Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court previously affirmed Defendant Robert Langley, Jr.'s aggravated murder convictions, but twice vacated his death sentences and remanded the case for further penalty-phase proceedings. On this third review, Defendant raised 27 assignments of error related to the third and most recent penalty-phase proceeding. As his second assignment of error, Defendant contended the trial court erred by requiring him to proceed pro se without first securing valid waiver of his right to counsel. Because the Supreme Court determined that that assignment was well-taken, the Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for further penalty-phase proceedings. View "Oregon v. Langley" on Justia Law

Two petitioners sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition (IP) 28 (2012). Before 2009, Oregon imposed a 6.6 percent tax rate on a corporation's "taxable income." In 2009, the voters approved Ballot Measure 67, which modified the marginal tax rate that corporations pay on their taxable income. Petitioner Patrick Green raised a single challenge to the caption, the "yes" vote result statement, the "no" vote result statement, and the summary. He contended that each part of the ballot title was defective because it referred to a tax on "corporate income" rather than a tax on corporate "profits" or "taxable income." He reasoned that the use of the phrase "corporate income" was misleading because it failed to communicate that the tax would fall only on corporate profits. Petitioner Dan Harmon raised a similar challenge, noting that what the IP would have modified was a corporate excise tax and that the ballot title should have either referred to an excise tax or used the phrase "taxable income." In his view, either phrase would have been more accurate and less misleading than the use of the unmodified term "income." In each instance, the certified ballot title used the term "income," even though that term can refer to more than one type of income and even though those differing types of income may have significantly different tax consequences. The Supreme Court concluded the Attorney General advanced no legitimate reason for not using a more accurate term, which would reduce the potential for misleading the voters that the certified ballot title currently presents. The Court agreed with Petitioners that referring to a tax on corporate "income" was, without more, misleading. Accordingly, the Court referred the caption, the "yes" result statement, the "no" result statement, and the summary to the Attorney General for modification. View "Green/Harmon v. Kroger" on Justia Law

Defendant Jose Cabanilla is a native Spanish speaker whose command of English was described as "weak." A witness saw Defendant's vehicle leave the road at a high rate of speed, roll over and come to rest in a nearby field. The responding officer arrested Defendant for driving under the influence of intoxicants. The matter before the Supreme Court concerned whether for purposes of implied consent, the officer "informed" Defendant of the consequences of refusing to take a breath test when those consequences were explained in English. The trial court concluded that Defendant had been adequately informed and declined to suppress evidence of Defendant's refusal to take the test. A jury convicted Defendant of driving while under the influence (DUII), and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that evidence of a DUII defendant's refusal to take a breath test is admissible against that defendant even if the state does not establish that the defendant understood the information given about his rights and the consequences of refusing the breath test. View "Oregon v. Cabanilla" on Justia Law

The issue in this case was whether a healthcare provider could be held liable for damages when the provider's negligence permitted the theft of its patients' personal information, though the information was never used or viewed by the thief or any other person. Plaintiffs Laurie Paul and Russell Gibson (individually and on behalf of all similarly-situated individuals) claimed economic and noneconomic damages for financial injury and emotional distress that they allegedly suffered when, through Defendant Providence Health System-Oregon's alleged negligence, computer disks and tapes containing personal information from an estimated 365,000 patients (including Plaintiffs') were stolen from the car of one of Defendant’s employees. The trial court and Court of Appeals held that Plaintiffs had failed to state claims for negligence or for violation of the Unlawful Trade Practices Act (UTPA). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that, in the absence of allegations that the stolen information was used in any way or even was viewed by a third party, Plaintiffs did not suffer an injury that would provide a basis for a negligence claim or an action under the UTPA. View "Paul v. Providence Health System-Oregon" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Greenwood Products, Inc. and Jewett-Cameron Lumber Corp. obtained a jury verdict in their favor on a breach of contract claim against Defendants Forest Products, Dovenberg, and LeFors. They appealed the Court of Appeals' decision that reversed the judgment entered on that verdict. The contract in question required Defendants to sell, and Plaintiffs to buy all of Defendants' inventory, for a certain percentage over Defendants' cost for that inventory. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants had breached the contract by erroneously accounting for their cost of inventory, causing Plaintiffs to pay $820,000 more for the inventory than they should have. Defendants moved for a directed verdict on the breach of contract claim, but the trial court denied the motion and sent the claim to the jury, which returned a verdict for Plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court should have granted defendants' motion for a directed verdict because the contract did not impose any obligation on defendants to accurately account for the cost of the inventory. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court in this case properly rejected each of the grounds that Defendants' raised at trial for granting their motion for a directed verdict. The Court also concluded that the additional argument that the Court of Appeals relied on in reversing the trial court was not preserved, and therefore reversed the appellate court's decision overturning the trial court. View "Greenwood Products v. Greenwood Forest Products" on Justia Law

