Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Department of Revenue appealed a Tax Court decision that accepted the property valuation proposed by taxpayer Hewlett-Packard (HP). In reaching that conclusion, the Tax Court held that the highest and best use of HP's property was a continuation of its current use as a single-tenant, owner-occupied research and manufacturing facility. The Tax Court also held that, of the numerous buildings on the campus, a potential owner would anticipate using only certain "core" buildings and would not anticipate using the "non-core" buildings. As a result, those non-core buildings were components of the property that prevented it from cost-effectively serving its highest and best use. The Tax Court, therefore, assessed the value of the loss caused by the presence of the non-core buildings. To do so, the Tax Court calculated the additional operating expenses that an owner would incur while operating the subject property as compared to the operating expenses that an owner would incur while operating a cost-effective version of the property consisting of only the core space. On appeal, the department raised the narrow issue of whether the Tax Court properly applied the administrative rule defining the value of the loss, OAR 150-308.205-(F)(3)(k). The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the Tax Court properly identified the value of the loss as the additional operating expenses that an owner would incur to operate the subject property compared to a more cost-effective option. View "Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Benton County Assessor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff initiated this action against the Secretary of State, challenging the constitutionality of ORS 250.048(9), which provided that a person who registered with the Secretary of State to collect initiative petition signatures for pay may not, “at the same time, obtain signatures on a petition or prospective petition for which the person is not being paid.” At the time he initiated the action, plaintiff had registered to collect initiative petition signatures for pay and had been hired to do just that. At the same time, he wanted to collect signatures on other measures on a volunteer basis. He contended that ORS 250.048(9) violated his constitutional rights of freedom of expression and association. During the pendency of the litigation, however, plaintiff stopped working as a paid signature collector, and his registration expired. The secretary moved for summary judgment on the ground that the action had become moot. Plaintiff opposed the motion, submitting an affidavit stating that he intended to work as a paid signature collector in the future and that he might be interested in collecting signatures on a volunteer basis on other measures at the same time. He also argued that, even if his action had become moot, the action nevertheless should proceed because it was “likely to evade judicial review in the future,” and ORS 14.175 expressly authorized courts to adjudicate such cases. The trial court granted the secretary's motion to dismiss, and the Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal. The issues, therefore, before the Supreme Court were: (1) whether the averments in plaintiff’s affidavit were sufficient to establish that his action was not moot; (2) even if the action was moot, whether it was nevertheless justiciable under ORS 14.175 because it was likely to evade review; and (3) if it is subject to ORS 14.175, whether the legislature possessed the constitutional authority to enact it. The Court concluded: (1) plaintiff’s affidavit was insufficient to establish that his action was not moot; (2) the action nevertheless was likely to evade judicial review under the standard set out in ORS 14.175, because it was not necessary to request expedited consideration to meet its terms; and (3) the legislature did possess the constitutional authority to enact the statute. Accordingly, because the Court concluded that the case was justiciable under ORS 14.175, it reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and trial court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Couey v. Atkins" on Justia Law

At issue before the Supreme Court in this declaratory judgment action was whether a home-rule city could impose a five-percent franchise fee on a sanitary authority with overlapping jurisdiction. The trial court concluded that the city had authority to impose the fee, but declined to reach an additional question whether the amount of the fee was reasonable, because that issue was not presented by the pleadings. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the city had authority to enact the ordinance providing for the fee and that the sanitary authority’s argument about reasonableness was unpreserved. After its review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error in the Court of Appeals' judgment and also affirmed. View "Rogue Valley Sewer Services v. City of Phoenix" on Justia Law

