Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review was whether an anticipatory release of a ski area operator’s liability for its own negligence in a ski pass agreement was enforceable. Plaintiff suffered serious injuries while snowboarding over a jump in defendant ski area operator’s “terrain park,” and filed suit alleging that defendant (the ski operator) was negligent in the design, construction, maintenance, and inspection of the jump. Defendant moved for summary judgment based on an affirmative defense of release; plaintiff filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on the ground that the release was unenforceable as a matter of law. The trial court granted defendant’s summary judgment motion and denied plaintiff’s cross-motion. Plaintiff appealed, arguing, among other arguments, that the trial court erred in concluding that the release did not violate public policy and that it was neither substantively nor procedurally unconscionable. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Because the Supreme Court concluded that enforcement of the release would have been unconscionable, it reversed and remanded. View "Bagley v. Mt. Bachelor, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant drove through a stop sign and collided with a car in which plaintiff was a passenger. Plaintiff filed a negligence action, which was tried to a jury of twelve. The trial court instructed the jury that defendant had “admitted liability so that the only issue to be decided by you [. . .] is the amount of the damages to be awarded to the plaintiff.” The court defined both economic and noneconomic damages for the jury. The court told the jury that it should answer the questions on the verdict form “according to the directions on the form and all the instructions of the court.” The court then explained that “[a]t least the same nine jurors must agree on each answer unless the verdict form instructs you otherwise as to a particular question.” After deliberations, the jury returned its verdict. The trial court read the verdict form to the parties and asked the presiding juror whether at least nine jurors had answered Question 2; she answered, “yes, sir.” Defendant asked that the jury be polled. When the court asked each juror whether the vote of $65,386 in economic damages was “your vote,” ten jurors said “yes.” Jurors one and three said “no.” When the court asked whether the vote of $300,000 was “your vote,” nine jurors said “yes”; jurors two, three, and twelve said “no.” The court indicated that it would accept the verdict and thanked the jurors for their service. Defendant then asked the court to wait, stating, “I don’t think there’s nine agreeing, if I counted right.” The court stated that it counted ten jurors agreeing on economic damages and nine agreeing on noneconomic damages. After the jury was discharged, defendant took exception for the record: looking for nine common people on economic and noneconomic, I add that up as only being eight people who agree." The trial judge replied: I agree with you that there were only eight that answered yes to the same—for the economic and noneconomic damages that answered the same way, and if your theory is that the same nine had to vote on both, then that will have to go up for the appeal…" Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the jury's verdict met the requirements of Oregon law. The Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the trial court. View "Kennedy v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for a lumber mill, Sun Studs, LLC. One evening while walking from one area of the mill to another, a forklift hit and severely injured him. After receiving workers' compensation benefits, plaintiff brought suit against Swanson Group, Inc., owner of Sun Studs, as well as other defendants. Plaintiff alleged that Swanson was liable for negligently failing (or for negligently failing to require Sun Studs) to provide a safe workplace and for failing to provide competent safety personnel. Plaintiff also alleged that Swanson was liable under the Employers Liability Law (ELL), which required employers to take certain safety measures. Swanson moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted its motion on the ground that the workers' compensation statutes provided the exclusive remedy for plaintiff's injuries. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment regarding plaintiff's ELL claim, reversed its judgment regarding plaintiff's negligence claim, and remanded the negligence claim for further proceedings. The court held that neither the workers' compensation statutes nor a statute immunizing limited liability company members and managers barred plaintiff's claims against Swanson. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held that the allegations in plaintiff's complaint stated a negligence claim but that plaintiff did not have a claim against Swanson under the ELL. After review of the parties' cross-petitions for review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, and reaffirmed the trial court's judgment regarding plaintiff's negligence claim, reversed the appellate court's judgment regarding plaintiff's ELL claim, and remanded the ELL claim to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Cortez v. Nacco Material Handling Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Linda Two Two and Patricia Fodge filed a complaint against defendant that included claims for negligence and strict liability. Plaintiffs alleged that they had been injured in separate incidents in 2008 when an elevator in the building in which they worked dropped unexpectedly and stopped abruptly. In their negligence claim, plaintiffs alleged that defendant had negligently designed, installed, and maintained that elevator and that defendant's negligence was the direct and proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries. In their strict liability claim, plaintiffs alleged that defendant had designed, installed, and constructed the elevator and that the elevator was defective and dangerous. Defendant sought summary judgment on both claims. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on both claims. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court decided that the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' negligence claim, but did not err in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' strict liability claim. View "Two Two v. Fujitec America, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue in this mandamus proceeding was whether the trial court correctly denied defendants' motion to change venue. Plaintiffs, a husband and wife, initiated a medical malpractice action against defendants in Multnomah County. Defendants argued that venue was in Clackamas County, because that was where the clinic was located, where the doctor who provided the husband's medical services resided, and where the husband received treatment. Plaintiffs argued that venue is proper in Multnomah County, because defendants solicited patients who lived in that county, referred patients to imaging facilities in that county, used medical education programs in that county, and "identified" the clinic's location in its website as the "Portland area." The trial court denied defendants' motion, explaining that defendants, by soliciting patients in Multnomah County, "purposely availed themselves of the court's jurisdiction" in that county. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court mistakenly conflated personal jurisdiction considerations with the statutory requirements for venue and erred in denying defendants' motion. The Court therefore granted defendants relief and granted the writ. View "Kohring v. Ballard" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured when one negligent driver and (shortly thereafter) another negligent driver collided with the truck in which plaintiff was a passenger. The underinsured motorist benefits available to plaintiff under the terms of the insurance policy that she purchased from turned on the meaning of the term "accident" as that term was used in that policy and is used in corresponding Oregon financial responsibility statutes. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the legislature intended that the term "accident" have its ordinary meaning, and that plaintiff presented evidence from which a jury could find that her injuries had been incurred in more than one "accident." Under the facts of this case, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Wright v. Turner" on Justia Law

