Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Dennis Davidson was convicted of two counts of public indecency for exposing himself at a public park; because he had two prior felony convictions for public indecency, and the trial court found no ground for downward departure, defendant was sentenced consecutively on each count to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under ORS 137.719(1). The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s convictions but held that the sentences violated Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution. Defendant petitioned the Oregon Supreme Court for review, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding his convictions. The State also sought review, asserting: (1) that defendant’s sentences were unreviewable because they are “presumptive” sentences; and (2) that the sentences were not unconstitutionally disproportionate in light of the facts of this case and the circumstances of defendant’s previous crimes. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant’s convictions, but concluded that the sentences were unconstitutionally disproportionate as applied to defendant. The case was remanded for resentencing. View "Oregon v. Davidson" on Justia Law

Defendant petitioned for review of a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, imposed for a conviction for first-degree sexual abuse. Defendant argued that, as applied to his circumstances, the sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate under Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution. The Court of Appeals rejected that challenge. As defendant observed, the Supreme Court concurred that his sentence was the second harshest criminal penalty under Oregon law. However, in light of the circumstances of defendant’s current offense and his history of committing similar offenses against other young children, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole that the trial court imposed pursuant to ORS 137.719(1) was not disproportionate under Article I, section 16. View "Oregon v. Sokell" on Justia Law

Defendant Robert Boyd's girlfriend was found dead on the street, the victim of a severe beating. Witnesses saw her on the ground and saw defendant running away from the scene. A few minutes later, police arrested defendant, who had the victim's blood on his hands, shoes, and pants. The issue in this case was whether police unlawfully interrogated defendant after he invoked his rights to counsel and against compelled self-incrimination. The State argued that defendant had asked a “confusing” question and that police responded by seeking “clarification,” which did not amount to unconstitutional interrogation. Defendant argued that he had merely asked why he had been taken into custody and whether he could make a phone call, that there was nothing particularly confusing about the requests, and that police responded with questions that were reasonably likely to (and in fact did) elicit incriminating evidence. The trial court agreed with the State and denied defendant’s motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed, and concluded that the police unconstitutionally interrogated him. View "Oregon v. Boyd" on Justia Law

Defendant Brian Chandler was convicted of two counts of first-degree sexual abuse. On appeal of that conviction, defendant argued the trial court erred by admitting a videotaped pretrial interrogation of defendant by Detective Gates. The videotape, which was played for the jury, included statements by Gates indicating her belief that defendant was lying and that the victims were telling the truth. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to redact Gates’s statements, because, under OEC 403, the prejudicial impact of those statements outweighed their probative value. The Court of Appeals concluded that defendant had failed to preserve his argument under OEC 403. The court rejected defendant’s remaining argument that Gates’s statements constituted impermissible vouching testimony. Finding no reversible error after review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Oregon v. Chandler" on Justia Law

The trial court found defendant Robert Makin guilty of first-degree child neglect, as well as other offenses. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s first-degree child neglect convictions without discussion. The question in this case was whether a reasonable trier of fact could find defendant guilty of first-degree child neglect for knowingly allowing his children to stay “[i]n a vehicle where controlled substances are being criminally delivered * * *.” Defendant's three children were in his car when a police officer stopped him for a traffic violation. Also in the car were methamphetamine and implements for selling it. There was no evidence, however, that defendant had sold or was delivering methamphetamine to an identified buyer while his children were with him in the car. Rather, all that the evidence showed was that, while his children were in the car, defendant possessed methamphetamine with the intent to sell in the future. After review, the Supreme Court held that first-degree child neglect, as defined in ORS 163.547, did not include knowingly leaving or allowing a child under 16 years of age to stay in a vehicle where controlled substances are possessed with an intent to deliver. Because the state did not argue that the evidence in this case gave rise to any inference other than possession with intent to deliver, the Court of Appeals' decision to the extent it upheld defendant’s convictions for first-degree child neglect was reversed. On review, defendant did not challenge his convictions for delivery and possession, and the state did not challenge the Court of Appeals decision reversing defendant’s conviction for manufacturing and remanding that charge for further proceedings. Those parts of the Court of Appeals decision were affirmed. View "Oregon v. Makin" on Justia Law