Petitioners were active and retired members of the Public Employee Retirement System (PERS) who challenged two legislative amendments aimed at reducing the cost of retirement benefits: Senate Bill (SB) 822 (2013), and SB 861 (2013). Petitioners raised numerous challenges to the amendments but primarily argued that the amendments impaired their contractual rights and therefore violated the state Contract Clause, Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution, and the federal Contract Clause, Article I, section 10, clause 1, of the United States Constitution. "Although there is no doubt that the legislature passed SB 822 and SB 861 to address legitimate public policy concerns and with an appropriate sensitivity to the impact that the amendments would have on retirees, those concerns do not establish a defense to the contractual impairment that the amendments effect. The public purpose defense that respondents ask [the Oregon Supreme Court] to recognize imposes a high bar to justify the state’s impairment of a state contract, like PERS, and the record in this case does not meet that standard. We therefore hold that respondents constitutionally may cease the income tax offset payments to nonresidents as set out in SB 822 and that respondents also constitutionally may apply the COLA amendments as set out in SB 822 and SB 861 prospectively to benefits earned on or after the effective dates of those laws, but not retrospectively to benefits earned before those effective dates." View "Moro v. Oregon" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the Marion County Assessor could obtain a correction to the tax rolls concerning the valuation of the real property of taxpayer Willamette Estates II, LLC from the Department of Revenue. The Tax Court concluded that the assessor was authorized by administrative rule to seek such a correction and that the department was authorized by statute to allow it. The taxpayer appealed, arguing the Tax Court's decision essentially sanctioned an assessor's unlawful appeal of his own assessment. In the alternative, taxpayer argued that the Tax Court's decision conflicted with the Oregon Supreme Court's precedents. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Willamette Estates II, LLC v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

Powerex Corporation wholesales natural gas and electricity to purchasers throughout the western part of North America. The issue on appeal was how much of Powerex's income was taxable in Oregon. This case turned on whether Powerex’s sales of electricity and natural gas occurred "in this state." The rules for making that determination differed depending on whether the sales are sales of "tangible personal property" or other types of sales. Generally, sales of tangible personal property are "in this state" if "[t]he property is delivered or shipped to a purchaser * * * within this state regardless of the f.o.b. point or other conditions of the sale." In the Tax Court, the parties agreed that natural gas was tangible personal property. They disagreed whether, in selling natural gas, Powerex shipped or delivered natural gas to purchasers "within this state." The Tax Court found that Powerex shipped gas to purchasers in other states through a hub in Malin where two pipelines intersected. It concluded that, in doing so, Powerex had not shipped or delivered gas to purchasers within Oregon. Regarding Powerex’s sales of electricity, the parties disagreed whether electricity is tangible personal property. The Tax Court ruled that electricity is not tangible personal property and that, because the greater part of the activity that produced the income from Powerex’s electricity sales occurred in British Columbia, those sales were not attributable to Oregon. The Tax Court accordingly concluded that, for the tax years at issue here, neither Powerex’s sales of electricity nor its sales of natural gas were "in this state." The Department of Revenue appealed that decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Tax Court correctly held that Powerex's natural gas sales were not "in this state." With regard to electricity, the Court reversed the Tax Court, and remanded the case to that court for consideration of whether electric transmission systems functioned in the same way that natural gas pipelines did: "[i]f the Tax Court makes that finding on remand, then our conclusion regarding Powerex’s natural gas sales presumably will control how most of Powerex’s electricity sales will be allocated." View "Powerex Corp. v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

