Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A tenant rented a space on a landlord’s farm to park and live in her recreational vehicle (RV). The site lacked a sewage disposal system, and the tenant connected her RV’s wastewater port to a pipe that discharged raw sewage onto the ground. After the county health department cited the landlord for this violation, the landlord notified the tenant of lease termination for cause and initiated a forcible entry and detainer (FED) action to evict her. The tenant argued that her obligation to keep the premises clean and sanitary depended on the landlord’s duty to provide a sewage system. She also counterclaimed for damages, alleging the landlord failed to provide both a sewage system and safe drinking water.The Umatilla County Circuit Court ruled in favor of the landlord on both the eviction and the tenant’s counterclaims, awarding possession to the landlord. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the landlord’s failure to provide a sewage system did not excuse the tenant’s duty to keep the premises sanitary, and that the tenant failed to prove her counterclaims, particularly because she did not notify the landlord of the problems.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case. It held that the landlord’s failure to provide a sewage disposal system violated his statutory obligation to maintain the premises in a habitable condition. However, this did not excuse the tenant from her independent obligation to refrain from dumping sewage onto the ground. The tenant’s continued discharge of sewage constituted a violation that justified termination of the tenancy and eviction. Regarding the counterclaims, the court found the tenant could recover damages for the lack of a sewage system because the landlord already knew of the deficiency, but not for unsafe drinking water, as there was no evidence the landlord knew or should have known of that issue. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings. View "Jared v. Harmon" on Justia Law

Several residents of a recreational vehicle park in Oregon brought a class action lawsuit against the park’s owners and managers, alleging that the park’s utility billing practices violated the Oregon Residential Landlord Tenant Act (ORLTA). Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that they were charged for electricity at rates higher than the actual cost and were improperly assessed meter reading fees. The plaintiffs sought to certify a class covering a ten-year period prior to the filing of the complaint, arguing that the statute of limitations should be tolled until tenants discovered or reasonably should have discovered the alleged violations.The Marion County Circuit Court agreed with the plaintiffs, holding that the one-year statute of limitations in ORS 12.125 incorporated a discovery rule. The court certified a class including tenants who paid the disputed charges during the ten years before the complaint was filed, provided they did not or should not have discovered the facts giving rise to their claims more than one year before filing. The court later granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs, found the defendants liable, and awarded substantial damages and attorney fees.On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s class certification and related rulings, holding that ORS 12.125 does not include a discovery rule and that the one-year limitations period is not tolled by a plaintiff’s lack of knowledge of the claim. The plaintiffs sought review of this issue.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The court held that ORS 12.125 does not incorporate a discovery rule; the one-year statute of limitations begins to run when the alleged violation or breach occurs, not when the plaintiff discovers it. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hathaway v. B & J Property Investments, Inc." on Justia Law

A group of farmers in Marion County, Oregon, formed an irrigation district to secure water for agricultural use by constructing a reservoir on Drift Creek. In 2013, the district applied to the Oregon Water Resources Department for a permit to store water by building a dam, which would inundate land owned by local farmers and impact an existing in-stream water right held in trust for fish habitat. The proposed project faced opposition from affected landowners and an environmental organization, who argued that the reservoir would harm both their property and the ecological purpose of the in-stream water right.The Oregon Water Resources Department initially recommended approval of the application, finding that the project would not injure existing water rights, as the prior appropriation system would ensure senior rights were satisfied first. After a contested case hearing, an administrative law judge also recommended approval. However, the Oregon Water Resources Commission, upon review of exceptions filed by the protestants, reversed the Department’s decision and denied the application. The Commission concluded that the proposed reservoir would frustrate the beneficial purpose of the in-stream water right—namely, supporting fish habitat—even if the required water quantity was maintained at the measurement point. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission’s order.