Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Washington resident Stuart Etter was an aircraft dispatcher for Horizon Air Industries, Inc. who worked almost entirely in Portland. To work as a dispatcher, however, he had to spend five hours each year riding along in the cockpit for each aircraft group that he dispatched. Taxpayer argued that, pursuant to 49 USC § 40116(f), that flight time exempted him from paying Oregon income tax in the tax year 2000. The Oregon Tax Court concluded that taxpayer did not meet the requirements of the federal statute and denied his exemption. On appeal, taxpayer renewed his arguments. Finding no reversible error, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed. View "Etter v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

Petitioners were a group of miners who operated small suction dredges in Oregon waterways. They challenged the lawfulness of an order of the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) adopting a general five-year permit that regulated that type of mining. By the time the challenge reached the Court of Appeals, however, the permit had expired. The agency then moved to dismiss petitioners’ challenge on mootness grounds. The Court of Appeals agreed and dismissed. Petitioners sought review of the dismissal arguing that their case was not moot, or in the alternative, their challenge nevertheless was justiciable under ORS 14.175 because it is the sort of action that is capable of repetition and likely to evade judicial review. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the petitioners’ challenge to the now-expired permit was moot. But the Court agreed with petitioners that it was justiciable under ORS 14.175. The Court therefore reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings. View "Eastern Oregon Mining Association v. Dept. of Env. Quality" on Justia Law

The Oregon Tax Court set aside a determination by the Department of Revenue (the department) that taxpayer DIRECTV’s property in Oregon was subject to central assessment under ORS 308.505 to 308.665. The department argued that, contrary to the Tax Court’s opinion, DIRECTV was a “communications” business whose property is subject to central assessment under ORS 308.515(1). The Supreme Court agreed and, therefore, reversed and remanded. View "DIRECTV, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

Oakmont LLC owned an apartment complex built in 1996. Oakmont appealed the assessed value for the 2009-10 tax year for that complex on the ground that structural damages resulting from construction defects had substantially reduced the property’s value. In 2011, the county assessor and Oakmont agreed to reduce the assessed value of the complex from over $21 million to $8.5 million for the 2009-10 tax year. Because the time for appealing the valuation for the 2008-09 tax year had passed, the taxpayer asked the Department of Revenue to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction to correct a “likely error” in the 2008-09 assessment. The department concluded that it had no jurisdiction to consider Oakmont’s request, and the Tax Court reversed. Both the county and the department appealed. After review, the Oregon Supreme Court found the Tax Court correctly held that the department had supervisory jurisdiction over Oakmont’s petition to reduce the assessed value of the property for the 2008-09 tax year. Oakmont had no remaining statutory right of appeal, and the parties to the petition agreed to facts indicating a likely error on the tax rolls. It follows that the department had supervisory jurisdiction to consider whether there was in fact an error on the tax rolls and whether, if there was, the department should exercise its discretion to correct any error. The department did not reach those issues, and the Supreme Court agreed with the Tax Court that the case should have been remanded to the department to consider those issues in the first instance. View "Oakmont, LLC v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

The taxpayer who owned the convention center in Bend also owned a hotel across the street. The convention center and the hotel were held in different property tax accounts. For the 2008-09 tax year, Taxpayer’s appraisal valued the convention center at $4,130,000, after applying two different approaches to valuation, the cost approach and the income approach. The appraiser for the Deschutes County Assessor (assessor) and the Department of Revenue (department) appraised the convention center at $16,700,000, after applying only the cost approach to valuation. The Regular Division of the Tax Court rejected the department’s appraisal for two independent reasons: (1) Measure 50 (codified as Article XI, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution) and its enabling statutes required the property in each tax account to be valued separately; and (2) the department’s appraisal was unpersuasive because the appraiser lacked good reason for not having used the income approach. The Tax Court awarded taxpayer its attorney fees, concluding that the department’s position was not objectively reasonable and that the department should be deterred from making similar arguments in the future. The department and the assessor appealed, raising a narrow range of issues. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Tax Court’s decision to reject the department’s appraisal on the ground that it was unpersuasive. Because that independent reason supported the Tax Court’s decision, the Supreme Court affirmed its judgment, and did not reach the issue of whether Measure 50 required valuing the property in each property tax account separately. Because it was based in part on the Tax Court’s Measure 50 analysis, the Supreme Court vacated the award of attorney fees and remanded for further proceedings. View "Dept. of Rev. v. River's Edge Investments, LLC" on Justia Law

The question in this case was whether an injured worker had to provide actual notice of secondary employment in connection with a workers' compensation claims process or whether the employer’s preexisting knowledge of that employment could be imputed to the insurer to satisfy the notice requirement of ORS 656.210(2)(b)(A). The Oregon Supreme Court held that the correct interpretation of ORS 656.210(2)(b)(A) required a claimant to prove that the insurer received actual notice of the claimant’s secondary employment within 30 days of the insurer’s receipt of the initial claim. View "DCBS v. Muliro" on Justia Law

