Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case, the plaintiffs, Weston and Carrie Twigg, hired Rainier Pacific Development LLC to build a home. After taking possession, they discovered various construction defects, including issues with the garage floor. Rainier Pacific agreed to make repairs, but failed to meet deadlines, leading to arbitration. The parties settled through a "Repair Agreement," but Rainier Pacific's subsequent repairs were also defective, prompting the Twiggs to reinitiate arbitration. The arbitrator found Rainier Pacific's work defective and awarded the Twiggs $150,000 for the garage floor repairs.The Multnomah County Circuit Court granted summary judgment to Admiral Insurance Company, Rainier Pacific's insurer, concluding that the damages did not arise from an "accident" as required by the commercial general liability (CGL) policy. The court relied on the precedent set by Oak Crest Construction Co. v. Austin Mutual Insurance Co., which held that damages solely from a breach of contract do not qualify as an "accident."The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that the damages arose solely from a breach of contract and not from an "accident" as defined by the CGL policy. The court emphasized that the Twiggs had not contended that Rainier Pacific's liability arose from a separate duty of care, i.e., a tort.The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and the trial court's decisions. The Supreme Court held that whether an insurance claim seeks recovery for an "accident" does not depend on the plaintiff's pleading decisions but on whether there is a factual basis for imposing tort liability. The court found that there were material factual disputes regarding whether Rainier Pacific's defective work constituted an "accident" under the CGL policy. Therefore, the case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Twigg v. Admiral Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The case involves a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by the Oregon State Building and Construction Trades Council (OBTC) against a preliminary injunction issued by the Marion County Circuit Court. The injunction was part of a public contracting dispute between the Oregon-Columbia Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America (AGC) and the Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT). AGC challenged the process used by ODOT to set the terms of "community benefit contracts" for certain highway improvement projects under ORS 279C.308.The Marion County Circuit Court issued a preliminary injunction preventing ODOT from using the terms of a Community Workforce Agreement (CWA) in any projects while AGC's challenge to the validity of the CWA under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) was pending before the Oregon Court of Appeals. AGC had filed three cases: one in the circuit court and two petitions for judicial review in the Court of Appeals. The circuit court case sought declaratory relief and an injunction against ODOT's use of the CWA. The Court of Appeals certified the case challenging the CWA's validity to the Oregon Supreme Court, which accepted the certification.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and decided the challenge to the validity of the CWA in a related case, Oregon-Columbia Chapter of AGC v. ODOT. As a result, the preliminary injunction issued by the circuit court expired, rendering OBTC's request for mandamus relief moot. Consequently, the Oregon Supreme Court dismissed the petition for a writ of mandamus. View "Oregon-Columbia Chapter Associated General Contractors of America v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Yamhill County filed an in rem civil forfeiture action against a property in Yamhill, Oregon, alleging it was used to facilitate prohibited conduct. Sheryl Lynn Sublet, who claimed an interest in the property, opposed the forfeiture, arguing it violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because she had already been prosecuted for the same conduct. The trial court rejected her argument, and a jury found in favor of the county, leading to a judgment forfeiting the property.The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, agreeing with Sublet that the forfeiture was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court held that civil forfeiture in Oregon is effectively a criminal penalty, thus implicating double jeopardy protections.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether civil forfeiture under Oregon law constitutes criminal punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court concluded that the civil forfeiture scheme under ORS chapter 131A is intended to be remedial and not punitive. The court emphasized that the forfeiture proceeds through an in rem action, targeting the property itself rather than the owner, and incorporates distinctly civil procedures. The court found no clear proof that the forfeiture's purpose and effect are punitive, thus it does not trigger double jeopardy protections.The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that civil forfeiture under current Oregon law does not constitute criminal punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. View "Yamhill County v. Real Property" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the Walton family and the Neskowin Regional Sanitary Authority over the installation of sewer lines on the Walton's property. The Waltons claimed that the installation constituted a "taking" under the Oregon Constitution and the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, for which they were entitled to "just compensation". The Sanitary Authority argued that the claim was time-barred under Oregon law, as it was not brought within the six-year limitations period.The trial court granted the Sanitary Authority's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the claim was indeed time-barred. The Waltons appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. The Waltons then petitioned for review by the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. The court held that the Waltons' claim was subject to the six-year limitations period established by Oregon law. The court further held that the claim accrued when the sewer lines were installed, which was no later than 1995, and therefore, the six-year limitations period expired in 2001, sixteen years before the Waltons filed their complaint. Consequently, the court concluded that the Waltons' claim was time-barred. View "Walton v. Neskowin Regional Sanitary Authority" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the approval of a site certificate for the construction of a wind energy facility in Umatilla County, Oregon. The Energy Facility Siting Council granted the certificate to Nolin Hills Wind, LLC, despite the proposed facility not complying with a local siting criterion requiring a two-mile setback between any turbine and a rural residence. Umatilla County sought judicial review of the council's decision, arguing that the council should have required Nolin Hills to comply with the two-mile setback rule.The case was reviewed by the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon. The court noted that the council had the authority to approve the proposed energy facility despite its failure to comply with the two-mile setback rule. The court also noted that the council had the authority to approve the proposed facility even if it did not pass through more than three land use zones and even if it did not comply with all of the county’s recommended substantive criteria.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon affirmed the council's decision, concluding that the council was authorized to issue a site certificate for the proposed wind facility notwithstanding the failure of the proposed facility to comply with the two-mile setback rule. The court found that the council was not required to reject a proposed facility simply because it did not comply with a local criterion. The court also rejected the county's argument that the council erred in concluding that the proposed facility "does otherwise comply with the applicable statewide planning goals." View "Umatilla County v. Dept. of Energy" on Justia Law

