Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Rockwood Water People’s Utility District (Rockwood PUD), Northwest Natural Gas Company (NW Natural) and Portland General Electric Company (PGE) sought review of a Court of Appeals decision to uphold the validity of municipal enactments by respondent City of Gresham (the city) that increased the licensing fee that each utility was required to pay from five percent to seven percent of the utility’s gross revenues earned within the City. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the enactments were void and unenforceable because they conflicted with the provisions of ORS 221.450. Alternatively, Rockwood PUD argued that it could not be taxed more than five percent by a city without explicit statutory authority. Trial court agreed with plaintiffs that the enactments violated ORS 221.450, and did not reach Rockwood PUD’s alternative argument. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the fee increase was not preempted by ORS 221.450 because the utilities were not operating “without a franchise” and that a city’s home-rule authority to impose taxes or fees on a utility is not affected by a utility’s municipal corporation status. The Supreme Court held that the license fee imposed by the City was a “privilege tax” and that the affected utilities were operating “without a franchise” within the meaning of ORS 221.450. The Court also held that the City was not preempted by ORS 221.450 from imposing the seven percent privilege tax on NW Natural and PGE, but that the City did not have express statutory authority to impose a tax in excess of five percent on Rockwood PUD under ORS 221.450. View "Northwest Natural Gas Co. v. City of Gresham" on Justia Law

In consolidated juvenile dependency cases, father appealed judgments changing the permanent plans for one of his children from reunification with a parent to guardianship and for another child from reunification to another planned permanent living arrangement. Father argued that his trial counsel was inadequate for failing to appear on his behalf at the hearing in which the juvenile court decided to change the permanent plans. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether a parent could raise a claim of inadequate assistance of counsel for the first time on direct appeal from judgments changing the permanent plans for his children from reunification with a parent to permanent plans of guardianship and APPLA. After review, the Supreme Court answered that question in the affirmative. The Court concluded: (1) the unchallenged rationale of "Oregon ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Geist" (796 P2d 1193 (1990)), was applicable to a direct appeal from judgments that make such changes in the permanent plans for children who were wards of the court in dependency cases; and (2) the legislature’s enactment, following the Supreme Court's decision in "Geist," of a statute that provided a juvenile court procedure for modifying or setting aside a dependency judgment while an appeal from the judgment was pending, did not obviate the need for a direct appeal remedy for father’s claim of inadequate assistance of counsel. View "Dept. of Human Services v. T. L." on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals certified two questions of Oregon law to the Oregon Supreme Court. This case arose when plaintiff, who was legally blind, was injured when she stepped into a hole while jogging in a public park in the City of Portland (the City). Plaintiff filed a complaint against the City and defendants Gibson and Stillson. Defendant Gibson had created the hole to fix a malfunctioning sprinkler head; he was a park technician with primary responsibility for maintenance of the park. Defendant Stillson was the maintenance supervisor for all westside parks in the City. As framed by the Ninth Circuit, the questions were: (1) whether individual employees responsible for repairing, maintaining, and operating improvements on City-owned recreational land made available to the public for recreational purposes are “owner[s]” of the land, as defined in the Oregon Public Use of Lands Act, and therefore immune from liability for their negligence; and (2) if such employees are “owner[s]” under the Act, whether the Act, as applied to them, violated the remedy clause of Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the individual employees in this case did not qualify as “owner[s]” under the Act, and that the Court need not address the second certified question. View "Johnson v. Gibson" on Justia Law

In this case, an administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that certain taxicab drivers performed services for Broadway Cab LLC for remuneration and were not independent contractors. Therefore, the ALJ concluded, Broadway was liable for unemployment insurance taxes on the drivers’ wages. The Court of Appeals agreed with the ALJ and affirmed. Broadway appealed, and after its review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and also affirmed. View "Broadway Cab LLC v. Employment Dept." on Justia Law

In the underlying lawsuit, the Oregon Supreme Court was asked to consider challenges to legislative amendments aimed at reducing the costs of the Public Employee Retirement System (PERS). Those challenges were brought by petitioners, who were active and retired members of PERS. The Supreme Court rejected petitioners’ challenge to the elimination of income tax offset benefits for nonresident retirees but agreed in part with petitioners’ claim that modifications to the PERS cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) formula impaired petitioners’ contractual rights and therefore violated the state Contract Clause, Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution. Although petitioners had argued that the state could not change the COLA formula for any current PERS member, the Court held that the COLA amendments impaired the PERS contract only insofar as the amendments applied retrospectively to benefits earned before the effective dates of the amendments. Claimants, who were pro se petitioners and attorneys representing the original petitioners, sought fees and costs. The Supreme Court remanded this case to a special master to make findings and recommend a reasonable amount of fees and costs. View "Moro v. Oregon" on Justia Law

For the 2006 tax year, taxpayers Mike and Sheri Hillenga claimed, among other things, a deduction based on a net operating loss carryover from their 2004 tax return. The Department of Revenue challenged the 2006 deduction, contending that taxpayers did not actually have a net operating loss in 2004 that could be applied against their 2006 taxes. The Tax Court held that the department could not challenge the 2004 deductions that resulted in the net operating loss carryover, because the 2004 tax year was closed by the statute of limitations. The department appealed. On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed with the department: by attempting to carry over their 2004 net operating loss to apply against their 2006 tax liability, taxpayers put the validity of their 2004 net operating loss at issue. Because the department was not trying to assess a deficiency for 2004, the statute of limitations did not apply. View "Hillenga v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

