Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted Defendant Douglas Pitt of two counts of first-degree unlawful sexual penetration, and two counts of first-degree sexual abuse. Defendant appealed, arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine to exclude evidence of prior uncharged sexual misconduct involving the victim and another individual. The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's convictions, concluding that the trial court did not err in declining to exclude the challenged evidence because it was relevant to bolster the victim's credibility in identifying defendant as her abuser. The Supreme Court granted review to decide whether the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the trial court's decision to deny defendant's motion in limine. The trial court did not decide that the evidence of defendant's uncharged misconduct was conditionally admissible. It ruled instead, without conditions, that the uncharged misconduct evidence was relevant and admissible. In light of the record that existed when the trial court addressed the motion in limine, the court's ruling was erroneous. Accordingly, the appellate court's affirmation of the trial court was in error. The ruling was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Pitt" on Justia Law

In this case the issue before the Supreme Court concerned an action under ORS 30.866 in which a plaintiff sought both a stalking protective order and a judgment for compensatory money damages, whether the parties are entitled to a jury trial on the claim for money damages. Plaintiff in this case filed a petition under ORS 30.866, alleging that the defendant had engaged in knowing and repeated unwanted sexual contact with her in the two years preceding the filing of the petition and that that contact had caused plaintiff reasonable apprehension regarding her safety. Plaintiff claimed that she was entitled to three forms of relief: a stalking protective order enjoining defendant from engaging in certain conduct; an award of compensatory damages for lost sick and annual leave, lost wages, and counseling expenses; and an award of reasonable attorney fees. Defendant asserted that he was entitled to a jury trial on plaintiff's claim for compensatory money damages. The trial court disagreed and conducted the trial on all three claims without a jury. The court found in favor of plaintiff, issued a stalking protective order, entered a general judgment for compensatory damages in the amount of $42,347.78, and entered a supplemental judgment for reasonable attorney fees. Defendant appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that defendant had neither a statutory nor a constitutional right to a jury trial. The court reasoned that the text of ORS 30.866 contains "no reference that conveys any kind of indication that the legislature intended to confer a right to a jury trial." Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court on the jury trial issue, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "M. K. F. v. Miramontes" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether defendant filed his notice of appeal from a supplemental judgment awarding restitution within the time allowed by ORS 138.071(4), which requires that the notice of appeal be filed not later than 30 days after "the defendant receives notice that the judgment has been entered." The Court of Appeals concluded that defendant's notice of appeal from the supplemental judgment was untimely and dismissed that appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Upon review, the Supreme Court also concluded that defendant's notice of appeal was not timely filed, and therefore affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Oregon v. Mullins" on Justia Law

Defendant Terry Haynes was charged with murder and manslaughter. Defendant filed two pretrial motions to exclude evidence, the first seeking to exclude evidence of five allegations of prior bad acts, and the second seeking to exclude his interview with the police. The trial court granted Defendant's motion to exclude his prior bad acts in its entirety, and granted in part and denied in part Defendant's motion to exclude the police interview. The State sought direct review of both rulings. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the state did not adequately preserve any of the arguments that it advanced on appeal with regard to the admissibility of the prior bad acts. In addition, the Court declined to consider the State's argument with regard to the partial exclusion of the interview because it assigned error to an order that the trial court did not make. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's orders and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Haynes" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court concerned the meaning of "aggrieved person" as that term was used in ORS 133.721(1), the statute that defines the class of persons who may seek suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to an order for a body wire or wiretap. Defendant was charged with various crimes arising from the murder of Asia Bell. Before trial, defendant filed motions to suppress certain evidence intercepted pursuant to a body wire order and a wiretap order. Specifically, through the body-wire order the police had obtained conversations that referred to defendant and indirectly suggested that he was involved in Bell's death. Based on that information, the police obtained the wiretap order, and, through the wiretap, intercepted conversations in which defendant made incriminating statements. The trial court denied defendant's motions to suppress. A jury convicted defendant of murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and two counts of attempted aggravated murder. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that defendant could not challenge the body-wire order because he was not an "aggrieved person" within the meaning of ORS 133.721(1). As to the wiretap order, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that defendant was an "aggrieved person" who could challenge that order, but noted that defendant's only argument to exclude the incriminating communications obtained pursuant to that order was that the order was based on information obtained through the allegedly invalid body-wire order. It rejected that argument. The Court of Appeals also rejected defendant's argument that the trial court committed prejudicial error in excluding certain evidence that defendant sought to introduce. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Oregon v. Klein" on Justia Law