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case. It held that the public interest protected by Oregon water law includes not only the quantity of water guaranteed to a senior right holder but also the beneficial use for which the right was granted. The Commission was correct to consider whether the proposed use would frustrate the beneficial purpose of the in-stream right. However, the Court further held that, after finding the presumption of public interest was overcome, the Commission was required to consider all statutory public interest factors before making its final determination. Because the Commission failed to do so, the Supreme Court reversed its order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "East Valley Water v. Water Resources Commission" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a tenant, brought a personal injury action against the defendants, his landlords, under the Oregon Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (ORLTA). The plaintiff sought damages for injuries sustained when a plastic cover of a light fixture fell from the ceiling of a shared, exterior hallway outside his apartment and struck him on the head. The plaintiff argued that the landlords were liable for his injuries due to their failure to maintain the premises in a habitable condition as required by ORS 90.320(1).The landlords moved for summary judgment, arguing that their habitability obligations under ORS 90.320(1) applied only to the interior of the tenant’s dwelling unit and not to common areas like the hallway. The trial court granted the landlords' motion for summary judgment, agreeing with their interpretation of the statute. The plaintiff appealed, and the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the landlords' habitability obligations did not extend to areas outside the tenant’s dwelling unit.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that a landlord’s habitability obligations under ORS 90.320(1) do extend to common areas of an apartment building that are adjacent to a tenant’s apartment and used by the tenant to access the apartment. The court concluded that conditions in these common areas can render a dwelling unit unhabitable. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. View "Jackson v. KA-3 Associates, LLC" on Justia Law

Grange Hill LLC sought approval from Yamhill County to operate a nine-guestroom bed and breakfast on its vineyard property, which is zoned for Exclusive Farm Use (EFU). The county approved the application, determining that the proposed bed and breakfast would operate as a "home occupation" within a "dwelling" that Grange Hill had yet to build. Friends of Yamhill County challenged this approval, arguing that the proposed structure did not meet the statutory requirements for a home occupation on EFU land, specifically that it must operate within a "dwelling" as defined by ORS 215.448(1).The Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA) affirmed the county's decision, reasoning that the proposed structure qualified as a "dwelling" because it met the design standards for a single-family residence and would be used as a residence for the innkeeper. LUBA dismissed Friends' argument that the structure needed to satisfy all requirements for a "primary dwelling in conjunction with farm use," including being the home of a farm operator.The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed LUBA's decision, concluding that the proposed structure was not a "dwelling" as a matter of law because it resembled a motel more than a home. The court emphasized that the entire structure must be a farm dwelling occupied by a group of people sharing a household on a long-term basis.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed in part and reversed in part the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the "dwelling" requirement in ORS 215.448 means a structure that satisfies the requirements for a category of dwelling allowed in the zone, specifically a "primary dwelling" on EFU land, which must be the home of a farm operator. The court concluded that LUBA erred in affirming the county's approval without ensuring the proposed structure met this requirement. The case was remanded to LUBA for further consideration. View "Friends of Yamhill v. Yamhill County" on Justia Law

A landlord sought to terminate a rental agreement with a tenant due to extensive property damage caused by the tenant's guinea pigs. The landlord issued a 30-day termination notice stating that no cure opportunity was available because the damage was too extensive to repair while the tenant remained on the premises. The tenant did not vacate, leading the landlord to initiate an eviction action.The trial court ruled in favor of the landlord, finding that the termination notice complied with ORS 90.392(3)(c) because the repairs were too costly and extensive for the tenant to complete within the minimum 14-day cure period. The tenant appealed, arguing that the notice was invalid because it did not inform him of his right to cure the violation.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that a landlord's termination notice need not state that a violation can be cured if the landlord determines that it is unreasonable to believe that any tenant could cure the violation within the prescribed time period.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that a termination notice under ORS 90.392 must state that a violation can be cured when, as a matter of law, the tenant has a right to cure the violation. The court concluded that a tenant has a right to cure all violations that can be the basis for termination under ORS 90.392, except for certain repeat violations described in ORS 90.392(5). Because the violation in this case was one that the tenant had a right to cure, the landlord's notice was invalid for failing to state that the violation could be cured. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "KKMH Properties, LLC v. Shire" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiffs, Weston and Carrie Twigg, hired Rainier Pacific Development LLC to build a home. After taking possession, they discovered various construction defects, including issues with the garage floor. Rainier Pacific agreed to make repairs, but failed to meet deadlines, leading to arbitration. The parties settled through a "Repair Agreement," but Rainier Pacific's subsequent repairs were also defective, prompting the Twiggs to reinitiate arbitration. The arbitrator found Rainier Pacific's work defective and awarded the Twiggs $150,000 for the garage floor repairs.The Multnomah County Circuit Court granted summary judgment to Admiral Insurance Company, Rainier Pacific's insurer, concluding that the damages did not arise from an "accident" as required by the commercial general liability (CGL) policy. The court relied on the precedent set by Oak Crest Construction Co. v. Austin Mutual Insurance Co., which held that damages solely from a breach of contract do not qualify as an "accident."The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that the damages arose solely from a breach of contract and not from an "accident" as defined by the CGL policy. The court emphasized that the Twiggs had not contended that Rainier Pacific's liability arose from a separate duty of care, i.e., a tort.The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and the trial court's decisions. The Supreme Court held that whether an insurance claim seeks recovery for an "accident" does not depend on the plaintiff's pleading decisions but on whether there is a factual basis for imposing tort liability. The court found that there were material factual disputes regarding whether Rainier Pacific's defective work constituted an "accident" under the CGL policy. Therefore, the case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Twigg v. Admiral Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The case involves a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by the Oregon State Building and Construction Trades Council (OBTC) against a preliminary injunction issued by the Marion County Circuit Court. The injunction was part of a public contracting dispute between the Oregon-Columbia Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America (AGC) and the Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT). AGC challenged the process used by ODOT to set the terms of "community benefit contracts" for certain highway improvement projects under ORS 279C.308.The Marion County Circuit Court issued a preliminary injunction preventing ODOT from using the terms of a Community Workforce Agreement (CWA) in any projects while AGC's challenge to the validity of the CWA under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) was pending before the Oregon Court of Appeals. AGC had filed three cases: one in the circuit court and two petitions for judicial review in the Court of Appeals. The circuit court case sought declaratory relief and an injunction against ODOT's use of the CWA. The Court of Appeals certified the case challenging the CWA's validity to the Oregon Supreme Court, which accepted the certification.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and decided the challenge to the validity of the CWA in a related case, Oregon-Columbia Chapter of AGC v. ODOT. As a result, the preliminary injunction issued by the circuit court expired, rendering OBTC's request for mandamus relief moot. Consequently, the Oregon Supreme Court dismissed the petition for a writ of mandamus. View "Oregon-Columbia Chapter Associated General Contractors of America v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Yamhill County filed an in rem civil forfeiture action against a property in Yamhill, Oregon, alleging it was used to facilitate prohibited conduct. Sheryl Lynn Sublet, who claimed an interest in the property, opposed the forfeiture, arguing it violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because she had already been prosecuted for the same conduct. The trial court rejected her argument, and a jury found in favor of the county, leading to a judgment forfeiting the property.The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, agreeing with Sublet that the forfeiture was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court held that civil forfeiture in Oregon is effectively a criminal penalty, thus implicating double jeopardy protections.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether civil forfeiture under Oregon law constitutes criminal punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court concluded that the civil forfeiture scheme under ORS chapter 131A is intended to be remedial and not punitive. The court emphasized that the forfeiture proceeds through an in rem action, targeting the property itself rather than the owner, and incorporates distinctly civil procedures. The court found no clear proof that the forfeiture's purpose and effect are punitive, thus it does not trigger double jeopardy protections.The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that civil forfeiture under current Oregon law does not constitute criminal punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. View "Yamhill County v. Real Property" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the Walton family and the Neskowin Regional Sanitary Authority over the installation of sewer lines on the Walton's property. The Waltons claimed that the installation constituted a "taking" under the Oregon Constitution and the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, for which they were entitled to "just compensation". The Sanitary Authority argued that the claim was time-barred under Oregon law, as it was not brought within the six-year limitations period.The trial court granted the Sanitary Authority's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the claim was indeed time-barred. The Waltons appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. The Waltons then petitioned for review by the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. The court held that the Waltons' claim was subject to the six-year limitations period established by Oregon law. The court further held that the claim accrued when the sewer lines were installed, which was no later than 1995, and therefore, the six-year limitations period expired in 2001, sixteen years before the Waltons filed their complaint. Consequently, the court concluded that the Waltons' claim was time-barred. View "Walton v. Neskowin Regional Sanitary Authority" on Justia Law