Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Two cases involving ORS 135.747 were consolidated in this opinion. In the first case, the State charged Defendant Vladmir Glushko with one count of attempt to elude, one count of reckless driving and one count of driving under the influence (DUI). Defendant pled not guilty, but entered a diversion agreement as to the DUI charge. The court received notice that Defendant failed to attend a "victim impact panel" as a part of his diversion program. Subsequently, Defendant was ordered to court to "show cause" as to why his diversion should not be revoked. Defendant failed to appear at the show cause hearing, and accordingly, the court revoked the diversion and issued a warrant for Defendant's arrest. In the second case, Defendant Harold Little was cited for DUI and ordered to appear for arraignment. Defendant appeared, and at that time, the court entered a release order which required Defendant to appear one week later. Defendant failed to appear and the court issued a warrant for his arrest. Both Defendants appealed, arguing that the trial courts erred in denying their respective motions to dismiss. Both argued that under ORS 135.747 whether or not they were deprived of their statutory right to a speedy trial "hinged" on the delay between the dates the courts issued arrest warrants and the dates the warrants were executed. This delay would be grounds for dismissal of the charges against them. The appellate court affirmed both cases without opinion. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Defendants' failures to appear at scheduled hearings was "consent" to delay as used in the statute, and if not, whether the delay was reasonable nonetheless. Upon review, the Court concluded that although Defendants did not consent to the delays that occurred in their cases as a result of their failures to appeal, the delays were reasonable. The trial courts therefore did not err in denying Defendants' motions to dismiss on statutory speedy trial grounds. View "Oregon v. Glushko" on Justia Law

Defendant David Swanson was charged with misdemeanor reckless driving. At trial, Defendant asked the trial court to instruct the jury on the elements of "careless" driving (a traffic violation), arguing that it is a lesser-included offense of reckless driving. The trial court declined to give such an instruction, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that "reckless driving" did not extend to the lesser-included violation, and was instead limited to lesser-included criminal offenses: "violations and crimes are distinctive categories of offenses and... juries are authorized to consider only lesser-included crimes, not lesser-included violations of a charged crime." View "Oregon v. Swanson" on Justia Law

The state charged Defendant Tyler Kurokawa-Lasciak with various drug offenses, and Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence that the police had obtained from a warrantless search of his rental van. The state contended that no warrant was required under the automobile exception to Article I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution or, alternatively, that Defendant's companion was in possession of the van and had given her consent to search. The trial court granted Defendant's motion to suppress and the state appealed. Defendant was detained in the parking lot of a casino. Officials there called police because Defendant had been disorderly earlier in the evening. The arresting officer told Defendant that he'd go to jail, but that he had another option: if Defendant consented to a search of his van, the officer might cite him at the casino and release him there. Defendant asked for a lawyer. The officer told Defendant he would impound the van and later obtain a search warrant. Further investigation would reveal that Defendant had given the keys to his girlfriend who was inside the casino. Officers found her inside and asked her whether they could search the van. She replied that she did not believe she had authority to permit the search. Eventually she acquiesced, and officers found 77 grams of marijuana, 56 grams of hashish, electronic scales, and approximately $48,000 in cash inside. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling and held that the search was valid under the automobile exception. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the automobile exception did not permit the warrantless search of Defendant's van. The Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to decide the issue that it did not reach -- whether the search was permitted by Defendant's companion's consent. View "Oregon v. Kurokawa-Lasciak" on Justia Law

The issue presented to the Supreme Court in this appeal was whether a criminal defendant may, after pleading 'no contest' to a misdemeanor offense, challenge his sentence on the ground that it violates the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution. The Court of Appeals held that it had jurisdiction under ORS 6 138.050(1)(a), which provides that a defendant who has pleaded guilty may appeal after making a colorable showing that the sentence "[e]xceeds the maximum allowable by law." The State sought review, arguing that, because defendant's sentence was well within the maximum allowable by applicable statutes, the case should have been dismissed. Defendant responded that because the process by which the court arrived at his sentence was unconstitutional, that sentence "exceed[ed] the maximum allowable by law" in the sense that any sentence arrived at by that process was unlawful. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the state was correct that this appeal was not cognizable under ORS 138.050, and therefore the Court reversed and remanded for entry of an order dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Oregon v. Cloutier" on Justia Law

The State argued that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing one of the trial court's rulings excluding certain evidence. In response, Defendant Terry Davis challenged two of the trial court's other evidentiary rulings excluding evidence, which the Court of Appeals had affirmed. Defendant was charged with murder and manslaughter based on allegations that he shook the victim, his 15-month-old daughter, and inflicted fatal abdominal and brain injuries on the night that she died. Defendant contended that the victim's autopsy revealed that the victim had been injured at least several days before the night of her death and that nothing that he intentionally did to the victim on that evening caused the catastrophic brain hemorrhage that killed her. As relevant to this case, Defendant attempted to introduce evidence that the victim had been subjected to physical abuse throughout her short life; that a friend of the victim's mother saw the victim four days before her death and concluded that the victim looked like the friend's own daughter, who had suffered a brain injury as a baby; and that that friend relayed that conclusion to the victim's mother. In each instance, the trial court excluded the evidence. Defendant was convicted of one count of murder and one count of manslaughter. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred in excluding testimony that, four days before the child's death, a friend told the victim's mother that the victim resembled the friend's child, who had suffered a brain injury. However, the Court of Appeals affirmed without discussion the trial court's rulings as to the other evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court partly affirmed, partly reversed the appellate court's decision, holding that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the victim's prior injuries. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. The case was remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Davis" on Justia Law

