Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendants Jose Guadalupe Cazares-Mendez and Jorge Reyes-Sanchez were convicted of aggravated murder in the death of Jessie Valero. During their separate trials, the court refused to allow them to present hearsay evidence from four different witnesses that another person, Tiffany Scherer, had stated that she had committed the murder. The appellate court held that the trial court erred in excluding the hearsay testimony. The trial court found that there was a credibility question of the witnesses' testimony. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that its case law confirmed "a relating witness's credibility is not part of the court's determination of whether a hearsay statement is trustworthy." Rather, a trial court should focus on whether the declarant's statements are sufficiently corroborated. The Court concluded that the statements in both Defendants' cases met the requirements for admission as "statements against penal interest," and as such, should have been admitted at trial. The Court affirmed the appellate court's decision and remanded both cases for new trials. View "Oregon v. Cazares-Mendez" on Justia Law

In this case, the police informed Defendant John Davis that he was the subject of an investigation for sexual abuse. Defendant retained counsel, who sent a letter to the police invoking his right to remain silent and directing the police to discuss the matter with counsel. Months later, the police obtained incriminating statements from defendant without the presence of his counsel by monitoring his communications with the victim. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the police, in obtaining those incriminating statements from defendant, violated his right against self-incrimination and right to counsel under the Oregon Constitution. The trial court concluded that, in light of defendant's earlier invocation of his right to remain silent and right to counsel, the police obtained the incriminating statements in violation of both constitutional provisions. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court concluded that the right against self-incrimination under Article I, Section 12, bars police questioning only when a defendant is in custody or otherwise in compelling circumstances. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the right to counsel under Article I, Section 11, bars police questions outside the presence of counsel only once "criminal proceedings" have begun, which, at the earliest, is the time of a suspect's arrest. Therefore the Court reversed the lower court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Davis" on Justia Law

Trial courts may impose enhanced sentences in criminal cases when an aggravating factor provides a substantial and compelling reason for doing so. The state sentencing guidelines list some aggravating factors that trial courts may consider. Trial courts, however, also may rely on aggravating factors that are not listed (non-enumerated aggravating factors) to impose an enhanced sentence. Defendant Roy Speedis argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that to the extent the sentencing guidelines permit the use of non-enumerated aggravating factors, they either violate the separation of powers provision of the Oregon Constitution or are vague in violation of the Oregon and the United States Constitutions. The trial court disagreed and imposed an enhanced sentence based on non-enumerated aggravating factors. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment without opinion. Upon careful consideration of Defendant's constitutional arguments, the case law and the legislative history of the applicable legal standards, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions. View "Oregon v. Speedis" on Justia Law

Defendant Ivey Barrett was convicted of misdemeanor stalking. The victim in this case is Appellant Linda Barrett, Defendant's estranged wife. Oregon law granted certain crime victims a "meaningful role" with respect to the criminal prosecution of the accused. At the onset of such proceedings, the prosecutor must inform the trial court, among other things, whether the victim is present, and if not, whether the victim requested advance notice of any critical stage of the proceeding. State law allows victims whose rights are violated to inform the trial court and propose a remedy. Mrs. Barrett invoked her right to be notified, and completed a form memorializing that request. A victim advocate told Mrs. Barrett that she did not need to be present for a pretrial appearance by Defendant. That appearance was not scheduled to involve entry of a plea or sentencing. However, the prosecutor negotiated a plea with Defendant prior to that hearing, and Defendant pled before the court. Mrs. Barrett filed a claim for violation of her rights as a crime victim because she was not notified of that hearing. The trial court agreed that Mrs. Barrett's rights had been violated, but held that state law provided no relief for the violation. On appeal, Mrs. Barrett argued to the Supreme Court that state law permitted her to "propose" her relief. She argued that the trial court erred by not vacating its sentencing decision so that she could be present. The Supreme Court found that Mrs. Barrett was entitled to a remedy, and that vacating Defendant's sentence and conducting a resentencing hearing was permissible under state law. The Court vacated Defendant's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing.

Two women brandishing swords robbed the Purple Parrot Lounge in Klamath Falls. As a result of that crime, a grand jury charged Defendant Roberta Gilmore with conspiracy and first-degree robbery. The trial court arraigned Defendant on those charges and appointed counsel to represent her. After her arraignment, Defendant remained in custody pending trial. Approximately two months later, Defendant sent two notes to the Oregon State Police, asking a detective to "come talk to her." Though the notes did not specify what Defendant wanted to talk about, the police noted that Defendant "wanted to see her kids before she went to prison." The Supreme Court characterized this case as one involving questions on what steps police must take to ensure a knowing and intentional waiver of a defendant's constitutional rights. The trial court implicitly found that Defendant had waived her right to counsel and denied her motion to suppress the statements made after she passed those two notes to the police. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. The Supreme Court found that the police officer did not advise Defendant of her Miranda rights when he spoke to Defendant at her request. Therefore, the statements to the officer should have been suppressed. The Court reversed the appellate and trial courts' decisions, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Defendant Bobby Guggenmos appealed the Court of Appealsâ decision that affirmed his conviction for possession of a controlled substance. Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress drug-related evidence seized by the police from his bedroom. Officers, without a warrant, searched Defendantâs bedroom in a house they believed to be involved in drug trafficking. An informant had stated that persons in the house hid known criminals there. The state charged Defendant with possession based on the evidence found after the officersâ search of the house. Defendant claimed that the officerâs âprotective sweepâ of his home violated his Fourth Amendment rights. After an exhaustive review of the record, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate courtâs decision, finding that the officers did not have probable cause to search Defendantâs home. The Court remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings.