Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A jury found defendant guilty of murder. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case based on its conclusion that the trial court had erroneously admitted eyewitness testimony of two witnesses that identified defendant as the perpetrator. On review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court properly admitted the identification testimony of one of the witnesses. The Court also concluded that any error admitting the testimony of the other witness was harmless. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Oregon v. Hickman" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with soliciting another person to commit aggravated murder. Evidence presented as trial showed that defendant asked the other person to deliver certain information to a third person which defendant thought would cause that third person to commit the murder. The issue this case presented to the Oregon Supreme Court was whether that evidence was sufficient to establish defendant solicited another to commit aggravated murder. The trial court held that the evidence was sufficient; the Court of Appeals affirmed. After its review, the Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts and affirmed too. View "Oregon v. Everett" on Justia Law

This case came before the Oregon Supreme Court on automatic appeal. Defendant Michael Washington was sentenced to death for the aggravated murder of Mohammed Jabbie. Defendant raised 22 alleged errors from both the guilt and penalty stages of his trial. The Supreme Court took each in turn, found no reversible error, and affirmed defendant's death sentence. View "Oregon v. Washington" on Justia Law

In October 2009, a jury found petitioner guilty of one count of second-degree assault constituting domestic violence, one count of possession of methamphetamine, and two counts of endangering the welfare of a minor. The trial court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced defendant to 76 months in prison and 36 months of post-prison supervision. A year later, petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court appointed counsel for petitioner. Petitioner's counsel then filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief, in which petitioner alleged that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel in various respects, in violation of the Oregon Constitution and United States Constitution. Specifically, petitioner alleged that his criminal trial counsel had been ineffective in failing to meet with and prepare a witness, who was present during the incident and was interviewed by the police after petitioner's arrest; in failing adequately to "investigate" the victim's hospital records; in failing to offer the victim's medical records into evidence; and in failing adequately to cross-examine the victim's treatment provider. Petitioner attached to the amended petition the indictment, judgment, and trial transcript from his criminal trial. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court for review centered on a provision of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA), The Court concluded that that statute requires a petitioner to attach materials, including the petitioner's own averments of fact, that address each element of each asserted ground for relief and that, if presumed true, would permit the post-conviction court to determine that the petitioner was entitled to post-conviction relief on that ground. The post-conviction court granted the state's motion to dismiss, concluding that the materials that petitioner had attached to his petition were insufficient to meet the statutory requirement. The Supreme Court found that petitioner met the attachment requirement of the Act with respect to his first ground for relief but not with respect to his second, third, and fourth grounds for relief. Therefore, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the post-conviction court for further proceedings. View "Ogle v. Nooth" on Justia Law

In 2002, defendant Gregory Bowen assaulted his ex-girlfriend and, in a different incident the same day, killed a friend and committed theft from that victim. Defendant was charged with two alternative counts of aggravated felony murder and one count of intentional murder, along with 15 other felony and misdemeanor charges. Defendant pled guilty to the several charges that arose from his assault of his ex-girlfriend. The remaining charges, which arose from the murder of the friend, went to a jury trial. The jury found defendant guilty on all those charges. Defendant was ultimately sentenced to death on the two aggravated murder charges. The trial court subsequently imposed a sentence of death on each of the two aggravated murder convictions and also sentenced defendant on the intentional murder conviction, as well as each of the other felony and misdemeanor charges. This case went before the Supreme Court on automatic and direct review for the third time following a remand to the trial court. The principal issue that defendant raised was whether, on remand, the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for resentencing on his noncapital felony convictions. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Oregon v. Bowen" on Justia Law

The juvenile court took jurisdiction over A.J.C. for conduct that, if committed by an adult, would have constituted possession of a firearm in a public building, unlawful possession of a firearm, unlawful use of a weapon, and menacing. The question this case presented to the Supreme Court for review was whether the school-safety exception to the warrant requirement announced in "State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. M. A. D.," (233 P3d 437 (2010)), permitted a school principal to conduct a warrantless search of the youth’s backpack after the principal had seized the backpack from the youth. The juvenile court concluded that the search was permissible under the school-safety exception, and it denied youth’s pretrial motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court also affirmed. View "Oregon v. A. J. C." on Justia Law

Petitioner sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Marion County Circuit Court to issue a protective order with respect to documents and communications subject to the lawyer-client privilege. Petitioner’s proposed protective order sought to prevent the State (the superintendent of the Oregon State Penitentiary) from disclosing such information to third parties unrelated to the underlying post-conviction case. Upon review of the facts and circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the post-conviction court’s order denying petitioner’s motion for a protective order was erroneous, and the Court mandated the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus requiring the post-conviction court to vacate its order and issue a protective order. View "Longo v. Premo" on Justia Law

Petitioner, the petitioner in the underlying post-conviction case, sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Marion County Circuit Court to issue a protective order with respect to documents and communications subject to the lawyer-client privilege. Petitioner’s motion for a proposed protective order sought to prevent the State (who is the superintendent of the Oregon State Penitentiary and the defendant in the underlying post-conviction case) from disclosing such information to third parties unrelated to the post-conviction case. In "Longo v. Premo," (355 Or 525 (2014)), the construed OEC 503(4)(c) to be a limited exception permitting disclosures of confidential information only as necessary for a lawyer to defend against allegations of breach of duty, and the Court directed the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus requiring a post-conviction court to issue a protective order. Similarly, in this case, the Court granted mandamus relief. View "Brumwell v. Premo" on Justia Law

Defendants held an around-the-clock vigil on the steps of the state capitol to protest the deployment of Oregon National Guard troops to Iraq and Afghanistan. During that vigil, the state police cited defendants for second-degree criminal trespass when they remained on the capitol steps after 11:00 p.m., in violation of a Legislative Administration Committee (LAC) guideline. Defendants challenged those citations, arguing that the LAC guideline was unconstitutional under Article I, section 8, and Article I, section 26, of the Oregon Constitution. Defendants also argued that the LAC guideline violated the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The trial court rejected those arguments and found defendants guilty of second-degree criminal trespass. On appeal, the Court of Appeals similarly rejected defendants' facial challenges to the guideline under the Oregon Constitution, but remanded defendants' as applied challenges to allow defendants to question the legislator co-chairs of the LAC about enforcement of the guideline. Because defendants' state constitutional challenges were unresolved, the Court of Appeals did not reach defendants' First Amendment argument. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals: the LAC guideline, on its face, did not violate Article I, section 8, or Article I, section 26, of the Oregon Constitution. However, the Court remanded the case to permit defendants to question the legislator co-chairs of the LAC about their involvement, if any, in enforcement of the guideline against defendants. Likewise, the Supreme Court did not reach defendants' First Amendment argument. View "Oregon v. Babson" on Justia Law

This case came before this court on automatic and direct review of defendant's judgment of conviction and sentence of death for multiple counts of aggravated murder. Defendant raised 30 assignments of error. The Supreme Court took each for analysis. Finding no reversible error, the Court affirmed Defendant's death sentence. View "Oregon v. Serrano" on Justia Law