Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted for the 1989 killing of the Department of Corrections director. At the time, Oregon law provided two sentencing options for aggravated murder: death or life with the possibility of parole (ordinary life). Petitioner contended that he received inadequate assistance of counsel at the time of his criminal trial, specifically that he was not told he had the right to object to a new sentencing law to his case on ex post facto grounds. The post-conviction court found that as a matter of fact, petitioner did not established that the advice would have made a difference. The appellate court and Supreme Courts affirmed that decision.View "Gable v. Oregon" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter centered on what constitutes a reprieve under the Oregon Constitution. After the Court affirmed Plaintiff-Respondent Gary Haugen's aggravated murder conviction and death sentence, he dropped all appeals, and the trial court set an execution date. The Governor subsequently issued a reprieve suspending Defendant's sentence for the duration of the Governor's term. Defendant purported to reject the reprieve, and sought to have it declared ineffective and invalid. The trial court held that a reprieve must be accepted to be effective and ruled the Governor's reprieve ineffective. The Governor appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the reprieve was valid and effective regardless of whether Defendant rejected it, and accordingly reversed the trial court.View "Haugen v. Kitzhaber" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for resisting arrest, raising, among other issues, two claims that the trial court erred in instructing the jury. The Court of Appeals concluded that it was barred from reviewing those claims by ORCP 5 59 H. The Supreme Court allowed defendant's petition for review to consider whether ORCP 59 H applied to and controlled appellate court review of claims of instructional error, including claims of "plain error." Finding that it does not, the Court reversed and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Vanornum" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a dispute over a cell phone. The victim sold defendant a cell phone with prepaid minutes. Defendant made a down payment when he got the phone and agreed to pay the balance in the future. When defendant failed to pay the balance owed, the victim contacted the cell phone provider and caused the remaining prepaid minutes to be cancelled. A jury found defendant guilty of third-degree assault. The trial court's instructions permitted the jury to find defendant liable for that crime either as the principal or as an accomplice. Throughout the litigation, defendant argued that, as a matter of statutory and constitutional law, the jurors had to agree on which role he played in the assault: Did he hit the victim, or did he aid and abet the person who did? The trial court declined to give defendant's requested instruction on that issue, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. After its review, the Supreme Court found it was harmless error to decline defendant's jury instruction. . View "Oregon v. Phillips" on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, plaintiff sought immediate release from prison. In his case against the superintendent of the institution in which he was incarcerated, plaintiff sought habeas corpus relief on the ground that the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision set a release date for him in 2018, but, when his earned sentence reduction credits were taken into account, his release date has passed; therefore, his continued incarceration was unlawful. In his administrative rule challenge, plaintiff argued that, to the extent that certain Department of Corrections (DOC) rules pertaining to the granting of earned-time sentence reductions are construed to exclude him from eligibility for such reductions, they are invalid. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that plaintiff was entitled to have his term of incarceration reduced by earned-time credits, but he was not entitled to habeas corpus relief, because the board had not yet performed its prerelease functions under ORS 144.125. The Court found it unnecessary to address plaintiff's rule challenge. Accordingly, the Court dismissed plaintiff's petitions in both cases. View "Engweiler v. Persson" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with criminally negligent homicide after he allegedly drove while under the influence of intoxicants and struck another vehicle, killing one of its occupants. During the investigation of the crime, a police officer read defendant the statutory implied consent warnings and defendant agreed to provide blood and urine samples. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the test results from those samples, arguing that his consent was involuntary because it was obtained after he had been warned of the legal consequences he would suffer if he refused consent. The trial court, following "Oregon v. Machuca," concluded that defendant's consent was involuntary. Accordingly, the trial court suppressed the blood and urine evidence because it was obtained in violation of defendant's constitutional rights. The state filed an interlocutory appeal of that pretrial order, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant's consent was voluntary; the police officer did not unconstitutionally coerce defendant's consent to the test of his blood and urine by reading him the statutory implied consent warnings. Therefore the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and the ruling of the trial court. View "Oregon v. Moore" on Justia Law

Defendant Bruce Pipkin was charged with first-degree burglary. At trial, defendant argued that the state should have been required to elect whether it intended to proceed on the theory that he entered the victim's home unlawfully or on the theory that he remained in her home unlawfully. Alternatively, relying on "Oregon v. Boots," (780 P2d 725 (1989), cert den, 510 8 US 1013 (1993)), defendant requested an instruction that at least 10 jurors had to agree on one (or both) of those theories. The trial court denied both requests, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court allowed defendant's petition for review and affirmed the Court of Appeals decision and the trial court's judgment. View "Oregon v. Pipkin" on Justia Law

Two law enforcement officers, believing that defendant was being assaulted, responded to an incomplete 9-1-1 call that had been traced to defendant's home. One officer took defendant's husband into custody, while the other officer proceeded to interview defendant on the porch of her home. While interviewing defendant, the officer made an observation that caused him to reasonably believe defendant might be in possession of drugs. The officer asked defendant if he could search her, and she agreed. During the search, the officer discovered a glass pipe with drug residue on it. Defendant was subsequently charged with possession of a controlled substance. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court in this case was whether the officers' actions, commands, and inquiries in investigating the possible domestic assault resulted in a seizure of defendant within the meaning of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution and, if so, whether that seizure was constitutionally permissible. The Court concluded that defendant was seized for constitutional purposes, but the Court further concluded that the seizure was lawful. The Court accordingly reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's judgment.View "Oregon v. Fair" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of felony driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII). At trial, defendant sought to introduce evidence that he suffered from a sleepwalking disorder and was "sleep driving" at the time he was stopped in his vehicle. Defendant argued he did not voluntarily drive his vehicle, an element of proof necessary to establish criminal liability for DUII. The trial court excluded defendant's proffered evidence, concluding it was not relevant because DUII is a strict-liability offense. On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed that DUII is a strict-liability offense and affirmed. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant's proffered evidence was indeed relevant to the driving element of the DUII charge, and accordingly reversed.View "Oregon v. Newman" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the legal standard for what constitutes a seizure under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. Police witnessed defendant and a companion "milling around" his car one evening in an area known for drug activity. The officer spoke briefly with defendant and asked him if he was "still on probation." Defendant told the officer he was not; the officer then asked both defendant and a companion whether they had their identification on them and whether the officer could look at that identification. Both defendant and the companion handed the officer their licenses. The officer estimated that he had the licenses for "at the most" between 30 seconds and a minute before returning them back. Defense counsel did not dispute that defendant's consent to search was voluntary or that the officers acquired sufficient cause to seize defendant when a plastic baggie concealed in defendant's hand was uncovered. Defendant argued only that before defendant gave his consent to search, the officer had unlawfully detained him by asking him for his identification and taking possession of that license, however briefly, and by asking for consent to search. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that the seizure was supported by a reasonable suspicion, and that the seizure ended when the officer handed back the licenses. The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant, but the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court: "Defendant's claim that [the officer] exploited an illegal stop of defendant to obtain his voluntary and otherwise valid consent falls with our conclusion that [the officer] did not seize defendant at any point before defendant gave his consent to search." View "Oregon v. Highley" on Justia Law