Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Jesse Moss filed a notice of appeal and then absconded. The state moved to dismiss his appeal pursuant to the state's fugitive dismissal rule (ORAP 8.05(3)). In the meantime, Defendant was arrested and returned to custody. On the basis of his return to custody, Defendant opposed the motion to dismiss, arguing that he had "surrendered" within the meaning of the statute. The State responded that the mere fact that an absconding defendant has been apprehended by police is not sufficient to establish that he has "surrendered" within the meaning of the rule. The Court of Appeals agreed with the State and dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court allowed Defendant's petition for review and affirmed the order of dismissal. View "Oregon v. Moss" on Justia Law

Realtor-Defendant Dylan McDowell petitioned for a peremptory or alternative writ of mandamus to compel his release pending trial. He contended that he was entitled to release under ORS 136.290, which provides, in part, that a criminal defendant "shall not remain in custody pending commencement of the trial of the defendant more than 60 days after the time of arrest." According to Defendant, he was indicted, arrested, and then held more than 60 days, when the state dismissed the charges and released him. Several days later, however, the state reindicted him on the same charges and arrested him again. He contended that the 60-day statutory deadline ran and that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to be released under ORS 136.290. The state argued that the court did not err in denying relator's motion, because the statutory 60-day deadline recommenced upon his rearrest. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with Defendant and issued a peremptory writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to release Defendant immediately. View "Oregon v. McDowell" on Justia Law

This case arose out of Defendant Javier Eumana-Moranchel's motion in limine to exclude the testimony of the State's expert witness in his prosecution for driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII). The issue presented was whether the state could introduce an expert's testimony to prove that defendant's blood alcohol content (BAC) was over the legal limit of .08 percent when a police officer stopped him for driving erratically, even though Defendant's BAC was under the legal limit at the time of his breath test, approximately an hour and a half later. At the pretrial hearing on Defendant's motion, the trial court excluded the expert's testimony interpreting defendant's breath test results to the extent that that testimony would explain that Defendant's BAC was over .08 percent at the time he was driving. The State filed an interlocutory appeal of that ruling and the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the expert's testimony was derived from a chemical analysis of defendant's breath and was therefore admissible. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the State should have been permitted to offer the expert's testimony explaining retrograde extrapolation to establish that Defendant's BAC was over .08 percent at the time he was driving. The Court affirmed the appellate court, reversed the circuit court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Eumana-Moranchel" on Justia Law

Defendants Michael Miskell and Anthony Sinibaldi sought review of a Court of Appeals decision affirming their convictions for aggravated first-degree theft and second-degree burglary. The Supreme Court allowed their petition for review to consider one of the issues defendants raised in their consolidated appeal: whether the trial court erred in denying their motion to suppress an audio recording of a conversation between defendants and a police informant, which the police made without first obtaining a court order. Upon review, the Court concluded that the police acted unlawfully in failing to seek a court order under ORS 9 133.726 before intercepting and recording the conversation, and that the recording should have been suppressed. The Court further concluded that the error was prejudicial. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Miskell/Sinibaldi" on Justia Law

The State appealed, and Defendant Kevin Jarnagin cross-appealed a pretrial order in a murder case suppressing evidence. Neither party challenged the trial court's ruling that the officers violated Defendant's rights under the state constitution when they questioned him at the police station and later at a hospital without advising him of his Miranda rights. The parties focused instead on whether statements that defendant made the next day at his home and before and after a polygraph examination should be suppressed on the ground that those statements were a product of the Miranda violations the day before. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the statements Defendant made at his home were a product of the Miranda violations the day before but that the statements he made before and after the polygraph examination were not. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's order in part and reverse it in part. View "Oregon v. Jarnagin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court previously affirmed Defendant Robert Langley, Jr.'s aggravated murder convictions, but twice vacated his death sentences and remanded the case for further penalty-phase proceedings. On this third review, Defendant raised 27 assignments of error related to the third and most recent penalty-phase proceeding. As his second assignment of error, Defendant contended the trial court erred by requiring him to proceed pro se without first securing valid waiver of his right to counsel. Because the Supreme Court determined that that assignment was well-taken, the Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for further penalty-phase proceedings. View "Oregon v. Langley" on Justia Law

