Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was whether plaintiff had standing under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, ORS 28.020, to seek a declaration that defendant Sisters School District #6 and its Board of Directors lacked authority to enter into a particular form of financing arrangement without a vote of the people. Plaintiff alleged that he had standing because his "status as a taxpayer and voter within the district will or may be adversely affected[.]" More specifically, plaintiff alleged that entering into the challenged form of financing arrangement might, in some unspecified way, "jeopardize the district[']s ability to provide for the daily operation of the district" and, if that should come to pass, increase the likelihood that the district will have to seek additional financing to cover its obligations. The trial court concluded that those allegations were insufficient to satisfy the requirement of ORS 28.020 that only persons "whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected" by the challenged ordinance have standing. The Court of Appeals concluded that the harm that plaintiff alleges is too attenuated and speculative to satisfy the standing requirement of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the appellate and trial courts. View "Morgan v. Sisters School District #6" on Justia Law

The Board of Licensed Professional Counselors and Therapists (board) issued a final order suspending petitioner Rachel Weldon's license for two years and assessed costs against her. Petitioner asked the board to stay enforcement of that order pending judicial review. A few months later, the board issued an amended final order of suspension. Concluding that petitioner had not demonstrated irreparable harm and had failed to show a colorable claim of error, and that substantial public harm would result if it entered a stay, the board also entered a final order denying petitioner's request for a stay. Petitioner appealed the board's order assessing the fine and denying the stay. Petitioner also asked the Court of Appeals to enter an emergency stay to permit her to continue to practice until appellate court proceedings were complete. The Appellate Commissioner granted petitioner a temporary stay pending the board's response to petitioner's motion. In its response, the board asserted that ORS 676.210 precluded the Court of Appeals from entering a stay. The commissioner accepted the board's understanding of ORS 676.210 but, sua sponte, decided that, by precluding the exercise of the court's inherent authority to grant a stay, the statute violated the separation of powers provision of Article III, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution. The board appealed the part of the commissioner's order that declared ORS 676.210 unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals ultimately granted review of the matter and determined that petitioner demonstrated a colorable claim of error. It denied petitioner's motion for a stay and vacated that part of the appellate commissioner's order that permitted petitioner to file a supersedeas matter to stay the board's fine. Upon review of the appeals, the Supreme Court concluded that the board erred when it argued, and the Court of Appeals erred when it decided, that the Court of Appeals had no authority to issue a stay pending its decision on the merits of petitioner's appeal. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court stayed the board's order suspending petitioner's license until the Court of Appeals issued its decision on petitioner's request. View "Weldon v. Bd. of Lic. Pro. Counselors and Therapists" on Justia Law

The State of Oregon, through the Oregon State Treasurer and the Oregon Public Employee Retirement Board (PERB), on behalf of the Oregon Public Employee Retirement Fund (PERF) (collectively, "state"), asserted claims against Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. (MMC) and Marsh, Inc. (MI). The state alleged that Marsh engaged in a scheme perpetrated by false and misleading statements that caused the state to lose approximately $10 million on investments in Marsh stock. The state contended that Marsh's actions violated ORS 10 59.135 and ORS 59.137. Marsh argued on appeal that ORS 59.135 and ORS 59.137 require a showing of reliance by the state, the state failed to establish any direct reliance by state actors on any actions by Marsh, and the state could not establish the required reliance by means of a presumption of reliance based on the "fraud-on-the-market" doctrine. Upon review of the trial court record and the applicable statutes, the Supreme Court determined that ORS 59.137 requires a stock purchaser to establish reliance, but that a stock purchaser who purchases stock on an efficient, open market may establish reliance by means of the "fraud-on-the-market" presumption. View "Oregon v. Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was the purported conflict between two statutes relating to the issuance of a writ of mandamus: ORS 34.110, which precludes issuance of the writ if the relator has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and ORS 34.130(3), which states that a writ of mandamus "shall be allowed" by a court or judge on the petition for the writ. After plaintiff filed a petition for an alternative writ, the court declined to issue the writ and instead dismissed plaintiff's petition, relying on the existence of an adequate remedy at law. Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed without opinion. Upon review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court concluded that that the circuit court permissibly dismissed plaintiff's petition. View "Oregon ex rel Portland Habilitation Center v. Portland St. Univ." on Justia Law

In this juvenile dependency proceeding, a father was found by the court to have subjected one of his children to sexual abuse. Although the child was unavailable to testify at the proceedings, the juvenile court admitted into evidence child's out-of-court statements. Father contended that the juvenile court's theory for admitting the statements - that they were the statements of a party-opponent and, therefore, not hearsay -was a fundamental misunderstanding of the evidence rule pertaining to statements of party-opponents. Furthermore, Father argued that the court's admission of child's out-of-court statements under OEC 801(4)(b)(A) violated his (father's) right to due process and to a proceeding that was fundamentally fair. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with father that the juvenile court erred in admitting the child's statements under OEC 801(4)(b)(A), and concluded that the error was not harmless. Accordingly, the Court reversed the juvenile court's judgments and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Dept. of Human Services v. G. D. W." on Justia Law

