Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Gregory McBride lived in his friend's house where the two grew, used and sold marijuana. THe friend's teen-aged daughter and her friend also lived there. Defendant occasionally smoked marijuana in the home, sometimes with the teenagers. Based on those circumstances, Defendant was charged with manufacturing a controlled substance, delivering said substance to a minor and two counts of endangering the welfare of minors. Defendant moved for acquittal at trial, but was ultimately convicted by a jury on all counts. The Court of Appeals affirmed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant challenged only his child-endangerment convictions. Upon review of the evidence in the record, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on those charges, and therefore reversed his conviction as to those counts. View "Oregon v. McBride" on Justia Law

Petitioner Plaid Pantries, Inc. argued before the Supreme Court that the land use final order that Respondent Metro adopted after a remand from the Court did not comply with the applicable statutory standards. Metro and Respondent Tri-County Metropolitan Transit District of Oregon (TriMet) asserted that the land use final order was legally sufficient. The center of the dispute concerned the construction of one part of the South North MAX Light Rail Project. Plain Pantries and other parties challenged the land use final order before the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA). The parties made a number of arguments before LUBA, one of which was that Metro had exceeded its statutory authority in adopting the land use final order because the order purported to approve parts of the project that lay outside the Portland metropolitan urban growth boundary. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Metro neither exceeded its authority not made any decision on the light rail route, associated facilities or highway improvements that was not supported by substantial evidence in the record. The Court affirmed the land use final order. View "Weber Coastal Bells v. Metro" on Justia Law

In opposing petitions for writs of mandamus, both challenged a trial court order that allowed a release to the press and public over one thousand redacted versions of "ineligible volunteer" files that belonged to Defendant Boy Scouts of America (BSA). The petitions arose from a tort action brought against the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints and the BSA by six former scouts who alleged sexual abuse by their scout leaders. The files in question contained information regarding child sexual abuse complaints against BSA volunteers from 1965 to 1985. The trial court had admitted the files, and BSA's actions in response to those complaints, into evidence in the jury trial. Following the verdict, plaintiffs moved to vacate the protective order so that they could release the ineligible volunteer files to the public. Six media entities had previously had moved to intervene and also asked the trial court to release the trial exhibits, including the 1,247 ineligible volunteer files, for immediate public access. The trial court vacated the protective order and ordered the redaction of the names of others who reported the alleged abuse. The trial court concluded that Article I, section 10, required the release of the ineligible volunteer files, reasoning that Article I, section 10, encompassed "the right of the public and the press to know what evidence is presented in Court proceedings and is available for consideration by the jury in reaching its verdict." In regard to the mandamus petition of the BSA, the Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court's reasoning in deciding that Article I, section 10, required the court to dissolve its protective order concerning the lists of names of alleged child sexual abuse victims and reporters of suspected child sexual abuse. The Court concluded the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion in all the circumstances. Thus, there was no basis to grant relief in mandamus to the BSA. In regard to the mandamus petition of plaintiffs and intervenors, the Court concluded that the open courts provision in Article I, section 10, did not require the trial court, at the end of a trial, to order the release of exhibits that were subject to an earlier protective order requiring that the parties maintain their confidentially at the close of trial. "The court had discretion to order, on good cause shown, the release of those documents subject to the redaction of names set out in the exhibits to protect victims of child sexual abuse and reporters of child sexual abuse from embarrassment, retaliation, or other harm." The court in this case properly exercised that authority. Additionally, the court did not violate Article I, section 10, by staying the effectiveness of its disclosure order pending appellate review. View "Doe v. Corp. of Presiding Bishop" on Justia Law

In this criminal case, the victim filed an interlocutory appeal challenging several orders of the trial court that she contended violated her right to "refuse an interview, deposition or other discovery request by the criminal defendant," under Article I, section 42(1)(c), of the Oregon Constitution. Defendant attempted to obtain from Google, Inc., by subpoena duces tecum "all internet activity and searches conducted by [the victim], email [of the victim] . . . including IP addresses, web searches requested, results, and sites viewed" as well as "[a]ny and all of [the victim's] email . . . to or from anyone concerning [defendant]." Google denied defendant's request, asserting that, under the federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 USC 2702(a) (2006), the company was prohibited from disclosing the information without the victim's consent or a court order. The prosecuting attorney requested the victim's consent, but she refused. Defendant then renewed his motion to compel. The prosecuting attorney opposed defendant's motion, arguing that requiring the discovery of the requested information following the victim's refusal to provide it would violate her right to refuse a discovery request under the Oregon Constitution. In December 2011, the trial court held a hearing on the prosecuting attorney's objections. Ultimately, the trial court overruled those objections and ordered the prosecuting attorney to obtain the Google information on defendant's behalf. Following arguments on the matter, the trial court denied the relief requested by the victim. The trial court explained that "the Court has never ordered the victim to produce anything and so there is nothing that the Court has ordered that is inconsistent with . . . her protections under . . . the Oregon [C]onstitution[.]" Upon review, the Supreme Court dismissed the interlocutory appeal: "[t]he victim had seven days from the trial court's issuance of its order denying her requested relief. . . . The victim did not file her notice of interlocutory appeal until April 27, 2012. The appeal was untimely. The timely filing of the notice of interlocutory appeal is 'jurisdictional and may not be waived.'" Accordingly, the Court dismissed the victim's appeal. View "Oregon v. Bray" on Justia Law