Defendant Jose Cabanilla is a native Spanish speaker whose command of English was described as "weak." A witness saw Defendant's vehicle leave the road at a high rate of speed, roll over and come to rest in a nearby field. The responding officer arrested Defendant for driving under the influence of intoxicants. The matter before the Supreme Court concerned whether for purposes of implied consent, the officer "informed" Defendant of the consequences of refusing to take a breath test when those consequences were explained in English. The trial court concluded that Defendant had been adequately informed and declined to suppress evidence of Defendant's refusal to take the test. A jury convicted Defendant of driving while under the influence (DUII), and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that evidence of a DUII defendant's refusal to take a breath test is admissible against that defendant even if the state does not establish that the defendant understood the information given about his rights and the consequences of refusing the breath test. View "Oregon v. Cabanilla" on Justia Law

In 2004, Defendant Nicholas Rainoldi was convicted of first degree forgery and identity theft, and was sentenced to 24 months' probation. On the judgment, the trial judge wrote "misd. treat. on completion of probation." Defendant completed probation in May 2006. Several months later, Defendant attempted to purchase a shotgun from a gun show. As part of that transaction, Defendant completed the background check form indicating he had never been convicted of a felony. Based on the background check, Defendant's application to purchase the gun was denied. Two police officers were at the gun show, and cited Defendant for attempted unlawful purchase of a firearm and attempted felon in possession of a firearm. The State then charged Defendant by information with those offenses, alleging Defendant "knowingly" attempted to purchase an "intentionally" attempted to own a firearm. The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was whether Oregon law requires proof that Defendant knew he had been convicted of a felony before he possessed or attempted to possess a firearm. The Court of Appeals held that Oregon law requires proof of such knowledge, and that the trial court erred in failing the deliver a jury instruction to that effect. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding the legislature clearly intended to dispense with the culpable mental state requirement as to the element that a defendant "has been convicted of a felony." Accordingly, the Court concluded that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's request for an instruction that it could not convict unless it found he knew he was a felon at the time he attempted to purchase the gun. View "Oregon v. Rainoldi" on Justia Law

This matter came to the Supreme Court on a "request" that it enforce, on its own motion, an alternative writ of mandamus that it previously issued in connection with Defendant Gary Haugen's death-warrant proceeding. After that writ issued, the Court determined that it had been complied with, and then sua sponte dismissed it. The request to enforce the dismissed writ was premised on an assertion that the trial court did not comply with the writ. The trial court held a hearing on whether to issue the death warrant. Defendant was represented by two lawyers, but before the hearing, Defendant made clear he wanted to represent himself and waive all future challenges to his conviction and sentence. Defense counsel objected, believing Defendant not competent to be executed. The trial court then asked Defendant a series of questions to evaluate his competency. Finding Defendant competent, his counsel was withdrawn but placed on "standby." After validly waiving his rights, the trial judge issued the death warrant and set a date for Defendant's execution. The Oregon Capital Resource Center (OCRC) attempted to participate by filing a writ of mandamus contending that the trial court discharged Defendant's counsel and issued a death warrant without a sufficient inquiry into Defendant's competence. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that OCRC had not made the necessary showing that it had any legal authority to bring the proceeding on Defendant's behalf. Furthermore, however, Defendant's former lawyers had authority to challenge Defendant's competency to discharge them. Finding no error in the trial judge's inquiry as to Defendant's competence to represent himself, the Court denied OCRC's request and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Oregon v. Haugen" on Justia Law

Petitioner Marco Montez sought review of an appellate court decision that denied him post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court had rejected Petitioner's claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase retrial proceeding that resulted in him receiving the death penalty. In his petition for reconsideration, Petitioner contended that one of the Justices on the Supreme Court should not have participated in the decision to deny review of the appellate court's decision. Petitioner pointed out that the Justice in question served on the Court of Appeals at the time of his appeal, and that the then-judge recused himself from considering Petitioner's appeal. Though the record in this case provided no explanation for the judge's decision to recuse himself from considering Petitioner's post-conviction appeal at the Court of Appeals, the Judge/Justice recused himself from the Supreme Court's review of Petitioner's appeal. As such, the Court concluded that Petitioner's arguments about the Justice's previous participation in the Court's decision to deny review was made moot. The Court subsequently allowed Petitioner's petition for reconsideration. View "Montez v. Czerniak" on Justia Law