This case concerned an employment discrimination dispute between Portland State University (PSU) and Portland State University Chapter of the American Association of University Professors (the Association). Those entities entered into a collective bargaining agreement that included a dispute resolution process for alleged violations of the agreement. That dispute resolution process included a "Resort to Other Procedures" (ROP) provision that permitted PSU to decline or discontinue a grievance proceeding if an Association member brought a claim regarding the same matter in an agency or court outside of PSU. PSU invoked that provision to halt a grievance proceeding after an Association member filed discrimination complaints with two outside agencies. The Association subsequently filed a complaint with the Oregon Employment Relations Board (ERB), alleging in part that PSU had engaged in an unfair labor practice by discontinuing the contractual grievance proceeding. ERB concluded that PSU's invocation of the ROP clause constituted unlawful discrimination. It therefore declined to enforce the ROP clause and ordered PSU to submit to the grievance process. On PSU's appeal, the Court of Appeals determined that ERB erred by applying the wrong legal standard in ordering PSU to submit to the grievance process, and it therefore reversed and remanded the case for ERB's reconsideration. The Association sought review of that decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals's decision, concluding that ERB correctly held that the ROP clause at issue in this case imposed a form of employer retaliation for protected conduct that reasonably would impede or deter an employee from pursuing his or her statutory rights. "The resulting harm is neither theoretical nor trivial, but qualifies as a substantive difference in treatment. The ROP provision is therefore facially discriminatory . . . Accordingly, ERB properly declined to enforce that illegal contract provision. " View "Portland St. Univ. Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Portland St. Univ." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the lawfulness of a portion of the City of Portland's Willamette River Greenway Plan that regulates uses of industrial and other urban land along a portion of the Willamette River known as the "North Reach." Specifically, the issue was whether the City of Portland (city) had authority to regulate development within the North Reach. Petitioners represented various industrial interests within the affected area of the city's plan. They contended that the law permitted the city to regulate only "intensification" or "changes" to existing uses and otherwise does not permit the regulation of existing industrial or other urban uses or other changes to such uses within the North Reach. The Land Use Board of Appeals rejected that argument, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court likewise rejected petitioners' argument and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Gunderson, LLC v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

In 2006, two ballot measures were placed before Oregon voters at the polls. Measure 46 (2006) sought to amend the Oregon Constitution to permit the enactment of laws prohibiting or limiting electoral campaign "contributions and expenditures, of any type or description." Measure 47 (2006) sought to create new campaign finance statutes that would, essentially, statutorily implement the constitutional changes proposed in Measure 46. Voters rejected Measure 46 but approved Measure 47. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case required the examination of the operative text of Measure 47. The trial court concluded that the text at issue was severable from the ballot measure and ruled that the remaining provisions of the measure were, according to the plain text of the measure itself, dormant. The Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court also affirmed the trial court's judgment and the decision by the Court of Appeals. View "Hazell v. Brown" on Justia Law

Under section 6(6) of Ballot Measure 49 (2007), certain "owners" of property may file a claim to establish up to three home-site approvals, notwithstanding existing land use restrictions that would otherwise preclude such development. At issue in this case was the meaning of the term "owner" as it is used in that section. Specifically, the issue was whether the term includes a seller of property under a land sale contract who retains legal title to the property. The Court of Appeals concluded that, as the term is used in Ballot Measure 49, the term "owner" means only the purchaser of property under a land sale contract and does not include the seller of the property who retains title. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals: "In short, there is no persuasive evidence that the voters intended the three categories of owners under ORS 195.300(18) to be mutually exclusive. To the contrary, the phrasing of that definition, along with other definitions in the same section, and other related provisions of the law make clear that those definitional components were intended to be inclusive." View "Burke v. Oregon" on Justia Law

Ann Sacks Tile and Stone, Inc.; Canac Kitchen US Limited; and Koehler Rental Power, Inc. appealed a general tax judgment against them directly to the Supreme Court. The Department of Revenue responded with a motion to determine jurisdiction, asking the Court to determine whether a defect in the manner in which the companies had served their notice of appeal on the department deprived the Supreme Court of authority to decide the appeal. The companies asserted that the defects did not deprive the court of jurisdiction. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded it indeed lacked jurisdiction over the case, and accordingly dismissed the appeal. View "Ann Sacks Tile and Stone, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law