Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendants Dale and Shannon Hickman were convicted of second-degree manslaughter after they declined to seek medical treatment for their son David, who died about nine hours after he was born prematurely. Defendants are members of the Followers of Christ Church, which encourages its members to rely on God to heal sickness and injury, and considers resorting to conventional medicine as a failure in faith. At trial, defendants argued that, because they withheld medical treatment from David based on their religious beliefs, the Oregon Constitution required the state to prove that they "knew" David would die if they relied on prayer alone and, despite that knowledge, failed to seek medical treatment for him. The trial court disagreed and allowed the state to proceed on a theory of "criminal negligence," consistently with the statute defining second-degree manslaughter by neglect or maltreatment. The Court of Appeals summarily affirmed. The Supreme Court granted review to consider whether the state must prove that a criminal defendant acted with "knowledge" that an unlawful result would follow when that defendant's conduct was motivated by a sincerely held religious belief. The Court concluded that it does not. View "Oregon v. Hickman" on Justia Law

Defendant Fernando Clemente-Perez was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm. At the close of the state’s case, defendant moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the state had not presented sufficient evidence that he had “[p]ossesse[d] a handgun that is concealed and readily accessible to the person within any vehicle,” within the meaning of ORS 166.250(1)(b). Alternatively, defendant argued that he qualified for an exception under ORS 166.250(2)(b), which provided a person may possess a handgun at the person’s “place of residence.” The trial court rejected those arguments, and a jury found defendant guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that defendant failed to preserve his argument that he had not been “within any vehicle” at the time that he possessed a handgun, and that he did not meet the “place of residence” exception. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Oregon v. Clemente-Perez" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by jury on one count of sodomy, one count of rape, and one count of unlawful sexual penetration. On appeal of that conviction, he argued that the trial court erred in failing to give his requested jury instruction that ten jurors had to agree on what factual occurrence constituted each of the offenses. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court correctly declined to give the requested instruction. On review, defendant argued that the circumstances of this case fell within the rule providing that, when a single crime has been charged but the evidence is sufficient for the jury to find that there were multiple, separate occurrences of the charged crime involving the same victim and the same perpetrator during the period of time alleged in the indictment, the state either must elect which occurrence constituted the charged crime or, alternatively, the defendant is entitled to an instruction that ten or more jurors must concur on which occurrence constituted that crime. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in failing to give defendant's proposed concurrence instruction. However, the Court concluded that the error was harmless, and therefore affirmed defendant's convictions. View "Oregon v. Ashkins" on Justia Law

Oregon's sentencing guidelines provided that, if a defendant with multiple terms of probation commits a single probation violation, any resulting terms of incarceration must be imposed concurrently, not consecutively. The state argued that, in consequence of the probation violation, the trial court should revoke probation and impose consecutive sentences of incarceration on each count in defendant David Lane's case, in light of the fact that the original charges involved four different victims. Defendant objected, arguing that, under the applicable provision of the sentencing guidelines, any terms of incarceration imposed as a result of a single probation violation must be served concurrently. In response, the state argued that, notwithstanding the guidelines, the court had authority to impose consecutive sentences under Article I, section 44(1)(b). The trial court agreed with the state, concluding that, under Article I, section 44(1)(b), it was "allowed to give consecutive sentences in this case, based upon the fact that there were four separate victims." The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that, because the imposition of terms of incarceration as a sanction for probation violation is not "sentenc[ing] * * * for crimes" within the meaning of Article I, section 44(1)(b), there was no conflict, so the guidelines provision validly prohibited the imposition of consecutive sentences. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the trial court correctly determined that the guidelines provision conflicted with Article I, section 44(1)(b). "Imposing terms of incarceration as a sanction upon probation revocation amounts to 'sentenc[ing] * * * for crimes' within the meaning of the constitution. Article I, section 44(1)(b), therefore controls, and the conflicting provision of the guidelines is invalid." View "Oregon v. Lane" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted on a single count of first-degree sex abuse. On appeal of his sentence, he argued the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine to exclude expert testimony concerning a diagnosis of child sexual abuse, in addition to the evaluative criteria underlying that diagnosis. Defendant contended that the testimony impermissibly commented on the credibility of the complaining witness in this case. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. And finding no reversible error in either the trial or appellate courts' judgments, the Supreme Court affirmed too. View "Oregon v. Beauvais" on Justia Law

An Oregon state trooper drove by a busy Portland intersection and noticed that, after he did so, defendant crossed the street against a “Don’t Walk” sign, a Class D violation under ORS 814.020(1) and (3). The trooper turned his car around and drove to a position near defendant, who was sitting on a bench at a bus stop. When defendant saw the trooper’s car approach, he got up and began to walk away. The trooper honked his horn and motioned to defendant to come and talk to him, which defendant did. The trooper knew that the intersection was in a high-crime area where a lot of recent gang activity had occurred. He observed that defendant was wearing an “oversized” or “puffy” jacket over a “hoodie sweatshirt,” “oversized baggy gray pants,” and “white tennis shoes,” and was carrying what could have been a green lanyard, garb that the trooper thought might indicate gang affiliation. Defendant replied that he had seen somebody else doing the same thing and “thought it was okay.” At that point, the trooper asked “do you have any weapons on you?” Defendant “kind of sighed and closed his eyes and said yes.” Defendant revealed that he was carrying a gun. Without being asked, defendant then separated his feet, leaned forward, separated his hands, and put his hands on the hood of the trooper’s car. The trooper frisked defendant, located the gun, and learned that defendant kept the gun for “protection” and that he was indeed a gang member. Defendant was taken to the police station where he was ultimately was charged with one count of unlawful possession of a firearm. Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress. The trial court denied the motion, and defendant was subsequently tried and convicted. Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the circuit court judgment. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the State did not claim that the trooper’s inquiry was independently justified by reasonable suspicion that defendant ran afoul of Oregon's firearms laws. Nor did the state argue that the trooper’s inquiry in this case was justified by officer-safety. Rather, the state took issue with the Court of Appeals’ preliminary conclusion that a weapons inquiry was an investigation of an unrelated matter: the state argued that “questions about the presence of weapons are reasonably related to the safe investigation of a traffic violation.” The Supreme Court concluded the state did not meet its burden to demonstrate that the officer’s weapons inquiry was reasonably related to his traffic investigation and reasonably necessary to effectuate it. The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. The judgment of the circuit court was reversed, and the case remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Jinenez" on Justia Law

