Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT) established terms for "community benefit contracts" for certain highway improvement projects, which included provisions for contractor training, use of apprentices, and employer-paid family health insurance. ODOT negotiated and signed a "Community Workforce Agreement" (CWA) with various trades councils and labor unions to include these terms in its contracts.The Oregon-Columbia Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America (AGC) challenged the validity of the CWA in the Court of Appeals, arguing that it constituted a "rule" under Oregon's Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and that ODOT was required to follow the APA's notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures before adopting it. ODOT acknowledged it did not follow these procedures but contended that the CWA was not a "rule." The Court of Appeals certified the case to the Oregon Supreme Court.The Oregon Supreme Court held that the CWA is a "rule" under the APA because it is a statement of general applicability that prescribes ODOT's policies for its community benefit program. The court noted that the CWA applies to all current and future ODOT community benefit projects, making it generally applicable. The court concluded that ODOT was required to follow the APA's notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures before adopting the CWA. As ODOT did not comply with these procedures, the court declared the CWA invalid as an invalidly promulgated rule. View "Oregon-Columbia Chapter Associated General Contractors of America v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

The case involves a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by the Oregon State Building and Construction Trades Council (OBTC) against a preliminary injunction issued by the Marion County Circuit Court. The injunction was part of a public contracting dispute between the Oregon-Columbia Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America (AGC) and the Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT). AGC challenged the process used by ODOT to set the terms of "community benefit contracts" for certain highway improvement projects under ORS 279C.308.The Marion County Circuit Court issued a preliminary injunction preventing ODOT from using the terms of a Community Workforce Agreement (CWA) in any projects while AGC's challenge to the validity of the CWA under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) was pending before the Oregon Court of Appeals. AGC had filed three cases: one in the circuit court and two petitions for judicial review in the Court of Appeals. The circuit court case sought declaratory relief and an injunction against ODOT's use of the CWA. The Court of Appeals certified the case challenging the CWA's validity to the Oregon Supreme Court, which accepted the certification.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and decided the challenge to the validity of the CWA in a related case, Oregon-Columbia Chapter of AGC v. ODOT. As a result, the preliminary injunction issued by the circuit court expired, rendering OBTC's request for mandamus relief moot. Consequently, the Oregon Supreme Court dismissed the petition for a writ of mandamus. View "Oregon-Columbia Chapter Associated General Contractors of America v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged an amendment to the energy facility site certificate for constructing a high-voltage electrical transmission line from Boardman, Oregon, to Hemingway, Idaho. The Energy Facility Siting Council (EFSC) had previously approved the original site certificate, which was affirmed by the court in Stop B2H Coalition v. Dept. of Energy. EFSC later approved Idaho Power’s request to amend the site certificate, expanding the site boundary and making other changes. Petitioners contested the process EFSC followed and the substance of the amendment, arguing they were entitled to a contested case proceeding and that the amendment did not comply with legal protections for watersheds and wildlife habitats.The lower court, EFSC, denied petitioners’ requests for contested case proceedings and approved the amendment. Petitioners then sought judicial review, contending that the circuit court had jurisdiction over their process challenge and that EFSC’s decisions were substantively flawed.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case and held that it had jurisdiction to address the process challenge. The court found that EFSC did not err in denying the contested case proceedings, as the issues raised by petitioners were either untimely or did not present significant issues of fact or law. The court also rejected the substantive challenges, concluding that the bond requirements were adequately addressed in the original site certificate and that the expanded site boundary did not permit construction outside the micrositing corridors without further review.The Supreme Court affirmed EFSC’s final order approving the amended site certificate, holding that EFSC’s decisions were legally sound and supported by substantial evidence. View "Gilbert v. Dept. of Energy" on Justia Law