In this case, a trial court found that defendant's statements to private investigators were induced by the investigators' promises of leniency and other benefits and therefore suppressed those statements and a second set of inculpatory statements that defendant made to a police officer on the same subject. The state appealed the suppression order. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court: "the state [had] the burden to produce evidence that the coercive influence under which the prior confession was made had sufficiently dispelled to render the subsequent confession [to police] voluntary. . . .The trial court did not err in reaching that conclusion or in suppressing those statements." View "Oregon v. Powell" on Justia Law

The state charged Defendant Ronald Leistiko with, among other things, three counts of first degree rape. Each count involved a different victim and arose out of a separate incident. The state offered evidence that defendant had forcibly compelled a fourth woman to engage in sexual intercourse with him. The trial court ruled that the fourth woman's testimony was admissible, and the jury convicted Defendant of two of the three counts of rape. On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the admission of the fourth woman's testimony, relying in large part on The Supreme Court's decision in "Oregon v. Johnson" (131 P3d 173 (2006)). The Supreme Court allowed Defendant's petition for review and reversed the Court of Appeals decision in part. "[The Court] recognize[d] that inferring a plan or design from prior similar acts to prove that a defendant acted consistently with that plan is vulnerable to the claim that the prior bad acts are merely propensity evidence. . . .[T]he fourth woman's testimony was not sufficiently similar for it to be admissible to prove intent. It necessarily follows that her testimony also was not sufficiently similar for it to be admissible to prove a plan that would permit the jury to infer that defendant acted consistently with that plan - namely, that he forcibly compelled each of the victims to engage in sexual intercourse with him. None of the grounds that the state has advanced justified admission of the fourth woman's testimony. The trial court erred in admitting it." View "Oregon v. Leistiko" on Justia Law

In 2006, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant Gregory Bowen's convictions for aggravated murder and the imposition of the death penalty. However, the Court concluded that the trial court erred in failing to merge two aggravated murder verdicts and one intentional murder verdict against Defendant into a single conviction set out in a single judgment that imposed one death sentence. On remand, the trial court denied several defense motions which were at the center of this case before the Supreme Court. Upon review of the trial court's corrected sentence, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Defendant's motions and also affirmed Defendant's merged conviction and death sentence. However, the Court reversed the corrected judgment and remanded the case for entry of a new corrected judgment. View "Oregon v. Bowen" on Justia Law

Defendant Gregory McBride lived in his friend's house where the two grew, used and sold marijuana. THe friend's teen-aged daughter and her friend also lived there. Defendant occasionally smoked marijuana in the home, sometimes with the teenagers. Based on those circumstances, Defendant was charged with manufacturing a controlled substance, delivering said substance to a minor and two counts of endangering the welfare of minors. Defendant moved for acquittal at trial, but was ultimately convicted by a jury on all counts. The Court of Appeals affirmed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant challenged only his child-endangerment convictions. Upon review of the evidence in the record, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on those charges, and therefore reversed his conviction as to those counts. View "Oregon v. McBride" on Justia Law

In this criminal case, the victim filed an interlocutory appeal challenging several orders of the trial court that she contended violated her right to "refuse an interview, deposition or other discovery request by the criminal defendant," under Article I, section 42(1)(c), of the Oregon Constitution. Defendant attempted to obtain from Google, Inc., by subpoena duces tecum "all internet activity and searches conducted by [the victim], email [of the victim] . . . including IP addresses, web searches requested, results, and sites viewed" as well as "[a]ny and all of [the victim's] email . . . to or from anyone concerning [defendant]." Google denied defendant's request, asserting that, under the federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 USC 2702(a) (2006), the company was prohibited from disclosing the information without the victim's consent or a court order. The prosecuting attorney requested the victim's consent, but she refused. Defendant then renewed his motion to compel. The prosecuting attorney opposed defendant's motion, arguing that requiring the discovery of the requested information following the victim's refusal to provide it would violate her right to refuse a discovery request under the Oregon Constitution. In December 2011, the trial court held a hearing on the prosecuting attorney's objections. Ultimately, the trial court overruled those objections and ordered the prosecuting attorney to obtain the Google information on defendant's behalf. Following arguments on the matter, the trial court denied the relief requested by the victim. The trial court explained that "the Court has never ordered the victim to produce anything and so there is nothing that the Court has ordered that is inconsistent with . . . her protections under . . . the Oregon [C]onstitution[.]" Upon review, the Supreme Court dismissed the interlocutory appeal: "[t]he victim had seven days from the trial court's issuance of its order denying her requested relief. . . . The victim did not file her notice of interlocutory appeal until April 27, 2012. The appeal was untimely. The timely filing of the notice of interlocutory appeal is 'jurisdictional and may not be waived.'" Accordingly, the Court dismissed the victim's appeal. View "Oregon v. Bray" on Justia Law