Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant John Shedrick walked into a bar and sat at a video poker machine near the ATM the bar maintained for customers. The bar’s owner was about to refill the ATM and placed a bundle of currency on top of it. Within two or three seconds, while the owner turned around to greet a patron who had entered the bar, defendant took the bundle of money, placed it in his jacket pocket, and walked toward the door. A bar patron saw defendant take the bundle and stopped him before he could leave. Defendant was ultimately convicted of first-degree theft. As defined in ORS 164.055(1)(a), the offense requires the State to prove, among other things, that the “total value of the property” stolen in the transaction “is $1,000 or more.” The issue on review was whether proof of a culpable mental state concerning the “value of the property” element was required. The trial court and the Court of Appeals agreed with the state that none was required; Defendant argued the jury should have been instructed that the state had to prove his culpable mental state—at least criminal negligence—concerning the value of the money taken. The Oregon Supreme Court held that in order to prove first-degree theft, the state must prove the defendant’s culpable mental state with respect to the value of the property stolen and that the trial court erred in failing to give the requested instructions. However, the Court concluded the error was harmless and, therefore, affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision and the trial court’s judgment of conviction. View "Oregon v. Shedrick" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review stemmed from the dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief filed by a petitioner who was a fugitive from justice while his criminal case was pending in the trial court. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition on the basis that petitioner’s flight from justice, which ultimately delayed his sentencing by 10 years, would impair the State’s ability to present witness testimony in any retrial that the post-conviction court might order. Specifically, the Supreme Court was asked whether the common-law “fugitive dismissal rule” should have been extended to post-conviction cases filed by former fugitives. The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded: "even if a petitioner’s former fugitive status might sometimes justify a post-conviction court refusing to carry out the statutorily prescribed post-conviction relief process, we conclude that the court’s concerns in this case—about delay-based prejudice to the state in any retrial—did not justify dismissal of petitioner’s claim for post-conviction relief." View "Sills v. Oregon" on Justia Law

In September 2017, Klamath County Animal Control impounded 22 dogs, three horses, and seven chickens from Petitioner Kenneth Hershey’s property. The state subsequently charged Hershey with three counts of second-degree animal neglect, one count for each type of animal. under ORS 167.347. As relevant here, that statute provides that, when an animal is being held by an animal care agency pending the outcome of a criminal action for mistreatment of the animal, a district attorney, acting on behalf of the animal care agency, may file a petition in the criminal action asking the circuit court to order the forfeiture of the animal unless the defendant in the criminal action (or another person with a claim to the animal) pays a security deposit or bond to cover the agency’s costs of caring for the animal. The question presented for the Oregon Supreme Court by this case was whether, under Article I, section 17, of the Oregon Constitution, a party has a right to a jury trial in a proceeding brought under ORS 167.347. The circuit court ruled that a party did not have such a right. The Court of Appeals affirmed, in a divided opinion. The Supreme Court concurred with the lower court decisions and affirmed. View "Oregon v. Hershey" on Justia Law

Defendant Zachary Carlisle challenged his conviction for misdemeanor third-degree sexual abuse, which required the state to prove that he “subject[ed] another person to sexual contact” and that “[t]he victim d[id] not consent to the sexual contact.” The question this case raised for the Oregon Supreme Court's review was which culpable mental state applied to the “victim does not consent” element of the offense. The trial court instructed the jury that the State needed to prove that defendant “knowingly” subjected the victim to sexual contact and that defendant was “criminally negligent” with respect to the fact that the victim did not consent to the sexual contact. According to defendant, the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that both elements required proof of a “knowing” mental state. The Supreme Court concluded, however, that the legislature did not intend that a conviction under ORS 163.415 would require proof that the defendant knew that the victim did not consent to the sexual contact. Accordingly, the trial court did not err, and defendant's convictions were affirmed. View "Oregon v. Carlisle" on Justia Law

Relator Randy Gray was the defendant charged in 2021 by a district attorney’s information with (among other things) the felony of assaulting a public safety officer. Shortly after the information was filed, relator’s defense counsel notified the district attorney that relator intended to appear as a witness before the expected grand jury proceeding. In addition to giving notice that relator would exercise his statutory right to appear, relator’s counsel later emailed the district attorney, expressing relator’s desire to have his counsel present in the grand jury room and asserting that he had a right to the presence of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The district attorney did not agree to counsel being in the grand jury room. A trial court denied relator’s motion, ruling that relator’s exercise of his statutory right to appear before the grand jury did not entitle him to have his counsel present in the room with him, but that counsel could wait outside and be available for consultation. Relator then filed this proceeding, seeking a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to grant his motion. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded on the facts presented here, Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution entitled relator to have his counsel present in the grand jury room during his testimony. View "Oregon v. Gray" on Justia Law