Claimant injured his low back while at work in April 2008, and his employer accepted his subsequent claim for a lumbar strain. Claimant was taken off work after his injury and, during the next several months, received an extensive course of chiropractic care. In An examining physician declared claimant medically stationary and released him to regular work without restriction. Based on the physician's findings, the employer issued a notice of closure that did not award benefits to claimant. Claimant was unsuccessful in his request for reconsideration. The Supreme Court, after its review of this case, concluded that the Department of Consumer and Business Services (DCBS) erred in its interpretation of the rules with regard to claimant's injury and determination for benefits. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the board for further proceedings. View "Schleiss v. SAIF Corporation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an Oregon resident, sustained injuries in a motorcycle accident that occurred in Wyoming. She filed an action in Oregon seeking damages for her injuries, naming as a defendant Grand Teton Cycles, LLC, a Harley-Davidson franchisee with a physical presence in Idaho and Wyoming. The trial court determined that it lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant and granted defendant's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court allowed plaintiff's petition for review to determine whether defendant had sufficient contacts with Oregon for a court in this state to exercise specific jurisdiction over it. The Supreme Court concluded that this litigation did not arise out of or relate to defendant's activities in Oregon. However, the Court affirmed for different reasons than the Court of Appeals, and disavowed the substantive relevance test to the extent that it was advanced in "State ex rel Michelin v. Wells," (657 P2d 207 (1982)). View "Robinson v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co." on Justia Law

In 2007, the decedent allegedly sustained personal injuries while disembarking from a bus operated by [defendant]. Decedent died a year later from causes unrelated to the bus accident. In 2009, more than two years, but less than three years, after the bus incident -- plaintiff, decedent's personal representative, filed a complaint alleging that [defendant] had negligently injured decedent and sought damages for the alleged personal injuries. The question before the Supreme Court in this case was whether plaintiff's survival action against a public body should have been brought within two years or three years of the alleged injury. One of two statutes provided the applicable statute of limitations. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that ORS 30.075(1) was the governing statute that triggered a two-year limitation period of ORS 30.275(9).View "Bell v. Tri-Met" on Justia Law

Petitioner and her friend were crossing a street late at night when defendant, who had been drinking, hit them with his car and seriously injured them. Defendant pled guilty to one count of driving under the influence of intoxicants and two counts of assault in the fourth degree for "intentionally, knowingly or recklessly caus[ing] physical injury." The trial court sentenced defendant to a combination of supervised probation, jail time, fines, and suspension of his driver's license. The trial court judgment also granted the state 90 days to submit a "reasonable final restitution amount." The state timely submitted a proposed supplemental judgment requesting that defendant be ordered to pay restitution in an amount that defendant stipulated represented the full amount of petitioner's economic damages. Petitioner filed suit, alleging that the trial court had violated her right to "receive prompt restitution" under Article I, section 42(1)(d) of the Oregon Constitution. The trial court denied petitioner's claim, and, pursuant to ORS 147.539, petitioner sought direct review of that order with the Supreme Court. Finding no constitutional violation, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Oregon v. Algeo" on Justia Law