Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case was an automatic and direct review of death sentences imposed after a "penalty phase" trial. Defendant raised 33 assignments of error. Five of them the Supreme Court said merited discussion: specifically, defendant's claims that (1) the adoption of Article I, section 40, of the Oregon Constitution violated the "separate vote" requirement of Article XVII, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution; (2) the so-called "third question," which asked whether defendant's conduct was "unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased," was unconstitutional; (3) the trial court erred by refusing to admit evidence relevant to the third question or failing to pose the question to the jury; (4) the trial court erred in empanelling an "anonymous" jury; and (5) the trial court erred in allowing the state's expert to testify about defendant's consensual homosexual experience as a teenager. The Court discussed, but rejected, three of the five arguments; defendant's position as to the fourth and fifth were well taken. The Court concluded that that the trial court erred in empanelling an "anonymous" jury without finding, as required by the Court's decision in "State v. Sundberg," (247 P3d 1213 (2011)), that there were strong and particular grounds for believing that the jurors' identities needed to be protected. Because that error was not harmless, the Court vacated the death sentences and remanded the case to the circuit court for a new penalty-phase trial. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to exclude evidence of defendant's homosexual experiences as a teenager. View "Oregon v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged by indictment with (among other things) assault in the first degree. At trial, the state proceeded solely under the theory that defendant had aided and abetted his codefendant's initial assault on the victim. A jury found defendant guilty. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed defendant's first degree assault conviction and remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings on the lesser charges of second- and fourth-degree assault. The Supreme Court allowed the state's petition for review to examine whether, on appellate review, the state can sustain a criminal conviction on a theory of criminal liability that it did not pursue at trial. Finding that it could not, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Oregon v. Burgess" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant Douglas Pitt of two counts of first-degree unlawful sexual penetration, and two counts of first-degree sexual abuse. Defendant appealed, arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine to exclude evidence of prior uncharged sexual misconduct involving the victim and another individual. The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's convictions, concluding that the trial court did not err in declining to exclude the challenged evidence because it was relevant to bolster the victim's credibility in identifying defendant as her abuser. The Supreme Court granted review to decide whether the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the trial court's decision to deny defendant's motion in limine. The trial court did not decide that the evidence of defendant's uncharged misconduct was conditionally admissible. It ruled instead, without conditions, that the uncharged misconduct evidence was relevant and admissible. In light of the record that existed when the trial court addressed the motion in limine, the court's ruling was erroneous. Accordingly, the appellate court's affirmation of the trial court was in error. The ruling was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Pitt" on Justia Law

In this construction defect case, defendant moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion. Plaintiff then filed a "motion for reconsideration" of the summary judgment ruling. The court meanwhile entered judgment, and plaintiff filed a notice of appeal. When the trial court later denied the motion for reconsideration, plaintiff did not file a new notice of appeal. The question in this case was whether plaintiff needed to do so. Defendant argued that, because a motion for reconsideration constitutes a motion for new trial, its filing rendered plaintiff's earlier notice of appeal premature and, as a consequence, a nullity. Plaintiff argued that the motion for reconsideration did not constitute a motion for a new trial and thus had no effect on the filing of the notice of appeal. The Court of Appeals concluded that, under "Carter v. U.S. National Bank," (747 P2d 980 (1987)), a motion for reconsideration constitutes a motion for a new trial. Nevertheless, the court held that the filing of the motion did not have the effect of rendering the appeal a nullity. Consequently, the court concluded that plaintiff was not required to file a new notice of appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that "Carter" and earlier decisions declaring that a motion for reconsideration of a summary judgment constitutes a motion for a new trial were incorrectly decided. In this case, plaintiff's filing of the motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment did not render the filing of the notice of appeal premature. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals on different grounds. View "Assoc. Unit Owners of Timbercrest Condo v. Warren" on Justia Law

In 2006, two ballot measures were placed before Oregon voters at the polls. Measure 46 (2006) sought to amend the Oregon Constitution to permit the enactment of laws prohibiting or limiting electoral campaign "contributions and expenditures, of any type or description." Measure 47 (2006) sought to create new campaign finance statutes that would, essentially, statutorily implement the constitutional changes proposed in Measure 46. Voters rejected Measure 46 but approved Measure 47. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case required the examination of the operative text of Measure 47. The trial court concluded that the text at issue was severable from the ballot measure and ruled that the remaining provisions of the measure were, according to the plain text of the measure itself, dormant. The Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court also affirmed the trial court's judgment and the decision by the Court of Appeals. View "Hazell v. Brown" on Justia Law

