Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was arrested, handcuffed, booked, and lodged in jail along with other 49 other "Occupy Portland" protesters. She was then charged with second-degree criminal trespass. The issue in this mandamus proceeding was whether the state's election under ORS 161.566(1) to "treat" the misdemeanor offense of criminal trespass as a violation effectively decriminalized that offense and thereby deprived defendant of the jury trial right afforded her under Article I, section 11. The Supreme Court concluded defendant was entitled to a jury trial on the violation charge, and accordingly dismissed the state's petition. View "Oregon v. Benoit" on Justia Law

Defendant was accused of shoplifting, was arrested and briefly incarcerated. She was charged with third-degree theft and attempted first-degree theft. At defendant's arraignment, the state elected under ORS 161.566(1) to prosecute the charges as violations rather than misdemeanors. Defendant filed a motion to have the charges tried to a jury and to be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, contending that she was entitled to those protections even though the state was prosecuting the charges as violations. The trial court denied the motion and found defendant guilty on both charges by a preponderance of the evidence. Defendant was fined $300 on each conviction. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the prosecutor's election to treat the offenses as violations precluded defendant from asserting her right to a jury trial. Consistently with its decision in "Benoit," the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court erred in rejecting defendant's demand for those protections and that the Court of Appeals correctly reversed defendant's convictions after a trial to the court. View "Oregon v. Fuller" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court in this case was whether Article I, section 17, of the Oregon Constitution applied to a restitution determination in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. The youth-defendant in this case argued that he was entitled to a jury trial because recent constitutional and statutory amendments transformed the juvenile restitution statute, ORS 419C.450, into a civil device through which victims of crime could recover monetary damages for their injuries. The Supreme Court held that a restitution determination pursuant to ORS 419C.450 was not civil in nature and that Article I, section 17, therefore did not require a jury trial in the defendant's case. View "Oregon v. N. R. L." on Justia Law

Defendant was accused of embezzling money from her employer in multiple transactions over a period of sixteen months. The prosecutor aggregated those transactions to indict defendant on sixteen counts of theft, one count for each month. The prosecutor's office did not have a "policy" for aggregating theft transactions, but did so to create "a clear organizational outline for the jury." Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that it violated the Supreme Court's mandate in "Oregon v. Freeland," (667 P2dd 509 (1983)). The trial court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the privileges and immunities provision of the state constitution, and whether it applied to prosecutors' charging decisions. If so, then the question remaining in this case was whether the prosecutor must consistently adhere to a coherent, systematic policy in making charging decisions. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed defendant's conviction. By this decision, the Supreme Court overruled "Freeman" and reaffirmed its decision in "Washington v. Clark," (630 P2d 810 (1981)). View "Oregon v. Savastano" on Justia Law

Defendant kidnapped his victim as part of an effort to persuade her not to testify against one of his friends. The friend had terrorized, raped, and sodomized the victim, and the victim feared that the defendant would use a gun to harm her. As a result, a grand jury indicted defendant for, among other things, second-degree kidnapping. He waived his right to a jury, and the trial court convicted him of that crime in addition to several others. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on whether the state constitution required that the facts necessary to impose a dangerous offender sentence be found by the grand jury and pleaded in the indictment. The trial court held that it did not, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court agreed, and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. View "Oregon v. Reinke" on Justia Law

Defendant challenged his conviction for the crime of felon in possession of a firearm, arguing that when he possessed the firearm in question, he was not a "person who has been convicted of a felony" within the meaning of the felon-in-possession statute. In this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had not declared defendant's conviction to be a misdemeanor in the original or a subsequent judgment of conviction by the time that defendant possessed the firearm in question. Accordingly, the Court rejected defendant's claim of error and affirm his conviction on the felon-in-possession charge. View "Oregon v. Stark" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of several weapons-related charges based on his possession of loaded semiautomatic handguns and a knife in a public place within the city of Portland. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Defendant petitioned the Supreme Court to review his convictions. The Court concluded that the ordinance enacted by the City of Portland was constitutional, and therefore affirmed. View "Oregon v. Christian" on Justia Law

Defendant Dean MacBale petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to order the trial court in his case to hold a public hearing to determine the admissibility of a rape victim's past sexual conduct, notwithstanding the state Rape Shield law. Defendant claimed that the victim made false allegations against him so that she could later bring a civil action against him for money damages. Defendant wanted to present evidence that the victim had a habit of falsely accusing men for later financial gain. Before his criminal trial, Defendant filed a motion under the Rape Shield law to determine the admissibility of the victim's conduct. The court granted the motion for a hearing, but denied making the hearing public in accordance with the Rape Shield Law. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that a hearing to determine admissibility of evidence under the Rape Shield Law does not constitute an "administration of justice" for the purposes of Article I, Section 10 of the Oregon Constitution, and therefore, such hearing could be closed to the public. View "Oregon v. MacBale" on Justia Law

Defendant challenged the admission of certain evidence following being held in contempt for violating a Family Abuse Prevention Act restraining order. On appeal, defendant argued that the admission of a certificate of service at trial violated his right to confrontation under the state Constitution because the State did not establish the declarant was unable to testify. The trial court concluded the certificate was admissible; the appellate court affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the out-of-court declaration made by the deputy sheriff who issued the certificate was not "witness" evidence that triggered defendant's constitutional rights; the certificate was an official record that the deputy was duty-bound to report, and it did not include investigative or gratuitous facts or opinions. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial and appellate courts. View "Oregon v. Copeland" on Justia Law

The Oregon Supreme Court issued its decision in this case in January, 2013; that decision reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed defendant's judgment of conviction for possession of methamphetamine. A few weeks later, defense counsel filed a petition for reconsideration, asking the court to reconsider and modify or reverse its decision or, at a minimum, to remand the case to the trial court for additional proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. In February 2013, defense counsel filed a notice pursuant to ORAP 8.45 informing the court that defendant had died more than a year before (on January 27, 2012), and contended therefore that the case was moot. Defense counsel also moved to vacate the Supreme Courts opinion and the judgment of conviction. Defense counsel argued that, because defendant's death rendered the case moot as of January 2012, the case necessarily was moot at the time this court issued its decision, and the appropriate disposition was to vacate that decision. Defense counsel further asserted that because: (1) the proper disposition of the case was to remand the case back to trial court for further proceedings; and (2) defendant's death meant that he could not take steps in the trial court to undo his conviction, the Supreme Court also should have vacated the judgment of conviction. The state opposed the motion to vacate, arguing that "the public interest in leaving the court's decision undisturbed far outweighs any equitable interests supporting vacatur." Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated its decision and the decision of the Court of Appeals and vacated defendant's judgment of conviction. View "Oregon v. Hemenway" on Justia Law