Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue in this case was the scope of a criminal defendant’s right to self-representation when that right is invoked in the middle of trial. In this case, the trial court concluded that defendant had no right to seek self-representation mid-trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that the trial court’s decision reflected an “apparent” concern about potential disruption of the trial and, because of that concern, did not amount to an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court held that, although Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution established a criminal defendant’s right to represent himself or herself in a criminal proceeding, the right was not unqualified. In particular, when the right is asserted well after trial commences, the trial court retains discretion to weigh its exercise against the constitutional obligation to preserve the integrity and fairness of the proceeding, as well as the court’s interest in ensuring an orderly and expeditious trial. If a trial court exercises that discretion to deny a defendant’s motion for self-representation, it should make a record that reflects how it exercised that discretion. View "Oregon v. Hightower" on Justia Law

The Oregon Supreme Court explained that, in a criminal action, when the state proffers evidence of uncharged acts, either to prove a defendant’s propensity to commit charged crimes under OEC 404(4), or for a nonpropensity purpose under OEC 404(3), and a defendant objects to the admission of that evidence, the trial court must conduct balancing under OEC 403, according to its terms, to determine whether the probative value of the challenged evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Defendant was charged with 12 counts of child sexual abuse. Before trial, the state filed a motion to permit it to introduce evidence that defendant also had sexually abused a different child. The state argued that that evidence was relevant for a number of nonpropensity purposes under OEC 404(3). Defendant countered that, because his defense was not mistaken identity or lack of intent, but, instead, that the charged acts of abuse had not occurred, the proffered evidence was not relevant for a nonpropensity purpose. Further, defendant argued, even if the evidence was minimally relevant, its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and it was therefore inadmissible under OEC 403. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, reversed the trial court’s judgment of conviction, and remanded this case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Baughman" on Justia Law

The trial court admitted other acts evidence over defendant’s objection and without conducting OEC 403 balancing. Defendant was charged with three counts of first degree sexual abuse of K and T, the daughters of defendant’s ex-girlfriend. The Court of Appeals concluded that that failure to balance was error apparent on the record under ORAP 5.45(1), in light of the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in “Oregon v. Williams,” (346 P3d 455 (2015)), and exercised its discretion to correct the error. The Court of Appeals vacated defendant’s convictions and remanded to the trial court for an OEC 403 balancing, and for a determination of whether defendant was prejudiced by the admission of the challenged evidence. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court’s judgment of conviction. View "Oregon v. Zavala" on Justia Law

In this prosecution for failure to perform the duties of a driver, reckless endangerment, and reckless driving, the trial court admitted other acts evidence over defendant’s objection and, the State conceded, without conducting OEC 403 balancing. Defendant argued the trial court erred in admitting that other acts evidence. Because the Court of Appeals could not conclude that the trial court’s error was harmless, it reversed defendant’s convictions and remanded the case for a new trial. The State argued that the Oregon Supreme Court should reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court because the trial court was not required to conduct “traditional” OEC 403 balancing and admission of the challenged evidence did not violate due process. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and remanded this case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Mazziotti" on Justia Law

After defendant Sean McNally refused to comply with a police officer’s order to leave a bus station, the officer arrested him and charged him with, among other things, the misdemeanor offense of interfering with a peace officer. At defendant’s subsequent trial, defendant asked the trial court to instruct the jury that it should acquit him of the charge of interfering with a peace officer if it found that he had engaged in passive resistance. The trial court refused, and the jury found defendant guilty on all charged counts. The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s conviction for interfering with a peace officer, holding that defendant had not been entitled to a passive resistance instruction, because only someone who is performing specific acts or techniques commonly associated with governmental protest or civil disobedience can be said to be engaged in “passive resistance.” After its review, the Oregon Supreme Court held the phrase “passive resistance” referred to noncooperation with a peace officer that does not involve violence or other active conduct by the defendant. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision affirming defendant’s conviction for interfering with a peace officer and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings; the Court otherwise affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Oregon v. McNally" on Justia Law

