Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In consolidated cases, plaintiff sought immediate release from prison. In his case against the superintendent of the institution in which he was incarcerated, plaintiff sought habeas corpus relief on the ground that the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision set a release date for him in 2018, but, when his earned sentence reduction credits were taken into account, his release date has passed; therefore, his continued incarceration was unlawful. In his administrative rule challenge, plaintiff argued that, to the extent that certain Department of Corrections (DOC) rules pertaining to the granting of earned-time sentence reductions are construed to exclude him from eligibility for such reductions, they are invalid. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that plaintiff was entitled to have his term of incarceration reduced by earned-time credits, but he was not entitled to habeas corpus relief, because the board had not yet performed its prerelease functions under ORS 144.125. The Court found it unnecessary to address plaintiff's rule challenge. Accordingly, the Court dismissed plaintiff's petitions in both cases. View "Engweiler v. Persson" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with criminally negligent homicide after he allegedly drove while under the influence of intoxicants and struck another vehicle, killing one of its occupants. During the investigation of the crime, a police officer read defendant the statutory implied consent warnings and defendant agreed to provide blood and urine samples. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the test results from those samples, arguing that his consent was involuntary because it was obtained after he had been warned of the legal consequences he would suffer if he refused consent. The trial court, following "Oregon v. Machuca," concluded that defendant's consent was involuntary. Accordingly, the trial court suppressed the blood and urine evidence because it was obtained in violation of defendant's constitutional rights. The state filed an interlocutory appeal of that pretrial order, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant's consent was voluntary; the police officer did not unconstitutionally coerce defendant's consent to the test of his blood and urine by reading him the statutory implied consent warnings. Therefore the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and the ruling of the trial court. View "Oregon v. Moore" on Justia Law

Defendant Bruce Pipkin was charged with first-degree burglary. At trial, defendant argued that the state should have been required to elect whether it intended to proceed on the theory that he entered the victim's home unlawfully or on the theory that he remained in her home unlawfully. Alternatively, relying on "Oregon v. Boots," (780 P2d 725 (1989), cert den, 510 8 US 1013 (1993)), defendant requested an instruction that at least 10 jurors had to agree on one (or both) of those theories. The trial court denied both requests, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court allowed defendant's petition for review and affirmed the Court of Appeals decision and the trial court's judgment. View "Oregon v. Pipkin" on Justia Law

Two law enforcement officers, believing that defendant was being assaulted, responded to an incomplete 9-1-1 call that had been traced to defendant's home. One officer took defendant's husband into custody, while the other officer proceeded to interview defendant on the porch of her home. While interviewing defendant, the officer made an observation that caused him to reasonably believe defendant might be in possession of drugs. The officer asked defendant if he could search her, and she agreed. During the search, the officer discovered a glass pipe with drug residue on it. Defendant was subsequently charged with possession of a controlled substance. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court in this case was whether the officers' actions, commands, and inquiries in investigating the possible domestic assault resulted in a seizure of defendant within the meaning of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution and, if so, whether that seizure was constitutionally permissible. The Court concluded that defendant was seized for constitutional purposes, but the Court further concluded that the seizure was lawful. The Court accordingly reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's judgment.View "Oregon v. Fair" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of felony driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII). At trial, defendant sought to introduce evidence that he suffered from a sleepwalking disorder and was "sleep driving" at the time he was stopped in his vehicle. Defendant argued he did not voluntarily drive his vehicle, an element of proof necessary to establish criminal liability for DUII. The trial court excluded defendant's proffered evidence, concluding it was not relevant because DUII is a strict-liability offense. On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed that DUII is a strict-liability offense and affirmed. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant's proffered evidence was indeed relevant to the driving element of the DUII charge, and accordingly reversed.View "Oregon v. Newman" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the legal standard for what constitutes a seizure under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. Police witnessed defendant and a companion "milling around" his car one evening in an area known for drug activity. The officer spoke briefly with defendant and asked him if he was "still on probation." Defendant told the officer he was not; the officer then asked both defendant and a companion whether they had their identification on them and whether the officer could look at that identification. Both defendant and the companion handed the officer their licenses. The officer estimated that he had the licenses for "at the most" between 30 seconds and a minute before returning them back. Defense counsel did not dispute that defendant's consent to search was voluntary or that the officers acquired sufficient cause to seize defendant when a plastic baggie concealed in defendant's hand was uncovered. Defendant argued only that before defendant gave his consent to search, the officer had unlawfully detained him by asking him for his identification and taking possession of that license, however briefly, and by asking for consent to search. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that the seizure was supported by a reasonable suspicion, and that the seizure ended when the officer handed back the licenses. The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant, but the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court: "Defendant's claim that [the officer] exploited an illegal stop of defendant to obtain his voluntary and otherwise valid consent falls with our conclusion that [the officer] did not seize defendant at any point before defendant gave his consent to search." View "Oregon v. Highley" on Justia Law

