Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This was an action brought by an injured construction worker and his wife. A defective board broke. Plaintiffs Kevin Rains and Mitzi Rains obtained a judgment based on claims of strict products liability and loss of consortium, respectively, against both the retailer, Stayton Builders Mart, and the manufacturer, Weyerhaeuser Company, of the defective wooden board. Stayton, in turn, obtained a judgment against Weyerhaeuser based on its cross-claim for common-law indemnity. Prior to trial, plaintiffs and Stayton had partially settled their claims in an agreement that required Stayton to pay at least $1.5 million in damages to plaintiffs, but capped Stayton’s liability at $2 million. Weyerhaeuser appealed, alleging numerous errors in trial court rulings. The Court of Appeals agreed with Weyerhaeuser that the trial court had erred by refusing to apply a statutory cap on noneconomic damages to plaintiff’s claim for strict products liability and by refusing to require Stayton to discharge its liability to plaintiffs before Stayton could prevail on its indemnity claim against Weyerhaeuser. The Court of Appeals, however, largely rejected Weyerhaeuser’s remaining arguments, affirming the trial court’s decisions: (1) refusing to dismiss Stayton as a defendant for lack of adversity after it had partially settled plaintiffs’ claims; (2) refusing to admit the partial settlement agreement in evidence at trial; (3) failing to allow the jury to allocate fault to the general contractor, Five Star Construction, on the verdict form; and (4) refusing to apply the statutory cap on noneconomic damages to Mitzi Rains’ claim for loss of consortium. And, although the Court of Appeals deducted some of the expenses that Weyerhaeuser challenged in Stayton’s award for defense costs, the deductions were small, and the Court of Appeals largely upheld the trial court’s calculation of Stayton’s defense costs. After its review of this matter, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed most aspects of the Court of Appeals' decision, but vacated with respect to the parties’ assignments of error concerning the statutory cap on noneconomic damages based on Article I, section 17, of the Oregon Constitution. Those assignments of error were remanded reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court's decision in "Horton v. OHSU," ( 359 Or 168 (2016)). Furthermore, the Court concluded that ORS 20.220(3) required the general judgment in favor of Stayton against Weyerhaeuser awarding defense costs to be reversed, and as such, reversed the Court of Appeals to the extent that it was inconsistent with that conclusion. The limited judgment for indemnity in favor of Stayton against Weyerhaeuser was reversed, as was the general judgment in favor of Stayton for costs on Stayton’s indemnity claim against Weyerhaeuser. View "Rains v. Stayton Builders Mart, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, an administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that certain taxicab drivers performed services for Broadway Cab LLC for remuneration and were not independent contractors. Therefore, the ALJ concluded, Broadway was liable for unemployment insurance taxes on the drivers’ wages. The Court of Appeals agreed with the ALJ and affirmed. Broadway appealed, and after its review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and also affirmed. View "Broadway Cab LLC v. Employment Dept." on Justia Law

In the underlying lawsuit, the Oregon Supreme Court was asked to consider challenges to legislative amendments aimed at reducing the costs of the Public Employee Retirement System (PERS). Those challenges were brought by petitioners, who were active and retired members of PERS. The Supreme Court rejected petitioners’ challenge to the elimination of income tax offset benefits for nonresident retirees but agreed in part with petitioners’ claim that modifications to the PERS cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) formula impaired petitioners’ contractual rights and therefore violated the state Contract Clause, Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution. Although petitioners had argued that the state could not change the COLA formula for any current PERS member, the Court held that the COLA amendments impaired the PERS contract only insofar as the amendments applied retrospectively to benefits earned before the effective dates of the amendments. Claimants, who were pro se petitioners and attorneys representing the original petitioners, sought fees and costs. The Supreme Court remanded this case to a special master to make findings and recommend a reasonable amount of fees and costs. View "Moro v. Oregon" on Justia Law