At issue in this case is what ORS 654.086(2) means when it says that an employer "could not with the exercise of reasonable diligence know" of a violation. Employer CBI Services, Inc. performed work on a water treatment tank that was under construction. At that time, the tank consisted of a 32-foot-high wall that created a circular enclosure about 130 feet in diameter. It did not yet have a roof. Around the inside of the tank, there was a carpenter's scaffold, about four feet below the tank's top edge. The scaffold would prevent falls to the inside of the tank. There was no such scaffolding on the outside of the tank. An Oregon Occupational Safety and Health Division (OR-OSHA) safety compliance officer, Brink, conducted a safety inspection of the construction site. As he approached the water tank, he saw a worker sitting on its top rim. The worker, later identified as Crawford, was welding and did not appear to be using fall protection. Brink took several pictures. He then approached the site supervisor, Vorhof, who was working at ground level, inside the entrance to the tank, rigging anchor cables. Brink and Vorhof were about 65 feet from Crawford, who was visible from where they stood. Brink told Vorhof what he had seen. Vorhof looked up at Crawford, who was still sitting on the rim of the tank. Crawford was not wearing a safety harness and lanyard. Vorhof told Crawford to get down. While Brink was talking to Vorhof, he noticed a second worker, Bryan, also working without required fall protection. Brink later issued employer a citation and notification of penalty for two "items" (two serious safety violations). Employer disciplined Crawford, Bryan, and Vorhof as a result of the citation. At the time, employer had in place safety rules, precautions, and training mechanisms (including fall-protection training) and mandatory worksite safety meetings. The Court of Appeals held that the statutory phrase referred not to whether an employer "could" know (in the sense of being capable of knowing) of the violation; rather, the phrase referred to whether, taking into account a number of specified factors, an employer "should" know of the violation. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in its construction of ORS 654.086(2), but affirmed on other grounds. View "OR-OSHA v. CBI Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs had been firefighters for the city of Portland when they suffered disabling injuries. The city's charger required it to provide disability benefits to its police and fire employees who suffer injuries in the course of their employment that render them “unable to perform [their] required duties,” with a minimum disability benefit of 25 percent of the employee’s base pay, “regardless of the amount of wages earned in other employment.” The city originally determined that plaintiffs’ disabilities made them unable to perform their “required duties” and paid them disability benefits. Years later, however, the city created new job assignments that included some of the duties within the job classifications that plaintiffs had held when they were injured. Because the city gave the new job assignments the same job classifications that plaintiffs had previously held, the city maintained that plaintiffs were no longer disabled. The city therefore required plaintiffs to return to work and discontinued paying them the minimum disability benefit. Plaintiffs sued the city for breach of contract, and the circuit court granted summary judgment for the city. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the city charter’s use of the term “required duties” meant core duties. Because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the duties of plaintiffs’ new job assignments were the “required duties” for the job classifications that plaintiffs previously held, the Court further concluded that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the city. View "Miller v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was an order of the Public Utility Commission (PUC) that addressed Portland General Electric's (PGE) recovery of its capital investment in the Trojan nuclear generating facility after that facility was retired from service. To determine whether a legal error that the PUC had made in an earlier rate case had affected rates that the PUC had authorized PGE to charge, the PUC reexamined those earlier rates. In that reexamination, the PUC determined that PGE had been required to recover its capital investment over time, and that the rates therefore should have included interest to account for the time value of money. Despite the legal error, the rates that the PUC authorized for 1995 to 2000 were just and reasonable, but that to make the post-2000 rates just and reasonable, it was required to order a refund to the post-2000 ratepayers. In affirming the PUC order, the Court of Appeals concluded the PUC had not erred in making those three determinations. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed both the Court of Appeals and the PUC's order. View "Gearhart v. PUC" on Justia Law

The issues this case presented for the Supreme Court were whether ORS 243.303(2) (which requires local governments to make available to retired employees, "insofar as and to the extent possible," the health care insurance coverage available to current officers and employees of the local government,) created a private right of action for the enforcement of that duty; or, if not, whether the Court should (under its common-law authority) provide such a right of action. The Court of Appeals held that the statute did not expressly or impliedly create a private right of action, and it considered that conclusion to be dispositive of plaintiffs' claim for relief. The Supreme Court also concluded that the statute did not expressly or impliedly create a private right of action for its enforcement. However, where a statute imposes a legal duty, but there is no indication that the legislature intended to create (or not to create) a private right of action for its enforcement, courts must (if such relief is sought) determine whether the judicial creation of a common-law right of action would be consistent with the legislative provision, appropriate for promoting its policy, and needed to ensure its effectiveness. Analyzing the duty imposed on local governments by ORS 243.303(2) under that standard, the Court declined to create an additional common-law right of action for its enforcement because: (1) plaintiffs failed to identify a cognizable common-law claim for relief whose creation is appropriate and necessary to effectuate the legislature's purpose; (2) a declaratory judgment and supplemental relief were adequate to enforce the statutory duty; and (3) a significant change in existing law would result from judicial creation of a tort claim permitting the recovery of noneconomic damages in the circumstances here, and there is no other need to create a common-law tort claim. View "Doyle v. City of Medford" on Justia Law