In prior cases, the Oregon Supreme Court has held that officers who had lawfully seized individuals for purposes of investigation also could, consistently with the Oregon Constitution, request and verify the individuals' identifications. This case presented another variation on the issues pertaining to asking for identification: whether an officer's request for and verification of a person's identification, in and of itself, convert an encounter that is not a seizure for constitutional purposes into one that is. The Supreme Court responded with a "no." Consequently, in this case, whereby Defendant challenged the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence following an officer's request for his identification, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the trial court's denial of that motion to suppress. View "Oregon v. Backstrand" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the legal standard for what constitutes a seizure under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. Defendant challenged the denial of his motion to suppress evidence officers obtained following a search. At the outset of the contact, the officers asked for identification. The officers did not seize defendant and his companion by asking them for identification. The Supreme Court found that the actions that the officers took after asking for that identification did result in seizing defendant and his companion. Defendant did not dispute, that by then the officers had reasonable suspicion for his seizure. The trial court concluded that the initial contact was "not a stop." The trial court further concluded that, once defendant gave the officers a false name, the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant, "given the circumstances which took the officers to the location[.]" Based on those findings and conclusions, the court denied the motion. The case went to trial, and a jury found defendant guilty as charged. The Court of Appeals reversed, but the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Oregon v. Anderson" on Justia Law

In 2007, a Portland police officer investigated a dispute between defendant and his girlfriend. During that investigation, the officer learned that defendant was 21 years old and that his girlfriend (victim) was 16. Defendant admitted to the officer that he had had sexual intercourse with the victim on several occasions during the previous year. Given that information, a grand jury indicted defendant for four counts of second-degree sexual abuse. Specifically, on four occasions "on or between December 11, 2006 to December 24, 1 2007," defendant "unlawfully and knowingly subject[ed the victim] to sexual intercourse, [the victim] not consenting thereto by reason of being under 18 years of age." Defendant waived his right to a jury trial, and the parties tried the charges to the court. The issue in before the Supreme Court in this case was what the phrase "does not consent" meant: defendant argued that it referred only to those instances in which the victim does not actually consent; the state responded that it also includes instances in which the victim lacks the capacity to consent. The trial court agreed with the state and convicted defendant of second-degree sexual abuse. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court's decision and affirmed. View "Oregon v. Ofodrinwa" on Justia Law

At issue in this case is whether Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution implicitly requires the state to treat the location where the offense was committed as a material allegation, which it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. The state contended that nothing in the wording of Article I, section 11, required such proof. In the state's view, the constitution merely granted a defendant a right to object (or waive objection to) improper venue, and in this case defendant waived that right by failing to assert it before trial. Defendant argued that, although the state was correct that Article I, section 11, itself did not say anything about requiring proof of venue as a part of the state's case, Supreme Court precedent nevertheless read the section to impose that requirement, and, here, the state failed to satisfy it. The Court of Appeals concluded that the state was required to establish venue beyond a reasonable doubt and that, in this case, the state failed to meet its burden. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that its earlier cases were mistaken in reading Article I, section 11: "The venue guarantee of that constitutional provision recognizes a right to a trial in a particular place, which right must be asserted before trial." Furthermore, the Court concluded it would be unfair to hold that the defendant in this case forfeited that right, given that, under the law at the time of trial, he was permitted to raise the issue during trial. Therefore, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals, reversed the circuit court, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Mills" on Justia Law