Petitioners were active and retired members of the Public Employee Retirement System (PERS) who challenged two legislative amendments aimed at reducing the cost of retirement benefits: Senate Bill (SB) 822 (2013), and SB 861 (2013). Petitioners raised numerous challenges to the amendments but primarily argued that the amendments impaired their contractual rights and therefore violated the state Contract Clause, Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution, and the federal Contract Clause, Article I, section 10, clause 1, of the United States Constitution. "Although there is no doubt that the legislature passed SB 822 and SB 861 to address legitimate public policy concerns and with an appropriate sensitivity to the impact that the amendments would have on retirees, those concerns do not establish a defense to the contractual impairment that the amendments effect. The public purpose defense that respondents ask [the Oregon Supreme Court] to recognize imposes a high bar to justify the state’s impairment of a state contract, like PERS, and the record in this case does not meet that standard. We therefore hold that respondents constitutionally may cease the income tax offset payments to nonresidents as set out in SB 822 and that respondents also constitutionally may apply the COLA amendments as set out in SB 822 and SB 861 prospectively to benefits earned on or after the effective dates of those laws, but not retrospectively to benefits earned before those effective dates." View "Moro v. Oregon" on Justia Law

In 2009, claimant sought workers' compensation benefits for a work-related injury. Claimant had preexisting multilevel degenerative disc disease and a history of intermittent low back pain with some bilateral radiation to his legs. SAIF, the employer's workers' compensation insurer, accepted a claim for a lumbar strain. Claimant subsequently sought acceptance of a combined condition, which SAIF ultimately denied on the ground that the accepted injury was no longer the major contributing cause of the combined condition. The Workers' Compensation Board upheld SAIF's denial, and claimant sought judicial review in the Court of Appeals. On appeal to that court, claimant contended that, in determining the compensability of his claim, the board erroneously had framed the inquiry in terms of whether the accepted condition continued to be the major contributing cause of his disability or need for treatment. In claimant's view, the proper inquiry was whether his accidental injury continued to be the major contributing cause of his combined condition. Claimant contended that there was no evidence that that injury was no longer the major contributing cause of his disability or need for treatment. While judicial review was pending before the Court of Appeals, claimant died of causes unrelated to his workplace injury, without a surviving spouse or other beneficiary entitled to a death benefit. The Court of Appeals held that claimant's estate, through his personal representative, was not authorized to pursue the claim to final determination under ORS 656.218(3) on the grounds that: (1) the estate was not one of the "persons" described in 656.218(5); and (2) the phrase "unpaid balance of the award" in the second sentence of subsection (5) restricted an estate's entitlement to permanent partial disability benefits that were awarded before a worker's death. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court: in the absence of persons who would have been entitled to receive death benefits if the injury causing a deceased worker's disability had been fatal, an award of permanent partial disability benefits that is finally determined after the worker's death pursuant to ORS 656.218(3) is payable to the worker's estate under ORS 656.218(5). The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Sather v. SAIF" on Justia Law

