Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant David Bartol was sentenced to death for aggravated murder; review by the Oregon Supreme Court was direct and automatic. Defendant made numerous challenges to both his conviction and sentence. The Court rejected all but one challenge to his sentence, based on Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution, which prohibited disproportionate punishments. After defendant was convicted and sentenced, the legislature enacted Senate Bill 1013 (2019), which, among other things, reclassified the criminal conduct that had constituted “aggravated murder,” which could be punished by death, to “murder in the first degree,” which could not be punished by death. Given that determination, the Supreme Court concluded that, although the legislature did not make SB 1013 retroactive as to sentences imposed before its effective date, maintaining defendant’s death sentence would violate Article I, section 16. Therefore, the Court affirmed defendant’s conviction but reversed his death sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. View "Oregon v. Bartol" on Justia Law

After defendant Randall Kragt pled guilty to three counts of first-degree sodomy (Counts 1, 3, and 5), the trial court sentenced him: for Count 1, 60 months in prison; for Count 3, 100 months in prison, concurrent with Count 1; and, for Count 5, 100 months in prison, consecutive to Count 3. For all three counts, the court initially imposed a single post-prison supervision (PPS) term of 240 months, minus the time defendant served in prison. As a result, defendant was effectively sentenced to 200 months in prison and, assuming he served the full term, 40 additional months of PPS. After defendant was released from prison, the trial court amended the part of the judgment of conviction that had imposed a single PPS term. Defendant appealed, arguing the trial court had erred by amending the judgment without notice and a hearing. The Court of Appeals agreed with that argument and reversed. On remand, defendant argued that ORS 144.103(1) required the trial court to impose a single PPS term for all three counts, as the court had done initially, before amending the judgment. The trial court disagreed and entered a judgment that imposed three PPS terms: 180 months for Count 1, 140 months for Count 3, and 140 months for Count 5. Defendant appealed again, arguing that ORS 144.103(1) required a single term of PPS regardless of the number of counts. In a per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals rejected that argument, relying on its decisions in Norris v. Board of Parole, 238 P3d 994 (2010), rev den, 350 Or 130 (2011), and Delavega v. Board of Parole, 194 P3d 159 (2008). Defendant petitioned for review by the Oregon Supreme Court, which was allowed. The question presented was whether, when sentencing a person convicted of multiple qualifying sex offenses, ORS 144.103(1) requires a trial court to impose a separate term of PPS for each count or whether that statute, instead, requires the trial court to impose a single term of PPS that covers all counts. The Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court. As did the Court of Appeals, the circuit court's judgment was vacated based on a different sentencing issue than the one presented on review, and the matter remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with the Court of Appeals decision in Kragt II (467 P3d 830 (2020)). View "Oregon v. Kragt" on Justia Law

In the Oregon Supreme Court's first decision in this case (393 P3d 224 (2017) (Hightower I)), it determined the trial court had erred when it denied defendant’s midtrial request to dismiss counsel and represent himself based on a mistaken belief that it did not have the authority to grant such a request. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for “further proceedings.” On remand, the trial court did not order a new trial. The court instead stood by its prior denial of defendant’s midtrial request to self-represent because it stated that it would have reached the same conclusion - based on defendant’s trial disruptions - had it understood it had the discretion to do that. On appeal, defendant argued that the Supreme Court's decision to reverse and remand the initial case for “further proceedings,” without issuing specific limiting instructions, did not permit the trial court to simply provide an alternative explanation for its denial of the request for self-representation, without affording defendant a new trial. The Court of Appeals agreed that defendant was entitled to a new trial on remand and reversed. The State petitioned for review of that decision, and the Supreme Court allowed the petition. Because it agree with the Court of Appeals that defendant was entitled to a new trial on remand, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Oregon v. Hightower" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ronald Strasser, whose direct appeal of his conviction, was dismissed by the Court of Appeals as untimely filed, argued in a subsequent post-conviction proceeding that appellate counsel was constitutionally inadequate in failing to request leave to file a late notice of appeal within the applicable 90-day window (although counsel had only been appointed four days before that window closed). Thus petitioner contended he was entitled to a delayed direct appeal. Alternatively, petitioner argued that, insofar as the Court of Appeals had not acted on his request for appointment of appellate counsel until four days before the 90-day deadline for filing a request for late appeal, it had effectively failed to appoint appellate counsel and, therefore, the ordinary bar on bringing claims in a post-conviction proceeding that could have been raised on direct appeal was inapplicable. The post-conviction court rejected both arguments and denied post-conviction relief, and the Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. On review, the Oregon Supreme Court agreed with the post-conviction court’s determination that appellate counsel was not constitutionally inadequate or ineffective in failing to meet the 90-day deadline in these circumstances. The Supreme Court concluded, however, that the post-conviction court’s determination that petitioner was barred from raising what could have been direct appeal claims in post-conviction was based on an incorrect assumption about the applicable statute, and that it erred in declining to consider those claims. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded to the post-conviction court to consider and decide defendant’s claims of constitutional error by the trial court, without regard to the fact that they could have been raised in an appeal. View "Strasser v. Oregon" on Justia Law

