Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State argued that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing one of the trial court's rulings excluding certain evidence. In response, Defendant Terry Davis challenged two of the trial court's other evidentiary rulings excluding evidence, which the Court of Appeals had affirmed. Defendant was charged with murder and manslaughter based on allegations that he shook the victim, his 15-month-old daughter, and inflicted fatal abdominal and brain injuries on the night that she died. Defendant contended that the victim's autopsy revealed that the victim had been injured at least several days before the night of her death and that nothing that he intentionally did to the victim on that evening caused the catastrophic brain hemorrhage that killed her. As relevant to this case, Defendant attempted to introduce evidence that the victim had been subjected to physical abuse throughout her short life; that a friend of the victim's mother saw the victim four days before her death and concluded that the victim looked like the friend's own daughter, who had suffered a brain injury as a baby; and that that friend relayed that conclusion to the victim's mother. In each instance, the trial court excluded the evidence. Defendant was convicted of one count of murder and one count of manslaughter. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred in excluding testimony that, four days before the child's death, a friend told the victim's mother that the victim resembled the friend's child, who had suffered a brain injury. However, the Court of Appeals affirmed without discussion the trial court's rulings as to the other evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court partly affirmed, partly reversed the appellate court's decision, holding that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the victim's prior injuries. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. The case was remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Davis" on Justia Law

This case tested the limits of a defendant's free speech rights under Article I, 3 section 8, of the Oregon Constitution, and the his violation of a protective order. The victim was an editor with the Portland Tribune, a weekly newspaper. In 2005, the newspaper sponsored a social event to which the public was invited. Defendant John Ryan attended the event, and soon afterward, Defendant began writing to the victim. Defendant violated the terms of a stalking protective order issued against him by contacting the victim through a third party and was subsequently found guilty by a jury of two counts of violating ORS 163.750. The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant's convictions. That court reasoned that Article I, section 8, required that ORS 163.750 be judicially narrowed to require "an unequivocal threat of the sort that makes it objectively reasonable for the victim to believe that he or she is being threatened with imminent and serious physical harm," and so the State failed to meet its burden of proof on both counts. On review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed Defendant's conviction: "because defendant's communications with the victim were already prohibited by the stalking protective order, the state was not required by Article I, section 8, to prove that defendant had communicated an unequivocal threat to the victim." View "Oregon v. Ryan" on Justia Law

This case concerned the proper application of stare decisis and required the Supreme Court to decide whether "Collins v. Farmers Ins. Co." was still good law. In "Collins," the Court held that an exclusion in a motor vehicle liability insurance policy that purported to eliminate all coverage for a claim by one insured against another insured under the same policy was unenforceable to the extent that it failed to provide the minimum coverage required by the Financial Responsibility Law (FRL). The exclusion, however, was enforceable as to any coverage beyond that statutory minimum. In this case, Plaintiff Farmers Insurance Company issued an insurance policy to Defendant Tosha Mowry that contained an exclusion identical to the exclusion in "Collins". Defendant was injured in an accident in which her friend -- a permissive user and thus an insured person under the policy -- was driving. Plaintiff brought this action seeking a declaration that Defendant had $25,000 available in coverage under her policy -- the minimum coverage required by the FRL for bodily injury to one person in any one accident. Defendant argued that her coverage was $100,000, the insurance amount stated on the declarations page of her policy. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the trial court granted Plaintiff's motion and denied Defendant's. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a per curiam opinion that cited "Collins." The Supreme Court concluded that Defendant "advanced no argument that this court has not previously considered for reaching a different result from that in 'Collins.' Defendant failed to carry the burden for overturning a fully considered precedent of this court." View "Farmers Ins. Co. v. Mowry" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Keith Drollinger, a convicted felon, brought suit against the lawyers who represented him in his attempt to obtain post-conviction relief, but shortly before the matter was scheduled for trial, withdrew. Defendants Gordon Mallon, John Lamborn, Robert Raschio and their firm, Mallon Lamborn & Raschio, PC, moved to dismiss the malpractice action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. They argued that, under the Supreme Court’s decision in "Stevens v. Bispham," (316 Or 221)(1993)), the action was barred because plaintiff had not been exonerated of the underlying offenses. The circuit court agreed with Defendants, granted their motion, and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that "Stevens," a case addressing the statute of limitations in a malpractice action brought by a former criminal defendant against trial counsel in the underlying case, did not preclude this convicted Plaintiff from pursuing a malpractice action against post-conviction counsel. Because the circuit court treated actual exoneration as a prerequisite for bringing the action, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Drollinger v. Mallon" on Justia Law