The City of Eugene sued to collect from Comcast of Oregon II, Inc. (Comcast) a license fee that the city, acting under a municipal ordinance, imposes on companies providing “telecommunications services” over the city’s rights of way. Comcast did not dispute that it used the city’s rights of way to operate a cable system. However it objected to the city’s collection effort and argued that the license fee was either a tax barred by the Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA), or a franchise fee barred by the Cable Communications and Policy Act of 1984 (Cable Act). The city read those federal laws more narrowly and disputed Comcast’s interpretation. The trial court rejected Comcast’s arguments and granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "City of Eugene v. Comcast of Oregon II, Inc." on Justia Law

The Attorney General prepared and filed a modified ballot title following remand from the Supreme Court. In its second trip to the Oregon Supreme Court, two petitioners challenged the modified title. IP 62 applies to public employees (employees) and public employee labor organizations (unions). If adopted by the voters, IP 62 would have amended several provisions of the Oregon Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act. Petitioners Neel and Forest set out two main objections to the modified caption: (1) they claimed that the phrase “limits public employee union members’ obligations” was vague and overbroad and was likely to mislead and confuse voters; (2) the phrase “employees might benefit without sharing bargaining costs" petitioners contended that, as used to describe IP 62, that phrase was “underinclusive, inaccurate, misleading, politically loaded,” and failed to reasonably identify the actual major effect of the proposed initiative measure. The Supreme Court found certain of the objections to be well taken, and referred the modified ballot title to the Attorney General for additional modification. View "Conroy v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Tyler Turner contended that defendant Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT) had contributed to a motor vehicle accident by negligently failing to correct hazardous conditions at the highway intersection where he was injured. In a summary judgment motion, ODOT claimed immunity under ORS 30.265(6)(c). ODOT’s claim of immunity rested on the theory that, because it had a policy of seeking highway safety improvement funding from the legislature only for the most crash-prone sites in the state highway system, ODOT’s omission of the crash site from its appropriation requests amounted to a budget-driven, discretionary policy decision not to make improvements at the site. Plaintiff opposed the motion with evidence that ODOT employees knew that the intersection was dangerous but had neglected to make improvements by using ODOT’s other mechanisms for evaluating and funding low-cost highway safety improvements. Although ODOT prevailed at the trial court, the Court of Appeals determined that questions of fact precluded summary judgment. ODOT argued to the Supreme Court that, when a state agency used a global process for setting priorities and allocating limited resources, discretionary-function immunity attached and the agency need not engage in further, particularized decision-making. "The record on summary judgment does not bear out that premise as a matter of undisputed fact. It follows that ODOT’s employment of the ranking process cannot resolve the issue of ODOT’s immunity under ORS 30.265(6)(c) as a matter of law. "Therefore, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for ODOT on that ground, and the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Turner v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

The question this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review was whether a statute limiting a state employee’s tort liability violated either the remedy clause of Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution or the jury trial clauses of Article I, section 17, and Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution. The trial court held that the statute, as applied to the state employee, violated each of those provisions and entered a limited judgment against the employee for the full amount of the jury’s verdict. Plaintiff’s six-month-old son developed a cancerous mass on his liver. Two doctors at Oregon Health & Science University (OHSU) participated in an operation to remove the mass: Dr. Harrison, a specialist in pediatric surgery, and Dr. Durant, a pediatric surgical fellow in training. During the operation, the doctors inadvertently transected blood vessels going to the child’s liver, resulting in the child having to undergo a liver transplant, removal of his spleen, additional surgeries, and lifetime monitoring due to the risks resulting from the doctors’ act. Plaintiff brought this action on her son’s behalf against Harrison, Durant, OHSU, and Pediatric Surgical Associates, P.C. The trial court granted Pediatric Surgical Associates’ motion for summary judgment, and dismissed Durant as a result of an agreement among plaintiff, OHSU, and Harrison. Pursuant to that agreement, Harrison and OHSU admitted liability for the child’s injuries and plaintiff’s case against Harrison and OHSU went to the jury to determine the amount of the child’s damages. The jury found that plaintiff’s son had sustained and will sustain economic damages of $6,071,190.38 and noneconomic damages of $6,000,000. After the jury returned its verdict, OHSU and Harrison filed a motion to reduce the jury’s verdict to $3,000,000 based on the Oregon Tort Claims Act. The trial court granted the motion as to OHSU. The trial court, however, denied the motion as to Harrison. Harrison appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding that applying the Tort Claims Act limit to plaintiff’s claim against defendant did not violate the remedy clause in Article I, section 10, nor does giving effect to that limit violate the jury trial clauses in Article I, section 17, or Article VII (Amended), section 3. View "Horton v. OHSU" on Justia Law