At issue in this dependency case was the lawfulness of a juvenile court order that required a father not to interfere with the ability of a child who is a ward of the court to visit other children who live with the father but are not wards of the court. The Court of Appeals concluded that the juvenile court possessed the authority to enter the order under ORS 419B.337(3). "J.R.F," the Father in this case, contended that the Court of Appeals erred in its holding, because the order at issue did not involve visitation "by the parents or the siblings." The Department of Human Services (DHS) contended that the Court of Appeals was correct, because, although ORS 419B.337(3) did not explicitly authorize the order at issue, the dependency statutes, taken as a whole, authorized the court to "make any order designed to further the best interest of a ward and advance the reunification of the family." Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that even if the state was correct about the scope of the authority that the statutes conferred on the juvenile court, the record in this case was inadequate to support the order at issue. The Court therefore reversed the opinion of the Court of Appeals and vacated the order of the juvenile court. View "Dept. of Human Services v. J. R. F." on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 26 (2012), arguing that the ballot title did not satisfy the requirements of ORS 250.035(2). Initiative Petition 26 would amend a number of statutory provisions pertaining to the commercial harvest and sale of fish caught in Oregon waters. As the Supreme Court noted in reviewing the ballot title for a different initiative petition concerning commercial fishing, those statutes "exist[ed] as part of a complex web of laws," including an interstate compact between Oregon and Washington, statutes and regulations of both states, federal law, treaties with Native American tribes, and various court orders. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the initiative's caption overstated the effect of the proposed measure by asserting that it would eliminate "non-tribal commercial fishing." Petitioners argued, and the Attorney General did not appear to disagree, that some commercial fishing -- of some species, in some Oregon waters, using some gear -- has occurred or was then occurring and that it would not be prohibited by Initiative Petition 26. Accordingly, the reference in the caption to the "elimination" of non-tribal commercial fishing needed to be changed. The caption also referred to only the Columbia River, thus understating the scope of the proposed measure, which would ban non-tribal commercial gillnetting of all fish in all Oregon "inland waters." That description, too, needed to be changed. The Court did not address petitioners' other challenges to the caption, and remanded the matter back to the Attorney General for modification. View "Girod v. Kroger" on Justia Law

Petitioners, Northeast Coalition of Neighborhoods and Coalition for a Livable Future, sought direct review under Oregon Laws 1996, chapter 12, of a decision by the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA) that affirmed in relevant part a land use final order by Respondent METRO. The land use final order at issue concerned the Columbia River Crossing Project, which (among other things) would extend a light rail line from Oregon to Washington. Petitioners contended Metro either exceeded its statutory authority in adopting the order or that its decisions in the order were not supported by substantial evidence. Respondents Metro and Tri-County Metropolitan Transit District of Oregon (TriMet) opposed the petition. Finding that Petitioners failed to show that METRO either exceeded its statutory authority or made a decision about the highway improvements that was not supported by substantial evidence on the whole record, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Weber Coastal Bells v. METRO" on Justia Law

Petitioners Jann Carson, David Fidanque, Roey Thorpe and Cynthia Pappas sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot initiative petition 22 (2012), arguing that the title did not satisfy the requirements of state law. "Initiative Petition 22" would amend the Oregon Constitution to create a new provision to "recognize personal 'right to life' (undefined) that begins at fertilization [and] prohibits all abortions [and] certain contraceptives." Petitioners contended that the ballot title was deficient in a number of respects pertaining to the caption, the "yes" and "no" vote result statements and the summary. The Supreme Court found that reference to the "full legal rights of a person" in the "no" vote result statement was too vague to substantially comply with state law. Furthermore, "the use of the phrase in the summary pose[d] the same problems and for that reason, the summary must be referred to the Attorney General to more accurately describe the current state of the law." The Court found that there appeared to be no dispute that adoption of the measure would have the effect of prohibiting certain fertility treatments. The Court therefore referred the ballot measure back to the Attorney General for further modification. View "Carson v. Kroger" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court pertained to ORCP 44 C and whether it required Plaintiff "A.G." to deliver to Defendants Robert Guitron and Aerobic & Dancewear Shoppe, LLC, at Defendants' request, a copy of all written reports of examinations related to the psychological injuries for which Plaintiff sought recovery, including the report of an examination by a psychologist retained by Plaintiff's counsel for the purpose of the litigation. Because Pefendants requested and plaintiff failed to deliver that report, the trial court entered an order precluding the psychologist from testifying at trial, and Defendants ultimately prevailed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Finding that the "search for truth and justice" to be paramount and Oregon case law required plaintiffs to produce on request, the reports of the experts who examine them for purposes of litigation as well as for treatment, the Supreme Court concluded that in this case, the trial court was correct that Plaintiff was required to produce the psychologist's report. The Court therefore affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the trial court. View "A. G. v. Guitron" on Justia Law