The primary question this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court’s review was whether a defective waiver of a preliminary hearing deprived a circuit court of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals accordingly considered defendant’s unpreserved challenge to his waiver, found the waiver defective, and reversed his conviction. The Supreme Court allowed the state’s petition for review to consider whether a defective waiver of a preliminary hearing was a jurisdictional defect. The Court held that Huffman v. Alexander, 251 P2d 87 (1952) stood for a more limited proposition than defendant perceived, and that the state constitutional provision on which he relied did not establish that a defective waiver of a preliminary hearing deprived a circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court accordingly reversed the Court of Appeals decision and remanded this case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Keys" on Justia Law

Petitioner Michael Evans raised a claim for inadequate assistance of counsel based on the performance of his appellate counsel, who had represented him in his direct appeal of multiple sexual-assault convictions. The post-conviction court denied that claim, concluding both that counsel had not acted unreasonably and that no evidence showed that petitioner had suffered any prejudice. Petitioner appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, but on different grounds than those at issue before the post-conviction court or raised by the parties in their briefing on appeal. The Oregon Supreme Court found the Court of Appeals, in effect, affirmed the post-conviction court’s judgment by invoking the “right for the wrong reason” principle. In Outdoor Media Dimensions Inc. v. Oregon, 20 P3d 180 (2001), the Supreme Court explained that an appellate court may affirm a lower court based on that principle, but only if certain conditions are met. One condition was that, if the question was not purely one of law, then the record had to “materially be the same one that would have been developed had the prevailing party raised the alternative basis for affirmance below.” Perhaps even more significantly for the Supreme Court: neither party had any opportunity to develop an argument regarding the appropriateness of the evidentiary burden that the Court of Appeals described. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals decision and remanded to that court, to resolve the issue framed by the parties. View "Evans v. Nooth" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court’s review centered on whether the trial court erred by ruling that defendant Damon Naudain, a Black man, could not pursue a line of questioning on cross-examination that was intended to show that the witness was racially biased against Black people. Defendant sought to ask about the witness’s relationship with the victim, who was the witness’s fiancée at the time and with whom the witness had a child and shared a home. Specifically, defendant wanted to ask questions that touched on the victim’s racial prejudices and refusal to allow Black people in the home that the couple shared. The trial court granted the state’s motion in limine to prevent such questioning, ruling that information about the victim’s racial bias was not probative of the witness’s own bias and, to the extent it had any relevance, it was unfairly prejudicial and inadmissible under OEC 403. Defendant was convicted and appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court erred in its ruling on the evidentiary issue because defendant’s proffered evidence of bias was relevant and not unfairly prejudicial. Concurring with the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court, and remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Naudain" on Justia Law

In 2019, the state charged defendant Michael Wolfe with aggravated murder as that crime was then defined. Later in 2019, the legislature passed Senate Bill (SB) 1013, narrowing the definition of aggravated murder, and amending the statute governing death penalty sentences. The State filed an amended indictment charging defendant with aggravated murder as redefined by SB 1013. Defendant sought dismissal of the aggravated murder charge based on the ex post facto clauses of the Oregon and United States Constitutions. The trial court granted defendant’s motion, and the State filed a direct, interlocutory appeal to the Oregon Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred; reversed the order of dismissal and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Wolfe" on Justia Law

Defendant Talon Ramoz was charged with two counts of first-degree rape and two counts of first-degree unlawful sexual penetration. When it came time to instruct the jury on those charges, defendant and the state both requested instructions that they expected would correspond to those set out in the Uniform Criminal Jury Instructions. The final jury instructions did not, however, correspond with those instructions; instead, the instructions omitted, in the list of elements the state was required to prove, the mens rea elements — that defendant had acted knowingly. Defendant was found guilty on all counts but moved for a new trial under ORCP 64 B(1), alleging that the omission in the instructions was an “[i]rregularity in the proceedings of the court” that prevented him from having a fair trial. The trial court granted defendant’s motion, and the state appealed. In a divided, en banc decision, the Court of Appeals reversed. Finding no reversible error, the Oregon Supreme Court concurred and affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Oregon v. Ramoz" on Justia Law

Defendant Justin Link committed aggravated murder as a juvenile in 2001. He was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment, which, as defined by statute at the relevant time, required him to serve “a minimum of 30 years without possibility of parole.” After serving that minimum term of confinement, defendant could petition to convert his sentence to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. In this case, defendant argued the statute under which he was sentenced violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court of Appeals agreed. The Oregon Supreme Court allowed the state’s petition for review, and reversed, finding defendant did not establish that the statutory scheme applicable here denied him a meaningful opportunity for release. "Therefore, the sentence that defendant received is not the functional equivalent of life without parole. It follows that defendant has failed to establish that Miller’s individualized-sentencing requirement applies to a sentence of 'life imprisonment' under ORS 163.105(1)(c) (2001)." The circuit court's order was affirmed. View "Oregon v. Link" on Justia Law