Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The state charged defendant with manufacture of cocaine and endangering the welfare of a minor, among other things. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress physical evidence and statements obtained by detectives after they knocked on the back door of defendant’s house and obtained defendant’s consent to enter and then to search the house. Defendant argued both that his consent had not been voluntary and that the detectives had exploited their unlawful conduct to obtain his consent in violation of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. The trial court denied the motion, and a jury convicted defendant as charged. The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that, under the "Oregon v. Hall" exploitation analysis, the detectives’ unlawful entry into defendant’s backyard to reach his back door had “tainted [defendant’s] subsequent consent.” Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, modifying in part, the exploitation analysis announced in Hall. Specifically, the Court "disavowed" the minimal factual nexus test described in Hall. Hall considered only the temporal proximity between the unlawful police conduct and the consent and mitigating or intervening circumstances. "Rather, courts must consider the totality of the circumstances, [. . .] including the nature of the illegal conduct and its purpose and flagrancy, without unduly emphasizing any single consideration." View "Oregon v. Unger" on Justia Law

In this case, a police officer on patrol encountered defendant at 10:00 p.m. in an area behind a shopping center where criminal activity frequently occurred. The officer stopped defendant and obtained her consent to search pouches that he saw inside her purse, as well as the remainder of her purse. During those searches, the officer found drugs and drug paraphernalia. Defendant sought to suppress that evidence at trial, arguing, among other things, that the stop had been unlawful and that defendant’s consent had been derived from the unlawful stop in violation of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. The trial court denied that motion, and defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of methamphetamine at a stipulated facts trial. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the officer had stopped defendant unlawfully and that the incriminating evidence had derived from that stop. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision: based on the facts of this case, the police improperly exploited their unlawful stop of defendant to obtain her consent to the search. View "Oregon v. Musser" on Justia Law

In this case, defendant challenged the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a voluntary consent search, which had followed an officer reaching into defendant’s apartment to knock on his bedroom door. The trial court concluded that the officer’s entry into defendant’s apartment had been lawful and that there was no basis for suppression. Defendant was convicted at a bench trial. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the officer’s conduct constituted an unlawful search and that the state had not proved that the subsequent consent was independent of or only tenuously related to that prior illegality. Upon review of the trial and appellate court records, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, finding that based on the totality of the circumstances, the state had shown that defendant’s consent was not the result of police exploitation of their unlawful conduct. View "Oregon v. Lorenzo" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was what constitutes an "enterprise" within the meaning of the Oregon Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (ORICO). Defendant was charged with one count of racketeering, and one count of theft in the first degree. The racketeering count, which required proof that defendant participated in an "enterprise" through a pattern of racketeering, was based on the charged theft offense and two uncharged offenses of theft in the second degree allegedly committed in another county. A jury found defendant guilty of both the racketeering and the first degree theft offenses. Defendant appealed his conviction for racketeering, arguing that there was insufficient evidence that he had participated in an enterprise and that the trial court therefore had erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the that count. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed too. View "Oregon v. Walker" on Justia Law

