence for resentencing. View "Oregon v. Vallin" on Justia Law

In criminal cases consolidated for trial, defendant Richard Lacey waived his right to counsel and invoked his right to self-representation after being warned that, if he engaged in disruptive conduct during his jury trial, he would be removed from the courtroom, and the trial would proceed without anyone present to represent him. Despite that warning and numerous others during the trial, defendant engaged in disruptive conduct throughout the trial, and, before closing argument, he informed the trial court that he would not abide by its order prohibiting him from referring to information that had not been admitted into evidence. After confirming that defendant intended to violate its order, the trial court removed defendant from the courtroom for the remainder of the trial day. The jury found defendant guilty of most of the charged crimes. Defendant appealed, asserting that the trial court had violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment by proceeding with the trial in his absence. The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the trial court had violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment “right to representation” because “it did not secure a waiver of defendant’s right to representation, it did not appoint counsel, and it did not take other measures to protect defendant’s right to representation after it removed him from the courtroom.” After review, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that, while representing himself, defendant made a knowing and voluntary choice to be removed from the courtroom and leave the defense table empty. The trial court did not violate defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights by accepting that choice. View "Oregon v. Lacey" on Justia Law