Defendant Shawn Haugen was convicted of one count of third-degree assault, based mainly on the victim’s eyewitness identification of him. Before his trial, defendant moved to exclude the eyewitness identification. Applying the test for admissibility of eyewitness testimony set out in “Oregon v. Classen,” (590 P2d 1198 (1979)), the trial court ruled that the victim’s eyewitness identification was admissible. While the case was pending on appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court announced its decision in “Oregon v. Lawson/James,” (291 P3d 673 (2012)), in which the Court substantially revised the Classen test for determining the admissibility of eyewitness testimony. In the Court of Appeals, defendant argued that the identification procedures used in this case raised serious questions about the reliability of the identification under “Lawson/James,” and, therefore, that the Court of Appeals should have remanded the case to the trial court for a new hearing and trial, with the trial court utilizing the “Lawson/James” test. The Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding that, even under “Lawson/James,” the trial court correctly denied defendant’s motion to suppress. The Supreme Court allowed review and, reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Oregon v. Haugen" on Justia Law

Relator Mark Moore, who was a defendant in the underlying criminal case, sought a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to dismiss the indictment against him with prejudice, based on former or double jeopardy under state and federal law. This petition arose out of criminal charges involving defendant, a codefendant and a third defendant. All three men allegedly played a role in the arson-related death of the victim. After a jury was impaneled and several witnesses for the state had testified, the trial court declared a mistrial. When the State sought a retrial, defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on jeopardy grounds, and the trial court denied his motion. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether, under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution, there was “manifest necessity” for the trial court’s mistrial order. After review, the Court concluded the State did not meet its burden of demonstrating that the trial court’s mistrial was consistent with the “manifest necessity” standard. The Court therefore directed the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus requiring the trial court to dismiss the indictment with prejudice. View "Oregon v. Moore" on Justia Law

In this case, two officers were waiting for defendant Bell Andersen's car to arrive at a parking lot to complete a drug sale. One officer was out of sight of the parking lot but listened as defendant’s passenger explained over his cell phone that he and defendant were arriving at the parking lot. The second officer left one part of the parking lot to see if defendant had arrived at a different part of the lot. When he did not see defendant’s car, he returned to where he had been a minute earlier and saw defendant’s car parked across several parking spaces. Defendant was sitting in the driver’s seat with the engine running as two passengers stepped out of the car and were walking towards the area where the drug sale was supposed to occur. Under the automobile exception to Article I, section 9, officers may search a car if they have probable cause to believe that the car contains evidence of a crime and the car is mobile at the time they stop it. The exception does not apply if the car is “parked, immobile and unoccupied at the time the police first encounte[r] it in connection with the investigation of a crime.” The trial court held that, although defendant’s car momentarily had come to rest before the second officer saw and stopped it, the car was mobile for the purposes of the automobile exception. The court accordingly denied defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence that the officers found when they later searched the car and its contents. Because defendant’s car momentarily had come to rest before the officer saw it, the Court of Appeals held that the automobile exception did not apply. The State appealed, and after review, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court, reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Oregon v. Andersen" on Justia Law

This case involved the State’s appeal of a pretrial order suppressing evidence in a pending murder prosecution. The trial court determined that, near the beginning of a custodial interrogation, defendant equivocally invoked his right against compelled self-incrimination under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution, but law enforcement failed to clarify defendant’s intent as to that invocation and, instead, continued the interrogation. The court concluded that the failure to clarify was unconstitutional, and it therefore suppressed defendant’s invocation and all the statements that he had made thereafter. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed, but on different grounds: that defendant unequivocally invoked his right against compelled self-incrimination and, therefore, the interrogation should have ended when defendant made that invocation. View "Oregon v. Nichols" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether police officers violated the prohibition against unreasonable seizures in Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, when they responded to a report that a named man was threatening to break things in a house, they saw defendant walking away from the house, and they ordered him to stop and return for questioning. The trial court concluded that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant to investigate whether he had committed a crime; thus, it denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence resulting from the stop. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for review to consider whether the Court of Appeals "erroneously heightened the standard" that the State must establish that an investigatory stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. The State contended that the Court of Appeals required the state to show that, before stopping defendant, the police had confirmed that he had committed a crime. Although there has been some variation in the Supreme Court’s articulation of the standard, the established standard for reasonable suspicion supporting an investigatory stop of a defendant is met when an officer can point to specific and articulable facts that give rise to a reasonable inference that the defendant committed or was about to commit a specific crime or type of crime. The Court of Appeals correctly applied the reasonable-suspicion standard to the facts established at the suppression hearing, which concerned whether it was reasonable for the officers to infer that defendant had committed a crime. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reversed the judgment of the trial court. View "Oregon v. Maciel-Figueroa" on Justia Law