Petitioner Martin Johnson was convicted of eight counts of aggravated murder and sentenced to death. After an unsuccessful direct appeal, petitioner sought post-conviction relief, arguing (among other things) ineffective assistance of trial counsel. At the post-conviction hearing, petitioner was represented by counsel. He also filed more than 100 pro se motions, totaling more than 6,000 single-spaced pages of argument. The post-conviction court refused to accept most of those pro se filings because they were not signed by counsel, but allowed others, along with the claims raised by petitioner’s attorneys. The court ultimately determined that petitioner had received inadequate and ineffective assistance of trial counsel during the guilt phase of his aggravated murder trial. The court vacated his convictions and remanded the case for a new trial. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a petitioner in a post-conviction appeal is entitled both to be represented by counsel and to appear pro se. The Court of Appeals held that, under the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in "Church v. Gladden," (417 P2d 993 (1966)), a post-conviction petitioner is entitled to be represented by counsel on appeal and, in the same appeal, to file any motions on his own behalf that his counsel has declined to file, provided the petitioner has a good faith and objectively reasonable basis for believing that competent counsel would have filed such motions. The Supreme Court concluded that nothing in the Church opinion could "be fairly understood to state an exception to the requirement of ORS 9.320 that represented parties ordinarily must appear through counsel. And nothing in the opinion sanctions the sort of hybrid representation that permits a post-conviction petitioner to be represented by counsel and, at the same time, flood the court with pro se motions and other requests for relief any time the petitioner disagrees with counsel’s prosecution of the case. Church says no more than this: If a post-conviction petitioner’s attorney fails to assert a ground for relief, the petitioner must bring that fact to the attention of the court to avoid the effect of ORS 138.550(3)." View "Johnson v. Premo" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of 20 counts of second-degree animal neglect. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court in this case was whether defendant was guilty of 20 separately punishable offenses, which turned on the question whether animals are "victims" for the purposes of the anti-merger statute. The trial court concluded that, because only people can be victims within the meaning of that statute, defendant had committed only one punishable offense. The court merged the 20 counts into a single conviction for second-degree animal neglect. On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that animals can be victims within the meaning of the anti-merger statute and, accordingly, reversed and remanded for entry of a judgment of conviction on each of the 20 counts and for resentencing. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals and affirmed. View "Oregon v. Nix" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana and methamphetamine after police officers stopped him and discovered those controlled substances on him. The trial court concluded that the officer who stopped defendant had a reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in criminal drug activity and denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of the drugs. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion of drug activity. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether, at the time of the stop, the officer had a reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in criminal drug activity and, particularly: (1) whether the officer who stopped defendant could rely on factual information provided to him by other officers to establish "reasonable suspicion;" and (2) whether the officer’s observation that defendant appeared to be under the influence of methamphetamine was sufficient to establish "reasonable suspicion" that defendant had committed the crime of possession of methamphetamine when considered under the totality of the circumstances. The Supreme Court answered those questions in the affirmative, reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, and affirmed the trial court. View "Oregon v. Holdorf" on Justia Law

The issue presented in these two consolidated cases centered on the meaning of the term "use" in ORS 166.220(1)(a): "a person commits the crime of unlawful use of a weapon if he or she '[a]ttempts to use unlawfully against another, or carries or possesses with intent to use unlawfully against another, any dangerous or deadly weapon.'" Defendants contend that the statute applied only when a person carries or possesses a weapon with the intent to "use" the weapon by actually employing it to injure another. The state argued that the statute also applied when a person carries or possesses a weapon with intent to "use" it to threaten or menace another unlawfully, without necessarily intending to injure the other person. The trial courts agreed with the state, as did the Court of Appeals. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Oregon v. Ziska" on Justia Law

Codefendants Fessenden and Dicke jointly owned a horse, which they kept on Dicke’s property. Dicke’s neighbors called the sheriff’s office to report that the horse appeared to be starving. An officer with specialized training in animal husbandry and in investigating animal cruelty was dispatched to investigate. In consolidated criminal appeals, the issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether the officer violated Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution or the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution when, without a warrant, he entered private property, seized the horse, and took the horse to a veterinarian. The Court concluded that the officer acted lawfully because he had probable cause to believe that defendants were committing the crime of animal neglect and reasonably believed, based on specific articulable facts, that immediate action was necessary to prevent further imminent harm to and the death of the horse. The Court affirmed the decisions of the Court of Appeals. View "Oregon v. Fessenden" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of resisting arrest for violating the terms of his parole. Defendant argued on appeal that an "arrest," as used on ORS 162.315, required that a person be restrained or placed in custody for the purpose of charging that person with an offense. Defendant argued that because a parole violation was not an "offense" as defined in ORS 161.505 and because he was restrained for a parole violation, officers had not placed him under restraint "for the purpose of charging him with an offense." Upon review of his appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that an arrest for a parole violation qualified as an arrest for the purposes of ORS 162.315, and affirmed his conviction. View "Oregon v. McClure" on Justia Law