Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Darrell Kasberg farmed piece of property leased from the Wheelers. The Wheelers agreed to loan Plaintiff money, using farmland he owned as collateral. When disagreements arose, the Wheelers threatened to evict Plaintiff from both his land and the leased land. On the day of the eviction trial, Plaintiff told his lawyer from Defendant firm Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP that he would be willing to give up his right to repurchase the leased farmland if the Wheelers would remove a crop lien placed on the land in time for him to meet a planting deadline. Plaintiff's lawyer met with the Wheelers' lawyer and they negotiated an oral settlement agreement. Plaintiff was not present at that meeting. The agreement required (amongst other things) that Plaintiff relinquish any interest or claim of interest in, and surrender possession of his collateral farmland. In exchange, the Wheelers agreed to dismiss their breach of contract action and to remove the lien. Plaintiff would later learn and inform his lawyer that the Wheelers had not removed the lien. This resulted in Plaintiff missing the planting deadline, and he lost an opportunity to receive both money from the sale of the crop and related government subsidies. Plaintiff wished to file an suit against the Wheelers for their handling of the crop lien, and approached his lawyer to handle the case. Though his lawyer lead Plaintiff to believe he would be successful in pursuit of the Wheelers, the lawyer had in reality given bad advice with regard to the statute of limitations that governed Plaintiff's suit. Plaintiff then initiated suit against his former lawyer and Defendant firm, alleging legal malpractice in handling the Wheeler lien dispute. The trial court decided that the facts did not present a genuine issue as to whether Plaintiff knew or should have known before he filed his action, that Defendant had negligently negotiated the oral settlement agreement. The court concluded that Plaintiff's action was thus time-barred. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Plaintiff proffered evidence from which a jury could reasonably find that he did not have actual knowledge that his attorney's acts or omissions were a cause of his damages. As such, the Court reversed the trial court's holding and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kaseberg v. Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP" on Justia Law

Defendant David Swanson was charged with misdemeanor reckless driving. At trial, Defendant asked the trial court to instruct the jury on the elements of "careless" driving (a traffic violation), arguing that it is a lesser-included offense of reckless driving. The trial court declined to give such an instruction, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that "reckless driving" did not extend to the lesser-included violation, and was instead limited to lesser-included criminal offenses: "violations and crimes are distinctive categories of offenses and... juries are authorized to consider only lesser-included crimes, not lesser-included violations of a charged crime." View "Oregon v. Swanson" on Justia Law

The question before the Supreme Court in this case was whether a landowner holding a "Measure 37" waiver had a common law vested right to construct a residential subdivision that he had begun but not completed by the effective date of "Measure 49." Yamhill County found that the costs that the landowner had incurred were sufficient to establish a vested right to complete construction of the subdivision, and the circuit court upheld the county's decision on a writ of review. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals started from the proposition that, in the context of Measure 49, a common law vested right turns primarily on the ratio between the costs that a landowner has incurred and the projected cost of the development. It reversed because the county had given too little weight to that factor. The Supreme Court allowed the landowner's petition for review to clarify the standard for determining when, in the context of Measure 49, a common law right to complete a development will vest. The Court then affirmed the Court of Appeals decision, although for different reasons than those stated in the Court of Appeals opinion. View "Friends of Yamhill County v. Board of Commissioners" on Justia Law

This opinion consolidated two cases brought before the Supreme Court on certified appeals from the Court of Appeals. Both cases involved the Public Employees Retirement Board's (PERB or the Board) revision or reduction of benefits with respect to "Window Retirees." These cases involved the Board's efforts to recoup overpayments of benefits to retirees that were predicated on a 20 percent earnings credit for calendar year 1999 that the Board approved by order in 2000. PERB sought to recoup these overpayments to the Window Retirees through an overpayment recovery mechanism set out in ORS 238.715.2. A number of members challenged the statutory mechanism for returning the payments, and the methodology the Board used in making its individualized determinations. Upon review, the Supreme Court determined that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to the "Arken defendants" on all four of the claims raised by the "Arken plaintiffs." Furthermore, the Court determined that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the "Robinson petitioners" on their claims for relief. Because the Court concluded that PERB correctly applied ORS 238.715 to recoup overpayments that were made to the Window Retirees based on the 20 percent earnings credit for 1999, the Court also determined that the trial court erred in denying PERB's cross-motion for summary judgment. View "Arken v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

Petitioners Gail Rasmussen and Bethanne Darby sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 15 (2012). If enacted, Initiative Petition 15 would add a provision to the Oregon Revised Statutes that would phase out all estate and inheritance taxes, and related taxes on intra-family property transfers that the state currently has statutory authority to collect. The proposed measure would supersede any Oregon law that purports to impose such a tax. Petitioners were electors who timely submitted written comments to the Secretary of State concerning the content of the Attorney General's draft ballot title and who therefore were entitled to seek review of the resulting certified ballot title to the Supreme Court. Petitioners challenged the caption and "yes" and "no" vote result statements. The Supreme Court reviewed the certified ballot title to determine whether it substantially complied with ORS 250.035(2) (stating requirements for ballot titles). The Court determined that the initiative warranted revision by the Attorney General, and referred the ballot back for modification. View "Rasmussen v. Kroger" on Justia Law