Defendant Hezakiah Baker was charged with multiple counts related to the manufacture and possession of marijuana. Before trial, Defendant moved to suppress evidence seized by Medford city police officers who, without a warrant, entered defendant's residence to investigate a 9-1-1 domestic disturbance call. An issue central to the case was the use of a "code word": the 9-1-1 caller stated she had heard the female resident of the house use a prearranged code word indicating to the caller that police assistance was needed. Officers were dispatched with the belief that the situation constituted an emergency because the dispatched officer subjectively believed the use of code amounted to "something important" requiring him to enter without a warrant under the "emergency aid" exception. The trial court denied defendant's motion. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that the warrantless entry of defendant's residence was not authorized as emergency aid, and thus violated Defendant’s rights under the Oregon Constitution. Upon review of the briefs submitted by the parties and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, finding that from the facts and circumstances of this case, a reasonable inference could have been drawn that emergency aid was needed. The Court affirmed the circuit court’s decision. View "Oregon v. Baker" on Justia Law

Commissioner of Public Lands Peter Goldmark sought a writ of mandamus to compel Attorney General Robert McKenna to pursue an appeal of a trial court decision in a condemnation action. Although Mr. McKenna provided representation at the trial court, he refused to pursue the appeal based on his evaluation of the merits of the case. The commissioner wished to appeal, which he discussed with his general counsel, an assistant attorney general. The commissioner and the attorney general then exchanged correspondence and met on at least one occasion, but the attorney general refused to file the appeal for the commissioner. The attorney general also refused to appoint a special assistant attorney general (SAAG) to pursue the appeal for the commissioner. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the issue in this case was one of first impression: the Court had never been "squarely presented" with an instance of the attorney general refusing to represent a state officer on an appeal. "Under the statutes, the responsibility is clear." Because the Court found no discretion within the attorney general's statutory duty, the Court issued the writ and directed the attorney general to provide the commissioner with legal representation. View "State ex rel Engweiler v. Felton" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a uniform criminal jury instruction on aiding and abetting correctly stated Oregon law. The charges in this case arose after Defendant Petronilo Lopez-Minjarez and his father drove Defendant’s truck to the home of a man who was having an extra-marital affair with Defendant’s mother. Police arrested Defendant after a neighbor reported seeing the victim abducted and gave police the license plate number of the truck in which he was taken. The State indicted Defendant on multiple charges. In instructing the jury, the trial court identified the elements of each of the substantive crimes with which Defendant was charged by using the pertinent uniform criminal jury instructions at issue in this case. The Supreme Court’s review found that the uniform instructions’ statement of the law was incorrect, and that the trial court gave those instructions in error. The Court concluded that the error prejudiced Defendant on his convictions for assault, felony murder, and aggravated murder, and accordingly the Court reversed those convictions. View "Oregon v. Lopez-Minjarez" on Justia Law

Petitioners Daniel Lavey and Anna Richter Taylor sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 16 (2012), arguing that the ballot title did not satisfy the requirements of state election law. Initiative Petition 16 would amend several statutory provisions regrading the use of studded tires on public roads. Currently state law makes it a class C traffic violation for a person to drive a vehicle equipped with stuffed tires on any Oregon highway. Initiative Petition 16 would delete two exemptions and amend the code so that no road authority would be allowed to issue a variance permit. Petitioners contended that the ballot title was deficient in a number of different respects pertaining to the caption, the "yes" vote result statement, the "no" vote result statement and the summary. Upon review, the Supreme Court rejected most of Petitioners' arguments without discussion, but wrote only to address one issue raised by petitioners that affected the caption and the "yes" vote result statement. The Court found that the caption and "yes" statement did not adequately identify the subject of the proposed initiative because it did not accurately state the change in the law that will take place if the initiative became law. The Court referred the ballot title back to the Attorney General's office for modification. View "Lavey v. Kroger" on Justia Law

Police obtained a warrant to search a house for stolen property. When they arrived at the house to execute the warrant, they encountered Defendant Bonnie Lou Walker. They placed her in handcuffs, read her Miranda rights, and took her outside while they searched the house. When they discovered what appeared to be Defendant's purse in the house, they asked for permission to search it. Defendant agreed and police found methamphetamine inside. Based on that evidence, Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine. Defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence of the drugs. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that the warrant and subsequent consent authorized the search. Upon review of the trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that Defendant failed to prove the warranted search was unlawful and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Oregon v. Walker" on Justia Law

Petitioners Gail Rasmussen and Bethanne Darby sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 14 (2012), arguing that the ballot title did not satisfy the requirements of state election law. If enacted, Initiative Petition 14 would amend the Oregon Constitution to prohibit the state from imposing any inheritance tax, estate tax or tax on the transfer of property "where the transfer is the result of the death of a person." Petitioners contended that the ballot title was deficient in a number of different respects pertaining to the caption and the "no" vote result statement and summary. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Attorney General with regard to the caption: "the Attorney General's identification of the subject matter of the measure as amending the constitution to prohibit estate taxes is accurate and substantially complies" with state law. However, with regard to the "no" statement, the Court found a vague and indefinite reference that did not adequately inform voters which estates currently subject to estate or inheritance taxes would continue to be subject to such taxes if the initiative was rejected. The Court referred the ballot title back to the Attorney General's office for modification. View "Rasmussen v. Kroger" on Justia Law