Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated murder in 1988. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed those convictions in 1990, but vacated defendant’s death sentence three times and remanded each time for new penalty-phase trials. This case was an automatic and direct review of defendant’s fourth death sentence. Defendant raised 87 assignments of error. The Supreme Court found that only 13 merited discussion, and even then, found no error in the trial court’s handling of his case. Accordingly, the Court affirmed defendant’s death sentences. View "Oregon v. Guzek" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant of 10 counts of rape, sodomy, and sexual abuse. When a jury finds a defendant guilty of multiple offenses, a trial court must make two related but separate sentencing decisions. One decision involves the length of the sentence for each conviction. The other involves whether the convictions should run concurrently or consecutively. On appeal in this case, the Court of Appeals concluded that both rules increased defendant’s sentence based on facts that, under “Apprendi v. New Jersey,” (530 US 466 (2000)), a jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt. Although the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court should have submitted those facts to the jury, it held that the failure to do so was harmless error. On review, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the two sentencing guidelines rules do not implicate Apprendi and affirmed the Court of Appeals decision on that ground. View "Oregon v. Cuevas" on Justia Law

Relator was 14 years old when he committed murder in 1998. Relator was waived into adult court and convicted of aggravated murder. The court sentenced relator to life imprisonment with a 30-year mandatory minimum period of incarceration. After relator had served roughly half of that period, he obtained a “second look” hearing under ORS 420A.203. The trial court entered a preliminary order of conditional release, but the state appealed that order to the Court of Appeals. At issue in this mandamus proceeding was the trial court’s related “direction” to the Department of Corrections, pursuant to ORS 420A.206(1)(a), requiring it to prepare a proposed release plan. Relator sought, and the Supreme Court issued, an alternative writ of mandamus ordering the department to comply with the trial court’s direction or to show cause for not doing so. The department, however, contended that its obligation to comply was automatically stayed under ORS 138.160. The Supreme Court disagreed and ordered the department to comply with the trial court’s direction to prepare and submit a proposed plan of release. View "Oregon ex rel Walraven v. Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

In January 2011, defendant was indicted on 21 felony counts, including nine counts of aggravated murder, for allegedly causing the death of Rainier Police Chief Ralph Painter. Shortly after defendant was indicted, his attorneys became concerned about his ability to aid and assist in his defense. The defense hired a psychiatrist (Dr. Larsen) to evaluate defendant. Larsen concluded that defendant suffered from psychosis and possibly schizophrenia, and recommended that defendant be treated with antipsychotic medication. In this mandamus proceeding, the issue presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review centered on the trial court's order directing relator, Oregon State Hospital (OSH), to administer involuntary medication to defendant for the purpose of restoring defendant's capacity to stand trial on felony charges. Upon review, the Court concluded that ORS 161.370(1) granted the trial court implied authority to issue the order (which was based on the trial court's assessment of all the medical evidence) even though OSH did not agree that administering the medication was medically necessary. View "Oregon State Hospital v. Butts" on Justia Law

Defendants Dale and Shannon Hickman were convicted of second-degree manslaughter after they declined to seek medical treatment for their son David, who died about nine hours after he was born prematurely. Defendants are members of the Followers of Christ Church, which encourages its members to rely on God to heal sickness and injury, and considers resorting to conventional medicine as a failure in faith. At trial, defendants argued that, because they withheld medical treatment from David based on their religious beliefs, the Oregon Constitution required the state to prove that they "knew" David would die if they relied on prayer alone and, despite that knowledge, failed to seek medical treatment for him. The trial court disagreed and allowed the state to proceed on a theory of "criminal negligence," consistently with the statute defining second-degree manslaughter by neglect or maltreatment. The Court of Appeals summarily affirmed. The Supreme Court granted review to consider whether the state must prove that a criminal defendant acted with "knowledge" that an unlawful result would follow when that defendant's conduct was motivated by a sincerely held religious belief. The Court concluded that it does not. View "Oregon v. Hickman" on Justia Law

