Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The petitioners in this case sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 9 (2014). They argued the ballot title did not satisfy the requirements of ORS 250.035(2). Initiative Petition 9, if adopted by the voters, would amend provisions of the Oregon Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act. Upon review of the ballot title, the Supreme Court concluded that the proposed ballot title did not contain a concise and impartial summary of not more than 125 words that summarized the proposed measure and its effects. Furthermore, the Court found that the proposed summary of the initiative did not disclose that employees who were not members of the union but who were members of the bargaining unit would receive representation without cost. Accordingly the title was referred back to the Attorney General's office for modification. View "Towers v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

The issue presented to the Supreme Court in this case was the appeal of a final order of the Energy Facility Siting Council that approved an amended site certificate for construction of a wind energy facility. Specifically, the issue was whether, in approving the amended site certificate, the council correctly declined to require compliance with a recently adopted county ordinance requiring a two-mile setback between wind turbines and rural residences pursuant to ORS 469.401(2). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the council did not err in not requiring compliance with the ordinance. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the council did not err in denying petitioners' requests for a contested case proceeding. Therefore the council's final order approving the amended site certificate was affirmed. View "Blue Mountain Alliance v. Energy Facility Siting" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the scope of Clackamas County's contractual obligation to provide health insurance benefits to command officer retirees of the County Sheriff's Office. A contract between the county and command officers, including Plaintiff Neil James, required the county to use a particular fund to pay for a certain level of benefits to command officers after they retired. The contract added that the obligation to pay benefits was "contingent upon the availability of sufficient funding in said fund to pay for the same." After plaintiff retired, the cost of insurance premiums increased to the point where the fund was and would for the foreseeable future continue to be insufficient to pay for the benefits required. The county entered into a new contract with certain union employees to provide lesser benefits from a more stable fund, and plaintiff (a retired officer, not a union employee) also was provided those lesser benefits. Plaintiff brought an action against the county, asserting breach of contract. He maintained that the first contract required the county to pay him full health insurance benefits and argued that the contingency provision did not apply because of the creation of the new fund, which had sufficient money to pay for those benefits. The trial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff, but the Court of Appeals reversed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the new fund was the product of a contract that was separate and independent from the earlier contract. Because the prior fund was insufficient to provide the agreed level of benefits, the county did not breach its contractual obligation to provide that level of benefits. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the appellate court's decision. View "James v. Clackamas County" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certified two questions of Oregon law to the Oregon Supreme Court. They arose from an action for personal injury brought in federal district court against defendant Christopher Boyle and his employer, the City of Beaverton, for injuries that plaintiff Jean Howell suffered in an automobile collision with a police car that defendant Boyle drove. A jury found that plaintiff and Boyle were equally at fault and that plaintiff's damages totaled approximately $1 million. The trial court reduced the award by half, in accordance with the jury's findings of comparative fault. Defendants then moved to reduce the award further, to the $200,000 limit of the then-current Oregon Tort Claims Act. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the application of the statutory limitation would have violated the remedy clause of Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution. Defendants appealed, and the Ninth Circuit certified the following questions: (1) is plaintiff's negligence action constitutionally protected under the Oregon Constitution's remedy clause irrespective of the jury's finding of comparative negligence?; and (2) if plaintiff's action is protected, is $200,000 an unconstitutional emasculated remedy despite the jury's finding of comparative negligence? The Oregon Supreme Court addressed the second question only, because its answer was dispositive: "[e]ven assuming for the sake of argument that, under the circumstances of this case, plaintiff's negligence action is constitutionally protected by Article I, section 10, the $200,000 limitation on her recovery is constitutionally permissible. Under this court's case law, the constitution requires that any remedy that remains after the imposition of a modern limitation on it be 'substantial.' In this case, the $200,000 judgment that plaintiff received satisfies that constitutional requirement." View "Howell v. Boyle" on Justia Law

The primary question in this case was whether the Oregon Department of Revenue properly classified income resulting from the sale of Crystal Communication's assets as "business income." Crystal operated as a multistate business providing wireless cellular telecommunications services and, in the relevant tax years, sold its assets related to those services. It reported the gain from the asset sale as "nonbusiness income" and allocated that gain to Florida, its state of commercial domicile. On audit, the department reclassified the gain as apportionable "business income." Crystal challenged the reclassification, and the Tax Court granted summary judgment in favor of the department and entered judgment accordingly. Crystal appealed to this court. Finding no error in the classification, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Crystal Communications, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a trial court's order dismissing as untimely plaintiffs' claims against a public school district. Plaintiffs are seven adult men born between 1957 and 1970. When they were in the fifth grade, a teacher who worked for the district sexually abused them, but they alleged they did not know that their teacher's touching was abusive when it occurred. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in granting the school district's ORCP 21 motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims. View "Doe v. Lake Oswego School District" on Justia Law