Subsection (1) of ORS 20.080 provides for an award of attorney fees to the plaintiff, if the plaintiff prevails in the action, plus prerequisites plaintiff must adhere to to collect the award. Subsection (2) provides for an award of fees to the defendant if the defendant pleads a counterclaim and the defendant prevails in the action. Subsection (2), however, does not mention any prerequisites to the award. The issue in this case was whether subsection (2) nevertheless should be read to require a defendant to have made a timely written demand as a prerequisite to recovering attorney fees under the statute. The Court of Appeals concluded that ORS 20.080(2) must be read to include the requirement. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed: "the legislature included no statutory wording that is reasonably capable of being read to require a defendant to tender a prelitigation demand as a prerequisite to recovering attorney fees." View "Halperin v. Pitts" on Justia Law

Under section 6(6) of Ballot Measure 49 (2007), certain "owners" of property may file a claim to establish up to three home-site approvals, notwithstanding existing land use restrictions that would otherwise preclude such development. At issue in this case was the meaning of the term "owner" as it is used in that section. Specifically, the issue was whether the term includes a seller of property under a land sale contract who retains legal title to the property. The Court of Appeals concluded that, as the term is used in Ballot Measure 49, the term "owner" means only the purchaser of property under a land sale contract and does not include the seller of the property who retains title. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals: "In short, there is no persuasive evidence that the voters intended the three categories of owners under ORS 195.300(18) to be mutually exclusive. To the contrary, the phrasing of that definition, along with other definitions in the same section, and other related provisions of the law make clear that those definitional components were intended to be inclusive." View "Burke v. Oregon" on Justia Law

In this case the issue before the Supreme Court concerned an action under ORS 30.866 in which a plaintiff sought both a stalking protective order and a judgment for compensatory money damages, whether the parties are entitled to a jury trial on the claim for money damages. Plaintiff in this case filed a petition under ORS 30.866, alleging that the defendant had engaged in knowing and repeated unwanted sexual contact with her in the two years preceding the filing of the petition and that that contact had caused plaintiff reasonable apprehension regarding her safety. Plaintiff claimed that she was entitled to three forms of relief: a stalking protective order enjoining defendant from engaging in certain conduct; an award of compensatory damages for lost sick and annual leave, lost wages, and counseling expenses; and an award of reasonable attorney fees. Defendant asserted that he was entitled to a jury trial on plaintiff's claim for compensatory money damages. The trial court disagreed and conducted the trial on all three claims without a jury. The court found in favor of plaintiff, issued a stalking protective order, entered a general judgment for compensatory damages in the amount of $42,347.78, and entered a supplemental judgment for reasonable attorney fees. Defendant appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that defendant had neither a statutory nor a constitutional right to a jury trial. The court reasoned that the text of ORS 30.866 contains "no reference that conveys any kind of indication that the legislature intended to confer a right to a jury trial." Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court on the jury trial issue, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "M. K. F. v. Miramontes" on Justia Law

Ann Sacks Tile and Stone, Inc.; Canac Kitchen US Limited; and Koehler Rental Power, Inc. appealed a general tax judgment against them directly to the Supreme Court. The Department of Revenue responded with a motion to determine jurisdiction, asking the Court to determine whether a defect in the manner in which the companies had served their notice of appeal on the department deprived the Supreme Court of authority to decide the appeal. The companies asserted that the defects did not deprive the court of jurisdiction. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded it indeed lacked jurisdiction over the case, and accordingly dismissed the appeal. View "Ann Sacks Tile and Stone, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

ORS 742.061 authorizes an award of attorney fees to an insured who prevails in "an action * * * in any court of this state upon any policy of insurance of any kind or nature * * *." A later enacted statute, ORS 742.001, provides that ORS chapter 742 "appl[ies] to all insurance policies delivered or issued for delivery in this state * * *." The question in this case was whether ORS 742.001 precluded awarding attorney fees to an insured who prevailed in an action in an Oregon court on an insurance policy that was issued for delivery and delivered in the State of Washington. The trial court concluded that it did and entered a supplemental judgment to that effect. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Considering the text, context, and legislative history of Chapter 742, the Supreme Court concluded that the legislature did not intend that ORS 742.001 would limit the scope of ORS 742.061. "For us to hold otherwise, we would have to turn an expansion of the state's authority to impose substantive regulations on insurers transacting business in Oregon into a limitation on the remedial and procedural rules that affect insurers appearing in its courts. * * * we would have to read a limitation into the text of that section that the legislature did not include. We may not do that." The Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Morgan v. Amex Assurance Company" on Justia Law