Defendant Fernando Clemente-Perez was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm. At the close of the state’s case, defendant moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the state had not presented sufficient evidence that he had “[p]ossesse[d] a handgun that is concealed and readily accessible to the person within any vehicle,” within the meaning of ORS 166.250(1)(b). Alternatively, defendant argued that he qualified for an exception under ORS 166.250(2)(b), which provided a person may possess a handgun at the person’s “place of residence.” The trial court rejected those arguments, and a jury found defendant guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that defendant failed to preserve his argument that he had not been “within any vehicle” at the time that he possessed a handgun, and that he did not meet the “place of residence” exception. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Oregon v. Clemente-Perez" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by jury on one count of sodomy, one count of rape, and one count of unlawful sexual penetration. On appeal of that conviction, he argued that the trial court erred in failing to give his requested jury instruction that ten jurors had to agree on what factual occurrence constituted each of the offenses. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court correctly declined to give the requested instruction. On review, defendant argued that the circumstances of this case fell within the rule providing that, when a single crime has been charged but the evidence is sufficient for the jury to find that there were multiple, separate occurrences of the charged crime involving the same victim and the same perpetrator during the period of time alleged in the indictment, the state either must elect which occurrence constituted the charged crime or, alternatively, the defendant is entitled to an instruction that ten or more jurors must concur on which occurrence constituted that crime. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in failing to give defendant's proposed concurrence instruction. However, the Court concluded that the error was harmless, and therefore affirmed defendant's convictions. View "Oregon v. Ashkins" on Justia Law

Oregon's sentencing guidelines provided that, if a defendant with multiple terms of probation commits a single probation violation, any resulting terms of incarceration must be imposed concurrently, not consecutively. The state argued that, in consequence of the probation violation, the trial court should revoke probation and impose consecutive sentences of incarceration on each count in defendant David Lane's case, in light of the fact that the original charges involved four different victims. Defendant objected, arguing that, under the applicable provision of the sentencing guidelines, any terms of incarceration imposed as a result of a single probation violation must be served concurrently. In response, the state argued that, notwithstanding the guidelines, the court had authority to impose consecutive sentences under Article I, section 44(1)(b). The trial court agreed with the state, concluding that, under Article I, section 44(1)(b), it was "allowed to give consecutive sentences in this case, based upon the fact that there were four separate victims." The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that, because the imposition of terms of incarceration as a sanction for probation violation is not "sentenc[ing] * * * for crimes" within the meaning of Article I, section 44(1)(b), there was no conflict, so the guidelines provision validly prohibited the imposition of consecutive sentences. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the trial court correctly determined that the guidelines provision conflicted with Article I, section 44(1)(b). "Imposing terms of incarceration as a sanction upon probation revocation amounts to 'sentenc[ing] * * * for crimes' within the meaning of the constitution. Article I, section 44(1)(b), therefore controls, and the conflicting provision of the guidelines is invalid." View "Oregon v. Lane" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted on a single count of first-degree sex abuse. On appeal of his sentence, he argued the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine to exclude expert testimony concerning a diagnosis of child sexual abuse, in addition to the evaluative criteria underlying that diagnosis. Defendant contended that the testimony impermissibly commented on the credibility of the complaining witness in this case. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. And finding no reversible error in either the trial or appellate courts' judgments, the Supreme Court affirmed too. View "Oregon v. Beauvais" on Justia Law

An Oregon state trooper drove by a busy Portland intersection and noticed that, after he did so, defendant crossed the street against a “Don’t Walk” sign, a Class D violation under ORS 814.020(1) and (3). The trooper turned his car around and drove to a position near defendant, who was sitting on a bench at a bus stop. When defendant saw the trooper’s car approach, he got up and began to walk away. The trooper honked his horn and motioned to defendant to come and talk to him, which defendant did. The trooper knew that the intersection was in a high-crime area where a lot of recent gang activity had occurred. He observed that defendant was wearing an “oversized” or “puffy” jacket over a “hoodie sweatshirt,” “oversized baggy gray pants,” and “white tennis shoes,” and was carrying what could have been a green lanyard, garb that the trooper thought might indicate gang affiliation. Defendant replied that he had seen somebody else doing the same thing and “thought it was okay.” At that point, the trooper asked “do you have any weapons on you?” Defendant “kind of sighed and closed his eyes and said yes.” Defendant revealed that he was carrying a gun. Without being asked, defendant then separated his feet, leaned forward, separated his hands, and put his hands on the hood of the trooper’s car. The trooper frisked defendant, located the gun, and learned that defendant kept the gun for “protection” and that he was indeed a gang member. Defendant was taken to the police station where he was ultimately was charged with one count of unlawful possession of a firearm. Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress. The trial court denied the motion, and defendant was subsequently tried and convicted. Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the circuit court judgment. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the State did not claim that the trooper’s inquiry was independently justified by reasonable suspicion that defendant ran afoul of Oregon's firearms laws. Nor did the state argue that the trooper’s inquiry in this case was justified by officer-safety. Rather, the state took issue with the Court of Appeals’ preliminary conclusion that a weapons inquiry was an investigation of an unrelated matter: the state argued that “questions about the presence of weapons are reasonably related to the safe investigation of a traffic violation.” The Supreme Court concluded the state did not meet its burden to demonstrate that the officer’s weapons inquiry was reasonably related to his traffic investigation and reasonably necessary to effectuate it. The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. The judgment of the circuit court was reversed, and the case remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Jinenez" on Justia Law