After receiving a report that defendant John Benson sexually assaulted B, police launched an investigation that was subsequently halted. Seven and a half years later, after the case was rediscovered during an “open case” search, a grand jury indicted defendant for first-degree rape, second-degree sexual abuse, and attempted first-degree sexual abuse. Prior to a bench trial, defendant moved to dismiss on grounds of preindictment delay. The trial court denied that motion, and defendant was found guilty on all charges. On appeal to the Oregon Supreme Court, defendant argued his due process rights were violated as a result of the preindictment delay. The Supreme Court rejected defendant’s claim of error and, accordingly, affirmed his convictions. View "Oregon v. Benson" on Justia Law

Defendant Lamar Stanton was charged with three counts of first-degree sexual abuse and two counts of first-degree sodomy. Because defendant was indigent, the trial court appointed counsel to represent him. Over the course of the trial court proceedings, defendant was represented by several different court-appointed lawyers. Defendant expressed frustration with his last-appointed counsel, Lee-Mandlin, and asked her to move to withdraw. Lee-Mandlin filed two motions to withdraw but told the trial court that she was prepared to represent defendant. The court denied the motions, and, after defendant was evaluated at the state hospital and the trial court determined that he was able to aid and assist in his defense, and the case proceeded to a bench trial. The trial court entered a judgment of conviction and sentence, and defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court had erred by proceeding as if defendant had waived his right to court-appointed counsel. The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. The Oregon Supreme Court found three motions had been presented with respect to defendant’s representation, and that the trial court should have addressed the three motions separately because they presented different legal questions. Because the trial court did not expressly address these questions, the Supreme Court surmised the trial court could not have concluded defendant expressly waived his right to court-appointed counsel. Consequently, in the context of the multiple pending motions, the trial court’s question to defendant about whether he wanted Lee-Mandlin to withdraw was too ambiguous for defendant’s answer to constitute an intentional relinquishment of his right to court-appointed counsel. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Stanton" on Justia Law

Defendant Jonathan Rusen challenged the trial court’s imposition of consecutive terms of incarceration upon revoking defendant’s probation. Defendant was serving the sentence of probation pursuant to a plea agreement and had stipulated that, if the court revoked his probation, the court could impose consecutive terms of incarceration as sanctions. Defendant had reserved the right, however, to argue that any probation revocation sanctions should be run concurrently. The Court of Appeals concluded that defendant’s challenge to the revocation sanction was reviewable and, on the merits, that the trial court lacked authority in this case to impose consecutive terms of incarceration following revocation of defendant’s probation. After review, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the legislature did not intend ORS 138.105(9) to bar review of challenges to “part of a sentence” when the parties reserved the right to make competing arguments regarding what the court should decide with respect to that part of the sentence. Accordingly, defendant’s challenge to the court’s decision to impose consecutive terms of incarceration was reviewable. On the merits, the Supreme Court concluded that ORS 137.123(2) applied to initial sentencing and, therefore, was compatible with OAR 213-012-0040(2)(a), which applied when a court revokes probation. View "Oregon v. Rusen" on Justia Law

This case involved the State’s direct and interlocutory appeal of an omnibus pretrial order granting numerous defense motions to suppress evidence that the State obtained through wiretaps and search warrants. Defendant Langston Harris was charged with first-degree and second-degree murder, first-degree robbery, promoting prostitution, and other crimes. The murder charges arose from the death of RBH, who was shot outside of his apartment building in the early morning hours of September 20, 2017. The trial court ruled: (1) the wiretaps violated federal law because the applications did not indicate that the elected district attorney personally was even aware of the applications, and (2) roughly two dozen search warrants for cell phone data and social media accounts were invalid for multiple reasons, including that the warrants were overbroad and that, after excising from later warrant applications all information derived from the invalid earlier warrant(s), the State lacked probable cause to support the later warrants. After careful consideration of the trial court record, the Oregon Supreme Court concurred and affirmed those rulings of the trial court. View "Oregon v. Harris" on Justia Law

During a single criminal episode, defendant Scott Kyger cut the necks of two people with a razor blade. For that conduct, the State charged him with, and he was convicted on two counts of attempted aggravated murder under ORS 163.095 (2015) and ORS 161.405 (2015). The question presented for the Oregon Supreme Court in this this case was whether the State charged a viable theory of attempted aggravated murder. Defendant contended that the existence of “more than one murder victim” was a circumstance that had to exist for a person to be guilty of aggravated murder; that it did not exist here because neither victim died; and that defendant’s intentional conduct did not amount to attempted aggravated murder because a person cannot “attempt” to commit a circumstance element of an offense. In defendant’s view, the allegations supported, at most, charges for attempted murder. The trial court and the Court of Appeals disagreed with defendant. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Oregon v. Kyger" on Justia Law