Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant’s boyfriend dropped off defendant and the couple’s child at a department store. Defendant entered the store and took clothing into a fitting room to try it on. Recognizing suspicious behavior, security officers began to monitor defendant’s actions and noticed that, after defendant had left the fitting room, two items of clothing were missing. Soon thereafter, the boyfriend returned to the store and held the child while defendant continued to try on clothing. Defendant left the fitting room a second time, and the security officers noted that two additional items were missing. Two officers and the store manager waited for defendant and the boyfriend to pass all points of sale and leave the store, and then followed them to the parking lot. Defendant would ultimately be arrested and convicted on shoplifting charges. In this case, the Supreme Court held that, to establish that defendant was “aided by another person actually present” and therefore was guilty of second-degree robbery under ORS 164.405(1)(b), the state was required to prove that the person who aided defendant acted with the intent to facilitate the robbery. Because the state proffered evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have reached that conclusion, the Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Oregon v. Morgan" on Justia Law

Defendant Donovan Carlton was charged with three counts of first-degree sexual abuse for putting his hands down the pants of a 7-year-old girl ("A") in multiple incidents. One of the counts also charged defendant with touching A’s breast. While investigating defendant’s conduct, police discovered that he had been using an alias and actually was a convicted sex offender from California. Defendant had three prior convictions for violating California Penal Code section 288, two in 1986, and one in 1993, by subjecting a victim under the age of 14 to “sexual contact.” The issue in this case was whether defendant’s previous convictions the California criminal statute were for “comparable offenses” to a qualifying Oregon offense under ORS 137.719(3)(b)(B), for purposes of the imposition of life sentences on his current convictions for the Oregon offense of first-degree sexual abuse. The trial court imposed life sentences for defendant’s current offenses after concluding that they were comparable to defendant’s prior California offenses, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the prior offenses were not comparable to a qualifying Oregon offense, so it reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirmed defendant’s convictions but reversed his sentences and remanded to the circuit court for resentencing. View "Oregon v. Carlton" on Justia Law

An officer stopped defendant Victor Pichardo to investigate whether he was helping another person evade the police. During the stop, the officer asked defendant for consent to a search for drugs. The primary question presented for the Supreme Court's review in this matter was whether the officer's request for consent was reasonably related to the reason for the stop and thus did not extend it in violation of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. The trial court ruled that the officer's request for consent did not unreasonably extend the stop. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that an unrelated request for consent extended the stop in violation of Article I, section 9, and that defendant's consent had not attenuated that illegality. The Supreme Court allowed the state's petition for review, vacated the Court of Appeals decision, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals, which adhered on remand to its decision. The Supreme Court allowed the state's petition for review from the decision on remand and affirmed the Court of Appeals decision. View "Oregon v. Pichardo" on Justia Law

Petitioner Karlyn Eklof was convicted for aggravated murder, for which she received a life sentence without the possibility of parole. He filed this successive action for postconviction relief to appeal the Court of Appeals decision that upheld summary judgment for the State on the ground that petitioner’s “Brady” violation claim was barred as a matter of law under ORS 138.510(3) and ORS 138.550(3).Under “Brady v. Maryland,” (373 US 83 (1963), the United States Supreme Court held that a prosecutor’s withholding of favorable evidence from a criminal defendant violated due process where the evidence was material either to guild or to punishment, irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prosecution. Petitioner argued that she was entitled to pursue her Brady violation claim despite the bars against untimely and successive petitions set out in the Oregon statutes, and that the trial court erred in concluding that her petition was barred as a matter of law. After review, the Oregon Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred in granting the state’s motion for summary judgment on petitioner’s Brady violation claim. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Eklof v. Steward" on Justia Law

Defendant Scott Gerhardt was convicted of strangling his wife. At sentencing, the trial court awarded the victim restitution for attorney fees that she incurred to enforce a no-contact order that the court had previously entered while defendant was in jail as well as to obtain a permanent protective order. The issue in this case was whether those attorney fees could be awarded as restitution under ORS 137.106(1)(a), which authorized restitution when a person is convicted of a crime “that has resulted in economic damages.” The Court of Appeals concluded that they may not be awarded and reversed. The Supreme Court concluded that, because defendant conceded that the attorney fees were caused by his conduct and were a reasonably foreseeable result of that conduct, the trial court did not err in awarding restitution for those fees. View "Oregon v. Gerhardt" on Justia Law

Defendant Lane Jesse was indicted in April 2011 on one count of first-degree sexual abuse, based on an allegation that he knowingly subjected his daughter M to sexual contact. The issue on appeal to the Oregon Supreme Court was whether the trial court erred in excluding certain expert testimony at trial on grounds it was not helpful to the jury. Defendant proffered that evidence in support of his theory that certain statements that he had made were not, in fact, actual confessions of guilt. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not err in excluding the proffered testimony and affirmed defendant’s conviction. View "Oregon v. Jesse" on Justia Law

Petitioner Marvin Taylor was an Oregon inmate who was convicted, sentenced, and incarcerated in Oregon, but confined in Colorado pursuant to the Western Interstate Corrections Compact (WICC). Petitioner appeals from a judgment dismissing with prejudice his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under ORS 34.310. This case presented the question of whether petitioner’s transfer and confinement out of state prohibited him from bringing a habeas claim in Oregon. After review, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that it did not. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and reversed the trial court's judgment. View "Taylor v. Peters" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jacob Barrett committed aggravated murder in Oregon and was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. Pursuant to the Interstate Corrections Compact (ICC), Oregon transferred petitioner to an institution in the state of Florida. Thereafter, petitioner filed, in Oregon, two separate petitions for writ of habeas corpus alleging, among other things, that the terms of his confinement in Florida violated his rights under the state and federal constitutions. Defendant Colette Peters, Director of the Oregon Department of Corrections moved to “deny” petitioner’s first habeas petition for failure to state a claim. The state argued that the director was not a proper defendant because she did not have physical custody of petitioner and because she did not control the conditions of confinement in Florida. The trial court agreed with the state and dismissed petitioner’s first habeas petition with prejudice. Subsequently, the trial court, acting sua sponte, dismissed petitioner’s second petition for the same reasons that it had dismissed petitioner’s first petition. In reversing both of the trial court's decisions, the Court of Appeal held that an Oregon inmate incarcerated out of state pursuant to the ICC retained the right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Oregon to remedy alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement and that petitioner had properly named the Director of ODOC as defendant. The state sought review of both cases, raising three issues: (1) whether Oregon law permits an inmate confined outside of Oregon pursuant to the ICC to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Oregon; (2) whether petitioner alleged cognizable habeas corpus claims in contesting the conditions of his confinement in Florida; and (3) whether petitioner properly named the Director of ODOC as defendant in these cases. After review, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that petitioner’s transfer to and confinement in Florida did not prohibit him from bringing those constitutional claims, and affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Barrett v. Peters" on Justia Law

The State charged defendant Denny Ghim and his wife with 17 counts of criminal mistreatment, first-degree theft, and aggravated first-degree theft. Midway through trial, defendant’s wife filed a motion in limine to exclude copies of her bank records, which the Department of Consumer and Business Services (DCBS) had obtained by administrative subpoena, from being admitted into evidence. Defendant joined in that motion and, throughout the trial, adopted his wife’s arguments on that issue. The question in this case was whether the agency’s use of an administrative subpoena to obtain defendant’s wife’s bank records violated Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence that the agency uncovered as a result of its subpoena, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Relying on "Oregon v. Johnson," (131 P3d 173 (2006)), the Court of Appeals held that defendant had no constitutionally protected privacy interest in the bank records. It followed that the agency’s use of an administrative subpoena to obtain those records did not violate Article I, section 9. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, but for slightly different reasoning: "Even if defendant has a protected privacy interest in his wife’s bank records, our decisions lead to the conclusion that the administrative subpoenas issued by DCBS did not violate defendant’s Article I, section 9, rights. We leave for another day the question whether and in what circumstances a defendant will have a protected privacy interest in information that a third party maintains, a question that can arise in differing factual circumstances which can have a bearing on its resolution." View "Oregon v. Ghim" on Justia Law

In 2012, an inter-agency drug interdiction team (comprised of U.S. Postal Service inspectors and local law enforcement) was deployed to examine packages at a USPS air cargo center near Portland International Airport. An officer noticed an Express Mail package addressed to "Maxi-pad Barnt" and addressed with defendant Max Barnthouse's Portland address. Aspects about the package and how it was addressed lead the officer to believe the package contained contraband. Officers went to Barnthouse's residence, and upon opening the package, found a stack of currency wrapped in a t-shirt. Subsequent search of the residence would reveal Barnthouse had large quantities of marijuana, packing materials, boxes and wrappers designed to hold bundles of money. Defendant was ultimately arrested and charged with unlawful possession of marijuana and intent to deliver. At issue in this case was whether the officer who initially handled the package violated Barnthouse's constitutional rights when it singled out the Express Mail package with the wrapped bundle of money in it. The trial court granted Barnthouse's motion to suppress, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. After review, the Supreme Court agreed the officers lacked probable cause to seize the package, and affirmed the appellate and trial courts. View "Oregon v. Barnthouse" on Justia Law