ORS 105.135(3) requires a plaintiff in an action for forcible entry and detainer (FED) to serve the summons and complaint "by the end of the judicial day next following the payment of filing fees." The issue in this case was whether failure to serve a summons and amended complaint within one day of the payment of filing fees required dismissal of the FED action. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals concluded that such a failure did not require dismissal. Plaintiff Balboa Apartments filed an FED complaint against Defendant Lisa Patrick for nonpayment of residential rent. Plaintiff paid the requisite filing fee at the same time. The summons and complaint erroneously listed Defendant's apartment as unit "#20," when, in fact, defendant occupied unit "#28." A process server attempted service on the wrong apartment, ultimately posting a copy of the summons and complaint on the door of unit 20. Plaintiff learned of the mistake and filed an amended complaint that listed the correct unit number. Plaintiff did not pay an additional filing fee, because none was required. The clerk reset the first appearance date. A process server posted the amended complaint and summons at Defendant's apartment. Defendant petitioned for review, and the Supreme Court accepted review to determine whether the Court of Appeals accurately interpreted ORS 105.135. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial and appellate courts which held dismissal of the case due to the gap in filing and payment of the filing fee was not warranted. View "Balboa Apartments v. Patrick" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought judicial review of a final order of the Public Employees Retirement Board (PERB). They contested the reduction of their retirement benefits as a result of PERB's efforts to recoup benefit overpayments that Petitioners had received because of an erroneous 20 percent earnings credit for 1999. The Court of Appeals certified the matter to the Supreme Court, and upon review of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed PERB's final order. View "Goodson v. Public Employees Retirement System" on Justia Law

The state charged Defendant Tyler Kurokawa-Lasciak with various drug offenses, and Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence that the police had obtained from a warrantless search of his rental van. The state contended that no warrant was required under the automobile exception to Article I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution or, alternatively, that Defendant's companion was in possession of the van and had given her consent to search. The trial court granted Defendant's motion to suppress and the state appealed. Defendant was detained in the parking lot of a casino. Officials there called police because Defendant had been disorderly earlier in the evening. The arresting officer told Defendant that he'd go to jail, but that he had another option: if Defendant consented to a search of his van, the officer might cite him at the casino and release him there. Defendant asked for a lawyer. The officer told Defendant he would impound the van and later obtain a search warrant. Further investigation would reveal that Defendant had given the keys to his girlfriend who was inside the casino. Officers found her inside and asked her whether they could search the van. She replied that she did not believe she had authority to permit the search. Eventually she acquiesced, and officers found 77 grams of marijuana, 56 grams of hashish, electronic scales, and approximately $48,000 in cash inside. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling and held that the search was valid under the automobile exception. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the automobile exception did not permit the warrantless search of Defendant's van. The Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to decide the issue that it did not reach -- whether the search was permitted by Defendant's companion's consent. View "Oregon v. Kurokawa-Lasciak" on Justia Law

The issues presented to the Supreme Court in this case concerned evidentiary and pleading questions that arose in the trial of a multi-defendant negligence case. Plaintiff Clarence Lasley (the decedent's father) brought this case against defendants Combined Transport, Inc. (Combined Transport) and Judy Clemmer (Clemmer). On the day that decedent died, a truck owned and operated by Combined Transport lost part of its load of large panes of glass on the freeway. During the clean-up, traffic backed up and decedent was stopped. Clemmer drove into decedent's pickup, causing leaks in its fuel system. The ensuing fire killed decedent. Combined Transport denied that it was negligent and that its conduct foreseeably resulted in decedent's death. Clemmer admitted that she was negligent in driving at an unreasonable speed and in failing to maintain a proper lookout and control. Clemmer also admitted that her negligence was a cause of decedent's death. Based on the pleadings, the trial court granted Plaintiff's motion in limine to exclude evidence that Clemmer was intoxicated at the time of the collision. The jury rendered a verdict against both defendants, finding Combined Transport 22 percent at fault and Clemmer 78 percent at fault for plaintiff's damages. Combined Transport appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court had erred in excluding the evidence of Clemmer's intoxication. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that evidence of Clemmer's intoxication was not relevant to the issue of whether Combined Transport's negligence was a cause of decedent's death but was relevant to the issue of apportionment of fault. The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, reversed the judgment of the circuit court, and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Lasley v. Combined Transport, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue presented to the Supreme Court in this appeal was whether a criminal defendant may, after pleading 'no contest' to a misdemeanor offense, challenge his sentence on the ground that it violates the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution. The Court of Appeals held that it had jurisdiction under ORS 6 138.050(1)(a), which provides that a defendant who has pleaded guilty may appeal after making a colorable showing that the sentence "[e]xceeds the maximum allowable by law." The State sought review, arguing that, because defendant's sentence was well within the maximum allowable by applicable statutes, the case should have been dismissed. Defendant responded that because the process by which the court arrived at his sentence was unconstitutional, that sentence "exceed[ed] the maximum allowable by law" in the sense that any sentence arrived at by that process was unlawful. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the state was correct that this appeal was not cognizable under ORS 138.050, and therefore the Court reversed and remanded for entry of an order dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Oregon v. Cloutier" on Justia Law