During a traffic stop, a deputy sheriff placed defendant William Delong in custody and then asked him, without first advising him of his Miranda rights, “if there was anything we should be concerned about” in his car. Defendant “told [the deputy] ‘no,’ and that if we wanted to search the vehicle, we could.” On appeal, the State conceded that the deputy violated Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution when he asked defendant that question without first advising him. However, the State argued that the physical evidence that the deputies later found in defendant’s car did not “derive from” the Miranda violation. The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that both defendant’s offer and the resulting evidence derived from the violation. The State appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals: "[n]othing that defendant said in the first part of his response to [the deputy's] unwarned question impaired defendant’s ability to make an independent decision to invite the deputies to search his car if they wanted to do so. [. . .] defendant’s invitation to search his car attenuated the taint flowing from [the deputy's] unwarned question. The evidence that the deputy found in defendant’s car did not derive from the preceding Miranda violation." View "Oregon v. Delong" on Justia Law

A jury convicted petitioner Kyle Green of eighteen sex offenses involving nine victims, ages twelve through seventeen. After an unsuccessful direct appeal, petitioner sought post-conviction relief, alleging he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Specifically, petitioner alleged in his pleading that counsel performed inadequately by failing to request an instruction directing the jury to consider the evidence concerning each alleged victim separately and only as that evidence pertained to a specific charge or charges relating to that victim. The post-conviction court entered a judgment denying post-conviction relief. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that “there was no evident downside to requesting such an instruction; the upside, however, was plain: The jury would have been prohibited from concluding that petitioner had committed the charged acts based on a belief that he had a propensity to commit such acts.” The State petitioned for the Supreme Court's review of "recurring" issues of what a postconviction petitioner must show to establish inadequate performance of counsel and what a petitioner must prove to establish that counsel’s inadequate performance prejudiced the petitioner’s case. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals. The Court concluded the post-conviction court applied the wrong legal standard for prejudice, so the Court reversed with regard to that issue. The judgment of the circuit court denying post-conviction relief was reversed and remanded with respect to petitioner’s instructional claim, and was otherwise affirmed. View "Green v. Franke" on Justia Law

The state charged defendant with identity theft for signing two documents with another person’s name. After a police officer stopped defendant for speeding, defendant identified himself as Sergio Molina, told the officer his date of birth, and explained that he used to live in Washington. Defendant, however, did not present a driver’s license or other type of identification to the officer. The officer called the dispatcher, who could not locate any person named Sergio Molina in either Oregon or Washington. The officer arrested defendant for failure to present a driver’s license and took defendant to the local police station. After checking the fingerprints on the card, AFIS notified the police department that defendant’s name was Emilio Medina. On further questioning, defendant admitted that the name and date of birth that he had given the officer were fake. After learning defendant’s real name, the officer also discovered that defendant was on probation. He contacted defendant’s probation officer, who explained that defendant might have given the officer a fictitious name because he was aware of a warrant for his arrest. At trial, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that no reasonable person could find that, in signing those documents, he had committed the crimes. Further, defendant argued that, if he had committed those acts, no reasonable person could find that he had done so with the requisite mental state. The trial court denied defendant’s motion, and convicted him of identity theft as well as three other charged offenses. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted defendant's petition for certiorari review, then reversed the Court of Appeals' and the trial court’s judgment as to defendant’s conviction for identity theft and remanded this case to the trial court concluding the trial court should have granted defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal because defendant did not utter the fingerprint card and property receipt nor did he convert those documents to his own use. View "Oregon v. Medina" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Lykins was convicted of the crime of tampering with a witness after he tried to persuade his girlfriend to testify falsely in his impending trial on charges of criminal trespass and criminal negligence. At defendant's sentencing hearing following the tampering conviction, the State asked the trial court to impose an upward departure sentence, based on the fact that defendant's girlfriend was a "vulnerable victim" under the administrative rule governing departure sentences. Defendant objected on the ground that the state, not the witness, is the victim of the crime of tampering with a witness and, therefore, that the departure factor did not apply. The trial court disagreed with defendant and imposed a 48-month durational departure sentence on the tampering conviction. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court, however, reversed and remanded. Because the word "victim" was not expressly defined for purposes of the departure rule, defendant urged the Court to interpret that word by reference to the substantive offense for which the defendant is being sentenced. For purposes of OAR 213-008-0002(1)(b)(B), which permits a trial court to enhance a defendant's sentence when the defendant "knew or had reason to know of the victim's particular vulnerability, * * * which increased the harm or threat of harm caused by the criminal conduct," the term "victim" had the same meaning as it has in the relevant statutory provision defining the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced. In this case, defendant was being sentenced for the offense of tampering with a witness in violation of ORS 162.285. The girlfriend was not a victim of that crime; it followed that the trial court erred in imposing a departure sentence for defendant's conviction of that offense based on OAR 213-008-0002(1)(b)(B). View "Oregon v. Lykins" on Justia Law