The petitioner pleaded guilty to three counts of first-degree sodomy and was sentenced to 60 months in prison for Count 1, 100 months for Count 3, and 100 months for Count 5, with the sentences for Counts 3 and 5 to be served consecutively. The trial court also imposed terms of post-prison supervision (PPS) for each count, calculated as 240 months minus the term of imprisonment served for each count. The petitioner completed his prison terms and was released in April 2016.The Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision calculated the PPS terms by subtracting the time served for each count from the 240-month maximum, resulting in 180 months for Count 1 and 140 months for Counts 3 and 5. The petitioner argued that the "term of imprisonment served" should be the total time served for all counts, which would result in a shorter PPS term. The board rejected this argument, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the board's decision.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the "term of imprisonment served" in ORS 144.103 refers to the time spent in prison for the specific count of conviction, not the total time served for all counts. The court also concluded that the PPS term begins when the offender is released into the community, not while still incarcerated on other counts. Therefore, the court affirmed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision. View "Kragt v. Board of Parole" on Justia Law

The case involves a criminal defendant charged with domestic violence offenses who served a pretrial subpoena on Clackamas Women’s Services (CWS) to obtain records related to services provided to the alleged victim (AV). CWS moved to quash the subpoena, arguing that the records were protected under Oregon Evidence Code (OEC) 507-1 and ORS 147.600, which protect confidential communications and records created or maintained in the course of providing services to victims of domestic violence. The defendant sought the records to challenge AV’s credibility, claiming she fabricated her claims to obtain financial assistance.The Clackamas County Circuit Court quashed the subpoena in part but ordered CWS to produce records disclosing the cell phone information and financial assistance provided to AV. CWS sought mandamus relief from the Oregon Supreme Court, arguing that the records were protected under the statute and rule, and disclosure without AV’s consent was prohibited.The Oregon Supreme Court agreed with CWS, holding that the records ordered for production by the trial court were protected under OEC 507-1 and ORS 147.600. The court concluded that the statute and rule broadly protect all records created or maintained by CWS in the course of providing services to victims of domestic violence, including those that do not contain confidential communications. The court also determined that the trial court had no authority to require CWS to create a new document disclosing the information contained in the protected records. Consequently, the court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its orders. View "State v. Sacco" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the ballot title for Legislative Referral 403 (2024) (LR 403), which was referred for voters' consideration at the upcoming November 2024 General Election. The petitioner, James Sasinowski, challenged all parts of the ballot title, asserting non-compliance with requirements set out in ORS 250.035(2). LR 403 would amend ORS chapter 254 to require "ranked choice voting" for certain elections and would permit local governments to adopt ranked-choice voting in their elections.The ballot title for LR 403 was prepared by a joint legislative committee and filed with the Secretary of State. The petitioner challenged all parts of the ballot title, arguing that the word "majority" was used inaccurately and without proper context. He contended that "majority of votes" suggests that a candidate has received the majority of total votes cast, but in operation, ranked-choice voting can produce a winner who does not receive that type of "majority" vote.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon agreed with the petitioner in part. The court found that the caption of the ballot title for LR 403 did not reasonably identify the subject matter of the measure and required modification. The court also agreed that the "yes" result statement in the ballot title for LR 403 did not substantially comply with ORS 250.035(2)(b) and required modification. However, the court disagreed with the petitioner that the "no" result statement and the summary in the ballot title for LR 403 required modification. The court concluded that the caption and "yes" result statement in the joint legislative committee’s ballot title for LR 403 required modification and referred the ballot title to the Attorney General for modification. View "Sasinowski v. Legislative Assembly" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the approval of a site certificate for the construction of a wind energy facility in Umatilla County, Oregon. The Energy Facility Siting Council granted the certificate to Nolin Hills Wind, LLC, despite the proposed facility not complying with a local siting criterion requiring a two-mile setback between any turbine and a rural residence. Umatilla County sought judicial review of the council's decision, arguing that the council should have required Nolin Hills to comply with the two-mile setback rule.The case was reviewed by the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon. The court noted that the council had the authority to approve the proposed energy facility despite its failure to comply with the two-mile setback rule. The court also noted that the council had the authority to approve the proposed facility even if it did not pass through more than three land use zones and even if it did not comply with all of the county’s recommended substantive criteria.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon affirmed the council's decision, concluding that the council was authorized to issue a site certificate for the proposed wind facility notwithstanding the failure of the proposed facility to comply with the two-mile setback rule. The court found that the council was not required to reject a proposed facility simply because it did not comply with a local criterion. The court also rejected the county's argument that the council erred in concluding that the proposed facility "does otherwise comply with the applicable statewide planning goals." View "Umatilla County v. Dept. of Energy" on Justia Law