CenturyTel operated as a multistate, unitary business that, until 2002, provided both wireless and wireline telecommunications services. In 2002, CenturyTel sold its assets related to its wireless services but continued to provide wireline services. As in "Crystal Communications, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue," (___ P3d ___ (decided March 7, 2013), CenturyTel reported the gain from the sale of its wireless assets as "nonbusiness income" and allocated that gain to its state of commercial domicile. On audit, the Department of Revenue reclassified the gain as apportionable "business income." CenturyTel challenged the department's reclassification, and the Tax Court, relying on its decision in "Crystal," granted summary judgment in favor of the department. CenturyTel appealed. Consistent with its decision in "Crystal," the Supreme Court affirmed the Tax Court's decision. View "CenturyTel, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Department of Corrections (DOC) made changes to its employees' scheduled days off and their shift stop and start times without first bargaining with representatives of the employees' union, the Association of Oregon Corrections Employees (AOCE). As an affirmative defense to AOCE's complaint alleging that DOC had committed an unfair labor practice, DOC asserted that the terms of the parties' collective bargaining agreement (CBA) permitted its unilateral action. The Employment Labor Relations Board (ERB) rejected DOC's argument and concluded that DOC had committed an unfair labor practice under ORS 243.672(1)(e). The Court of Appeals reversed. The DOC appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals after review of the applicable statutory authority and controlling case law. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Assn. of Oregon Corrections Emp. v. Oregon" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether plaintiff had standing under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, ORS 28.020, to seek a declaration that defendant Sisters School District #6 and its Board of Directors lacked authority to enter into a particular form of financing arrangement without a vote of the people. Plaintiff alleged that he had standing because his "status as a taxpayer and voter within the district will or may be adversely affected[.]" More specifically, plaintiff alleged that entering into the challenged form of financing arrangement might, in some unspecified way, "jeopardize the district[']s ability to provide for the daily operation of the district" and, if that should come to pass, increase the likelihood that the district will have to seek additional financing to cover its obligations. The trial court concluded that those allegations were insufficient to satisfy the requirement of ORS 28.020 that only persons "whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected" by the challenged ordinance have standing. The Court of Appeals concluded that the harm that plaintiff alleges is too attenuated and speculative to satisfy the standing requirement of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the appellate and trial courts. View "Morgan v. Sisters School District #6" on Justia Law

The Board of Licensed Professional Counselors and Therapists (board) issued a final order suspending petitioner Rachel Weldon's license for two years and assessed costs against her. Petitioner asked the board to stay enforcement of that order pending judicial review. A few months later, the board issued an amended final order of suspension. Concluding that petitioner had not demonstrated irreparable harm and had failed to show a colorable claim of error, and that substantial public harm would result if it entered a stay, the board also entered a final order denying petitioner's request for a stay. Petitioner appealed the board's order assessing the fine and denying the stay. Petitioner also asked the Court of Appeals to enter an emergency stay to permit her to continue to practice until appellate court proceedings were complete. The Appellate Commissioner granted petitioner a temporary stay pending the board's response to petitioner's motion. In its response, the board asserted that ORS 676.210 precluded the Court of Appeals from entering a stay. The commissioner accepted the board's understanding of ORS 676.210 but, sua sponte, decided that, by precluding the exercise of the court's inherent authority to grant a stay, the statute violated the separation of powers provision of Article III, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution. The board appealed the part of the commissioner's order that declared ORS 676.210 unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals ultimately granted review of the matter and determined that petitioner demonstrated a colorable claim of error. It denied petitioner's motion for a stay and vacated that part of the appellate commissioner's order that permitted petitioner to file a supersedeas matter to stay the board's fine. Upon review of the appeals, the Supreme Court concluded that the board erred when it argued, and the Court of Appeals erred when it decided, that the Court of Appeals had no authority to issue a stay pending its decision on the merits of petitioner's appeal. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court stayed the board's order suspending petitioner's license until the Court of Appeals issued its decision on petitioner's request. View "Weldon v. Bd. of Lic. Pro. Counselors and Therapists" on Justia Law