Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In two criminal cases consolidated for purposes of opinion, each defendant attempted to waive his constitutional right to a jury trial as guaranteed by Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution. In both cases, the trial court refused to consent to the waiver, and juries subsequently convicted each defendant of the charges against him. In "Oregon v. Harrell," (250 P3d 1 (2011)), the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in refusing defendant Harrell's requested jury waiver and affirmed the convictions. On review in Harrell, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to reconsider defendant's jury waiver. In "Oregon v. Wilson," (247 P3d 1262 (2011)), the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court's refusal to consent to defendant's requested jury waiver had been within the trial court's discretion and affirmed defendant's convictions. On review in Wilson, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court to reconsider defendant's jury waiver. View "Oregon v. Harrell" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant Leland Hemenway with possession of methamphetamine. Before trial, he filed a motion to suppress evidence seized by police, arguing that his consent to search was the product of an illegal seizure, and therefore was inadmissible under the Oregon Constitution. The trial court denied the motion, and Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, finding that the stop was unlawful and the evidence from the search was presumptively obtained through exploitation of the earlier unlawful conduct. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, using the opportunity of this opinion to modify the exploitation analysis announced in the case-law authority the Court of Appeals relied on in its reversal (Oregon v. Hall, 115 P3d 908 (2005)). View "Oregon v. Hemenway" on Justia Law

In his criminal case, defendant unsuccessfully sought an order compelling the victim to produce the hard drive of her laptop computer so that the defense could obtain a forensic examination of the hard drive. After his conviction, defendant requested that the trial court order that an already-existing copy of the hard drive, preserved in a related civil case, be placed under seal in the trial court record of defendant's criminal case, for purposes of appellate review. The trial court granted that motion and rejected the victim's claim that the order violated her right as a crime victim under Article I, section 42, of the Oregon Constitution to refuse a discovery request. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's order did not violate the victim's rights under Article I, section 42. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Oregon v. Bray" on Justia Law

In two criminal cases consolidated for purposes of opinion, each defendant's conviction was based, for the most part, on eyewitness identification evidence. In "Oregon v. Lawson," the Court of Appeals concluded that, despite the state's use of unduly suggestive pretrial identification procedures, under the test first articulated by the Supreme Court in "Oregon v. Classen," (590 P2d 1198 (1979)), the victim's identification of defendant Lawson had been reliable enough to allow the jury to consider it in its deliberations. In "Oregon v. James," (again relying on "Classen") the Court of Appeals similarly concluded that, although the witnesses had been subject to an unduly suggestive police procedure in the course of identifying defendant James, those identifications had nevertheless been sufficiently reliable, and were therefore admissible at trial. The Supreme Court allowed review in each of these cases to determine whether the Classen test was consistent with the current scientific research and understanding of eyewitness identification. In light of the scientific research, the Court revised the test set out in Classen and adopted several additional procedures, based generally on applicable provisions of the Oregon Evidence Code (OEC), for determining the admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence. View "Oregon v. Lawson" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether a physician's conclusion that defendant physically abused a child met the requirements for admissibility of scientific evidence. The child in this case, C, was approximately 18 months old when he arrived at the emergency room with multiple injuries, including a golf-ball-sized lump on his forehead and a fractured skull. The state accused defendant of causing C's injuries and charged him with two counts of criminal mistreatment and first- and third-degree assault. To prove first-degree assault, the state had to show that defendant had caused C "serious physical injury," defined as injury that "creates a substantial risk of death." The jury convicted defendant of third-degree assault and two counts of criminal mistreatment. The jury acquitted defendant on the charge of first-degree assault, but found him guilty of the lesser-included offense of second-degree assault. Like first-degree assault, second degree assault requires a finding that the inflicted injury created a substantial risk of death. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the expert's diagnosis was not limited to determining the cause of C's injuries, but included a conclusion that C's injuries were the result of child abuse. That aspect of the expert's diagnosis addressed a second disputed issue, whether defendant's actions were intentional or accidental. Because the Court could not conclude that there was little likelihood that the admission of the expert's diagnosis did not affect all of defendant's convictions, the Court also could not conclude that the trial court's error was harmless as to the convictions for first degree mistreatment and third-degree assault. The decision of the Court of Appeals was therefore reversed, and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Sanchez-Alfonso" on Justia Law