In 2022, Oregon voters approved Ballot Measure 113, amending the state constitution to disqualify any state legislator who accumulates 10 or more unexcused absences during a legislative session from holding office "for the term following the election after the member’s current term is completed." The Secretary of State interpreted this to mean that the disqualification applies to a legislator’s immediate next term. However, a group of legislators challenged this interpretation, arguing that the disqualification should apply one term later.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon held that the measure's disqualification applies to the legislator’s immediate next term of office. The Court found that the text of the amendment was capable of supporting the Secretary's interpretation. This interpretation was also supported by the ballot title and the voters’ pamphlet, which repeatedly described the disqualification as occurring immediately following the legislator’s current term. The Court concluded that voters would have understood the amendment in light of these materials. Therefore, the Court upheld the Secretary's rules implementing the amendment. View "Knopp v. Griffin-Valade" on Justia Law

The case involves the defendant, Jason Thomas Wilcox, who was taken into police custody for public intoxication under ORS 430.399, a noncriminal statute. During this process, the police seized and inventoried his backpack, discovering a butterfly knife. As Wilcox had a prior felony conviction, he was charged and convicted for being a felon in possession of a restricted weapon under ORS 166.270(2). Wilcox appealed, arguing that the seizure of his backpack was unlawful under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. The Court of Appeals agreed, finding that the seizure was unlawful, and based its decision on a previous case, State v. Edwards.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals had erred in its analysis because it treated the seizure as a criminal one rather than an administrative one. The Court pointed out that when a person or their property is seized under ORS 430.399, the seizure is administrative, not criminal, and such seizures must comply with a different set of constitutional standards. The Court also clarified that the state’s interference with a person’s possessory or ownership interests constitutes a seizure, regardless of whether the person objects to the interference.The Supreme Court held that the seizure of the backpack was indeed a seizure. However, it did not decide whether the seizure was lawful, instead remanding the case to the Court of Appeals to determine whether ORS 430.399, or some other source of authority, authorized the seizure of defendant’s backpack and if so, whether that seizure was effectuated in accordance with the requirements of State v. Atkinson, which set the framework for assessing the constitutionality of an administrative search or seizure. View "State v. Wilcox" on Justia Law

In the case of PNW Metal Recycling, Inc., et al. v. Oregon Department of Environmental Quality, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the Department of Environmental Quality's (DEQ) internal decision to adopt a new interpretation of a statute did not constitute a "rule" under the Oregon Administrative Procedures Act (APA).The case emerged when the DEQ changed its interpretation of the "auto-dismantler exception" in the solid waste management regulations. Previously, facilities dismantling and recycling used vehicles were not required to obtain a permit for solid waste disposal, even if they also disposed of non-vehicle solid waste. However, in 2018, the DEQ informed the petitioners that it had revised its interpretation of the relevant statutes, and the facilities would now be required to obtain permits.The petitioners, who operate such facilities, challenged this change, arguing that the DEQ's new position constituted a "rule", meaning it should have been adopted following the APA rulemaking procedures. The Court of Appeals agreed with the petitioners and held the DEQ's decision invalid.However, the Oregon Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals and dismissed the judicial review. The court reasoned that an agency's internal decision to adopt a new statutory interpretation is not, by itself, a "rule" under the APA. Instead, a "rule" is a more formal, generally applicable agency directive, standard, regulation, or statement that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy.The court highlighted that the APA provides different avenues for agencies to announce policy, not all of which require formal rulemaking. Specifically, an agency can announce a general policy applicable to a case and future similar cases during a contested case proceeding, without going through formal rulemaking procedures. The court concluded that the DEQ's revised interpretation of the auto-dismantler exception and its stated intention to require the petitioners to obtain a permit were precursors to an enforcement action that may lead to a contested case proceeding, not a rule. The decision of the Court of Appeals was vacated, and the judicial review was dismissed. View "PNW Metal Recycling, Inc. v. DEQ" on Justia Law