Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendants Jose Guadalupe Cazares-Mendez and Jorge Reyes-Sanchez were convicted of aggravated murder in the death of Jessie Valero. During their separate trials, the court refused to allow them to present hearsay evidence from four different witnesses that another person, Tiffany Scherer, had stated that she had committed the murder. The appellate court held that the trial court erred in excluding the hearsay testimony. The trial court found that there was a credibility question of the witnesses' testimony. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that its case law confirmed "a relating witness's credibility is not part of the court's determination of whether a hearsay statement is trustworthy." Rather, a trial court should focus on whether the declarant's statements are sufficiently corroborated. The Court concluded that the statements in both Defendants' cases met the requirements for admission as "statements against penal interest," and as such, should have been admitted at trial. The Court affirmed the appellate court's decision and remanded both cases for new trials. View "Oregon v. Cazares-Mendez" on Justia Law

Defendants Farmers Insurance Company of Oregon, Mid-Century Insurance Company and Truck Insurance Exchange (Farmers) petitioned the Supreme Court to reconsider an opinion that affirmed a trial court's judgment against it for approximately $8.9 million in compensatory and punitive damages. Farmers contended that the Court's resolution of certain state law issues violated its federal due process rights. Farmers was required by statute and contract to provide personal injury protection to its insureds by covering all reasonable and necessary medical expenses within a year of the insured's injury. Plaintiff Mark Strawn filed a class action suit against Farmers, alleging that Farmers' claims handling process breached its contractual obligations to its insureds. According to Farmers, the Court, in its prior decision, created an "irrebuttable presumption" that altered what was required under state law to prove a fraud claim in a class action in a way that violated due process. The Court held that "Farmers's argument misses the mark" by characterizing the Court's conclusion in its prior holding as "novel" by "assuming the answer to one of the legal questions that [the] Court had to resolve." The Court concluded that Farmers' premises on appeal were incorrect, and that "Farmers's legal arguments therefore fail." View "Strawn v. Farmers Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In this case, the police informed Defendant John Davis that he was the subject of an investigation for sexual abuse. Defendant retained counsel, who sent a letter to the police invoking his right to remain silent and directing the police to discuss the matter with counsel. Months later, the police obtained incriminating statements from defendant without the presence of his counsel by monitoring his communications with the victim. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the police, in obtaining those incriminating statements from defendant, violated his right against self-incrimination and right to counsel under the Oregon Constitution. The trial court concluded that, in light of defendant's earlier invocation of his right to remain silent and right to counsel, the police obtained the incriminating statements in violation of both constitutional provisions. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court concluded that the right against self-incrimination under Article I, Section 12, bars police questioning only when a defendant is in custody or otherwise in compelling circumstances. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the right to counsel under Article I, Section 11, bars police questions outside the presence of counsel only once "criminal proceedings" have begun, which, at the earliest, is the time of a suspect's arrest. Therefore the Court reversed the lower court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Davis" on Justia Law

Trial courts may impose enhanced sentences in criminal cases when an aggravating factor provides a substantial and compelling reason for doing so. The state sentencing guidelines list some aggravating factors that trial courts may consider. Trial courts, however, also may rely on aggravating factors that are not listed (non-enumerated aggravating factors) to impose an enhanced sentence. Defendant Roy Speedis argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that to the extent the sentencing guidelines permit the use of non-enumerated aggravating factors, they either violate the separation of powers provision of the Oregon Constitution or are vague in violation of the Oregon and the United States Constitutions. The trial court disagreed and imposed an enhanced sentence based on non-enumerated aggravating factors. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment without opinion. Upon careful consideration of Defendant's constitutional arguments, the case law and the legislative history of the applicable legal standards, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions. View "Oregon v. Speedis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff John Stuart decided to build a new house on a small farm. He contacted his insurance agent of nineteen years, Defendant Ronald Pittman for "course-of-construction" insurance to cover any problems in the course of building his house. Mr. Pittman discussed the scope of coverage that the policy would provide. Relying on Mr. Pittman's oral assurance of what the policy would cover, Plaintiff agreed to it. Construction started in 2003. Plaintiff received a premium statement, but not a written copy of the policy. An ice storm struck Plaintiff's building project. Plaintiff contacted Mr. Pittman to initiate an insurance claim. Mr. Pittman told Plaintiff that damage should be covered by the policy. In 2004, Plaintiff received a declaration page from Country Mutual Insurance Company, and found that damage to his house was not covered. Plaintiff brought an action against both Mr. Pittman and the Insurance Company alleging breach of the oral "policy" that he and Mr. Pittman agreed to at the onset of the building project. At the conclusion of the trial's evidentiary phase, Defendant moved for a directed verdict, arguing that Plaintiff failed to prove that the oral insurance binder covered his project. The trial court denied the motion, and the jury would later rule in favor of Plaintiff. The verdict was overturned on appeal. The court held that there was no evidence from which a jury could have found in favor of Plaintiff. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff argued that the appellate court misinterpreted the Oregon law that required him to prove that the oral binder superseded the "usual exclusions" of the written policy. The Supreme Court found that the written policy was, as a matter of law, deemed to include all terms of the oral binder. Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court's decision and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "Stuart v. Pittman" on Justia Law