Defendant petitioned the Supreme Court to reconsider its decision in "Oregon v. Leistiko," (282 P3d 857 (2012)). He argued that the Court erred in two respects: (1) in stating that he had not pursued two issues on review that he had raised in the Court of Appeals; (2) in not deciding whether the admission of evidence of an uncharged rape affected the jury's determination that he had committed crimes other than rape. The Court allowed the petition and after review of defendant's contentions of error, modified the original opinion. View "Oregon v. Leistiko" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the legal standard for the mental state of criminal negligence and, when tested by that standard, whether the record in this case was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of criminally negligent homicide. Defendant, while driving a tractor-trailer truck, collided with the victim's catering truck from the rear. The collision pushed the victim's truck into the oncoming lane of traffic where it was struck by a logging truck. The victim died at the scene. The state charged defendant with criminally negligent homicide. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress evidence of the manner in which he had been driving 10 to 15 minutes before the collision. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant then waived his right to a jury and proceeded with a bench trial. At the close of the state's case, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the court denied. The trial court subsequently convicted defendant. Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. Finding no error in the trial court's interpretation of the standard for criminal negligence, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Oregon v. Lewis" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court reviewed a trial court's orders declaring defendant's son, "Z" (a 19-year-old man who suffers from autism and developmental disabilities) not competent to testify at trial and excluding from evidence a video involving out-of-court statements made by Z and drawings made by Z. Z was called to testify at Defendant's aggravated murder trial accused of killing Z's caregiver William Mills. Finding that the State bore the burden to preserve alternative arguments supporting the admissibility of any part of evidence given by Z, and the State did not meet this burden at trial, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to exclude all of the evidence in question here. Furthermore, the Court determined that the decision not to admit the video testimony was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion. The Court affirmed both of the trial court's orders. View "Oregon v. Sarich" on Justia Law

This case was an automatic and direct review of death sentences imposed after a "penalty phase" trial. Defendant raised 33 assignments of error. Five of them the Supreme Court said merited discussion: specifically, defendant's claims that (1) the adoption of Article I, section 40, of the Oregon Constitution violated the "separate vote" requirement of Article XVII, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution; (2) the so-called "third question," which asked whether defendant's conduct was "unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased," was unconstitutional; (3) the trial court erred by refusing to admit evidence relevant to the third question or failing to pose the question to the jury; (4) the trial court erred in empanelling an "anonymous" jury; and (5) the trial court erred in allowing the state's expert to testify about defendant's consensual homosexual experience as a teenager. The Court discussed, but rejected, three of the five arguments; defendant's position as to the fourth and fifth were well taken. The Court concluded that that the trial court erred in empanelling an "anonymous" jury without finding, as required by the Court's decision in "State v. Sundberg," (247 P3d 1213 (2011)), that there were strong and particular grounds for believing that the jurors' identities needed to be protected. Because that error was not harmless, the Court vacated the death sentences and remanded the case to the circuit court for a new penalty-phase trial. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to exclude evidence of defendant's homosexual experiences as a teenager. View "Oregon v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged by indictment with (among other things) assault in the first degree. At trial, the state proceeded solely under the theory that defendant had aided and abetted his codefendant's initial assault on the victim. A jury found defendant guilty. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed defendant's first degree assault conviction and remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings on the lesser charges of second- and fourth-degree assault. The Supreme Court allowed the state's petition for review to examine whether, on appellate review, the state can sustain a criminal conviction on a theory of criminal liability that it did not pursue at trial. Finding that it could not, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Oregon v. Burgess" on Justia Law