Defendant Jesse Moss filed a notice of appeal and then absconded. The state moved to dismiss his appeal pursuant to the state's fugitive dismissal rule (ORAP 8.05(3)). In the meantime, Defendant was arrested and returned to custody. On the basis of his return to custody, Defendant opposed the motion to dismiss, arguing that he had "surrendered" within the meaning of the statute. The State responded that the mere fact that an absconding defendant has been apprehended by police is not sufficient to establish that he has "surrendered" within the meaning of the rule. The Court of Appeals agreed with the State and dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court allowed Defendant's petition for review and affirmed the order of dismissal. View "Oregon v. Moss" on Justia Law

Realtor-Defendant Dylan McDowell petitioned for a peremptory or alternative writ of mandamus to compel his release pending trial. He contended that he was entitled to release under ORS 136.290, which provides, in part, that a criminal defendant "shall not remain in custody pending commencement of the trial of the defendant more than 60 days after the time of arrest." According to Defendant, he was indicted, arrested, and then held more than 60 days, when the state dismissed the charges and released him. Several days later, however, the state reindicted him on the same charges and arrested him again. He contended that the 60-day statutory deadline ran and that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to be released under ORS 136.290. The state argued that the court did not err in denying relator's motion, because the statutory 60-day deadline recommenced upon his rearrest. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with Defendant and issued a peremptory writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to release Defendant immediately. View "Oregon v. McDowell" on Justia Law

This case arose out of Defendant Javier Eumana-Moranchel's motion in limine to exclude the testimony of the State's expert witness in his prosecution for driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII). The issue presented was whether the state could introduce an expert's testimony to prove that defendant's blood alcohol content (BAC) was over the legal limit of .08 percent when a police officer stopped him for driving erratically, even though Defendant's BAC was under the legal limit at the time of his breath test, approximately an hour and a half later. At the pretrial hearing on Defendant's motion, the trial court excluded the expert's testimony interpreting defendant's breath test results to the extent that that testimony would explain that Defendant's BAC was over .08 percent at the time he was driving. The State filed an interlocutory appeal of that ruling and the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the expert's testimony was derived from a chemical analysis of defendant's breath and was therefore admissible. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the State should have been permitted to offer the expert's testimony explaining retrograde extrapolation to establish that Defendant's BAC was over .08 percent at the time he was driving. The Court affirmed the appellate court, reversed the circuit court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Eumana-Moranchel" on Justia Law

Defendants Michael Miskell and Anthony Sinibaldi sought review of a Court of Appeals decision affirming their convictions for aggravated first-degree theft and second-degree burglary. The Supreme Court allowed their petition for review to consider one of the issues defendants raised in their consolidated appeal: whether the trial court erred in denying their motion to suppress an audio recording of a conversation between defendants and a police informant, which the police made without first obtaining a court order. Upon review, the Court concluded that the police acted unlawfully in failing to seek a court order under ORS 9 133.726 before intercepting and recording the conversation, and that the recording should have been suppressed. The Court further concluded that the error was prejudicial. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Miskell/Sinibaldi" on Justia Law

The State appealed, and Defendant Kevin Jarnagin cross-appealed a pretrial order in a murder case suppressing evidence. Neither party challenged the trial court's ruling that the officers violated Defendant's rights under the state constitution when they questioned him at the police station and later at a hospital without advising him of his Miranda rights. The parties focused instead on whether statements that defendant made the next day at his home and before and after a polygraph examination should be suppressed on the ground that those statements were a product of the Miranda violations the day before. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the statements Defendant made at his home were a product of the Miranda violations the day before but that the statements he made before and after the polygraph examination were not. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's order in part and reverse it in part. View "Oregon v. Jarnagin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff David Eads underwent surgery performed by a Defendant Dr. Timothy Borman, a physician whose office was in a building that Defendant Salem Hospital, a limited liability company (LLC), leased to medical providers. The surgeon performed the surgery negligently, causing Plaintiff permanent and disabling injuries. Plaintiff brought this malpractice action against the LLC landlord, as well as the surgeon and others involved in his medical treatment. Plaintiff pursued the action against the LLC on a theory of apparent agency. Specifically, Plaintiff's theory was that, through the signage on the building and other representations, the LLC created the appearance that the building housed a group medical entity of which Plaintiff's surgeon was an agent. The trial court granted summary judgment for the LLC, concluding that the evidence was legally insufficient to hold the LLC vicariously liable for the surgeon's negligence on an apparent agency theory. The Court of Appeals agreed, and affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Plaintiff's petition for review to resolve when a nonnegligent person or entity may be held vicariously liable on an apparent agency theory for physical injuries negligently inflicted by a medical professional. The Court concluded that, for such liability to arise, the injured party must have dealt with the negligent medical professional based on a reasonable belief, traceable to the putative principal's conduct or representations, that the medical professional was the principal's employee or was otherwise subject to the principal's right of control in providing the medical services that caused the injured party's injury. View "Eads v. Borman" on Justia Law