Defendant Ivey Barrett was convicted of misdemeanor stalking. The victim in this case is Appellant Linda Barrett, Defendant's estranged wife. Oregon law granted certain crime victims a "meaningful role" with respect to the criminal prosecution of the accused. At the onset of such proceedings, the prosecutor must inform the trial court, among other things, whether the victim is present, and if not, whether the victim requested advance notice of any critical stage of the proceeding. State law allows victims whose rights are violated to inform the trial court and propose a remedy. Mrs. Barrett invoked her right to be notified, and completed a form memorializing that request. A victim advocate told Mrs. Barrett that she did not need to be present for a pretrial appearance by Defendant. That appearance was not scheduled to involve entry of a plea or sentencing. However, the prosecutor negotiated a plea with Defendant prior to that hearing, and Defendant pled before the court. Mrs. Barrett filed a claim for violation of her rights as a crime victim because she was not notified of that hearing. The trial court agreed that Mrs. Barrett's rights had been violated, but held that state law provided no relief for the violation. On appeal, Mrs. Barrett argued to the Supreme Court that state law permitted her to "propose" her relief. She argued that the trial court erred by not vacating its sentencing decision so that she could be present. The Supreme Court found that Mrs. Barrett was entitled to a remedy, and that vacating Defendant's sentence and conducting a resentencing hearing was permissible under state law. The Court vacated Defendant's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing.

Two women brandishing swords robbed the Purple Parrot Lounge in Klamath Falls. As a result of that crime, a grand jury charged Defendant Roberta Gilmore with conspiracy and first-degree robbery. The trial court arraigned Defendant on those charges and appointed counsel to represent her. After her arraignment, Defendant remained in custody pending trial. Approximately two months later, Defendant sent two notes to the Oregon State Police, asking a detective to "come talk to her." Though the notes did not specify what Defendant wanted to talk about, the police noted that Defendant "wanted to see her kids before she went to prison." The Supreme Court characterized this case as one involving questions on what steps police must take to ensure a knowing and intentional waiver of a defendant's constitutional rights. The trial court implicitly found that Defendant had waived her right to counsel and denied her motion to suppress the statements made after she passed those two notes to the police. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. The Supreme Court found that the police officer did not advise Defendant of her Miranda rights when he spoke to Defendant at her request. Therefore, the statements to the officer should have been suppressed. The Court reversed the appellate and trial courts' decisions, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff Mark Strawn filed a class action suit against Defendants Farmers Insurance Company of Oregon, Mid-Century Insurance Company, and Truck Insurance Exchange (collectively, Farmers). Plaintiff alleged that Farmers had breached contractual duties and committed fraud by instituting a claims handling process that arbitrarily reduced payments for reasonable medical benefits owed under its automobile insurance policies. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff, and awarded damages totaling approximately $8.9 million. Farmers appealed, and the appellate court concluded that the punitive damages awarded by the trial court exceeded constitutional limits, but otherwise affirmed the judgment. Both parties sought the Supreme Courtâs review. Farmers challenged the damages award, arguing that it should be lower. Plaintiff argued that the original award should be reinstated. The Supreme Court rejected Farmersâ arguments, and concluded that the appellate court should not have reached Farmersâ constitutional challenge to the amount of the punitive damages award. Consequently, the Court affirmed part, and reversed part of the appellate decision, and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

The Sheriffs of Jackson and Washington Counties withheld concealed handgun licenses from persons who met all of the statutory conditions for the issuance of such licenses, but admitted to being regular users of medical marijuana. When the sheriffsâ actions were challenged in court, the sheriffs responded that the stateâs handgun licensing scheme does not take medical marijuana use into consideration. The reason why the sheriffs denied the handgun licenses was because the state law is preempted by the federal prohibition on the possession of firearms by persons who are âunlawful users of controlled substances.â Both the trial and appellate courts rejected the preemption argument, and held that the concealed handgun licenses were wrongfully withheld. The sheriffs appealed. The Supreme Court held that the Federal Gun Control Act did not preempt the stateâs concealed handgun licensing statute, and accordingly, the Court ordered the sheriffs issue or renew the requested licenses.

Petitioners Gail Rasmussen and Bethanne Darby sought review of a certified ballot title for âInitiative Petition 10 (2012).â The proposed measure, if approved by the voters, would amend the state constitution to set the procedure for how the state sets its legislative districts following the federal census. Petitioners contended that the caption understates the scope of the changes that adoption of the measure would require under state law, and is thus misleading. The Supreme Court agreed with Petitioners that the caption understates the major effects of adopting the Initiative. The Court remanded the ballot title back to the attorney General for modification.