This case tested the limits of a defendant's free speech rights under Article I, 3 section 8, of the Oregon Constitution, and the his violation of a protective order. The victim was an editor with the Portland Tribune, a weekly newspaper. In 2005, the newspaper sponsored a social event to which the public was invited. Defendant John Ryan attended the event, and soon afterward, Defendant began writing to the victim. Defendant violated the terms of a stalking protective order issued against him by contacting the victim through a third party and was subsequently found guilty by a jury of two counts of violating ORS 163.750. The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant's convictions. That court reasoned that Article I, section 8, required that ORS 163.750 be judicially narrowed to require "an unequivocal threat of the sort that makes it objectively reasonable for the victim to believe that he or she is being threatened with imminent and serious physical harm," and so the State failed to meet its burden of proof on both counts. On review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed Defendant's conviction: "because defendant's communications with the victim were already prohibited by the stalking protective order, the state was not required by Article I, section 8, to prove that defendant had communicated an unequivocal threat to the victim." View "Oregon v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Keith Drollinger, a convicted felon, brought suit against the lawyers who represented him in his attempt to obtain post-conviction relief, but shortly before the matter was scheduled for trial, withdrew. Defendants Gordon Mallon, John Lamborn, Robert Raschio and their firm, Mallon Lamborn & Raschio, PC, moved to dismiss the malpractice action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. They argued that, under the Supreme Court’s decision in "Stevens v. Bispham," (316 Or 221)(1993)), the action was barred because plaintiff had not been exonerated of the underlying offenses. The circuit court agreed with Defendants, granted their motion, and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that "Stevens," a case addressing the statute of limitations in a malpractice action brought by a former criminal defendant against trial counsel in the underlying case, did not preclude this convicted Plaintiff from pursuing a malpractice action against post-conviction counsel. Because the circuit court treated actual exoneration as a prerequisite for bringing the action, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Drollinger v. Mallon" on Justia Law

Defendant Hezakiah Baker was charged with multiple counts related to the manufacture and possession of marijuana. Before trial, Defendant moved to suppress evidence seized by Medford city police officers who, without a warrant, entered defendant's residence to investigate a 9-1-1 domestic disturbance call. An issue central to the case was the use of a "code word": the 9-1-1 caller stated she had heard the female resident of the house use a prearranged code word indicating to the caller that police assistance was needed. Officers were dispatched with the belief that the situation constituted an emergency because the dispatched officer subjectively believed the use of code amounted to "something important" requiring him to enter without a warrant under the "emergency aid" exception. The trial court denied defendant's motion. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that the warrantless entry of defendant's residence was not authorized as emergency aid, and thus violated Defendant’s rights under the Oregon Constitution. Upon review of the briefs submitted by the parties and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, finding that from the facts and circumstances of this case, a reasonable inference could have been drawn that emergency aid was needed. The Court affirmed the circuit court’s decision. View "Oregon v. Baker" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a uniform criminal jury instruction on aiding and abetting correctly stated Oregon law. The charges in this case arose after Defendant Petronilo Lopez-Minjarez and his father drove Defendant’s truck to the home of a man who was having an extra-marital affair with Defendant’s mother. Police arrested Defendant after a neighbor reported seeing the victim abducted and gave police the license plate number of the truck in which he was taken. The State indicted Defendant on multiple charges. In instructing the jury, the trial court identified the elements of each of the substantive crimes with which Defendant was charged by using the pertinent uniform criminal jury instructions at issue in this case. The Supreme Court’s review found that the uniform instructions’ statement of the law was incorrect, and that the trial court gave those instructions in error. The Court concluded that the error prejudiced Defendant on his convictions for assault, felony murder, and aggravated murder, and accordingly the Court reversed those convictions. View "Oregon v. Lopez-Minjarez" on Justia Law

Police obtained a warrant to search a house for stolen property. When they arrived at the house to execute the warrant, they encountered Defendant Bonnie Lou Walker. They placed her in handcuffs, read her Miranda rights, and took her outside while they searched the house. When they discovered what appeared to be Defendant's purse in the house, they asked for permission to search it. Defendant agreed and police found methamphetamine inside. Based on that evidence, Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine. Defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence of the drugs. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that the warrant and subsequent consent authorized the search. Upon review of the trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that Defendant failed to prove the warranted search was unlawful and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Oregon v. Walker" on Justia Law