A plaintiff, Robert Trebelhorn, suffered a serious knee injury at his apartment complex when a section of an elevated walkway collapsed due to deterioration. The defendants, Prime Wimbledon SPE, LLC, and Prime Administration, LLC, who owned and managed the apartment complex, were aware of the deteriorated condition of the walkway but chose not to repair it. Trebelhorn sued the defendants for negligence and violation of Oregon's Residential Landlord-Tenant Act and won. The jury awarded him just under $300,000 in damages and also imposed punitive damages of $10 million against each defendant. On post-verdict review, the trial court concluded that although the evidence supported some amount of punitive damages, the amount of $10 million would violate the defendants' due process rights. The trial court reduced the punitive damages to just under $2.7 million against each defendant. On cross-appeals, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court and affirmed. The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon also agreed with the trial court that $10 million in punitive damages would violate the defendants' due process rights and affirmed the judgment of the trial court and the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Trebelhorn v. Prime Wimbledon SPE, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Gregg Lawrence sued defendant Oregon State Fair Council for negligence, alleging that defendant had failed “to supervise and maintain its premises in a reasonably safe manner” so that guests walking on the property would not be injured. Plaintiff alleged that, as a result, the aluminum bleachers at a show that he attended with his wife and mother were wet and unsafe, causing him to fall and incur injuries. The trial court granted defendant’s pretrial motion to exclude certain evidence. During trial, at plaintiff’s request, the trial court reconsidered its ruling, but adhered to its decision to exclude the evidence. After a verdict for defendant, plaintiff appealed, arguing the trial court erred in its evidentiary ruling. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that plaintiff had not done enough to preserve the issue of the admissibility of the challenged evidence. To this the Oregon Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals for a determination of that issue on its merits. View "Lawrence v. Oregon State Fair Council" on Justia Law

At Tax Court, the parties disagreed about what types of equipment fall within the definition of "logging equipment" exempt from ad valorem property taxation under ORS 307.27. Specifically, they disagreed about what types of equipment used for logging road work - logging road construction, maintenance, reconstruction, improvement, closure, or obliteration - fell within the definition. Plaintiff Bert Brundige, LLC argued that all types of equipment used for logging road work fell within the definition. Defendant, the Oregon Department of Revenue, argued that excavators were the only type of equipment used for logging road work that fell within the definition. The Tax Court agreed with defendant and entered a judgment in its favor. Plaintiff appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed. View "Bert Brundige, LLC v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company (bank) held a deed of trust to the a condominium unit, while defendant Tanglewood Hills Condominium Association (Tanglewood) had a lien for condominium assessments that had not been paid by the owner. Although the bank’s lien would ordinarily take priority, Tanglewood contended that its lien gained priority under ORS 100.450(7), because the bank “ha[d] not initiated” a foreclosure action during a 90-day notice period prescribed by that statute. The trial court rejected Tanglewood’s argument and granted summary judgment for the bank. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Oregon Supreme Court agreed with Tanglewood that a condominium association’s notice under ORS 100.450(7)(a) triggered an obligation on a first lienholder to act within 90 days, or the condominium association’s lien will take priority. In this case, the bank did not act before the 90 days expired. Nor could the bank rely on its previously filed foreclosure action, as that action had been dismissed by general judgment prior to the notice, and it remained dismissed throughout the entire 90-day period. Once the 90 days elapsed without the case being reopened or a new foreclosure action being filed, Tanglewood was granted priority over the bank’s interest by operation of ORS 100.450(7). The decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed. The judgment of the circuit court was reversed, and the case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co. v. Sulejmanagic" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Albany & Eastern Railroad Company (AERC) petitioned the Oregon Supreme Court for reconsideration of its decision in Albany & Eastern Railroad Co. v. Martell, 469 P3d 748 (2020). In the previous case, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of defendants, holding that the trial court correctly concluded that defendants established a prescriptive easement over plaintiff AERC’s land. By that decision, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. In its petition for reconsideration, plaintiff did not challenge the resolution of the prescriptive easement issue. Instead, plaintiff argued the Supreme Court erred in affirming the judgment of the trial court, rather than remanding the case to the Court of Appeals to consider a separate issue: the trial court’s award of attorney fees to defendants under ORS 20.080(2). Plaintiff had argued to the Court of Appeals that, even if defendants successfully asserted a prescriptive easement counterclaim, the trial court had no authority to award attorney fees to defendants. According to plaintiff, a prescriptive easement was an equitable remedy that fell outside of ORS 20.080. Defendants filed a response, arguing that the trial court was correct in its award of attorney fees. They also filed petitions for attorney fees and costs and disbursements. Plaintiff objected to the request for attorney fees, arguing that the issue of defendants’ entitlement to fees had not yet been resolved and, alternatively, that defendants’ claimed fees were unreasonable. The Supreme Court agreed with plaintiff that the matter of attorney fees should have been remanded to the Court of Appeals following its disposition on the merits. Accordingly, plaintiff’s petition for reconsideration was granted, and the disposition in the earlier case modified. Defendants' petition for fees was denied. View "Albany & Eastern Railroad Co. v. Martell" on Justia Law