At issue in this case is what ORS 654.086(2) means when it says that an employer "could not with the exercise of reasonable diligence know" of a violation. Employer CBI Services, Inc. performed work on a water treatment tank that was under construction. At that time, the tank consisted of a 32-foot-high wall that created a circular enclosure about 130 feet in diameter. It did not yet have a roof. Around the inside of the tank, there was a carpenter's scaffold, about four feet below the tank's top edge. The scaffold would prevent falls to the inside of the tank. There was no such scaffolding on the outside of the tank. An Oregon Occupational Safety and Health Division (OR-OSHA) safety compliance officer, Brink, conducted a safety inspection of the construction site. As he approached the water tank, he saw a worker sitting on its top rim. The worker, later identified as Crawford, was welding and did not appear to be using fall protection. Brink took several pictures. He then approached the site supervisor, Vorhof, who was working at ground level, inside the entrance to the tank, rigging anchor cables. Brink and Vorhof were about 65 feet from Crawford, who was visible from where they stood. Brink told Vorhof what he had seen. Vorhof looked up at Crawford, who was still sitting on the rim of the tank. Crawford was not wearing a safety harness and lanyard. Vorhof told Crawford to get down. While Brink was talking to Vorhof, he noticed a second worker, Bryan, also working without required fall protection. Brink later issued employer a citation and notification of penalty for two "items" (two serious safety violations). Employer disciplined Crawford, Bryan, and Vorhof as a result of the citation. At the time, employer had in place safety rules, precautions, and training mechanisms (including fall-protection training) and mandatory worksite safety meetings. The Court of Appeals held that the statutory phrase referred not to whether an employer "could" know (in the sense of being capable of knowing) of the violation; rather, the phrase referred to whether, taking into account a number of specified factors, an employer "should" know of the violation. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in its construction of ORS 654.086(2), but affirmed on other grounds. View "OR-OSHA v. CBI Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs had been firefighters for the city of Portland when they suffered disabling injuries. The city's charger required it to provide disability benefits to its police and fire employees who suffer injuries in the course of their employment that render them “unable to perform [their] required duties,” with a minimum disability benefit of 25 percent of the employee’s base pay, “regardless of the amount of wages earned in other employment.” The city originally determined that plaintiffs’ disabilities made them unable to perform their “required duties” and paid them disability benefits. Years later, however, the city created new job assignments that included some of the duties within the job classifications that plaintiffs had held when they were injured. Because the city gave the new job assignments the same job classifications that plaintiffs had previously held, the city maintained that plaintiffs were no longer disabled. The city therefore required plaintiffs to return to work and discontinued paying them the minimum disability benefit. Plaintiffs sued the city for breach of contract, and the circuit court granted summary judgment for the city. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the city charter’s use of the term “required duties” meant core duties. Because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the duties of plaintiffs’ new job assignments were the “required duties” for the job classifications that plaintiffs previously held, the Court further concluded that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the city. View "Miller v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for a lumber mill, Sun Studs, LLC. One evening while walking from one area of the mill to another, a forklift hit and severely injured him. After receiving workers' compensation benefits, plaintiff brought suit against Swanson Group, Inc., owner of Sun Studs, as well as other defendants. Plaintiff alleged that Swanson was liable for negligently failing (or for negligently failing to require Sun Studs) to provide a safe workplace and for failing to provide competent safety personnel. Plaintiff also alleged that Swanson was liable under the Employers Liability Law (ELL), which required employers to take certain safety measures. Swanson moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted its motion on the ground that the workers' compensation statutes provided the exclusive remedy for plaintiff's injuries. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment regarding plaintiff's ELL claim, reversed its judgment regarding plaintiff's negligence claim, and remanded the negligence claim for further proceedings. The court held that neither the workers' compensation statutes nor a statute immunizing limited liability company members and managers barred plaintiff's claims against Swanson. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held that the allegations in plaintiff's complaint stated a negligence claim but that plaintiff did not have a claim against Swanson under the ELL. After review of the parties' cross-petitions for review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, and reaffirmed the trial court's judgment regarding plaintiff's negligence claim, reversed the appellate court's judgment regarding plaintiff's ELL claim, and remanded the ELL claim to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Cortez v. Nacco Material Handling Group, Inc." on Justia Law

The issues this case presented for the Supreme Court were whether ORS 243.303(2) (which requires local governments to make available to retired employees, "insofar as and to the extent possible," the health care insurance coverage available to current officers and employees of the local government,) created a private right of action for the enforcement of that duty; or, if not, whether the Court should (under its common-law authority) provide such a right of action. The Court of Appeals held that the statute did not expressly or impliedly create a private right of action, and it considered that conclusion to be dispositive of plaintiffs' claim for relief. The Supreme Court also concluded that the statute did not expressly or impliedly create a private right of action for its enforcement. However, where a statute imposes a legal duty, but there is no indication that the legislature intended to create (or not to create) a private right of action for its enforcement, courts must (if such relief is sought) determine whether the judicial creation of a common-law right of action would be consistent with the legislative provision, appropriate for promoting its policy, and needed to ensure its effectiveness. Analyzing the duty imposed on local governments by ORS 243.303(2) under that standard, the Court declined to create an additional common-law right of action for its enforcement because: (1) plaintiffs failed to identify a cognizable common-law claim for relief whose creation is appropriate and necessary to effectuate the legislature's purpose; (2) a declaratory judgment and supplemental relief were adequate to enforce the statutory duty; and (3) a significant change in existing law would result from judicial creation of a tort claim permitting the recovery of noneconomic damages in the circumstances here, and there is no other need to create a common-law tort claim. View "Doyle v. City of Medford" on Justia Law

In a wage claim case, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Bureau of Labor and Industries (BOLI) correctly determined that a business entity, Blachana, LLC, was a "successor" employer and must, therefore, reimburse BOLI for wages paid from the Wage Security Fund on behalf of four wage claimants. The employees had worked for NW Sportsbar Inc. before that corporation went out of business and surrendered its property and business to Blachana. The Court of Appeals reversed the holding that Blachana was not a "successor to the business" of NW Sportsbar. The Supreme Court concluded that BOLI did not err in deciding that an entity is a successor to a business if it "conducted essentially the same business as conducted by the predecessor." View "Blanchana, LLC v. Bureau of Labor & Industries" on Justia Law