Appellant AT&T (together with subsidiaries) appealed a Tax Court judgment that denied AT&T's claim for a refund of a portion of the Oregon corporate excise taxes it paid for tax years 1996 through 1999. The dispute centered on AT&T's sale of interstate and international phone and data transmissions. The issue this case presented on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether those sales were counted in determining the fraction of AT&T's income that Oregon can tax. AT&T presented a cost study that purported to show that Oregon did not have the greatest share of the "costs of performance." The Department of Revenue challenged AT&T's interpretation of "income-producing activity" and attacked the validity of its cost study. The Tax Court ruled in favor of the department. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that AT&T did not use a correct definition of "income-producing activity [:] AT&T's proposed interpretation [was] network-based; it focused on the operation of its network as a whole. The correct understanding, however, is transaction-based; it examines individual sales to customers. AT&T thus failed to meet its burden of proof, because it did not correctly calculate the 'costs of performance' for the correct 'income-producing activities.'" View "AT&T Corp. v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

Appellants were three municipal corporations located in Washington State: The City of Seattle, the City of Tacoma, and Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County (taxpayers). Each taxpayer owned an interest in electrical transmission capacity that was purchased from the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) and was used for transmitting electricity over the Northwest's federally-administered power transmission grid. Together, the taxpayers appealed the grant of summary judgment in which the OregonTax Court, citing "Power Resources Cooperative v. Dept. of Rev.," (996 P2d 969 (2000)), concluded that taxpayers' interest in electrical transmission capacity could (because much of that grid was located in Oregon) be taxed by the department as a property interest "held" by taxpayers, under ORS 307.060. On appeal, taxpayers argued that: (1) "Power Resources" was wrongly decided; (2) the Oregon Supreme Court's decision in "Pacificorp Power Marketing v. Dept. of Rev.," (131 P3d 725 (2006)) did not apply in this case; and (3) the Oregon legislature's repeal of the 2005 property tax exemption benefitting out-of-state power-generating municipalities was enacted in violation of Article IV, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution, a provision that required bills for raising revenue originate in the House of Representatives. The Oregon Court rejected the taxpayers' arguments and affirmed the Oregon Tax Court. View "City of Seattle v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

The Department of Revenue appealed a Tax Court decision that accepted the property valuation proposed by taxpayer Hewlett-Packard (HP). In reaching that conclusion, the Tax Court held that the highest and best use of HP's property was a continuation of its current use as a single-tenant, owner-occupied research and manufacturing facility. The Tax Court also held that, of the numerous buildings on the campus, a potential owner would anticipate using only certain "core" buildings and would not anticipate using the "non-core" buildings. As a result, those non-core buildings were components of the property that prevented it from cost-effectively serving its highest and best use. The Tax Court, therefore, assessed the value of the loss caused by the presence of the non-core buildings. To do so, the Tax Court calculated the additional operating expenses that an owner would incur while operating the subject property as compared to the operating expenses that an owner would incur while operating a cost-effective version of the property consisting of only the core space. On appeal, the department raised the narrow issue of whether the Tax Court properly applied the administrative rule defining the value of the loss, OAR 150-308.205-(F)(3)(k). The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the Tax Court properly identified the value of the loss as the additional operating expenses that an owner would incur to operate the subject property compared to a more cost-effective option. View "Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Benton County Assessor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff initiated this action against the Secretary of State, challenging the constitutionality of ORS 250.048(9), which provided that a person who registered with the Secretary of State to collect initiative petition signatures for pay may not, “at the same time, obtain signatures on a petition or prospective petition for which the person is not being paid.” At the time he initiated the action, plaintiff had registered to collect initiative petition signatures for pay and had been hired to do just that. At the same time, he wanted to collect signatures on other measures on a volunteer basis. He contended that ORS 250.048(9) violated his constitutional rights of freedom of expression and association. During the pendency of the litigation, however, plaintiff stopped working as a paid signature collector, and his registration expired. The secretary moved for summary judgment on the ground that the action had become moot. Plaintiff opposed the motion, submitting an affidavit stating that he intended to work as a paid signature collector in the future and that he might be interested in collecting signatures on a volunteer basis on other measures at the same time. He also argued that, even if his action had become moot, the action nevertheless should proceed because it was “likely to evade judicial review in the future,” and ORS 14.175 expressly authorized courts to adjudicate such cases. The trial court granted the secretary's motion to dismiss, and the Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal. The issues, therefore, before the Supreme Court were: (1) whether the averments in plaintiff’s affidavit were sufficient to establish that his action was not moot; (2) even if the action was moot, whether it was nevertheless justiciable under ORS 14.175 because it was likely to evade review; and (3) if it is subject to ORS 14.175, whether the legislature possessed the constitutional authority to enact it. The Court concluded: (1) plaintiff’s affidavit was insufficient to establish that his action was not moot; (2) the action nevertheless was likely to evade judicial review under the standard set out in ORS 14.175, because it was not necessary to request expedited consideration to meet its terms; and (3) the legislature did possess the constitutional authority to enact the statute. Accordingly, because the Court concluded that the case was justiciable under ORS 14.175, it reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and trial court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Couey v. Atkins" on Justia Law