Defendant Robert Davis threatened and assaulted two people outside of a store, and two uniformed officers were dispatched to the area. When the officers arrived, one of them saw defendant walking away from a group of people. Believing that defendant was the perpetrator, the officer got out of his patrol car and identified himself as a police officer. Defendant ran away. The officer chased him and repeatedly yelled “Stop, police!” The other officer pursued defendant in his patrol car, activating its overhead emergency lights and siren. Defendant kept running and continued to run from the officers until they apprehended him. The state ultimately charged defendant with third-degree escape for fleeing from police after the officer commanded him to stop. The issue in this case was whether, in running from the police, defendant committed the criminal offense of third-degree escape. The statute that defined the offense requires proof that the defendant was in custody at the time of the escape. The trial court concluded that the police, in shouting for defendant to stop, had effectively placed him in “constructive custody.” The Court of Appeals agreed, affirming without a written opinion. After review, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that police merely shouting for another person to stop does not place that person in custody for the purposes of establishing third-degree escape. View "Oregon v. Davis" on Justia Law

Defendant Caryn Nascimento was convicted of theft and computer crime for using a computer terminal at work, which was linked to the Oregon State Lottery, to print and steal lottery tickets. She appealed the conviction for computer crime, arguing that the trial court erred in denying her motion for judgment of acquittal on that count because, she argued, she was “authorized” to use the computer terminal and therefore had not violated ORS 164.377(4). The narrow "but potentially far-reaching issue" in this case was the scope of ORS 164.377(4), and the term “without authorization.” The State argued that, although defendant’s employer authorized her to use the computer terminal at issue here, defendant did so for a purpose not permitted by her employer and thus was guilty of computer crime. Defendant conceded that her use may have violated her employer’s policies or other provisions of ORS 164.377, but she was still authorized to use it. After review, the Supreme Court agreed that defendant’s conduct did not violate subsection (4) of the statute, and, accordingly, that the trial court erred in denying her motion for judgment of acquittal. Defendant’s computer crime conviction was therefore reversed. View "Washington v. Nascimento" on Justia Law

Defendant Rasool Islam Islam shoplifted 15 pairs of jeans from a Macy’s retail department store and was convicted of one count of theft in the second degree. The prosecutor sought restitution for Macy’s economic damages based on the retail price of the jeans at the time and place of the theft. Defendant argued that restitution instead should have been based on the value of the jeans on the wholesale market, and any lost profits that Macy’s could prove resulted from the theft. The trial court granted restitution based on the retail value of the jeans, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that a retail seller of goods that have been stolen may recover, as restitution, the reasonable value of those goods on the market to which the seller would resort to replace those goods at the time and place of conversion, together with any additional losses that the state proves the victim sustained. In this case, because the state did not prove any such additional losses, the victim was limited to restitution in the amount of the reasonable wholesale value of the jeans. The Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Islam" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first-degree rape of the victim, a friend who had spent the night on defendant’s couch after an evening of drinking. The victim contacted the police following the incident, and Detective Myers asked the victim if she would send defendant text messages to “try to get [defendant] to make a comment about what had happened between the two of them.” The victim agreed, and Myers instructed her on the content of the messages. The victim sent defendant two text messages. Defendant did not respond to either message. At trial, defendant challenged the admissibility of the text messages and his nonresponse on both constitutional and evidentiary grounds. The trial court concluded that neither objection was well taken, and the jury found defendant guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the text messages and defendant’s nonresponse constituted inadmissible hearsay, and that the trial court erred in admitting them. The Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Schiller-Munneman" on Justia Law

Defendant Amanda Newcomb was convicted of second-degree animal neglect after she failed to adequately feed her dog, Juno, resulting in his malnourishment. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress blood test results showing that Juno had no medical condition that would have caused him to be malnourished, which in turn indicated that Juno was malnourished because he was starving. Defendant argued that the state had violated both Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, and the Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution by failing to obtain a warrant before testing the dog’s blood. The trial court denied the motion and allowed the state to introduce the test results during trial. Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which agreed with defendant that she had a protected privacy interest in her dog’s blood that required the state to obtain a search warrant, unless the circumstances fit within an exception to the warrant requirement, and reversed. The Supreme Court concluded defendant had no privacy interest in the dog's blood under the State or federal constitutions, and reversed. View "Oregon v. Newcomb" on Justia Law